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EDITOR'S NOTE
The summer of 2002 will surely be remembered by all in the
water law community. At the time the Water Law Review went to press,
the snow pack in the mountains was less than half of average and
several communities already had water restrictions in place. In light of
the less than adequate water supply facing the West this year, it seems
fitting that the majority of Volume 5, Issue 2 focuses on alternatives to
our current system of water management and allocation.
Water is a fluid resource, essentially incapable of being
governed in accordance with political boundaries. Paul Drucker's
article demonstrates problems that may arise when water bodies are
governed not only by states, but also by Indian tribes. It is hard
enough to get a few states to agree to water allocations, adding several
hundred Indian tribes to the mix only magnifies the issues. Alf Brandt
then describes one of the programs California is looking to in order to
better balance the tension between consumptive use and instream
flows. Although the program is still in its infancy, the CALFED
Environmental Water Account provides one option to easing this
tension. Kara Gillon's article proceeds to discuss how watershed
management is working in the Southwest. Watershed management is
an entirely different way of managing water resources. The technique
focuses on ecological and geographical boundaries rather than
political boundaries. Ms. Gillon's article also discusses binational
water management, as many watersheds cross not only state and tribal
boundaries, but also national boundaries.
The shortage of water we are facing this summer will also affect
recreation and conservation uses. Lori Potter, Kathy Kanda and
Steven Marlin address the "right to float" in their article, Legal
Underpinnings of the Right to Float Through Private Property in
Colorado: A Reply to John Hill. In addition, Peter Nichols discusses
the implications of conservation easements on water, and whether it is
likely the Colorado Supreme Court will recognize such easements.
Both recreation and conservation significantly affect the allocation of
water and will play a large role in the coming summer's water issues.
Finally, Jeffrey Clayton urges us to rewrite water law, looking to
economic factors to guide us. Mr. Clayton's commentary provides a
different perspective, encouraging readers to open their minds to new
ideas and concepts.
Ultimately, no matter where you are this summer, the shortage
of water will play a large role. So whether you are a water lawyer, a
water engineer, an academician, or someone for whom water is a
fascinating subject; whether you are sitting in an office, or out in the
wilderness hiking the Colorado Trail, take a moment to do as Mr.
Clayton suggests, and "'dream' of what 'could be'." Take a moment to
entertain those far-fetched thoughts that you rarely let out of the back
of your mind, and see where they lead....
Rebekah King
Editor-in-Chief
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EDWARD E. "EDDIE" PRINGLE

CHIEF JUSTICE, PROFESSOR EMERITUS,
RESPECTED FRIEND
Dedication to Edward E. "Eddie" Pringle
1914-2002
KIOWA K_ ENGWIS'
The Water Law Review humbly dedicates its Spring 2002 issue to
the extraordinary life of the late Edward E. "Eddie" Pringle; Colorado
Supreme Court Chief Justice, Professor, friend and loved one. Known
for his good nature and clarity in analysis and writing, Edward Pringle
made a number of enduring contributions to the Colorado judicial
system, Colorado water law, and legal scholarship.
Edward Pringle spent all but the first four years of his life in
Colorado, graduating from North High School at sixteen and the
University of Colorado School of Law at twenty-two. Over his eightyseven years he contributed to our nation's efforts in World War II,
overhauled the Colorado judicial system, made himself available to
answer-in plain English-questions about rulings during his
eighteen-year tenure on the Colorado Supreme Court, and shared his
love for the law and lucid writing within the walls of the University of
Denver College of Law.
In 1958 former governor Steve McNichols appointed Edward
Pringle as a Denver District Court Judge, and three years later as a
Supreme CourtJustice. Between 1961 and 1979, Edward Pringle spent
nine years as Chief Justice, a position that he used to broker an era of
unprecedented judicial reform. Chief Justice Pringle is credited with
re-establishing the Colorado Court of Appeals, and implementing the
code of judicial conduct, the judicial disciplinary committee and
planning council, continuing legal and judicial education programs,
and judicial selection reforms. At all times Justice Pringle insisted on
increasing transparency between the judicial system and the public.
Justice Pringle was also a key figure in shaping Colorado water
law, formulating two vital statutes during his tenure-the 1965
Colorado Ground Water Determination Act and the 1969 Colorado
Water Rights Determination Act. Most of the water rights-related cases
brought before the Pringle court pertained to the interpretation of the
1965 and 1969 Acts, with an emphasis on the tenuous relationship
In 1970, in
between vested rights and maximum utilization.
Fundingslandv. Colorado Ground Water Commission, Chief Justice Pringle
considered the long-term impacts on groundwater withdrawal from
designated groundwater basins and decided in favor of a "modified"
prior appropriations system. Fundingsland ushered in an era of
Kiowa K. Engwis became a staff member on the University of Denver Water Law
Review in the fall of 2001. After demonstrating extraordinary commitment and
exceptionally high quality work Kiowa was promoted to the Editorial Board as an

Articles Editor after serving as a staff member for only one semester. Kiowa has been
elected to serve as the Managing Editor for the 2002-03 school year. The tribute is one
of the most important sections of the Water Law Review, thank you Kiowa, for taking
the time and effort to write a great one.

"controlled depletion" of groundwater by establishing threshold
depletion standards. The 1969 Act is considered closely in Kuiper v.
Well Owners where the Supreme Court upheld the authority of the
1969 regulations. Well Owners, issued two years after the 1969 Act,
authorized the phase-out ofjunior wells unless a plan of augmentation
was submitted showing no affect on senior surface appropriators.
Fundingsland and Well Owners, through Justice Pringle, worked to
recognize the validity of both the 1965 and 1969 Acts.
After retiring from the Supreme Court in 1979, Edward Pringle
sought a different form of leadership at the University of Denver
College of Law. He shared his enthusiasm for legal training as the
director for the University's new legal research and writing program.
That program served as a model for establishing research and writing
programs for first-year students at law schools nationwide. Professor
Pringle continued to serve the University after retirement as Professor
Emeritus-keeping his door open for legal and philosophical debates
with both faculty and students.
Edward Pringle is remembered fondly in the press as "a jurist
who could evolve and change with the times while fighting fiercely to
ensure that public passion or prejudice would not compromise the
rights of individual defendants," and as a man of gentle humor and a
cheerful outlook. Perhaps the most enduring memory of Edward
Pringle is the stained glass hanging in the Colorado Supreme Court
Building, where his likeness stands above the words "honesty and
integrity."
This tribute could never fully capture the accomplishments of
a man who was summarized as "one of the nicest, most interesting
persons to ever trod the streets of Denver. Deeply devoted to the law,
his family, his friends, his state and nation, there is nothing ordinary
about this man."
This issue of the Water Law Review is for you, Edward E. "Eddie"
Pringle, for being extraordinary.
Edward Pringle's life inspired many people. If you would like to
contribute to his memory, donations can be made to the Edward Pringle
Scholarship Fund at the University of Denver College of Law or to the Allied
Jewish Federation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"In this case, we confront one of the more complex kinds of
overlapping sovereignty that exists in the United States today: that
between the States and Indian tribes."'

With this statement, Judge Diane Wood, writing for a unanimous
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
began an opinion in a case marking a turning point in water pollution
regulation under the Clean Water Act. In Wisconsin v. EPA, the court
rejected the State of Wisconsin's challenge to the EPA's grant of

1. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2001).
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"Treatment as a State" status to the Sokaogon Chippewa Community
Indian Tribe for purposes of setting water quality standards under the
Clean Water Act. In doing so, the court confirmed what many in the
environmental field have suspected or suggested: Indian tribes with
"Treatment as a State" status are co-equal sovereign regulatory bodies
of the same class as individual states under the Clean Water Act. In
addition, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a state to
challenge a tribe's "Treatment as a State" designation.
This article reviews the Seventh Circuit's seemingly simplistic
decision over the complex issues in Wisconsin v. EPA with an eye
toward its repercussions for nationwide water pollution regulation. To
appreciate the implications of this decision, one must understand the
basic framework of the Clean Water Act, including the important role
of cooperative federalism in achieving the Act's goals. Accordingly,
Part I of this article reviews the fundamental components of the Clean
Water Act. Part II discusses the extension of the Clean Water Act's
cooperative federalism to Indian tribes, enabling qualified tribes to
exercise many of the same regulatory powers as states for waters within
reservation boundaries.
This discussion includes an important
examination of how a tribe qualifies for "Treatment as a State" status
and notions of "inherent authority." Part III reviews the facts in
Wisconsin v. EPA and maps the court of appeals' opinion. Part IV
assesses this case's implications, specifically focusing on the potentially
significant increase in tribal assertion of authority under the Clean
Water Act and the tremendous difficulty that states face in challenging
a tribe's "Treatment as a State" designation.
Part V considers
watershed management as an alternative approach that may be better
suited for comprehensive and cooperative water pollution regulation.
The author argues four main points: (1) the Seventh Circuit's decision
in Wisconsin v. EPA was correct as a matter of law; (2) more tribes will
be seeking "Treatment as a State" status to administer water quality
standards; (3) the court's opinion in Wisconsin v. EPA has eliminated
most of the viable challenges a state may make in opposition to the
grant of "Treatment as a State" status to a tribe; and (4) a potential
influx of additional water pollution regulatory authorities is of
questionable value to the Clean Water Act's operation which may be
better served by basing regulation on hydrological boundaries rather
than political borders.
H. THE CLEAN WATER ACT
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 was the federal
government's first, albeit modest, attempt to statutorily regulate water
pollution in the twentieth century. The Act was revised numerous
times between its enactment and 1971.' As a whole, however, this
2. Id.
3. STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 222 (2d ed.
2001).
4. EPA v. California ex ret State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202 n.2
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initial attempt to control water pollution was flawed, deficient, and
ineffective in many ways.5 The situation came to a head in 1971 when
the Senate Public Works Committee concluded, "the national effort to
abate and control water pollution has been inadequate in every vital
aspect.
In response to this finding, Congress enacted the Federal
Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972.'
In 1977, after
additional amendments were enacted, the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act became known as the Clean Water Act ("CWA" or "Act").9
The Supreme Court described the CWA as "an all encompassing
program of water pollution regulation... [whose] 'major purpose...'
was to 'establish a comprehensive long range policy for the elimination
of water pollution'."" The statute itself proclaims that its overarching
and lofty objective is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."" To reach this
objective, the CWA sets forth specific attainment goals including: (1)
eliminating pollutant discharge into navigable waters; (2) achieving an

(1976).
5. See id. at 202-03. The United States Supreme Court explained the specific
problems with the statute before 1972:
[T]he Federal Water Pollution Control Act employed ambient water quality
standards specifying the acceptable levels of pollution in a State's interstate
navigable waters as the primary mechanism in its program for the control of
water pollution. This program based on water quality standards, which were
to serve both to guide performance by polluters and to trigger legal action to
abate pollution, proved ineffective. The problems stemmed from the
character of the standards themselves, which focused on the tolerable effects
rather than the preventable causes of water pollution, from the awkwardly
shared federal and state responsibility for promulgating such standards, and
from the cumbrous enforcement procedures. These combined to make it
very difficult to develop and enforce standards to govern the conduct of
individual polluters.
Id. Professor Ferrey further described the statute's ineffectiveness:
Prior to 1972, enforcement of water pollution violations was difficult because
enforcement depended on a discharger's ability to reduce the ambient water
3uality of the receiving waters below a specific level....
Given multiple
ischarges to many water bodies, the agency's burden in proving which
discharger was the sole cause of pollution was nearly impossible.
FERREY, supra note 3, at 222-23. See also Piney Run Pres. Ass'n v. County Comm'rs, 268
F.3d 255, 264 (4th Cir. 2001) ("This water quality standard scheme.., was plagued by
many problems. Significantly, it was often difficult to formulate precise water quality
standards and even more difficult to prove that a particular operator's discharge
reduced water quality below these standards.").
6. Victor B. Flatt, A Dirty River Runs Through It (The Failureof Enforcement in the
Clean Water Act), 25 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 7 (1997) (quoting S. REp. No. 92-414
(1972), reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3674).
7. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 204.
8. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816 (1972). After a "long and contentious" debate, the amendments were
enacted over a presidential veto on October 18, 1972. William A. Anderson, II & Eric
P. Gotting, Taken in Over Intake Structures? Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act, 26
CoLuM.J. ENvrL. L. 1, 9 n.49 (2001).
9. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977); Flatt, supra
note 6, at 6 n.31.
10. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 318 (1981).
11. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
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interim water quality goal wherever attainable, which provides for fish,
shellfish, and wildlife protection and propagation and recreation in
and on the water (often referred to as the "fishable & swimmable"
goal) ;12 and (3) prohibiting toxic pollutant discharge in toxic
amounts.'" From these admirable ambitions, one can discern that the
ultimate aim of the CWA is the tall order of eliminating pollutant
discharges into United States waterways.14
A. MEETING THE CWA'S GOALS: EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS AND WATER
QUALITY STANDARDS

In order to work toward the CWA's objectives, there must be a way
to gauge the "quality" of the Nation's waters and the pollutants that
enter them. Without this ability, realistic regulatory enforcement has
proved unworkable.' 5
Therefore, the CWA's new regulatory
framework included a new set of "measuring tools." The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit explained the role and function of these
new tools as follows:
The Clean Water Act provides two measures of water quality. One
measure is an "effluent limitations guideline." Effluent limitations
gidelines are uniform, technology-based standards promulgated by
te EPA, which restrict the quantities, rates and concentrations of
specified substances discharged from point sources.
The other
measure of water quality is a "water quality standard." Unlike the
technology-based effluent limitations guidelines, water quality
standards are not based on pollution control technologies, but
express the desired condition or use of a particular waterway. Water
quality standards supplement technology-based effluent limitations
guidelines "so that numerous point sources, despite individual
compliance with effluent limitations, may be further regulated to
levels."'
prevent water quality from falling below acceptable
Thus, the CWA is generally concerned with regulating levels of

pollutants dischargedfrom point sources'7 (i.e., effluent limitations) and
12. Robert W. Adler, IntegratedApproaches to Water Pollution:Lessons from the Clean Air
Act, 23 HARv. ENVrL. L. REv. 203, 209 n.35 (1999).
13. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)-(3). The CWA's introduction sets forth a total of seven
national "goals" and "policies." Two "goals" set specific attainment target dates. Total
elimination of pollutant discharge into the navigable waters was targeted to be
accomplished by 1985. The attainment date for the establishment of water quality
providing for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and
providing for recreation in and on the water was July 1, 1983. Neither of these
deadlines were met. FERREY, supra note 3, at 224.
14. Flatt, supra note 6, at 8.
15. See supra text accompanying note 5.
16. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 419 n.4 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal
citations omitted).
17. "Point sources" are defined as "any discernable, confined and discrete
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit,
well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation,
or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14). A "nonpoint source" includes "everything that is not a 'point
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establishing pollution limits for navigable water bodies that receive
pollutant discharges (i.e., water quality standards). These two gauges
form the basis for virtually all water pollution control under the CWA.
1. Effluent Limitations and the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System
The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES")
is the heart of the CWA's enforcement regime.
The NPDES
mechanism "provides for the issuance of discharge permits ("NPDES
permits") that allow the holder to discharge pollutants at levels below
thresholds incorporated in the permit."' The permit system is the
means of achieving and enforcing the technology-based effluent
limitations by specifically identifying to the polluter what may be
legally expelled from an end-pipe into a waterbody. ° The EPA
promulgates effluent limitation guidelines using the latest scientific
knowledge" and after carefully considering various statutorily
prescribed factors. 2 By following the terms of their NPDES discharge
permits, permit holders can avoid liability under the CWA. 5
At first blush, the idea that the CWA grants "licenses to pollute"
seems squarely at odds with the Act's goal of eliminating pollutant
discharge into navigable waters.24 Yet, the CWA is a careful mix of
absolutist language and carved-out exceptions. Section 301, known as
the "centerpiece of the CWA,"" demonstrates this, stating "[e]xcept as
in compliance with this section and [other sections of the Act], the
discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful."26 Thus,
source' or not associated with a discrete point of discharge." FERREY, supra note 3, at
217. Examples include discharges attributable to farming, construction, mining, and
urban runoff. Id. There tends to be disparate regulatory treatment of point sources
and nonpoint sources. "Consignment to the point source category brings attentive
regulation ....
Relegation to the nonpoint source group beings loose oversight."
Flatt, supra note 6, at 8 n.53 (citing WILuAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENviRONMrNTAL LAW §
4.5 at 303 (2d ed. 1994)). One reason for this may be that it is physically easier to
monitor discrete discharges from, for instance, pipes of a factory than it is to measure
runoff of polluted water into a waterbody. Another reason may be that nonpoint
source pollution generally emanates from land use; therefore, to mitigate such
pollution, land use activities must be controlled-often leading to an array of different
problems. FERRY, supra note 3, at 217, 452-456.
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
19. Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481, 486 (2d Cir. 2001).
20. EPA v. California ex reL State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 204-05
(1976).
21. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1).
22. When considering effluent limitation guidelines, the EPA must make three
essential determinations: "(1) whether the pollutant results from a non-point source
or a point source; (2) whether the pollutant is classified as conventional, nonconventional, or toxic; and (3) whether the discharger is a new or existing source of
pollution." Flatt, supra note 6, at 8.
23. Piney Run Pres. Ass'n v. County Comm'rs, 268 F.3d 255, 265 (4th Cir. 2001).
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1); see also supratext accompanying note 13.
25. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 151
(4th Cir. 2000).
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
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the CWA creates a scheme of strict liability for any pollutant discharge
unless the discharge fits into one of the CWA's limited exceptions.27
In reality, the only "exception" by which a pollutant discharger can
escape the strict liability of the CWA is by compliance with a valid
NPDES permit.28 Resultantly, the CWA regulatory regime does not
create an outright discharge ban, but instead establishes a
sophisticated discharge allowance system for polluters. 29 The ultimate
goal, however, has not been forsaken. The NPDES permit mechanism
contemplates a gradual progression of point source discharge
reduction using technology-based standards.0
The premise is that,
"[a]lthough Congress intended the CWA to lead to the long-term
elimination of pollutants in the nation's waterways, Congress
recognized the technological infeasibility of prohibiting all pollutants
in the short term."' Therefore, rather than unrealistically forcing an
immediate about-face by industry and other polluters, the CWA uses
NPDES permits to "progress toward the national goal of eliminating
the discharge of all pollutants."2 As pollution control technology
improves and ostensibly becomes more economical, such technology
will be incorporated into the tolerated pollutant limits in NPDES
permits. 2 Thus, rather than contravening the fundamental purpose of
the CWA, the "permits to pollute" are the monitoring tools used to
achieve it.3 4 "The availability of such permits simply recognizes 'that

27. Piney Run Pres. Ass'n, 268 F.3d at 265.
28. Id. (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1374 (D.C.
Cir. 1977)) ("The legislative history makes clear that Congress intended the NPDES
permit to be the only means by which a discharger from a point source may escape the
total prohibition of [§] 301(a).").
29. Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481, 486 (2d Cir. 2001).
There are two basic types of NPDES permits: (1) individual and (2) general. An
individual permit is specifically tailored to an individual facility using the detailed
information contained in the permit application. A general permit covers multiple
facilities within one category. It is a generally applicable permit, which covers
categories of point sources having common attributes. General permits may only be
issued to dischargers with similar characteristics located within a specific geographical
region. The idea behind the general permits is to promote efficiency by covering
similar dischargers under one preset permit rather that expending resources to issue
individual permits. EPA Office of Water, Office of Wastewater Management, National
Pollutant
Discharge
Elimination
System
Permit
Program,
at
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/index.cfm?program-id=0 (last visited Nov. 18, 2001).
30. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314.
31. Piney Run Pres. Ass'n, 268 F.3d at 265.
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (2)(A).
33. See id.§§ 1314(b) (1)(B), 1316(b) (1)(B).
34. Flatt, supra note 6.
The permits specify the control technology applicable to each pollutant, the
effluent limitations a discharger must meet, and the deadline for compliance.
Each pollutant then must be monitored, and the results submitted to EPA or
to another governing entity in periodic discharge monitoring reports
(DMRs). Permits under NPDES may be granted for no more than five years,
but are renewable thereafter.
Id.at 12 (internal citations omitted). See generally Amy E. Fortenberry, Moving
Violations: Violations of the Clean Water Act and Implicationsfor CERCLA 's
Federally Permitted
Release Exception, 24 B.C. ENVrL. A. L. REv. 821 (1997).
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pollution continues because of technological limits, not because of any
inherent rights to use the nation's waterways for the purpose of
disposing of wastes'.""
Clearly, the NPDES permitting structure
constituted a major shift in mindset and procedure for both regulators
and dischargers.
In addition, the CWA allows the federal government to delegate to
state governments the authority to administer the NPDES program for
point sources located within a state." The EPA must approve any such
state program, 7 and once it does, the state is considered a "primacy
state" for CWA purposes." In the absence of an approved state
program, the EPA administers the NPDES permit program. 9 Even in
primacy states, the EPA retains power to both block issuance of any
NPDES permit to which it objects," and take enforcement action.
Importantly though, a primacy state may adopt discharge permit
conditions more stringent than those federally required." Thus, the
CWA sets up a system of "cooperative federalism,"" whereby the
federal government offers the states the opportunity to regulate
discharge limits so long as the state standards meet or exceed the
federal standards."
2. Water Quality Standards
In the simplest of terms, "[a] water quality standard defines the
water quality goals of a water body, or portion thereof, by designating
the use or uses to be made of the water 5 and by setting criteria
necessary to protect the uses."" When considering water quality
standards, the frame of reference is not what is being dischargedfrom
an end-pipe, but rather the water body into which such a pipe expels
pollutants.
Thus, water quality standards and technology-based
effluent limitations are, at least initially, distinct measuring tools.
35. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 151
(4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1375
(D.C. Cir. 1977)).
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). See, e.g., Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273
F.3d 481, 486 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing NPDES program administered by New York
State Department of Environmental Conservation which calls its program the State
Pollution Discharge Elimination System).
37. The requirements that a state must meet for EPA approval are set forth at 33
U.S.C. § 1342(b).
38. S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Office of Surface Mining, 20 F.3d 1418, 1427 (6th Cir.
1994).
39. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1994); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 103 (1992).
40. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2); Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 489 (1987).
41. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(i).
42. Id. § 1370; S. Ohio Coal Co., 20 F.3d at 1427-28.
43. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992); S. Ohio Coal Co., 20 F.3d at
1427 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1370.
45. For a concise explanation of the "use designation" process seeJanet K. Baker,
Tribal Water Quality Standards:Are There Any Limits?, 7 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 367,
372-73 (1997); see also 40 C.F.R. § 131.10 (2001).
46. 40 C.F.R. § 131.2.
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"Whereas technology-based and process-based controls are concerned
with the reduction of pollution at the source, the water quality
standards focus on the receiving waters and their designated uses.
These standards create a baseline for the level of a particular pollutant
that a body of water may tolerate."47 However, as will be more fully
explained below, in the end, water quality standards and effluent
limitations do not act in isolation but instead work together to form an
integrated water pollution control system. 8
While the EPA generally promulgates effluent limitations, the
states have the primary role in promulgating water quality standards.)
The EPA, however, provides states with substantial guidance in
developing water quality standards. The EPA develops criteria for
water quality reflecting the latest scientific knowledge and provides
such information to the states as guidance." States can utilize the
EPA's recommended water quality criteria or use other criteria for
which they have sound scientific support. 2 While the states very often
rely on the EPA's recommended criteria," they are also specifically
authorized to develop standards more stringent than those
recommended by the EPA. The CWA requires that states review their
water quality standards at least once every three years in a process
commonly known as "triennial review" to ensure that the standards
protect the public health or welfare, enhance the quality of water, and
serve the purposes of the CWA.55 A state must provide notice and hold
47. Flatt, supra note 6, at 11 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). The
EPA's Office of Water explains the fundamentals of water quality standards as follows:
Water quality standards include designated uses for a water body (e.g., public
water supply, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreation); water quality
criteria necessary to support the designated uses; and a policy for preventing
degradation of the quality of water bodies. Water quality criteria include
numeric criteria for specific parameters (e.g., copper, chlorine, temperature,
pH); toxicity criteria to protect against the aggregate effects of toxic
pollutants; and narrative criteria that describe the desired condition of the
water body (e.g., free from visible oil sheen).
EPA Office of Water, Office of Wastewater Management, Overview of the Water Quality
http://cfpub.epa.
at
Process,
Standards-to-Permits
gov/npdes/wqbasedpermitting/wqoverview.cfm?program id=2 (last modified Feb. 28,
2001).
48. See generally EPA Office of Water, Office of Wastewater Management, Overview of
at
Process,
Standards-to-Permits
Quality
Water
the
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/wqbasedpermitting/wqoverview.cfm?program-id=2 (last
modified Feb. 28, 2001).
49. See33 U.S.C §§ 1311, 1314.
50. Id. § 1313(a)-(c); Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir.
1993); 40 C.F.R. § 131.4.
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a); City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 419 n.5
(10th Cir. 1996).
52. Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d at 419 n.5.
53. 33 U.S.C. § 1314; Am. PaperInst., Inc., 996 F.2d at 349.
54. 40 C.F.R. § 131.4(a).
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1); Am. PaperInst., Inc., 996 F.2d at 349. "Additionally, the
CWA directs states to consider a variety of competing policy concerns during these
reviews, including a waterway's 'use and value for public water supplies, propagation of
fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and other

WATER LAWREVIEW

Volume 5

a public hearing before any water quality standard is adopted or
revised.
The proposed water quality standards and supporting
analyses must be available to the public prior to the hearing to allow
for informed participation."
The EPA has the final word on a state's water quality standards.
After a state has followed the required procedures and revised or
adopted a new water quality standard, the state must submit said
standard to the EPA for review and approval along with the various
analyses the state employed in developing the standard." The CWA
requires the EPA to ensure that a state's standard is consistent with the
provisions of the Act. 9 Specifically, the EPA ensures that the state has
adopted criteria that protect the designated water uses, that the state
has followed its own legal procedure for revising or adopting
standards, and that the state's standards are based on appropriate data
and scientific analysis.6 If the EPA feels that a state's standard does
not pass muster under the CWA, it will notify the state and specify the
changes necessary for EPA approval' If the state does not adopt the
EPA's revisions within ninety days after notification, the EPA will itself
impose the standards on the state. 6 The EPA may also impose revised
or new water quality standards on a state "in any case" where the EPA
determines that the standard is necessary to meet the requirements of
the CWA.63 This illustrates that, notwithstanding the CWA's "shift in64
focus of environmental regulation towards the discharge of pollutants,
water quality standards still have an important role in the CWA
regulatory scheme." 5 Indeed, as will be seen, state water quality
standards are often at the heart of the extraterritorial conflicts
concerning water pollution control.
B. The Convergence of Water Quality Standards, Effluent Limitations,
and NPDES Permits
Water quality standards, technology-based effluent limitations, and
NPDES permits all work together in an integrated system to
accomplish the CWA's pollution reduction objectives. The NPDES
permit program is the "point of contact"6 between technology-based
effluent limitations and water quality standards. The simple reason is
purposes'." Id. at 349 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2) (A)).
56. 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.10(e), 131.20(b).
57. Id. § 131.20(b).
58. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2) (A); 40 C.F.R. 131.20(c).
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (3); 40 C.F.R. § 131.5(a)(1).
60. 40 C.F.R. § 131.5(a)(2)-(4).

61. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (3); 40 C.F.R. § 131.5(b).
62. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3)-(4).
63. Id. § 1313(c) (4) (B).
64. See supra text accompanying note 5.
65. Piney Run Pres. Ass'n v. County Comm'rs, 268 F.3d 255, 265 (4th Cir. 2001)
(emphasis added).
66. John S. Harbison, The Downstream People: TreatingIndian Tribes as States Under the
Clean Water Act, 71 N.D. L. REv. 473, 477 (1995).
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that state water quality standards determine, in part, the allowable
effluent discharge for an NPDES permit. While case law and
commentary can agree on this point, they often seem to travel
confusingly divergent statutory paths to reach the same conclusion.
Although frustrating, such dissimilar explanations of the incorporation
of water quality standards in the NPDES permit procedure is
understandable. "The 1972 Act removed the requirement for a single
implementation plan from the definition of [water quality standards]
and replaced it with a series of somewhat confusing, overlapping
planning and implementation requirements spread throughout
various sections and subsections of the Act."6 7 With these hazards in
mind this article will try to take the least circuitous route in explaining
water quality standards under the NPDES permit program.
The starting point is section 302(a) of the CWA, which explains
that where the application of federal effluent limitations would
interfere with the attainment or maintenance of water quality
standards in a water body, the effluent limitations for contributing
point sources must be adjusted to promote the achievement of the
water quality standards. 6 Next, section 303(d) of the Act requires
individual states to adopt water quality standards, identify waters where
technology-based effluent limitations will be insufficient to meet water
quality standards, and limit pollutant discharge into those waters thus
preventing contravention of water quality standards. 69 Finally, section
301, which has been described as the "centerpiece of the Clean Water
Act," 70 requires that effluent limitations shall be achieved' as well as

"any more stringent limitation, including those necessary to meet
water quality standards... established pursuant to any State law.... "
Thus, section 301 "expressly identifies the achievement of state water
quality standards as one of the Act's central objectives. 01
Next, and perhaps most importantly, is the language of section 402
of the Act.74 This section governs the NPDES permit system,
irrespective of whether the EPA or a state is administering it. Section
402 allows issuance of NPDES discharge permits only upon the express
condition that the discharge meets the requirements of sections 301
and 302.7' As explained above, those sections require adherence to
67. Adler, supra note 12, at 215.

68. 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1994).
69. Id. § 1313(d); see also, FERREY, supra note 3, at 221.
70. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 151
(4th Cir. 2000).
71. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1) (A) (emphasis added).

72. Id. § 1311(b)(1)(C).
73. Id. § 1311(b)(1)(C); Arkansas v.Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 106 (1992) (emphasis
added).

74. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
75. Id. §1342 (a)(1). Section 402 also allows issuance of a permit prior to the
taking of necessary implementing actions relating to all such requirements (i.e., those
under §§ 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, and 1343) if other conditions established by

the EPA in furtherance of the NPDES process are met. Id. "This provision gives EPA
considerable flexibility in framing the permit to achieve a desired reduction in
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state water quality standards. This shows how section 402 is the "point
of contact" between effluent limitations and water quality standards.
In addition, EPA regulations pointedly state that a discharge permit
may not be issued "[w] hen the imposition of conditions cannot ensure
compliance with the applicable water quality requirements of all
affected States." 6 At the end of this statutory maze, the ultimate result
is that NPDES permits must comply with sections 301 and 302 of the
CWA as well as with the EPA's regulations. Because these statutes and
regulations mandate adherence to state water quality standards,
NPDES effluent limitations are inextricably linked to state water
quality criteria."
The upshot of all this is that a discharge permit transforms
"'generally applicable effluent limitations and other standardsincluding those based on water quality-into obligations.., of the
individual discharger'." 8 Stated another way:
[T]he rubber hits the road when the state-created [water quality]
standards are used as the basis for specific effluent limitations in
NPDES permits.... [Ounce a water quality standard has been
promulgated, section 301 of the CWA requires all NPDES permits for
point sources Ao incorporate discharge limitations necessary to satisfy
that standard.
Thus, not only does a prospective pollutant discharger have to
demonstrate that it will individually comply with effluent limitation
guidelines; but also it must demonstrate that its discharge, in
combination with other sources of pollution to the water body, will not
interfere with the attainment of state water quality standards." Of
pollutant discharges," and acknowledges "Congress did not regard numeric effluent
limitations as the only permissible limitation on a discharger." Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1380 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In fact, as the Costle
court recognized, the other limitations Congress contemplated were water quality
standards. Id.
76. 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (2001).

77. See Fortenberry, supra note 34, at 829; see also EPA Office of Water, Office of
Wastewater Management, Overview of the Water Quality Standards-to-PermitsProcess, at
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/wqbasedpermitting/wqoverview.cfm?program-id=2 (last
modified Feb. 28, 2001).
When assessing point source discharges to determine whether controls based
on water quality standards are necessary, an NPDES permitting authority
should conduct an analysis to determine whether the discharge causes, has
the 'reasonable potential' to cause, or contributes to an excursion of any
water quality criteria in the receiving water. Where effluent limits based on
water quality standards are necessary, the permitting authority allocates
responsibility for controls through wasteload allocations and then effluent
limits in NPDES permits consistent with those wasteload allocations.
Id.
78. United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 830 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting
EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 (1976)).
79. Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 346, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
80. See Piney Run Pres. Ass'n v. County Comm'rs, 268 F.3d 255, 266 (4th Cir. 2001)
("NPDES permits are therefore somewhat interdependent; the permitting authority
must account for the effluent discharge of others in calculating the appropriate levels
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course, if a prospective discharger's technology-based controls will be
sufficient to meet both federal effluent guidelines and state water
quality standards, that would normally be sufficient to obtain a
discharge permit."
However, a prospective discharge that would
comply with federal effluent limitations would nevertheless violate the
CWA if it hindered realization of state water quality standards." The
permitting agency can issue a permit only if it incorporates the more
stringent limitations, which exceed federal effluent guidelines and are
sufficient to satisfy state water quality standards."
The Total Maximum Daily Load ("TMDL") provisions of the CWA
provide the general method of translating a state's water quality
standards into discharge permits." The TMDL program has been
described as "the intersection of the CWA's technology-based and
water quality-based components of regulation."
Under section
303(d) of the CWA, states and tribes with "Treatment as a State"
("TAS") status must develop lists of impaired water bodies within their
jurisdiction.86 "These impaired waters do not meet water quality
standards that states, territories, and authorized tribes have set for
them, even after point sources of pollution have installed the
minimum required levels of pollution control technology."87 Section
303(d) (1) (C) of the Act requires each state to set TMDLs for the
impaired waters identified. "A TMDL specifies the maximum amount
of a pollutant that a water body can receive and still meet water quality
standards, and allocates pollutant loadings among point and nonpoint
pollutant sources."89 The CWA requires "[s]uch load shall be
for an individual permit holder.").
81. Flatt, supranote 6, at 11.
82. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1312(a), 1313(d), 1341, 1342.
83. Id. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1312(a), 1313(d), 1341, 1342; see also Fortenberry, supra
note 34, at 830.
84. 33 U.S.C. §1313 (d).
85. J.B. Ruhl, The EnvironmentalLaw of Farms: 30 Years of Making a Mole Hill Out of a
Mountain, 31 ELR NEWS & ANALYSIS 10203, 10211 n.115 (2001).
86. According to the EPA, the lack of water quality standard attainment continues
to be a major problem:
Over 40% of our assessed waters still do not meet the water quality standards
states, territories, and authorized tribes have set for them. This amounts to
over 20,000 individual river segments, lakes, and estuaries. These impaired
waters include approximately 300,000 miles of rivers and shorelines and
approximately 5 million acres of lakes-polluted mostly by sediments, excess
nutrients, and harmful microorganisms. An overwhelming majority of the
population-218 million-live within 10 miles of the impaired waters.
EPA Office of Water, Overview of Current Total Maximum Daily Load - TMDL - Program
and Regulations, at http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/overviewfs.html (last modified
May 17, 2001).
87. Id.
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
89. EPA Office of Water, Overview of Current Total Maximum Daily Load - TMDL Program and Regulations, at http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/overviewfs.html (last
modified May 17, 2001); see also Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d
91, 94 (2d Cir. 2001) ("In effect, a TMDL posts a limit on the total amount of a
pollutant a water body may receive over a period of time."); see also Ruhl, supra note
85, at 10212 n.119 ("Point sources implement the wasteload allocations within TMDLs
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established at a level necessary to implement the applicable water quality
standardswith seasonal variations and a margin of safety which takes
into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship
between effluent limitations and water quality."" Thus, the TMDL
system is how the CWA attempts to convert the desired water quality
standards into practical discharge constraints allocated among the
various dischargers to a water body.91
It is evident at this point that individual states wield great power
over pollutant discharges from point sources located within their
borders. The states have the central role in determining water quality
standards, and state or EPA issued discharge permits must comply with
such standards. Consequently, a state's EPA approved adjustment of
water quality standards may single-handedly determine the ability of a
prospective discharger to obtain an NPDES permit. This demonstrates
that state authority under the CWA is not a mere facade without
substance or implication. To the contrary, the states' role in setting
water quality standards puts serious bite into the NPDES permit
system.
C. TRANSBOUNDARY CONFLICTS: POLLUTION FLOWS DOWNSTREAM
There is nothing too surprising about a state's authority to regulate
point source discharges or water quality standards for water bodies
within its borders. Yet, it is very common for streams, lakes, rivers,
groundwater, and all other types of water bodies and waterways to
traverse the borders of more than one state. One of the fundamental
physical characteristics of water as a natural resource is its mobility.
Most pollutant discharges into a transboundary waterway do not simply
contaminate the local region around the discharge; instead, such
pollutants flow throughout the waters to which the original receiving
waterway is connected. Thus, for every waterway that crosses a border,
one state will be upstream and another downstream from the
through enforceable water quality-based discharge limits in NPDES permits authorized
under section 402 of the CWA.") (internal quotations omitted); see also supra text
accompanying note 77.
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (emphasis added).
91. There has been extensive litigation and controversy concerning the
development of TMDLs under the CWA.
While TMDLs have been required by the Clean Water Act since 1972, until
recently states, territories, authorized tribes, and EPA have not developed
many. Several years ago citizen organizations began bringing legal actions
against EPA seeking the listing of waters and development of TMDLs. To
date, there have been about 40 legal actions in 38 states. EPA is under court
order or consent decrees in many states to ensure that TMDLs are
established, either by the state or by EPA.
EPA Office of Water, Overuiew of Current Total Maximum Daily Load - TMDL - Program
and Regulations, at http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/overviewfs.html (last modified
May 17, 2001). The EPA has promulgated new regulations to speed up the adoption
and effectuation of the TMDL framework. However, through an appropriations rider,
Congress has thus far prevented the Agency from spending any money to implement
the rule. Id. See generallyJonathan Z. Cannon, EPA and Congress (1994-2000): Who's
Been Yanking Whose Chain?,31 ELR NEws & ANALYSis 10942 (2001).
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discharge. Articulated from a more global perspective:
[A] fundamental ecological and economic truth [is that] in the
watersheds 2 in which we live, all of us are Upstream or Downstream
People, and most of us are both. As Upstream and Downstream
People, we exist in a complex web of ecological and economic
connections with our watersheds and with each other.
Since the CWA requires all fifty states to promulgate water quality
standards,94 there are at least fifty upstream and downstream
sovereigns with diverse interests in the water within their borders. The
problem plainly arises: what happens when a proposed upstream
discharge threatens to violate the water
95 quality standards of a
downstream state to which the water flows?
The United States Supreme Court answered this critical question
in the seminal case of Arkansas v. Oklahoma.6 In that case, the city of
Fayetteville, Arkansas applied to the EPA for an NPDES permit for a
new sewage treatment plant.97 The EPA was the permitting authority
because Arkansas was not authorized to administer its own NPDES
permit program at the time of the plant's completion." The EPA
issued the permit authorizing the discharge of up to half of the plant's
effluent into a stream in northwestern Arkansas. That stream's flow
passed through a series of creeks and eventually entered the Illinois
River at a point twenty-two miles upstream from the ArkansasOklahoma border.'
One of the conditions of the discharge permit
was "that if a study then underway indicated that more stringent
limitations were necessary to ensure compliance with Oklahoma's
92. The term "watershed" is often copiously used in academic discourse on
pollution control without ever informing the reader what it means. A watershed is:
the land area that drains water to a particular stream, river, or lake. It is a
land feature that can be identified by tracing a line along the highest
elevations between two areas on a map, often a ridge. Large watersheds, like
the Mississippi River basin contain thousands of smaller watersheds.
U.S.
Geological
Survey,
Water
Science
Glossary
of
Terms,
at
http://wwwga.usgs.gov/edu/dictionary.html
(last modified July 5,
2001).
"Watersheds are nature's boundaries. They are the areas that drain to water bodies,
including lakes, rivers, estuaries, wetlands, streams, and the surrounding landscape.
Ground water recharge areas are also considered." EPA Office of Water, Office of
Wetlands, Oceans, & Watersheds, EPA's Most Frequently Asked Questions Related to
Wetlands, Oceans & Watersheds, at http://www.epa.gov/owow/questions.html (last
modified Sept. 5, 2001).
93. Harbison, supra note 66, at 473.
94. 33U.S.C. § 1313(a)(3)(A).
95. At this juncture, this article is not referring to upstream dischargers which
require a federal license or permit to conduct any activity including, but not limited
to, the construction or operation of facilities which may result in a pollutant discharge.
See id. § 1341 (a)(1). The special rules concerning a downstream state's voice in such
matters is discussed later in Part II(A) (2) of this article.

96. 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 95.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 95.
Id.
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water quality standards, the permit would be modified to incorporate
those limits."'
Both Arkansas and Oklahoma sought judicial review. "Arkansas
argued that the Clean Water Act did not require an Arkansas point
source to comply with Oklahoma's water quality standards."'02
Oklahoma claimed the EPA permitted discharge in Arkansas violated
Oklahoma's water quality standards which provided that "no
degradation of water quality shall be allowed in the upper Illinois
River, including the portion of the river immediately downstream from
the state line."" Essentially, the court was faced with two questions.
The first was whether the EPA must apply the water quality standards
of downstream states when issuing a permit for a discharge in the
upstream state. The second question was if the CWA does not
statutorily requiresuch consideration by the permitting agency, does the
EPA still have the authority to mandate such compliance in its
regulations.'" The Court decided that it did not need to reach the
first question because its answer to the second question disposed of
Arkansas' challenge."' The Court held that even if the CWA does not
require upstream discharges to comply with downstream water quality
standards, the CWA does not limit the EPA's authority to direct such
compliance by regulation.' 6
In reaching this decision, the Court noted that the CWA does not
authorize a downstream state to veto a discharge allowed by an
upstream state simply because the downstream state alleges that its
water quality standards will be compromised. Citing its decision in
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, the Court reiterated that a
downstream state's only recourse is to apply to the EPA Administrator
when it is unhappy with the allowance of an upstream discharge.' 8 In
fact, the CWA sets forth a procedure that upstream states must follow
to alert any state whose waters may be affected by the issuance of a
permit. After such notification, section 402 of the CWA provides:

101. 1I
102. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 97. In addition to the condition in the EPA
granted discharge permit, upon Oklahoma's challenge of the permit to the EPA, the
Agency's ChiefJudicial Officer had ruled that the CWA required any discharge permit
be strict enough to meet downstate water quality standards. Id. at 96-97.
103. Id. at 95 (internal quotations omitted).
104. Id at 104. A third question the court faced concerned the water degradation
issues surrounding Oklahoma's challenge to the issuance of the permit and is not
relevant for this article. The Court also made clear at the outset that its answers to
these questions did not turn on whether a state or the EPA was the permitting
authority since the requirements and procedures for issuing discharge permits are the
same no matter which entity is administering the NPDES program. Id. at 102 n.7, 103,
105 n.10.
105. Id. at 104.
106. I at 105.
107. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
108. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 100 (citing Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 490-91).
109. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3) (1994).
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[A]ny State (other than the permitting State), whose waters may be
affected by the issuance of a permit may submit written
recommendations to the permitting State (and the [EPA]
Administrator) with respect to any permit application and, if any part
of such written recommendations are not accepted by the permitting
State.... the permitting State will notify such affected State (and the
[EPA] Administrator) in writing of its failure to so accept such
recommendations together with its reasons for so doing.' 0 e
In connection with this provision,

the CWA provides the EPA

Administrator broad discretion to set conditions for NPDES permits
issued by the EPA,"' and allows the Administrator to block the
issuance of a state discharge permit as being "outside the guidelines

and requirements of this chapter.""
Furthermore, as mentioned
above, the EPA's regulations bluntly state: "No permit may be
issued... [w]hen the imposition of conditions cannot ensure
compliance with the applicable water quality requirements of all
affected States."" 3 In Arkansas v. Oklahoma, the EPA relied upon this
regulation
when issuing the discharge permit for the sewage treatment
4

plant."

The Court connected the wide discretionary latitude given to the
EPA Administrator in the Act with the EPA's regulatory mandate that
upstream discharges may not violate downstream water quality
standards. In so doing, the Court concluded that:
The regulations relied on by the EPA were a perfectly reasonable
exercise of the Agency's statutory discretion. The application of state
water quality standards in the interstate context is wholly consistent
with the Act's broad purpose "to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."... [T]he
achievement of state water quality standards [is] one of the Act's
central objectives. The Agency's regulationsthis
conditioning
NPDES
goal.
permits are a well-tailored means of achieng
The Court clarified that although the CWA limits participation by an
affected state in permitting decisions (i.e., it can submit its
recommendations about, but cannot veto a proposed permit), such
limits "do not in any way constrain the EPA's authority to require 6a
point source to comply with downstream water quality standards."
This holding was a colossal event for water pollution control
throughout the United States. It was a firm proclamation that
110. Id. § 1342(b)(5). This procedure applies irrespective of whether the EPA or a
state is administering the permit program. See id. § 1342(a) (3).
111. See id. § 1342(a)(2); Arkansasv. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 105.
112. 33U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2).
113. 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (2001). This prohibition applies irrespective of whether
the EPA or a state is administering the permit program. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503
U.S. at 105 n.10; 40 C.F.R. § 123.25.
114. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 105.
115. Id. at 105-106.
116. Id. at 106 (second emphasis added).
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pursuant to the EPA's regulations, a state or the EPA may not issue a
discharge permit if such discharge will violate another state's water
quality standards."7 Thus, the regulatory battle lines were drawn-the
borders of the individual states of the nation. After Arkansas v.
Oklahoma, the victors in this battle would generally be the more
vulnerable downstream states.
HI. THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
AND INDIAN TRIBES
As explained thus far, the CWA, like many other federal statutes,"'
"anticipates a partnership between the States and the Federal
Government, animated by a shared objective: 'to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters."'" 9 Within this framework of cooperative federalism, states
have a choice between letting the federal government wholly regulate
water pollution of the navigable waters within the state or to selfMost states have
regulate with federal approval and oversight.2
water quality
to
setting
in
addition
and,
the
latter
option
chosen
standards as required by the CWA, have availed themselves of the
opportunity to administer their own NPDES programs. To date, all
but six states have EPA approved NPDES programs.
A. "TREATMENT AS A STATE" STATUS FOR INDIAN TRIBES

In 1987, Congress amended the CWA to extend this cooperative
Upon application
federalism framework to include Indian tribes.'
and aPProval by the EPA, an Indian tribe may receive "Treatment as a
State" 2 ("TAS") status for purposes of the CWA." 4 The implications of
117. This is the general rule, and unless the EPA allows a variance, both the EPA
and state permitting authorities must comply with this admonition. Certain types of
variances are permitted under the EPA's regulations. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 123.25,
124.51(b), 124.62, 131.13.
118. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1992) and cases cited
therein discussing other statutes incorporating cooperative federalism mechanisms.
119. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)).
120. See Kenaitze Indian Tribe v. Alaska, 860 F.2d 312, 314 (9th Cir. 1988).
121. The only states that currently do not have approved NPDES programs are
Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Mexico. Puerto Rico
also does not have an approved program. Interestingly, the Virgin Islands had a
permit program approved in 1976. In 1998, Texas became the most recent state to
obtain approval. All of the approved states (but not the Virgin Islands) also have an
approved "general permits" program. EPA Office of Water, Office of Wastewater
at
Status,
Program
State
Management,
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm?program-id=12 (last modified Mar. 3,
2001); see also supratext accompanying note 29.
122. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1994).
123. The "Treatment as a State" terminology was recently changed to "treatment in
the same manner as a State" in response to tribes objecting to the original phrase.
"Many tribes commented that they are not 'States'; rather, they have a unique
relationship with the United States Government." EPA Office of Water, American
Indian Environmental Office, Resource Guide, Chapter Three: EPA's Approach to
at
Country,
Indian
in
Protection
Environmental
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a TAS designation are exactly as the name implies, a tribe will have the
same regulatory opportunities as a state under the CWA. Specifically,
a tribe may receive TAS status for purposes of:
(a) research, investigations, training, and information under section
104; (b) grants for pollution control programs under section 106; (c)
water quality standards and implementation plans under section 303;
(d) reports on water quality under section 305; (e) reporting
requirements under section 308; (f) enforcement of standards under
section 309; (g) clean lake programs under section 314; (h) nonpoint
source management programs under section 319; (i) certification
under section 401 that federally issued permits or licenses will be in
compliance with water quality standards; (j) issuance of NPDES
permits under sectionsection
402; and
404. %) issuance of permits for dredged
or fill material under
A tribe may receive TAS status for some or all of these CWA provisions
depending on what the tribe applies for and what the EPA approves. 6
A number of tribes have seized upon the opportunity to become an
integral player in water pollution control by seeking TAS status for
some of the allowable purposes 7 The most important functions
mentioned for which a tribe can obtain TAS status are the opportunity
to set water quality standards and implementation plans under section
303; the responsibility under section 401 to certify that federally issued
permits or licenses will be in compliance with tribal water quality
standards; and the power to issue NPDES permits under section 402 .
These will be examined in turn.
1. Section 303: Water Quality Standards
The tribes obtain a powerful regulatory tool with the ability to set
water quality standards. It enables a tribe to supplement the federally
set effluent limitations with EPA approved water quality standards.
Also, identical to the implications when a state sets water quality
http://www.epa.gov/indian/resource/chap3.htm#86

(last visited Jan. 14, 2002); see

also EPA Office of Water, American Indian Environmental Office, Laws Regulations &

Guidance, at http://www.epa.gov/indian/treatst.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2002) ("The
term 'treatment-as-a-State' is somewhat misleading and may be offensive to tribes.").
124. This concept is not unique to the CWA. Indian tribes may also receive
"Treatment as a State" status under the Safe Drinking Water Act and Clean Air Act for
certain types of program authorizations and grant awards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-11,
7601(d).
125. Jane Marx et al., TribalJurisdictionOver Reservation Water Quality and Quantity, 43
S.D. L. REv. 315, 329 (1998); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e); Amendments to the Water
Quality Standards Regulations that Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations, 54
Fed. Reg. 39,098 (Sept. 22, 1989) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
126. See, e.g.,
Paul G.Kent, EPA Approves Treatment as a State Statusfor Mole Lake Tribe Other ApplicationsPending,2 Wis. ENVrL COMPLIANCE UPDATE Issue 11 (Nov. 1995).
127. See EPA Office of Water, American Indian Environmental Office, Treatment of
Tribes
in the Same Manner as States/Program Approval Matrix, at
http://www.epa.gov/indian/matrix.htm (last modified March 1998). No tribe has
applied for TAS status for all of the permissible purposes under the CWA. Id.
128. See, e.g., Kent, supra note 126.
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standards, a prospective pollutant discharge that would be in
compliance with federal effluent limitations would nevertheless be
unlawful under the CWA if it hinders realization of a TAS tribe's water
quality standards. In such a situation, an NPDES permit for a
prospective discharger on reservation land may be issued only if
effluent limitations are incorporated that exceed the federal
guidelines and protect tribal water quality standards. It is generally
recognized that not only do Indian tribes commonly adopt water
quality standards requiring more stringent effluent limitations than
federally required, but also tribal water quality standards are usually
more restrictive than even the state standards in which the reservations
are located.'2
2. Section 401: Certification of Compliance with Water Quality
Standards
As a counterpart to TAS designation for administering water
quality standards, a tribe will also be subject to the responsibilities of
section 401 of the CWA. Section 401 provides:
Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity
including, but not limited to, the construction or operation of
facilities, which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters,
shall provide the licensing or permitting agency a certification from
the State in which the discharge originates or will originate ...that
any such discharge13 will comply with [effluent limitations and water
quality standards].
Section 401, therefore, obligates states and TAS designated tribes to
grant or deny certification for federally permitted or licensed activities
that may result in a discharge into navigable waters within its borders.
As explained by the EPA:
The decision to grant or deny certification is based on a State
determination regarding whether the proposed activity will comply
with, among other things, applicable water quality standards. States
and Tribes qualifying for treatment as States may thus deny
certification and prohibit the federal permitting or licensing agency
from issuing a permit or license for activities that will violate water

129. See, e.g., id. The EPA permits TAS tribes great leeway in setting water quality
standards. In fact, the "EPA believes that criteria sufficiently stringent to meet the
fishable and swimmable goals may not be disapproved under the CWA, on the
grounds that such criteria are more stringent than natural background water quality."
Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to Standards on
Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,886 (Dec. 12, 1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 131); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2). For an extensive review and critique of the
EPA's position, see Mark A. Bilut, Albuquerque v. Browner, Native American Tribal
Authority Under the Clean Water Act: Raging Like A River Out of Control, 45 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 887, 898 (1994).

130. 33U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
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quality standards."'
In addition, a TAS tribe that is downstream from a proposed
discharge activity under section 401 may protest a certification by the
originatingupstream state when the downstream TAS tribe determines
that "the proposed activity would violate its water quality
requirements.
When the EPA receives a federal license or permit
application accompanied by a certification under section 401(a) (1)
from the state in which the discharge originates, the EPA must notify

other states and TAS tribes whose water quality may also be affected by
the discharge "certified" by the originating upstream state. 3 If a state
or TAS tribe then objects to the permit issuance because the
extraterritorial effect of the applicant's discharge will violate the state
or tribal water quality standards, a series of procedural mechanisms
begin. The end result is that the federal agency "shall condition such
[federal] license or permit in such manner as may be necessary to
insure compliance with applicable water quality requirements [of the
downstream state or TAS tribe]. If the imposition of conditions
cannot insure such compliance such agency shall not issue such
license or permit."'34 Thus, a downstream TAS tribe's water quality
standards may, in effect, bar upstream activity subject to federal
licenses or permits. The authority to set water quality standards is
clearly a powerful tool.
It makes sense that a tribe's capacity to "certify" compliance with its
water quality standards (or protest another state's certification) goes
hand-in-hand with its authority to set water quality standards.
Standards with which to "certify" compliance must exist. In fact, when
the EPA approves a tribe's TAS designation for purposes of section 303
(water quality standards) and section 401 (certification) it does so
simultaneously and combines each approval into one category of TAS
authorization (i.e., EPA approval of TAS status for sections 303/401
purposes)."' To date, the EPA has granted only a small fraction of
eligible tribes such authorization. Of the 145 tribes who have applied
and been approved for TAS designation for at least one CWA activity,
twenty-one have been approved for sections 303/401 purposes and

131. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,890.

132. Id. at 64,876; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2).
133. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2).
134. Id.; see also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 103 (1992) ("Section 401(a) (2)
appears to prohibit the issuance of any federal license or permit over the objection of
an affected State unless compliance with the affected State's water quality
requirements can be ensured.").
135. See EPA Office of Water, American Indian Environmental Office, Treatment of
Tribes in
the
Same Manner as States/Program Approval Matrix,
at
http://www.epa.gov/indian/matrix.htm (last modified March 1998); see also 40 C.F.R
§ 131.4(c) (2001) ("Where EPA determines that a Tribe is eligible to the same extent
as a State for purposes of water quality standards, the Tribe likewise is eligible to the

same extent as a State for purposes of certifications conducted under Clean Water Act
section 401.").
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sixteen have applications pending."'
3. Section 402: NPDES Permits
Finally, tribes may receive TAS status for purposes of administering
an NPDES program under section 402 for discharges within the
boundaries of the Indian reservation. 7 Interestingly though, the EPA
has not authorized any tribes to issue discharge permits. 138 In fact, only
two tribes have even applied to receive such authorization and their
applications are still pending. 1 9 There may be many reasons for the
dearth of requests for section 402 authorization, including a choice by
tribes to allocate limited resources to other purposes for which they
desire TAS designation.'40 Perhaps the most obvious explanation is
that tribes simply do not need such authorization in order to protect
their water resources. In the absence of an approved tribal NPDES
program, the EPA bears the burden of administering the permit
program for discharges within the boundaries of Indian reservations.'
Once a tribe has authorization to set water quality standards, the
conditions in any discharge permit issued by the EPA for reservation
point sources must be sufficient to satisfy such standards.12 The result
is the enforcement of tribal water quality standards through an EPA
administered NPDES permit program. Thus, the tribe accomplishes
its regulatory goal without bearing the additional costs and
administrative burdens of operating the permit program.

136. See EPA Office of Water, American Indian Environmental Office, Treatment of
Tribes in
the Same Manner as States/Program Approval Matrix, at
http://www.epa.gov/indian/matrix.htm (last modified March 1998). Results from
the 1990 census showed 278 federally recognized Indian reservations. EPA Office of
Water, American Indian Environmental Office, Resource Guide, Chapter One:
Understanding Native Americans, at http://www.epa.gov/indian/resource/chapl.htm
(last visited Jan. 14, 2002).

137. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e).
138. EPA Office of Water, Office of Wastewater Management, State and Tribal
ProgramIssues, at http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestribes/issues.cfmprogramid=12
(last modified Feb. 21, 2001).
139. EPA Office of Water, American Indian Environmental Office, Treatment of Tribes
in
the
Same
Manner
as
States/Program
Approval
Matrix,
at
http://www.epa.gov/indian/matrix.htm (last modified March 1998).
140. In discussing a tribe's capability to manage water quality standards, the EPA
explained that tribes need to "give serious consideration" to the "resource impacts"
and "annual resource commitments" of assuming such a burden. Amendments to the
Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations,
56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,883 (Dec. 12, 1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131); see also 33
U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2). Such considerations seem equally important for a TAS tribe
considering whether to apply for NPDES permitting authority which would also
require significant resources.
141. EPA Office of Water, Office of Wastewater Management, State and Tribal
Program Issues, at http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestribes/issues.cfm?programid=12
(last modified Feb. 21, 2001); see also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 103 (1992).
142. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 103.
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B. ALBUQUERQUE V. BROWNER "TREATMENT AS A STATE" REALLYMEANS
TREATMENT AS A STATE

In the real world of pollution control, of what relevance is the
above discussion concerning TAS designation for water quality
standards and certification of compliance? Can it really be that a TAS
tribe is a co-equal sovereign with states for water pollution regulation,
or is there some "catch"? A review of the important case of Albuquerque
v. Brownd 4 3 answers these questions and illustrates why TAS status
really matters.
In Albuquerque v. Browner, the EPA granted the Isleta Pueblo Indian
Tribe TAS status to administer water quality standards and to certify
compliance with such standards (i.e., sections 303/401 authorization)
for waters located within its reservation in New Mexico.'" The tribe
proposed, and the EPA approved water quality standards for the
portion of the Rio Grande River that flows through the reservation.
Not unexpectedly, the tribe's standards were more stringent than both
the federal minimums and those set by the state of New Mexico.'45
The city of Albuquerque ("City") operated a waste treatment
facility that created a point source discharge on the Rio Grande
approximately five miles north of the Isleta Pueblo Reservation. The
EPA issued a permit that authorized the facility's discharge, 46 so the
plant was considered a federally licensed or permitted facility under
section 401 of the CWA. Consequently, the Isleta tribe should have
received two forms of protection if it was, in practice, to be treated as a
state. First, the permitting authority (the EPA in this case) would not
be allowed to issue a discharge permit for the treatment facility,
pursuant to EPA's regulations and Arkansas v. Oklahoma, if the
discharge would violate a downstream TAS tribe's water quality
standards.

Second, because Albuquerque's plant required a federal

license or permit, it would fall under the purview of section 401, again
requiring the imposition of conditions to insure compliance with
downstream water quality standards.
The City filed suit against the EPA contending, among other
things, that section 518 "does not allow tribes to establish water quality
standards more stringent than federal standards and does not permit
tribal standards to be enforced beyond tribal reservation
boundaries."'47 With respect to its first argument, the City asserted that
section 518 specifically listed the authorized functions for a TAS tribe
under the CWA and section 510 was not included as one of the
authorized functions.1 48 That section of the Act allows a state to set
143. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996).
144. 1l at 419.
145. Id, at 419, 421.
146. Id at 419. Recall that New Mexico is one of the few states that has not been
authorized to administer its own NPDES permit system. See supra text accompanying
note 121.
147. Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d at 421.
148. Id. at 423.
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water quality standards more stringent than the federal minimums. 4 1
The City's argument, therefore, was the familiar doctrine of expressio
unius est exclusio alteriusr, that inclusion of specific functions in the
statute necessarily excludes functions not mentioned.' Since section
510 was excluded from section 518, the City argued, TAS tribes were
not authorized to set
water quality standards more stringent than the
51
federal minimums.1
The EPA countered the City's position by pointing out that section
510 was merely a savings clause recognizing authority already
possessed by the state. ' "Because a savings clause confers no new
authority, but instead clarifies existing authority [that] is not
preempted [by the CWA], it was not necessary for Congress to
specifically reference section 510 when it authorized the [EPA]
Administrator to treat tribes as states." 1 3 The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit agreed that it was unnecessary to incorporate section
510 into section 518 to give tribes powers to set more stringent water
quality standards because "Indian tribes have residual sovereign
powers that already guaranteethe powers enumerated in [section 510],
absent an express ... elimination of those powers." 5' In addition,
although not expressly articulated by the court, one commentator
noted the strongest and most obvious reason to interpret the CWA as
allowing tribes to set more stringent standards than the federal
minimums:
[I]t would make little sense for Congress to create section 518 as part
of the 1987 Clean Water Act amendments, but give tribes no power to
adopt stringent water quality standards.... If viewed as the City
argues, section 518 would be an illusory delegation of power, since
tribes would be unable to adopt more stringent standards and the
[CWA prohibits] the adoption of standards less stringent than the
federal criteria. As such, [tribes] would only be able to adopt
standards neither more nor less stringent then federal standards, and
this would render section 518 meaningless.

In Albuquerque v. Browner, the court of appeals made clear that section
518 was not an illusory delegation of power and that TAS tribes do
indeed have the same authority as states to adopt water quality
standards more stringent than the federal minimums.
The City's second argument that tribal water quality standards
could not be enforced beyond reservation boundaries was a flashback
to Arkansas v. Oklahoma. Recall in that case, the Supreme Court held

149. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 153 F.3d 809, 811 (7th Cir. 1998).
151.

Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d at 423.

152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Bilut, supranote 129, at 898.
Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d at 423 (emphasis added).
Bilut, supranote 129, at 899.

156.

Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d at 423.
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that it was within the EPA's statutory discretion to promulgate and
enforce regulations requiring upstream point source discharges to
comply with downstream water quality standards. Now, the moment of
truth had arrived for Indian tribes: could TAS tribal water quality
standards receive similar protection from upstream discharges?
The court of appeals resoundingly answered that question in the
affirmative based primarily on the fact that tribes, like individual states,
are not the sovereign imposing their water quality standards on the
upstream dischargers. 5 It was the EPA exercising its authority through
its valid regulations requiring such compliance.'
Furthermore,
section 518 incorporated the relevant NPDES statutory provisions,
construed in Arkansas v. Oklahoma to allow the EPA to require
upstream dischargers to comply with downstream water quality
standards. 9
The important thing to take away from Albuquerque v. Browner is
that it made crystal clear that TAS tribes would be afforded identical
rights and powers as actual states for authorized purposes under the
CWA. TAS tribes are not second-class sovereigns, 160 but instead are
bestowed with the statutory tools to make a major impact on
transboundary water regulation. Albuquerque v. Brownerconfirmed that
"Treatment as a State" really means treatment as a state.
C. OBTAINING "TREATMENT AS A STATE" STATUS

There is a specific process that tribes must follow to acquire TAS
status. In section 518(e) of the CWA, Congress set out the threshold
qualifications that a tribe must meet and directed the EPA to
promulgate final regulations to expound upon and effectuate TAS
designation. 6' On December 12, 1991, after full notice and comment
rulemaking, the EPA issued a final rule articulating: (1) the
procedures by which an Indian tribe may qualify for treatment as a
state for purposes of the CWA section 303 water quality standards and
section 401 certification programs; and (2) a mechanism to resolve
unreasonable consequences that may arise from Indian tribes and
157. Id. at 424.
158. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (2001). Of course, this concept is somewhat of a legal
fiction; hence its importance and constant reiteration throughout this article. The
practical effect of the EPA's regulations is that a downstream state or TAS tribe will
indeed be imposing its water quality standards on the upstream discharger. But, this is
only made possible by the EPA's (i.e., the federal government's) regulations requiring
upstream permits to comply with downstream water quality standards. If the EPA
decided to repeal or amend its regulations, a downstream state would have no
authority to veto upstream discharge permits which would result in the contravention
of downstream water quality standards. By focusing on this argument in Albuquerque v.
Browner, the court avoided heavy reliance on the second Montanaexception (discussed
infra Part II.C). See Andrea K. Leisy, Inherent Tribal Sovereignty and the Clean Water Act:
The Effect of Tribal Water Quality Standards on Non-Indian Lands Located Both Within and
Outside Reservation Boundaries,29 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 139, 166 (1999).
159. Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d at 424 n.13.
160. See Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 750 (7th Cir. 2001).
161. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1994).
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states setting differing water quality standards on common bodies of
water.' 62
In these regulations, the EPA's TAS criteria track the threshold
qualifications specified by Congress in section 518(e) and add that the
applicant tribe must have federal recognition. The final rule states
that the EPA "may accept and approve a tribal application for
purposes of administering a water quality standards program if the
Tribe meets the following criteria:'
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

The Indian Tribe is recognized by the Secretary of the
Interior...;
The Indian Tribe has a governing body carrying out substantial
governmental duties and powers;
The water quality standards program to be administered by the
Indian Tribe pertains to the management and protection of
water resources which are within the borders of the Indian
reservation and held by the Indian Tribe, within the borders of
the Indian reservation and held by the United States in trust for
Indians, within the borders of the Indian reservation and held
by a member of the Indian tribe if such property interest is
subject to a trust restriction on alienation, or otherwise within
the borders of the Indian reservation; and
The Indian Tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in the
Regional Administrator's judgment, of carrying out the
functions of an effective water quality standards program in a
manner consistent with the terms and purposes of the Act and
applicable regulations.64

The regulations go on to explain the information required to be
included in the TAS application submitted by the tribe to the EPA. Of
significance is the requirement that the tribe include "[a] descriptive
statement of the Indian tribe's authority to regulate water quality"165 in
order to satisfy the third requirement of the EPA's TAS criteria. That
162. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876 (Dec. 12, 1991) (codified at 40
C.F.R pt. 131). In addition to requiring regulations specifying how Indian tribes shall
be treated as states under section 518, Congress explicitly required the EPA to provide
a dispute resolution mechanism of this type. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e).
163. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(a) (2001).
164. Id. § 131.8(a)(1)-(4).
165. Id. § 131.8(b) (3).
This statement should include: (i) A map or legal description of the area
over which the Indian Tribe asserts authority to regulate surface water
quality; (ii) A statement by the Tribe's legal counsel (or equivalent official)
which describes the basis for the Tribes (sic] assertion of authority and which
may include a copy of documents such as Tribal constitutions, by-laws,

charters, executive orders, codes, ordinances, and/or resolutions which
support the Tribe's assertion of authority; and (iii) An identification of the
surface waters for which the Tribe proposes to establish water quality
standards.

Issue 2

WISCONSIN V. EPA

is, when are reservation waters sufficiently "held" by a tribe so that it
may have jurisdiction to set water quality standards for them?' This
becomes a crucial issue in Wisconsin's challenge to the EPA's grant of
TAS status to the Sokaogon Chippewa Community Indian Tribe and
requires exploration in more detail.
1. Inherent Tribal Authority
During the rulemaking process to develop qualifications for tribes
to receive TAS status to administer water quality standards " [ t] he issue
of whether and how EPA should require Tribes to demonstrate...
authority to regulate water quality within the boundaries of their
reservations, attracted significant comment."' 61 Some commentators
suggested the Tribes needed to submit detailed information and
reasons supporting their jurisdictional claims over the waters they
proposed to regulate and, in essence, start with a presumption against
their inherent authority.' 6 Predictably, "other commentators asserted
that Tribes invariably possess inherent authority to regulate all
reservation waters, and that EPA should presume the existence of such
authority and not require Tribes to make any specific factual
showing." 6 ' Clearly, the EPA's response is important to the Indian
tribes:
The inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes is a longstanding precept of
federal Indian law. The continued viability of tribal sovereignty,
exercised through the tribal governmental powers that have not been
diminished, is particularly relevant to the protection and
enhancement of the natural resources on which many tribes depend
for economic subsistence and cultural continuity. Water is perhaps

166. As discussed further below, the EPA found that section 518(e) as a whole was
not an explicit delegation of regulatory authority to Indian tribes. The phrase in the
third criterion concerning waters "otherwise within the borders of an Indian
reservation" has been interpreted by the EPA "as a separate category of water
resources and also as a modifier of the preceding three categories of water resources,
thus limiting the Tribe to acquiring [TAS] status for the four specified categories of
water resources within the borders of the reservation." Amendments to the Water
Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations, 56
Fed. Reg. at 64,881. So, according to the EPA, this phrase simply designates another
category of water resources a tribe may be able to regulate after it provides sufficient
evidence of its inherent authority over such waters.
167. Id. at 64,877.
168. Id.
169. Id The specific context in which the debate arose was whether an Indian Tribe
may enforce its water quality standards against non-members of the tribe on nonIndian-owned fee lands within the boundaries of the reservation. In Wisconsin v. EPA,
266 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 2001), none of the land within the Sokaogon Chippewa
Community Reservation was controlled or owned outright by non-members of the
tribe. The existence of fee land owned by non-tribal members on reservation land
may require a more studied appraisal of the tribe's TAS application, but does not alter
the standards the EPA will use to evaluate a tribe's authority over the water it proposes
to regulate.
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the most fundamental of such resources.170

In order to resolve these differing views of the necessity and method of
demonstrating inherent authority, the EPA considered and reconciled
Montana v. United States7 ' and Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation."'
i. Montana v. united States- "The Montana Test"
In Montana v. United States, the Crow Tribe of Montana
attempted to prohibit non-Indians from hunting and fishing on all
lands within the reservation, including lands owned in fee simple by
non-Indians.7 7 The tribe believed it had authority to enact these
regulations based on its claimed ownership of the bed of the Big Horn
River, 74 the treaties which created the reservation, 3 and its inherent
power as a sovereign.
The Supreme Court squarely rejected the tribe's authority to enact
the regulation and refuted each of the tribe's underlying
justifications. 77 The Court held that absent express congressional
delegation "Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation." 78 The Court,
however, carved out two exceptions to this rule, commonly referred to
as the "Montana exceptions."'7
The Court held that "in certain
circumstances, even where Congress has not expressly authorized it,
Indian tribes retain sovereign power to exercise civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians on fee lands." 80 The first exception permits tribes to
exercise civil jurisdiction over non-members who enter into consensual
relationships with a tribe or its members through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements.'
The second exception
permits tribes to exercise jurisdiction over non-members whose
conduct "threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity,
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."8 2 For
170. Edmund J. Goodman, Indian Tribal Sovereignty and Water Resources: Watersheds,
Ecosystems and Tribal Co-Management, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 185, 191-92

(2000).
171. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
172. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408 (1989).
173. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 544.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 544-46.
178. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. at 564).
179. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 565-66.
180. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1140 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at
566).
181. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 565.
182. Id at 566. Although beyond the scope of this article, it is worth mentioning
that concepts of inherent sovereignty arise in the first instance when examining
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purposes of TAS designation and the CWA, the second exception is
critical.
Accordingly, if the EPA were to follow the Supreme Court's
interpretation of permissible tribal authority during the rulemaking, it
had three questions to pose. First, the EPA had to determine whether
Congress expressly delegated authority to tribes to regulate all reservation
waters. If yes, then the inquiry ended and there was no need to
evaluate inherent authority."83 However, if the EPA found that
Congress had not expressly delegated the authority to regulate all
reservation waters, it would have to consider whether either of the two
"Montanaexceptions" applied."'
In the context of water regulation, the first Montana exception
concerning consensual relations is generally inapplicable. Therefore,
the EPA would primarily evaluate whether the regulation of the water
involved conduct that threatened or had some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of
the tribe.' As will be explained in further detail below, because the
EPA determined that section 518 is not an express grant of authority to
tribes, the second Montana exception carries great weight in
determining a tribe's authority to regulate non-member conduct. 6
ii. BrendaleCauses Debate
During the rulemaking, there was considerable debate whether the
Montana standards remained intact or if the Supreme Court had
abrogated them in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima
Nation.'87 In that case, both the Yakima Nation and the state of
Washington "asserted authority to zone non-Indian real estate
developments on two parcels within the Yakima reservation, one in an
area that was primarily Tribal, the other in an area where much of the
land was owned in fee by nonmembers [of the tribe]. " "' In an
extensive and complicated opinion, the Court "split 4:2:3 in reaching
the decision that the Tribe should have exclusive zoning authority over
certain aspects of sovereignty Indian tribes have lost or retained throughout the years.
"[T]hrough their original incorporation into the United States as well as through
specific treaties and statutes, the Indian tribes have lost many attributes of
sovereignty." Id. at 563 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)). In
sum, Indian tribes now have a "diminished status" as sovereigns. Id. at 565.
183. See Regina Cutler, To Clear the Muddy Waters: Tribal Regulatory Authority Under
Section 518 of the Clean Water Act, 29 ENvL. L. 721, 728 (1999) ("Under this analysis, an
appeal to inherent sovereignty as a basis for a tribe's civil regulatory jurisdiction is
unnecessary if Congress has directly delegated that authority to the tribe.").
184. Id.
185. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 566.
186. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,880 (Dec. 12, 1991)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
187. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408 (1989).
188. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,877.
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property in the Tribal area and the State should have exclusive zoning
authority over non-Indian owned property in the fee area."18 9 Perhaps
because none of the three opinions in Brendae could agree on a
common approach for applying the second Montana exception, or
because neither of the two opinions representing the opinion of the
Court rely on Montana as the basis for their holding, many
commentators decreed that Brendale caused the death of Montana's
second exception."'
The EPA disagreed with this assessment of Brendale. It found that
the Supreme Court had not abrogated the viability of the Montana test,
but simply could not reach a consensus how to formulate the second
exception in the complicated factual scenario of Brendale "' Putting it
another way, "[a]lthough the Justices disagreed over how to apply
Montana'ssecond exception in [the Brendale] context, a majority of the
Justices nonetheless agreed that the Montana rule controlled." 92 The
EPA recognized, however, that in Brendaleseveral of the justices argued
that in order for inherent authority to arise under the second Montana
exception, the regulated activity's effect should be "demonstrably
serious."19
iii. The EPA's Resolution
At this point in the rulemaking, the EPA decided the Montana test
was still valid but that expressions by some Justices in Brendale
combined with statements made in subsequent opinions provoked
uncertainty as to what type of activity would trigger a tribe's inherent
authority under Montana's second exception. The EPA responded to
this predicament with a cautious, inclusive, and flexible approach:
In evaluating whether a tribe has authority to regulate a particular
activity on land owned in fee by nonmembers but located within a
reservation, EPA will examine the Tribe's authority in light of
evolving case law as reflected in Montana and Brendale. The extent
of such tribal authority depends on the effect of that activity on the
tribe....
[Tihe Agency will apply, as an interim operating rule, a
formulation of [the second Montana exception, i.e., inherent
authority] that will require a showing that the potential impacts of
regulated activities on the tribe are serious and substantial.
The choice of an Agency operating rule containing this standard is
taken solely as a matter of prudence in light of judicial uncertainty
and does not reflect an Agency endorsement of this standard per

189. Id.

190. Cutler, supra note 183, at 729; see also Amendments to the Water Quality
Standards Regulation that Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at
64,877.

191. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,877-78.
192. Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 1998).
193. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,878 (internal citations omitted).
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Thus, the EPA adopted a careful blend of Montana and Brendale,
perhaps on the hunch that further judicial development of the
inherent authority concept would yield the same result.
It appears that EPA was correct. In 1997, the Supreme Court
decided Strate v. A-1 Contractors'" in which Justice Ginsburg penned a
unanimous opinion resurrecting the Montana test from any perceived
erosion. In Strate, the Court disallowed tribal court jurisdiction over a
personal injury lawsuit resulting from an automobile accident
occurring between two non-members on a state highway running
through the Indian reservation."
The Supreme Court agreed the
dispute was "distinctly non-tribal in nature... [arising] between two
non-Indians involved in a run-of-the-mill highway accident."1 97 As such,
tribal jurisdiction was not connected to the self-governance of the
tribe. The Court held that because a tribe's inherent power does not
reach beyond what is necessary to protect self-government or to
control internal relations of the tribe,
9 8 the facts in this case could not
trigger Montana'ssecond exception.
It is still not entirely clear whether Justice Ginsburg's explanation
of Montana's second exception was a narrowing of its reach or merely a
clarification of the original rule designed to head off overuse.'" In any
event, this holding was important for two reasons. First, the EPA had
determined, during the rulemaking, that water quality management
protects public health and safety and, therefore, is critical to the selfgovernment of a tribe.2 °O Second, irrespective of how one interprets
Justice Ginsburg's statements, notions of protecting self-government
and internal relations reflect potentially "serious and substantial"
impacts on the tribe; the primary standard the EPA had used."' Thus,
in its rulemaking statements discussing "self-government" and "serious
194. Id. (first and second emphasis added).
195. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
196. Id. at 439. The state highway was a federally-granted right-of-way for which the
state paid the Tribes. Since the Tribes could no longer assert a landowner's right to
occupy and exclude over the property, the Court likened it to land within reservation
borders alienated to non-Indians in fee simple. Characterized as such, the Montana
test was clearly applicable. Id. at 455-56.
197. Id at 457 (internal indications omitted).
198. Id at 459.
199. Strate may arguably be read as a mere clarification of the original intent of the
Montanatest with Brendale being a complicated transitional case between Montana and
Strate. The most troublesome result of this reading is that while tribal "selfgovernment" and "internal relations" can easily be paralleled to "political integrity"
and "economic security," a disconnect results when trying to connect Montana's
"health or safety" component. The extremely convenient bridge for this gap was the
EPA's finding that water quality management protects public health and safety and,
therefore, is critical to the self-government of a tribe. See infra note 202.
200. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,879 (Dec. 12, 1991)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131) (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 64,878-79.
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and substantial effects," it appears the EPA's standards for applying
Montana's second exception foreshadowed the Supreme Court's
holding in Strate102 Moreover, it is evident Strate is exactly the type of
"evolving case law" the EPA hoped would arise to help guide the
Agency in its future decisions.
iv. The Montana Test and "Treatment as a State" Designation
To where does this arduous exploration lead? It leads back to the
original Montana test bolstered by the Supreme Court's indication that
the EPA's rule that the potential impacts must be "serious and
substantial" (indicated by threats to tribal self-government or internal
relations) to trigger inherent authority is on target. To simplify, the
following is the structure of the Montana test applied by the EPA:
A.
Did Congress expressly delegate authority to the tribes to
regulate the activity over all reservation land or waters?
If yes, then the tribe has express authority to exercise civil
regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee lands and
there is no need to discuss inherent sovereignty.
B.
If no, does the activity fall into one of the two following
Montana exceptions?

(1)

It concerns activity relating to non-members who enter into
consensual relationships with the tribes or its members
through commercial dealing, contracts, leases or other
arrangements; or
(2) It concerns conduct that threatens or has a direct serious and
substantial effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.
Once it had established the proper framework of the Montana test, the
EPA could use it to evaluate section 518(e) of the CWA.
Under this test, the EPA's first query was whether section 518(e)
was an express delegation to qualified tribes of regulatory authority
over all reservation waters. More specifically, the EPA needed to
determine if the section resulted in expanding tribal authority and
jurisdiction over non-Indians.2 The statute itself is not explicit in this
regard so the EPA reviewed the legislative history. The legislative
history was conflicting and ambiguous, reflecting many of the perils of
straying beyond the text of a statute itself.2 4 Therefore, the EPA
202. Montanav. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998).
203. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards' Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,880.

204. Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit has recognized the hazards of relying
on legislative history:

One may say.., that legislative history is a poor guide to legislators' intent
because it is written by the staff rather than by members of Congress, because
it is often losers' history ("If you can't get your proposal into the bill, at least
write the legislative history to make it look as if you'd prevailed"), because it
becomes a crutch ("There's no need for us to vote on the amendment if we
can write a little legislative history"), because it complicates the task of
execution and obedience (neither judges nor those whose conduct is
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concluded that "[g]iven that the legislative history ultimately is
ambiguous and inconclusive, EPA believes that it should not find that
the statute expands or limits the scope of Tribal authority beyond that
inherent in the Tribe absent an express indication of Congressional
intent to do so."0 5 The EPA was saying section 518(e) is not an express
grant of additional authority to qualified tribes, but is only a
mechanism to recognize authority that they already possess. In light of
this finding, the EPA reached two important conclusions. The first was
that for a tribe to receive TAS status under the CWA, it would need to
have inherent authority over the waters it desired to regulate.2 6 That is,
the second Montana exception needed to be satisfied. The second
finding was that a tribe will need to make an affirmative demonstrationof
its inherent authority to the EPA.207 This had to be done by
completing the TAS application and providing verifying
documentation in support of the tribe's authority. In sum, according
to the EPA, section 518(e) authorized TAS treatment over activities
already within a tribe's inherent authority and the tribe must supply
proof that such authority exists.
v. The EPA's Presumption of Inherent Authority
At first glance, it appears there is a formidable roadblock to a tribe
obtaining TAS status. After all, the idea of inherent authority over an
activity that threatens or has a direct serious and substantial effect on
the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare
of the tribe is seemingly amorphous and malleable. Now, the EPA
supposed to be influenced by the law can know what to do without delving
into legislative recesses, a costly and uncertain process). Often there is so
much legislative history that a court can manipulate the meaning of a law by
choosing which snippets to emphasize and by putting hypothetical
questions--questions to be answered by inferences from speeches rather
than by reference to the text, so that great discretion devolves on the
(judicial) questioner.
In reSinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989).
205. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,880 (emphasis added).
206. At this point, this article becomes unconcerned with the first Montana
exception. The consensual relationship concept is much more clear-cut and unlikely
to give rise to complicated disputes. In any event, it is not a subject of EPA
deliberation during the TAS rulemaking process, nor is it at issue in Wisconsin v. EPA.
207. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,881
The Agency does not believe.., that it would be appropriate to recognize
Tribal authority and approve treatment as a State requests in the absence of
verifying documentation. In addition, in light of the legislative history of
section 518, the question of whether section 518(e) is an explicit delegation
of authority over non-Indians is not resolved. Therefore, the EPA does not
believe it is currently appropriate to eliminate the requirement that Tribes
make an affirmative demonstration of their regulatory authority. EPA will
authorize Tribes to exercise responsibility for the water quality standards
program once the Tribe shows that, in light of the factual circumstances and
the generalized findings EPA has made regarding reservation water quality, it
possess the requisite authority.
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required "proof' of such authority from the tribes. From the legalese
terminology to the desire for "evidence," it sounded almost as if the
intent was to intimidate tribes from applying for TAS designation.
To the contrary though, the EPA made the showing of inherent
authority quite easy. In fact, although the Agency makes the ultimate
decision concerning tribal jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis,"'8 "the
Agency presumes that, in general, Tribes are likely to possess the
authority to regulate activities affecting water quality on the
reservation. " 'O' The EPA provided numerous reasons for this
presumption including: (1) the Agency has "special expertise [in]
recognizing that clean water... is absolutely crucial to the survival of
many Indian reservations;"1 0 (2) the enactment of the CWA itself
constitutes a legislative finding that activities which affect water quality
"may have serious and substantial impacts,"21 (3) the mobile nature of
pollutants may cause serious and substantialimpacts even if they do not
originate on Indian owned lands;2 12 (4) Congress expressed a
preference for tribal regulation of reservation water quality;2 and (5)
water quality management protects public health and safety and,
therefore, is critical to self-government. 4 The EPA collectively labels
these: "generalized findings regarding the relationship of water quality
to tribal health and welfare."2 '
These generalized findings
"supplement[] the factual showing a tribe makes in applying for
treatment as a State."21 6 The obvious intent of this structure is to allow
an applicant tribe to meet the Montana second exception without
difficulty.
The EPA incorporated this intent into the TAS application
process. Recall the criteria •that the• regulations
require an applicant to
•
217
meet in order to receive TAS designation.
The EPA frankly admits
that to meet those requirements, a tribal application for TAS status
"will need to make a relatively simple showing of facts"21 8 asserting that:
"(1) there are waters within the reservation used by the tribe, (2) the
waters and critical habitat are subject to protection under CWA, and
(3) impairment of waters would have a serious and substantial effect
on the health and welfare of the tribe."219 Once the tribe meets this
208. Id. at 64,878, 64,881.
209. Id. at 64,881.
210. I& at 64,878.
211. Id. (emphasis added).
212. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,878 (emphasis added).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 64,879 (emphasis added).
215. Id.; see also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 1998).
216. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,879; see also Montana v. EPA, 137
F.3d at 1139.
217. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(a)(1)-(4) (2001).
218. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,879.
219. Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1139.

Issue 2

WISCONSIN V. EPA

initial burden, the EPA will, in light of the facts presented by the tribe
and supplemented by the Agency's generalized findings regarding the
relationship of water to tribal health and welfare, presume an actual
showing of tribal jurisdiction over fee lands.2 0 Unless an appropriate
governmental entity demonstrates a tribe's lack of jurisdiction, the
EPA will find that the tribe has inherent authorit and will grant it TAS
status for administering water quality standards.2
D. OPPOSING A TRIBE'S APPLICATION FOR "TREATMENT AS A STATE"
STATUS

The EPA's regulations include a specific procedure for the EPA's
Regional Administrator to follow when processing an Indian tribe's
application for TAS status to administer water quality standards. 2 The
regulations require the Administrator provide "appropriate notice" to
"all appropriate governmental entities" within thirty days after receipt
of a tribe's TAS application.2 3 The notice "shall include information
on the substance and basis of the Tribe's assertion of authority to
regulate the quality of reservation waters."2 4 The governmental
entities have thirty days to submit comments on the tribal application
and the Administrator must consider such comments when evaluating
whether the tribe should be granted TAS status.22 5 This process is
important because, as discussed above, unless an appropriate
governmental entity can demonstrate that a tribe lacks jurisdiction
over reservation waters, the EPA will presume that the applicant tribe
has inherent authority to set water quality standards. The notice and
comment procedure is a governmental entity's primary opportunity to
oppose TAS status. The regulations raise two important questions: (1)
what exactly is an "appropriate governmental entity" permitted to
comment on the TAS application?; and (2) are there any limitations to
the permissible scope of the governmental entities' comments and
challenges to a TAS application? These questions will be addressed in
turn.
1. "Appropriate" Governmental Entities: Who May Challenge?
The concept of which governmental agencies are permitted to
comment on a tribe's TAS application is of great interest to any locale
or industry that may be affected by an Indian tribe being granted TAS
status to set water quality standards. In other words, under the EPA's
regulations, what is an "appropriate governmental entity?" There are
many state, county, local, and tribal governments that may have
important interests at stake if a particular tribe is given authority to set
220. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,879.
221. Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1139.
222. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8.
223. Id. § 131.8(c) (2) (ii).
224. Id. § 131.8(c) (2) (i).
225. Id. §§ 131.8(c) (3), 131.8(c) (4).
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water quality standards for reservation waters. For instance, in
Albuquerque v. Browner, would the city of Albuquerque have been an
"appropriate governmental entity" entitled to comment on the Isleta
Pueblo Indian Tribe's assertion of authority to adopt water quality
standards for the Rio Grande water flowing through the reservation?
Does a state that is located three or four states upstream from the
reservation receive notice and comment privileges? What about a local
county government coordinating a "regional water reclamation
program? The result in Albuquerque v. Browner made clear that these
and other governmental entities may be drastically affected by the
imposition of tribal water quality standards if a TAS application is
approved.2
Recognizing this, during the notice and comment period for the
proposed regulations specifying the TAS criteria and application
processing procedures, several commentators requested clarification
227
of what would be considered "appropriate governmental entities."
The EPA responded that the phrase "appropriate governmental
entities" would be defined as "States, Tribes, and other Federal entities
located contiguous to the reservation of the Tribe which is applying
for treatment as a State."28 Thus, the EPA not only significantly
narrowed the type of governmental entity that could participate, but
also curtailed the number of participants by restricting the geographic
connection the entity must have with the tribe. Interestingly, the EPA
also decided that neighboring tribes will be treated as "appropriate
governmental
entities" whether or not they have obtained TAS
229
status.

With respect to local governments such as cities and counties, the
EPA excluded them from the definition of "appropriate governmental
entities." 3 ° Not only are these entities not entitled to notice under the
regulations, but also, if such governments catch wind of a pending
TAS application and submit comments challenging a tribe's assertion
of authority, the EPA will not consider such comments.2 1 However,
the EPA does encourage local governments to direct their comments
to the "appropriate State governments" which may then include such
concerns in any comments they chose to submit.2 2 To encourage such
involvement, the EPA stated that it would "make an effort to provide
notice to local governments by placing an announcement in
appropriate newspapers... [that] will advise interested parties to
direct comments on Tribal authority to appropriate State
226. See City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 424-26 (10th Cir. 1996).
227. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,884 (Dec. 12, 1991)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
228. Id.

229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,884.
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governments.""' s This appears to be a strangely contradictory element
of the EPA's policy. The Agency first says that local governments are
not "appropriate governmental agencies" and will not receive notice of
a TAS application or an opportunity to comment. Then, in the same
breath, it decides to provide publication notice to local governments
and encourages them to submit their comments to the EPA through
the state. Why not provide notice and an opportunity to directly
comment in the first instance? Or, at the very least, why not provide
local governments with the same type and quality of notice that it
provides to states,3 4 even if such notice only advises the local
government to direct comments to the state government? If not
internally inconsistent, the EPA's approach is, at best, inefficient. 25
Finally, the EPA clarified that the notice and comment procedure
for TAS applications is "not intended to establish any form of
adjudication or arbitration process to resolve differences between State
and Tribal governments."2 Instead, the comments are simply another
piece of information for the EPA to evaluate as it deliberates whether a
tribe has the requisite authority to receive TAS status. 23' The EPA thus
quashed any notions of the existence of a dispute resolution process
before TAS status is granted, and reinforced that the Agency is the sole
determiner of a tribe's eligibility for TAS designation.
2. Limitations: What May Be Challenged?'
Once it was determined that states, tribes, and other federal
entities would be the only participants in the notice and comment
process, the question arose as to about what, exactly, the EPA would
permit these parties to comment. In practical terms, the question
became: what type of objections would the EPA consider in opposition
to a tribe's TAS application and what, if anything, was excluded from
challenge?
The proposed regulations had indeed narrowed the allowable
subject matter of comments. The proposed rule stated: "The Regional
Administrator shall provide thirty days for comments to be submitted
on the Tribal application. Comments shall be limited to the Tribe's assertion
of authority.""8 This rule is a pared down way for the EPA to say that it
233. Id.
234. When alerting the state of a tribe's TAS application, the EPA provides notice to
"the most appropriate State contacts which may include, for example, the Governor,
Attorney General, or the appropriate environmental agency head." Id. This is
certainly a more reliable and targeted type of notice than the mere publication notice
which the EPA will "make an effort" to provide for local governments.
235. From a practical standpoint, it seems that it would be administratively more
burdensome to identify the appropriate local newspapers and manage the logistics of
proper publication notice than it would be to simply send a single form notice to the
appropriate local government contact in the first instance.
236. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,884.
237. Id
238. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulations that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 54 Fed. Reg. 39,098, 39,108 (proposed Sept. 22,
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intended only to consider comments that addressed the third criterion
needed for TAS designation. As described above, the third criterion
concerns the question of whether the waters in which the tribe sought
to regulate are within the borders and "held" by the tribe either
directly or indirectly.2 9 The answer to this question turns on whether
the tribe has inherent authority over the waters for which it seeks to
administer water quality standards, thus invoking the EPA's use of the
second Montana exception. 4 ' Consequently, the proposed EPA rule
only allowed comments on whether a tribe applying for TAS
designation actually had inherent authority over the waters it sought to
regulate.
This proposed rule did not sit well with governmental entities that
were prospective challengers to TAS applications. In their comments
to the proposed rule, they claimed that it was "unlawful to limit public
comment to just the Tribal demonstration of authority [and that the
regulations] should allow public review of all four statutory criteria. " ",
The EPA rejected this assertion. The Agency reasoned that the CWA
does not require the EPA to provide notice and comment on TAS
applications to begin with; therefore, if the Agency chose to accept
comments at all it was within its discretion what subjects would receive
consideration. But why did the EPA pick the third criterion-the
tribe's assertion of authority over the waters? The Agency's answer was
that it believed that it did not need any outside input to accurately
decide the other TAS criteria.242 That is, the Agency was sufficiently
informed to determine whether the tribe is federally recognized, is a
governing body carrying out governmental powers, and is capable of
administering an effective water quality standards program. Accepting
comments on these criteria, according the EPA, would unnecessarily
complicate and delay the TAS application process. 43
In contrast, the "EPA believes that providing for comment on the
authority criterion is appropriate because this is the only criterion
which outside comments might help to address.", 44 Implicit in this
belief is the Agency's concession that it may not have access to, or have
the wherewithal to locate, all of the pertinent information concerning
a tribe's asserted inherent authority. Another reason may be that the
"authority criterion" may be the one criterion that the commenting
1989) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131) (emphasis added).
239. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(a) (3) (2001).
240. The reason for this, as explained above, is that the EPA had interpreted section
518(e) to not be an express grant of regulatory authority over all reservation waters
(despite the "or otherwise within the borders of an Indian reservation" language in the
statute).
Under Montana, without an express delegation, tribal regulation of
reservation waters would only be granted if tribes could demonstrate inherent
authority over the waters.
241. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,884 (Dec. 12, 1991)
(codified at 40 C.F.RI pt. 131).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id,
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governmental entities are in the best position to challenge. That is,
unlike the other TAS criteria, other states may oppose tribal authority
over certain waters because it believes that the subject waters are
actually "held" by the state and could not be the subject of a tribe's
inherent authority. A state may be asserting authority over the same
waters that a tribe wants to regulate; this factor makes the "authority
criterion" unique.
In the end, the EPA adopted its proposed rule. In doing so, the
EPA significantly limited the number of comments that it would have
The final
to contend with when processing a TAS application.
regulations limit comments from appropriate government entities
about a TAS application to a tribe's assertion of authority."' Only
states, tribes, and other federal entities located contiguous to the
applicant's reservation are allowed to comment on a tribe's request for
TAS designation. The limitations incorporated in this rule appear to
tip the decisional scale in favor of Indian tribes receiving TAS status, a
viewpoint that becomes a major point of contention in Wisconsin v.
EPA.
One may argue that not only does the EPA start with the
presumption that an applicant tribe will have inherent authority over
reservation waters, but also, that such a presumption is practically
The strict
irrebuttable by a challenging governmental entity.
limitations placed on the notice and comment opportunities, the
EPA's generalized findings supporting tribal inherent authority, the
EPA's finding of congressional policy favoring tribal regulation of
water quality, and the EPA's express statements espousing a preference
for delegation of authority to tribes all buttress the position that
challenges to a TAS application by appropriate governmental entities
will be futile. Of course, the response to this contention is that the
entire notice and comment procedure for TAS applications is not
statutorily required in the first instance, and the EPA is in fact being
generous by allowing it. It would thus follow that there is no basis to
complain about the restrictive nature of the comment process or the
presumptive position in favor of tribal authority.
Is the opportunity to comment on tribal authority over particular
water resources nothing but an illusory mechanism with a foregone
conclusion? Is there any objectivity in the analysis of a tribe's asserted
authority over reservation waters? Are there effective legal challenges
an "appropriate governmental entity" can make in opposition to a
tribe's TAS designation? These questions, as well as the numerous
other issues discussed so far in this article, arise in the important case
of Wisconsin v. EPA.

245.

40 C.F.R- § 131.8(c) (2001).
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IV. WHEN THE GOVERNMENTAL ENTIT'IS CHALLENGE TO
"TREATMENT AS A STATE" DESIGNATION HAS FAILED - MAY
IT PLEASE THE COURT: WISCONSIN V. EPA
When the EPA grants or denies treatment as a state status to a
tribe, it is not necessarily the end of the line for the tribe or the
governmental entities challenging the tribe's authority. The EPA is,
after all, a federal administrative agency whose decisions are subject to
judicial review by the federal courts. Because of the ease with which a
tribe may demonstrate inherent authority over reservation waters and
the EPA's proclivity to grant TAS status, the most likely factual scenario
for judicial review is where a governmental entity is seeking review of a
TAS designation. Such a situation played out recently when the state
of Wisconsin sought judicial review of the EPA's decision to grant TAS
status to the Sokaogon Chippewa Community Indian Tribe for
purposes of setting water quality standards under section 303 and
certifying compliance with those standards under section 401. In
Wisconsin v. EPA, 46 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
rejected Wisconsin's opposition to the TAS designation, thus
establishing a high threshold for a governmental entity to successfully
challenge a grant of TAS status.
A. BACK ON THEIR HEELS: THE STANDARD OF REVIEW OF TAS

DECISIONS

It is especially important for purposes of this article to pay
attention to the standard of review used by a federal court in reviewing
a TAS designation. While the standard ofjudicial review is perhaps a
mundane subject needing only quick mentioning in other contexts,
the instant case demonstrates the application of review standards and
attendant difficulties encountered by governmental entities opposing
tribal authority status.
The well-settled rule is that a federal court will grant an agency
substantial deference when reviewing its decisions. The Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA) 2 47 dictates that when an administrative agency
is interpreting an agency-administered statute as applied to a
particular set of circumstances, the reviewing court may only set aside
the agency action if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law.", 4 This standard applies
when a court is reviewing agency fact-finding and, as applied, is very
deferential.249
Furthermore, the long-standing test fashioned by the Supreme
Court in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council" supports
upholding agency interpretations of statutes they administer. In
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001).
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
Id. § 706(2) (a).
CAE, Inc. v. Clear Air Eng'g, Inc., 267 F.3d 660, 675 (7th Cir. 2001).
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Chevron, the Court held that "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute."25 Following this standard, when a lawsuit is brought by a
governmental entity challenging the EPA's finding of tribal authority
over the reservation waters, the first step is to look at the CWA itself.
Section 518 of the CWA does not address what standards to apply in
order to ascertain whether a tribe has authority over reservation
waters. That is, the statute does not explain how to determine if the
waters are "held" directly or indirectly by the tribe, how to administer
the application process, or what competing claims of authority over
the subject waters may trump a tribe's claim. However, section 518 is
not completely silent; it expressly directs the EPA to "promulgate final
regulations which specify how Indian tribes shall be treated as States
for purposes of this chapter." 25 ' The TAS regulations promulgated by
the EPA are also "given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."253
Finally, not only will the promulgated regulations specifying the
TAS designation procedure receive a "light touch review," but the
actual decisions the EPA makes in applying those regulations will also
receive substantial deference. The Supreme Court reiterated this
viewpoint recently when it stated: "[w] e have recognized a very good
indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express
congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking
or adjudication that produces regulations or rulingsfor which deference is
claimed."24 Thus, the EPA's decision (arising from its promulgated
regulations) whether or not to grant a tribe TAS status to administer
water quality standards will also receive substantial deference.

251. Id. at 843.
252. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(3).
253. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.
Id. In Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit rejected a
facial challenge to TAS regulations. The court in Montana found that the EPA is not
entitled to deference concerning the scope of tribal authority because it is a question of
law, it has nothing to do with the EPA's expertise, and it was not a subject specifilcally
committed to the EPA's regulation. Notwithstanding this heightened level of review,
the court held the EPA had not "committed any material mistakes of law in its
delineation of the scope of inherent tribal authority." Id. at 1140.
254. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (emphasis added); see
also Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 2001).
[T]he EPA here has interpreted the statute by promulgating formal
regulations, using plenary notice-and-comment procedures, and then
implementing its rule with respect to the Band through a formal process in
which the State was entitled to be heard. Its regulationsand subsequent decision
are therefore entitled to deference under Mead and Chevron. (emphasis
added).
Id. at 746.
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The ultimate result combines the APA's standard of review for
agency factfinding with Chevron's deference to an agency's
promulgation and application of congressionally mandated
regulations. Accordingly, when a governmental entity fails to convince
the EPA that a tribe does not have the requisite authority for TAS
status, the government must challenge the EPA's decision under the
arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law
standard.25 5 This deferential standard makes challenging the grant of
TAS status in the courts exceedingly difficult.
B. FACTS
Judge Wood's opinion explained the backdrop of Wisconsin v. EPA
very clearly and, for that reason, this article shall generally restate the
court's

articulation

of the

facts 56

(with

some

supplementary

information from the parties' briefs and other materials).
The
Sokaogon Chippewa Community is an Indian tribe located in
northeastern Wisconsin on an 1,850 acre reservation. The tribe is also
known as the Mole Lake Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians and
thus is referred to by the court as "the Band." 57 There are three lakes
on or adjacent to the Band's reservation: Mole Lake, Bishop Lake, and
Rice Lake. Rice Lake, which lies at the headwaters of the Wolf River,
is the largest waterbody on the reservation and is one of the last
remaining ancient wild rice beds in the state of Wisconsin.259 The wild
rice serves as a significant dietary, economic, and cultural resource for
the Band. Each year in early autumn, the Band holds the traditional
rice harvest on Rice Lake in the same manner as they have done for
many years.2 6 The harvest is a significant part of the Band's heritage. 6'
Furthermore, the Band is generally reliant on all of its reservation
water resources for food, fresh water, medicines, and raw materials.6 2
A unique characteristic of the Mole Lake reservation is that all of
the land within the reservation is held by the United States in trust for
the tribe; none of the land is owned in fee by non-members of the
tribe. This fact obviates many of the legal and policy intricacies of the
Montana test because there is no concern about regulating activity by
non-members of the tribe on fee lands within the reservation.
In August of 1994, the Band applied for TAS status to administer
water quality standards for reservation waters. 263 Pursuant to TAS

255. Conversely, this standard would apply equally where a tribe challenges the
EPA's denial of TAS designation.
256. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 744-45.

257. Id. at 745.
258. Great Lakes Intertribal Council, Sokaogon (Mole Lake) Band of Chippewa Indians,

at http://www.glitc.org/mlchip.htm.
259. Id
260. Wild Rice Harvest, Article by Olive Glasgo, at http://www.molelake.com/.

261. Id.
262. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 745.
263. Id.
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application processing regulations, the EPA notified Wisconsin of the
Band's TAS application submission. The EPA invited comment from
Wisconsin concerning the Band's assertion of authority over
reservation waters and any competing claim of jurisdiction the state
may have. "Wisconsin opposed the application, arguing that it was
sovereign over all of the navigable waters in the state, including those
on the reservation, and that its sovereignty precluded any tribal
regulation."2 " Specifically, Wisconsin sent two letters to the EPA
claiming that the Equal Footing Doctrine reserved all navigable waters
and land under them to the people of the states, and that the creation
of the Mole Lake reservation ninety-one years after Wisconsin was
admitted to the Union did not divest the state of its authority over
those waters. 65 Wisconsin emphasized that the EPA interpreted
section 518(e) of the CWA as intending only to recognize authority
the tribe already possessed; not to grant any new authority.2
Wisconsin argued that under the Equal Footing Doctrine the state
possessed sovereignty over reservation waters long before the Mole
Lake reservation was even created; therefore any grant of authority to
the Band over such waters would extend new authority to the Band
rather than simply recognize preexistingjurisdiction.
After extensive administrative hearings, the EPA granted TAS
status to the Band for section 303 and 401 purposes. The EPA
determined the Band met all four TAS criteria including
demonstration of inherent authority over all of the reservation waters.
In granting TAS status to the Band, the EPA dismissed Wisconsin's
Equal Footing Doctrine argument primarily for two reasons. First,
Wisconsin's reading of the doctrine as giving the state absolute
authority over the waters overlying the submerged beds was overbroad.
That is, even if the state has title to the shores and submerged beds of
reservation waters, such rights do not trump the federal government's
constitutional authority to regulate the navigable waters of the United
States. Second, neither the Equal Footing Doctrine nor title to
lakebeds is mentioned in section 518 of the CWA. Congress did not
limit TAS designation to those tribes who owned submerged lands
within their reservations. According to the EPA, inherent authority
over reservation waters does not turn on who holds title to land
underlying the waters. Consequently the Band received TAS status
despite Wisconsin's objections to the application.
This plot, of course, is not without all the essential characters of a
classic environmental melodrama. Upstream from Rice Lake on the
Wolf River was a large, nearly completed, privately owned, zinc-copper
sulfide mine. 261 Mines create substantial point source discharges
264. 1&
265. Brief for Appellant at 10-11, Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001)
(No. 99-2618).
266. See Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,880 (Dec. 12, 1991)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
267. In the court's opinion,Judge Wood characterized the Band's TAS designation
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containing various pollutants that mandate NPDES permits.2'6 In
addition, "[a]lthough mining permits are issued by various State
agencies, the Office of Water may review State issued permits to ensure
compliance with water quality criteria and ensure that effluent
guidelines for ore/coal mining and processing are properly applied to
wastewater discharges from these activities."269 Now the picture
becomes clear; if the Band received TAS status, it would likely set water
quality standards stringent enough to proscribe some or all of the
discharge from the upstream mine. Without being able to discharge
certain amounts into the river, the operation of the mine may be
severely limited or completely prohibited.
On January 25, 1996, Wisconsin filed an action with the District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin seeking revocation of the
EPA's grant of TAS status to the Band. On April 28, 1999, the district
court upheld the TAS designation on summary judgment. The court
found that the EPA reasonably interpreted its regulations when it
determined that a tribe could regulate all water within a reservation
regardless of who owned the submerged lands. Two months later
Wisconsin filed a notice of appeal and the Band intervened as a
defendant, filing a brief in support of TAS designation.
Oral
argument commenced on November 6, 2000 before a panel of the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals consisting of Judges Diane Wood,
Ann Williams, and Michael Kanne. More than ten months after oral
argument, in late September of 2001,"' Judge Wood issued a
unanimous opinion.
C. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
At the outset of its opinion, the court of appeals pointed out that
this case was ripe for adjudication. It did not matter that the Band had
not yet promulgated specific water quality standards resulting in any
sort of restriction on an upstream discharge or to an ongoing project.
Wisconsin's real challenge, the court explained, was the grant of TAS
status to the Band. By granting TAS status, the EPA effectively created
a state-like entity within the borders of Wisconsin. 7' If the court found
as "an action with the potential to throw a wrench into the state's planned
construction of... [the] mine." Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 745. In its Petition for
Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc of the Seventh Circuit Panel's
decision, Wisconsin characterized judge Wood's statement as a "glaring factual error."
Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 13-14, Wisconsin v.
EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-2618). Wisconsin sought to clarify that a
private company, not the state, was planning and constructing the mine. However,
even if true, this fact does not necessarily negate the state's likely concern over the
potentially stifling effect of the Band's water quality standards on economic
development upstream from the reservation (including the mine in question).
268. See generally EPA Office of Water, Office of Wastewater Management, Mining, at
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/indpermitting/mining.cfm?program-id=14
(last
modified Nov. 26, 2001).
269. I&
270. This delay perhaps reflected the intricacies of the issues involved in this case.
271. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 745.
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this action improvident, there was a present injury caused by the EPA
that the court had the power to remedy.
Turning to the substantive analysis, the court noted that
"Wisconsin is challenging the EPA's findings only with respect to the
third requirement for TAS status-the demonstration of the tribe's
inherent authority to regulate water quality within the borders of the
reservation."2 " The court was merely highlighting that the state was
renewing challenges it was permitted to make during the notice and
This raises the interesting question of whether,
comment period.
despite the state's inability to submit comments on other TAS criteria,
it could seek judicial review of conclusions pertaining to those criteria,
e.g., a tribe's capability to administer a water quality standards
program. In this case, however, the sole focus was on the EPA's
finding that the Band sufficiently demonstrated inherent authority
over the waters it sought to regulate.
1. Not "Within the Borders"
The court quickly rejected Wisconsin's argument that Rice Lake
was not within the borders of the Mole Lake Reservation. The
argument was never presented to the district court and was not made
to the EPA during the comment period; as a result, it was waived. 5
For good measure, the court noted that even if it were to consider the
argument, it would be of no merit. "Rice Lake is almost completely
surrounded by reservation land (and the small percentage that is not
abuts off-reservation trust lands)."276 In these circumstances, the EPA
could reasonably conclude that Rice Lake was sufficiently within the
27
Thus, while the argument was technically
reservation's bordersY.
waived by Wisconsin, the court took the opportunity to make a
significant statement concerning the geographic scope of waters that
may fall within the purview of tribal regulation. It is conceivable that
in the future, a tribe involved in similar litigation would cite to the
court's judicial dictum.7

272. Id.; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
273. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 746.
274. Id. at 745.
275. Id at 746.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. SeeAlloy Int'l Co. v. Hoover-NSK Bearing Co., 635 F.2d 1222,,1225 n.5 (7th Cir.
1980) (discussingjudicial dictum); see also Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715 (Ill. 1993)
The term 'dictum' is generally used as an abbreviation of obiter dictum, which
means a remark or opinion uttered by the way. Such an expression or
opinion as a general rule is not binding as authority or precedent within the
stare decisis rule. On the other hand, an expression of opinion upon a point
in a case argued by counsel and deliberately passed upon by the court,
though not essential to the disposition of the cause, if dictum, is a judicial
dictum. And further, ajudicial dictum is entitled to much weight, and should
be followed unless found to be erroneous (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 717.
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2. The Equal Footing Doctrine
The court next addressed Wisconsin's renewal of its argument that
the tribe simply could not have authority over reservation waters
because the state had title to reservation waters and lands submerged
beneath those waters pursuant to the Equal Footing Doctrine. The
Equal Footing Doctrine took shape in Pollard v. Hagan2" where the
United States Supreme Court held that a state receives absolute title to
the beds of navigable waterways within its boundaries upon admission
to the Union.2 0 The general premise flowing from the Equal Footing
Doctrine is that newly admitted states have the same rights,
sovereignty, and jurisdiction over their lands as the original thirteen
states.
Since the original states had title to the submerged lands
within their borders, then so must the states subsequently admitted to
the Union. 22 Thus, in Pollard"the Court established the absolute title
of the States to the beds of navigable waters, a title which neither a
provision in the Act admitting the State to the Union nor a grant from
Congress to a third party was capable of defeating.283

Ownership of the submerged lands, however, does not result in a
state's absolute right to regulate the overlying waters. In Montana v.
United States, the Court explained:
[T]he ownership of land under navigable waters is an incident of
sovereignty. As a general principle, the Federal Government holds
such lands in trust for future States, to be granted to such States when
they enter the Union and assume sovereignty on an "equal footing"
with the established States. After a State enters the Union, title to the
land is governed by state law. The State's power over the beds of navigable
waters remains subject to only one limitation: the paramount power of the
United Sttes to ensure that such waters remain free to interstate and foreign
commerce.

Thus, the federal government retains a dominant navigable servitude
to regulate waters of the country under the Commerce Clause." 5 The
tension becomes apparent, as Wisconsin is sovereign over the land on
which the water in the state sits, while the overlying water is always
subject to the extensive power of the Commerce Clause.8 6 The CWA

279.
280.

44 U.S. 212 (1845).
Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 374

(1977).
281. Pollard,44 U.S. at 230.
282. Id. at 229.
283. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. at 374; see also Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 283-85 (1997).
284. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981) (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
285. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824) ("The power of Congress [under
the Commerce Clause], then, comprehends navigation, within the limits of every State
in the Union; so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with
'commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian
tribes'.").
286. See United States v. Schaffner, 258 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2001).
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itself is an example of the federal government asserting its Commerce
Clause authority over the quality of navigable waters throughout the
nation. 287 Only through federal delegation, strictly overseen, may a
state administer its own programs under the CWA. Indeed, even in
one of the savings clauses of the CWA, Congress chose its words very
carefully in specifying what water rights states reserve under the Act:
"[i]t is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to
allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be
superceded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this chapter.""'
The Equal Footing Doctrine argument Wisconsin put forth is not
cleanly disposed of by reference to a single case or statute.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals convincingly rejected the argument.
The court started its analysis by assuming Wisconsin did in fact have
title to the beds of water within the reservation. The court next
addressed the case of Wisconsin v. Baker,"9 which Wisconsin
continuously cited to in its briefs. In Baker, the Chippewa Indians
claimed that an 1854 treaty with the United States creating the tribe's
reservation in Wisconsin also gave the tribe the exclusive right to hunt
and fish in reservation waters.
As a result, the tribe contended, it
had the power to restrict public hunting and fishing in those lakes.
However, eight years prior to the treaty creating the reservation,
Wisconsin had been admitted to the Union on "equal footing" with
the original states.!" Therefore, it obtained title to all submerged
lands including those that eventually were encompassed within the
reservation boundaries.
In Baker, the court of appeals made two important findings. First,
the 1854 treaty was silent concerning any grant of exclusive hunting

[I]n determining whether Congress, in exercising its power under the
Commerce Clause, has acted within the bounds of its constitutional
authority, we must keep in mind that congressional power under the
Commerce Clause "is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
Constitution."
Id. at 678 (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196).
287. See United States v. Hartsell, 127 F.3d 343, 348 n.1 (4th Cir. 1997) (explaining
that the CWA is certainly a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause); Burnette v. Rowland, Nos. 3:94-CV-00420, 3:94-CV-00676, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11710, at *8 (D. Conn. May 4, 1998) ("Congress enacted RCRA and the CWA,
along with CERCLA, pursuant to the Commerce Clause.").
288. 33 U.S.C. § 125 1 (g) (1994) (emphasis added). Wisconsin also attempts to rely
on another savings clause in the CWA which declares that nothing in the Act shall be
"construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or.jurisdiction of the
States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such States." Id
§ 1370(2). Wisconsin contended that this provision reinforced that § 518(e) could not
be used to trump its preexisting title and control over reservation waters. This
argument does not further Wisconsin's position because it merely begs the question of
whether Wisconsin actually obtained title to and exclusive control over the reservation
waters pursuant to the Equal Footing Doctrine.
289. 698 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir. 1983).
290. Id. at 1333.
291. Id,
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and fishing rights on reservation waters to the Chippewa Tribe.! 2
Second, the power to regulate fishing and hunting on navigable lakes
was one of the powers held by the original thirteen states incidental to
their ownership of the submerged lands;23 therefore, when Wisconsin
was admitted to the Union on "equal footing," it was vested with
regulatory power over hunting and fishing.24 The court determined
that the Equal Footing Doctrine gave Wisconsin both title to the
submerged lands in the state and the power to regulate hunting and
fishing on all of the state's navigable waters. Since the court found
that neither the 1854 treaty nor any other action by the United States
government clearly divested Wisconsin of its regulatory power over
hunting or fishing on navigable waters, the Chippewa Tribe could not
claim it had that same authority over reservation waters.
Judge Wood rejected Wisconsin's heavy reliance on Baker on three
grounds. First, Baker was decided before section 518(e) of the CWA
was enacted. "The legal structure governing Baker involved only the
treaty that created the reservation, and that treaty did not contain any
language regarding the tribe's power to regulate reservation waters.
In this case, there exists section 518(e) of the CWA that allows a
delegation of authority to Indian tribes over reservation waters when
specific statutory and regulatory criteria are satisfied. 96 Additionally,
there is nothing in section 518(e) that limits such TAS grants only to
those tribes with title to the submerged lands of reservation waters.
Second, unlike the Band in this case, the Chippewa Tribe in Baker
did "not contend that public fishing and hunting pose[d] an
imminent threat to the political integrity, the economic security, or
the health or welfare of the [tribe]." ' As a result, the court found
that not only did the Chippewa Tribe lack express authority to regulate
reservation waters under the treaty, but also it did not make a claim
that it had inherent authority under the second Montana exception.
More importantly, to Judge Wood, the Baker court's line of reasoning
indicated that the court "left open the possibility that state ownership
of lake beds may not preclude tribal authority over the waters if tribal
regulation was necessary to protect the 'political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare' of the Band." s Thus,
contrary to Wisconsin's arguments, the Baker decision did not
foreclose the possibility of a tribe obtaining regulatory authority over
reservation waters even where the reservation was created subsequent
to the state acquiring title to the submerged lands. 99
292. Id. at 1333-34.
293. Id.; see also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 550-51 n.1 (1981).
294. Baker, 698 F.2d at 1333-34.
295. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 2001).
296. Id.
297. Baker, 698 F.2d at 1335 (internal quotations omitted).
298. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 747.
299. Wisconsin makes too much out of the Baker court's explanation that state
regulation of hunting and fishing on state waters arises from the state's title to the
submerged lands. Wisconsin asserts that such authority must mean that the state has
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Finally, the court of appeals rejected the application of Baker
because it concerned hunting and fishing rights, which traditionally
fall within the purview of state regulation.
In contrast, Wisconsin v.
EPA concerned water quality standards of navigable waters. Unlike
hunting and fishing rights, the federal government (i.e., the EPA), not
the state, regulates water quality.30 In fact, the state can only act in this
area when and how the federal government allows it. It is the
revocable delegation of authority by the EPA that enables Wisconsin to
set water quality standards for the state and to administer an NPDES
permit program.
After discrediting Baker as inapplicable to this case, the court went
on to describe "legal principles" that were applicable. According to the
court, these principles all "support the EPA's determination that a
state's title to a lake bed does not in itself exempt the waters from all
outside regulation." 3 Put another way, these concepts explain why
the Equal Footing Doctrine is not an obstacle to a tribe obtaining TAS
status.
The first concept is Congress's expansive power to regulate
navigable waters of the United States under the Commerce Clause as
discussed above. The court's strongest statement rejecting Wisconsin's
equal footing argument came when it pointed out that:
[Congress's Commerce Clause power over navigable waters] has not
been eroded in any way by the Equal Footing Doctrine cases, which
"involved only the shores of and lands beneath navigable waters.
[The doctrine] cannot be accepted as limiting the broad powers of
the United
States to regulate navigable waters under the Commerce
3 4

Clause."

There is simply no body of precedent that gives states unbridled
regulatory authority over the actual water that passes through or
overlays the submerged lands they own. 0 5 Despite Wisconsin's
references to case law, which make remarks that "navigable waters
uniquely implicate sovereign state interests," 0 6 it ignores what Judge
Wood ultimately finds controlling. Since Pollard,states have received
title to the waters and the exclusive right to control the use thereof. This is quite a
leap! In fact, it seems that authority to regulate hunting and fishing as an incident to
submerged land ownership is just that: the authority to regulate hunting and fishing.
300. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 747.
301. Id.
302. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (1994) (explaining procedure for EPA's
withdrawal of an EPA approved state NPDES program for noncompliance).
303. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 747.
304. Id. (citing Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-98 (1963)).
305. States do manage appropriation and riparian water distribution systems. The
CWA contemplates that it can coexist with such systems. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (g).
306. Wisconsin's citation to Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 282-84 (1997)
does not promote its position. In fact the majority of the language from the opinion
that is cited explains that only the lands underlying navigable waters are "sovereign
lands." Simply because "navigable waters uniquely implicate [state] sovereign
interests" does not mean states receive title to the waters themselves. See generally id.
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both title and authority specifically over submerged lands and shores
within the state. This separation of underlying lands and shores from
the overlying water is intentional. The federal government's authority
over all navigable waters applied to the original thirteen states and
applies similarly to subsequently admitted states, such as Wisconsin,
through the Equal Footing Doctrine. Congress' broad Commerce
Clause power is not diminished by state ownership of submerged lands
and shores. Even the state's power over the beds of navigable waters
remains subject to "the paramount power of the United States to
ensure that30 7such waters remain free to interstate and foreign
commerce."
The United States' extensive authority over Indian tribes also
worked to convince the court. This authority is exclusive and comes
directly from the Constitution.3 8 In fact, the general rule is that state
laws may only be applied to Indians on their reservations if Congress
allows.30 ' For instance, in the case of the Mole Lake Band, the EPA,
not Wisconsin, administers the NPDES permit program for reservation
discharges in the absence of an approved tribal program."'
At the close of its analysis, the court points out that Wisconsin does
not deny that its ownership of submerged lands would not prevent the
federal government from regulating reservation waters and, thus,
"cannot now complain about the federal government allowing tribes to
do so. 1 1 While this argument initially sounds appealing, its brevity in
the opinion makes it unclear and subject to attack. There are two
problems with Judge Wood's statement. The first is that the CWA
allows a tribe to receive "Treatment as a state" status under the CWA,
not "Treatment as the Federal Government." There may be certain
actions within the authority of the federal government to perform that
would be constitutionally improper for a state to administer. For
instance, the federal government could require Wisconsin to stop a
project that might block a navigable waterway, but it is doubtful that it
could authorize California to direct Wisconsin to do the same. If the
federal government tried designating a similar federal duty to a TAS
tribe, it would be giving the tribe privileges beyond what any other
state could constitutionally obtain.
The second problem is that it gives the impression the court thinks
that section 518(e) is an express grant of authority to tribes over
reservation waters. Simply reasoning that if the federal government
has regulatory jurisdiction, it can delegate the same to a tribe ignores
the EPA's determination that section 518(e) was not an express
delegation of authority to tribes over reservation waters. During the
307. Montana, v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981).
308. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3; see also Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 747.
309. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 747 (citing California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987)).
310. EPA Office of Water, Office of Wastewater Management, State and Tribal
ProgramIssues, at http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestribes/issues.cfm?programjid=12
(last modified Feb. 21, 2001); see also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 103 (1992).
311. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 747.
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rulemaking, the EPA determined section 518(e) of the CWA intended
only to recognize authority that the tribe already possessed; not to
grant any new authority."' Wisconsin argued that any grant of
authority to the Band over reservation waters would be extending new
authority to the Band rather than simply recognizing preexisting
jurisdiction. So, the issue is not whether the federal government can
simply let the tribe do what the federal government could; the issue
here is whether the tribe possessed inherent authority over the
reservation waters to begin with. Although, in the next section of its
opinion, the court recognized that the EPA does not consider section
518(e) an express grant of authority, the court's brief statement
concerning federal delegation could be construed as an internal
inconsistency in the opinion.
Read practically though, Judge Wood's statement simply calls
Wisconsin's bluff concerning the Equal Footing Doctrine. If tide to,
and exclusive control over the reservation waters truly passed to the
state under the Equal Footing Doctrine, regulation of the water would
even be beyond federal power."' But, Wisconsin admits the federal
government can regulate its waters (without any act of divestiture), and
therefore simultaneously admits that the power over overlying waters
could not have been part of the rights and powers granted to the states
under the Equal Footing Doctrine. Such regulation falls under the
Commerce Clause and exceeds the jurisdiction of the original thirteen
states. Accordingly, asserting title and control to overlying waters was
received (and) granted (or) vested at the time of statehood as a
defense to a tribe's inherent authority over reservation waters lacks
merit.
3. Inherent Authority Over Off-Reservation Activities
The court of appeals next dealt with Wisconsin's argument "that
the Band did not make the required showing of authority over those
activities potentially affected by its imposition of water quality
standards."315 Wisconsin argued the Band could not establish its
inherent authority over extraterritorial activity such as the upstream
mine, because Montana only applies to on-reservation activities of nonmembers. Wisconsin believed a tribe could only establish its inherent
authority by showing that impairment of the reservation's waters from
312. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,880 (Dec. 12, 1991)
(emphasis added) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
313. Wisconsin's argument is that title to the overlying waters was granted to the
state with the title to the submerged lands. If such title to the waters was of equivalent

quality to that of the submerged lands, Pollardand its progeny would dictate that a
state's title to the waters is "absolute" and neither a provision in the Act admitting the
state to the Union nor a grant from Congress to a third party (i.e., an Indian tribe) is
capable of defeating a state's title to the waters. See Oregon ex rel State Land Bd. v.
Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 374 (1977).

314. See generally United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1996).
315.

Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 748.
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on-reservation activitieswould affect the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.
The court's responses to this position prove it unavailing. First and
foremost, Wisconsin ignored that Congress permits a tribe to receive
"Treatment as a State" status. Such designation gives a tribe all of the
rights and powers of a state for approved purposes under the CWA.
The holding in Arkansas v. Oklahoma and the EPA's regulations
instruct that upstream discharges must comply with downstream states'
water quality standards. The lesson of Albuquerque v. Browner is that a
TAS tribe is not a second-class sovereign but is treated as a full-fledged
state under the CWA. Accordingly, upstream extraterritorial activities
must comply with a downstream TAS tribe's water quality standards.
Thus, by enacting section 518(e), Congress created an express
statutory provision that allows TAS tribes the ability to regulate
reservation waters even if extraterritorial activities are affected.
Wisconsin's argument that the Band has not shown inherent
authority over extraterritorial activities (and it never could because its
authority only extends to non-members within reservation boundaries)
puts the cart before the horse. The Band sought to regulate the water
quality standards of the reservation, not the activity of the upstream
mine or any other facility. It is only after the Band shows it has
authority to regulate the reservation waters that its water quality
standards are imposed on upstream dischargers-not the other way
around. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is not relevant in considering
inherent authority in the first instance, but is simply a side effect
arising from the grant of TAS designation. In addition, "[t] here is no
case that expressly rejects an application of Montana to off-reservation
activities that have significant effects within the reservation."01 6 A TAS
applicant need only establish inherent authority over the regulation of
reservation waters by showing that: "(1) there are waters within the
reservation used by the tribe, (2) the waters and critical habitat are
subject to protection under the CWA, and (3) impairment of waters
would have a serious and substantial effect on the health and welfare
of the tribe.""' A tribe need not demonstrate authority over offreservationactivity to satisfy any of these elements.
Second, and further evidencing that off-reservation effects are
irrelevant in the TAS application stage, is that Congress mandated
establishment of a dispute resolution mechanism to work out
"unreasonable consequences" arising from different water quality
standards set by states and tribes on the same waterbody 8 The EPA
established such a system. It is hard to conceive why Congress
recognized this issue and required a transboundary dispute-solving
device it if did not anticipate that a TAS tribe's water quality standards
could restrict certain off-reservation activities.1 9
316. Id,at 749.
317. Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 1998).
318. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1994).
319. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 749.
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Third, the court pointed out that a TAS tribe is still subservient to
the EPA's decisions concerning national water pollution control.
Under the CWA, a downstream TAS tribe's only recourse is to apply to
the EPA Administrator when it is unhappy with the allowance of an
upstream discharge; it cannot veto an upstream activity. 20 Indeed, it is
the EPA-not the tribe or the state-requiring upstream compliance
with downstream water standards.32 ' The EPA's regulations prohibit
issuance of permits that could cause downstream water quality
standard violations.2
The EPA could easily amend its regulations,
allow for variances, 23 or use the dispute resolution mechanism to allow
an upstream discharge that may otherwise violate downstream water
quality standards. The ultimate authority remains with the federal
government and a TAS tribe receives no more than any other
approved state under the CWA.
. Finally, an underlying difficulty with Wisconsin's stance from the
outset was that it "conceded that the waters within the Band's
reservation are very important to the Band's economic and physical
existence." 2 4 In the court's view, this concession turned Wisconsin's
argument into the following: "we acknowledge that the Band would
have inherent authority over reservation waters but for our title to and
control over the submerged lands and the overlying waters, and a
tribe's inability to regulate non-members outside the reservation."
Once the court refuted Wisconsin's two primary objections to inherent
authority, it was left with Wisconsin's admission that the impairment of
waters would have a serious and substantial effect on the health and
welfare of the tribe. Wisconsin should not be faulted for such a
position; a contrary argument would surely have been disingenuous.
V. IMPLICATIONS
There are 554 federally recognized Indian tribes in the United
States. 25 In the 1990 census, the federal government recognized 278
Indian land areas as reservations. 6 Some reservation areas include
significant acreage. For instance, "the Navajo Reservation consists of
some 16 million acres in Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah."3 27 Such

320. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 100 (1992) (citing International Paper Co.
v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 490-91 (1987)). A TAS tribe also may also submit
comments and recommendations to the permitting state and the EPA with respect to
any permit application being considered. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (5).
321. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 106.
322. 40 C.F.R. § 122.41 (2001).
323. See supranote 117.
324. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 750.
325. EPA Office of Water, American
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Resource
Assistance
Handbook,
at
http://www.epa.gov/indian/tribhand.htm.
326. EPA Office of Water, American Indian Environmental Office, Resource Guide,
Chapter
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numbers make clear that the widespread grant of TAS designation to
tribes to administer water quality standards could potentially have an
enormous impact on the functioning of the CWA throughout the
United States.
Furthermore, while reservation land is spread
throughout the country, the vast majority of reservations are
concentrated in the western states and Alaska.3 2 The western states are
historically where the most intense disputes have arisen over water
regulation due to the constant supply and demand problems
associated with the climate and topography3s
The patchwork of
reservation land in the West comes with the potential for a collage of
different water quality standards set by TAS tribes-a virtual guarantee
of transboundary conflicts. Thus, a whole new saga in the storied
water battles of the West may find a stage in section 518(e) of the
CWA. Of course, although perhaps more pronounced in the West,
transboundary conflicts may play out in any of the fifty states where
TAS tribes are located (e.g., Wisconsin). Complications that arise
from empowering more tribes with regulatory power under the CWA
are not hard to envision.
The implications of the Seventh Circuit's holding in Wisconsin v.
EPA concern the prelude to water quality conflicts between tribes and
states; the TAS designation process itself. That is, the court's opinion
helps set the tone concerning tribes' ability to obtain TAS status in the
first instance, thus enabling them to become sovereign players in the
CWA and assert their authority. Specifically, this article addresses two
likely implications of the Seventh Circuit's holding. First, more tribes
will apply for and receive TAS status to administer water quality
standards. And second, opposition by governmental entities to TAS
designation to administer water quality standards will be virtually
futile. These predictions are reviewed in more detail below.
A. "TREATMENT AS A STATE" DESIGNATIONS TO ADMINISTER WATER

QuALrrY STANDARDS WILL INCREASE

The threshold determinant of the potential ramifications of
section 518(e), and its accompanying regulations, is how many Indian
tribes are going to apply for and obtain TAS designation to set water
quality standards. Clearly, the easier it is for tribes to obtain TAS
status, the more likely it is that additional tribes will apply for such
designation.3 '
Indian tribes often have limited personnel and
328. "Four states (all in the West) have Indian populations of 100,000 or more:
Oklahoma, California, Arizona, and New Mexico. The six states where Native
Americans make up 5 percent or more of the total population are Alaska, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Montana, and Arizona." Id.
329. See generally Betsy Cody, Western Water Resource Issues, Congressional Research
Service Reports, at http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRS/abstract.cfm?NLEid=16352.
330. Such logic is subject to the caveat that resource limitations faced by many tribes
may dissuade them from applying for TAS status irrespective of their anticipated
ability to obtain such designation. See supra text accompanying note 140. Conversely,
due to the extreme importance of water resources to many reservations, some tribes
may pursue TAS status no matter how difficult the fight or how high the costs.
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resources to deal with environmental matters""' and pursuing TAS
designation would seem more appealing when there are fewer
obstacles (i.e., less expenditure of resources) to its attainment.3 2 Thus
far, this article has described some of the ways it has been made easier
for tribes to show that hey have sufficient inherent authority over
reservation waters to receive TAS designation. In addition, this article
has discussed some of the obstacles facing a governmental entity in
opposing a tribe's assertion of authority during the TAS application
phase or when seeking judicial review of the EPA's grant of TAS
designation. In combination, these two observations appear to tip the
scale in favor of tribal regulatory authority despite competing claims of
jurisdiction from "appropriate governmental entities."
The state of Wisconsin would claim that this characterization is a
drastic understatement of the practical realities of the TAS designation
process. Although never addressed by the court of appeals' opinion,
Wisconsin had vehemently argued this point in its briefs. Wisconsin
pointedly asserted that the "TAS application process is designed to
lead to a predetermined result-the granting of tribal applications for
According to Wisconsin, the EPA's
treatment as a state."33
proclamation that it would examine each tribal claim of authority on a
"case-by-case basis" was nothing but lip service, and upon application
by a tribe for TAS status, a finding of tribal authority over reservation
waters was a forgone conclusion.
331. See EPA Office of Water, American Indian Environmental Office, Tribal
Handbook,
at
Environmental
and
Natural
Resource
Assistance
http://www.epa.gov/indian/tribhand.htm.
Many tribes have limited environmental staffs that are faced with the
challenge of addressing a broad range of environmental issues. Unlike state
environmental programs that have received annual federal funding for many
years, Tribal environmental programs generally must compete annually for
their funds.... Therefore, Tribal environmental staffs spend a large part of
their time applying for grants and searching for sources of federal assistance.
Id.
332. In addition, population trends and industrial development may make it more
important than ever for a tribe to assert control over its water resources. The EPA
notes that population studies indicate Indians are not shifting away from reservation
areas, Indian populations are growing, and more than half of tribal lands now have at
least as many non-Indians as Indians residing there. The Agency observed:
There are two interesting implications of this information for environmental
management purposes. First, Native Americans are not leaving their
homelands and, in fact, there is a likelihood that these communities will
develop to accommodate their increasing numbers. Second, many Native
American communities perceive that they have been and are being
encroached upon by the larger non-Native American populations.
fore to
Environmental management will be needed more than ever
minimize environmental impacts as populations grow. Also, Native American
environmental management systems will need to be innovative and creative
in accommodating the needs of their Native American and non-Native
American populations.
EPA Office of Water, American Indian Environmental Office, Resource Guide,
Americans,
available
at
Chapter
One:
Understanding
Native
http://www.epa.gov/indian/resource/chapl.htm.
333. Brief for Appellant at 10, Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001) (No.
99-2618).
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Specifically, Wisconsin was troubled by the lack of an honest
appraisal by the EPA of a tribe's claim ofjurisdiction over reservation
waters. Remember, for a tribe to satisfy the second Montana exception
(i.e., inherent authority) an application for TAS status "will need to
make a relatively simple showing of facts" 33 4 asserting that: (1) there
are waters within the reservation used by the tribe; (2) the waters and
critical habitat are subject to CWA protection; and (3) impairment of
waters would have a serious and substantial effect on the health and
welfare of the tribe. 5 Once the tribe meets this initial burden, the
EPA will presume, in light of facts presented in the TAS application
supplemented by the Agency's generalized findings regarding the
relationship of water quality to tribal health and welfare, that there has
been an actual showing of tribal jurisdiction and thus, authority to set
water quality standards. '
According to Wisconsin, this test "create[s] an insurmountable
presumption that tribes should obtain TAS status" 37 and is a "test for
inherent tribal authority that no tribe can fail."38 The indignation
underlying Wisconsin's assertions stems from what it believes to be the
EPA's total disregard of competing claims of jurisdiction over
reservation waters despite the Agency's policy "on paper" to seek out
and consider input on the subject. In Wisconsin's view, the test
implemented by the EPA belies any Agency intent to consider
competing claims ofjurisdiction. The only way a state could overcome
the EPA's presumption of tribal inherent authority would be to show
"that a reservation contains no water that is used by tribal members."3 9
Such a showing would be virtually impossible for a state to make.
It seems that Wisconsin's observations are not completely
unfounded hyperbole.
A careful reading of TAS regulations,
rulemaking proceedings, and EPA policy statements expressed in
various administrative publications support the position that
everything will be done to ensure an applicant tribe will receive TAS
status. Primarily, as discussed above, the EPA starts with the
presumption a that tribe will have inherent authority over reservation
waters. The Agency has assembled a collection of conclusions which,
despite being innocuously labeled as "generalized findings," are in fact
virtual proclamations that tribes will always possess authority to
regulate reservation waters. The EPA attempts to mitigate the impact
of the generalized findings' determinative quality by stating that the
findings will simply supplement a tribe's factual showing in its TAS
application. However, in the same breath, the Agency admits a
334. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,879 (Dec. 12, 1991)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Brief for Appellant at 16, Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001) (No.
99-2618).
338. Id.
339. Id. at 40.
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sufficient showing of facts will be "relatively simple." 4 ' With the
question of TAS authorization turning on whether a tribe has inherent
authority over the reservation waters, how can the EPA's standards
lead to any result but a grant of TAS designation?
Tribes that desire to chart the destiny of their water resources have
a helping hand in the EPA because the Agency has an institutional
predilection for tribal administration of water quality standards. More
tribes will apply for TAS status because its bestowment by the EPA is
virtually guaranteed. For those incredulous as to the existence of such
a policy, one need only read the EPA's own words:
Qualifying for administration of the water quality standards program
is optional for Indian Tribes and there is no time frame limiting

when such application can be made. As a general policy, EPA will not
deny a tribalapplication. Rather than formally deny the tribe's request,
EPA will continue to work cooperatively with the tribe in a continuing
effort to resolve deficiencies in the application or the tribal program
so that tribal authorization may occur. EPA also concurs with the view

that the intent of Congress and the EPA Indian Policy is to support
tribal govrnments in
programs.3

assuming authority to manage various water

Such policy statements send a clear signal to both tribes and interested
governmental entities that when a tribe submits a TAS application to
administer water quality standards, the EPA is hardly a neutral
decision-maker weighing the application against any competing claims
of jurisdiction.342 Instead, the Agency's institutional predisposition is
340. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,879.
341. EPA Water Quality Standards Branch, Water Quality StandardsHandbook Second
at
1994),
available
&
Update
Aug.
(Sept.
1993
Edition
(emphasis
http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/library/wqstandards/handbook.pdf
added); see also Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain
to Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,884 ("the provision allowing
appropriate governmental entities to comment on tribal assertions of authority is not
intended as a barrier to Tribal program assumption."); see id. at 64,881 ("the Agency
presumes that, in general, Tribes are likely to possess the authority to regulate
activities affecting water quality on the reservation."); see id. at 64,888 ("Although EPA
believes that tribes should be provided every opportunity to regulate water quality and to
participate in environmental control programs, during dispute resolution actions the
appointed mediator/arbitrator will act first and foremost as a neutral facilitator of
discussions between parties.") (emphasis added); see id. at 64,879 (A tribal application
for TAS status "will need to make a relatively simple showing of facts.").
342. In an effort to drive home its claim of EPA "bias" in the TAS designation
process, Wisconsin explained that EPA officials had gone so far as to engage in
criminal conduct to defeat Wisconsin's competing claims ofjurisdiction over waters of
other reservations in the state. When Wisconsin v. EPA was initially filed in the district
court, it was consolidated with four other cases where Wisconsin was challenging the
EPA's decisions granting TAS status to two additional tribes: the Menominee and
Oneida. During the discovery phase of the consolidated cases, evidence surfaced that
EPA officials had backdated EPA documents pertaining to the TAS applications of the
Menominee and Oneida tribes and then falsely testified on multiple occasions about
having done so. This was done by the EPA officials, Wisconsin explains, to "bolster the
administrative records and thereby defeat Wisconsin's claim of sovereignty over waters
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to encourage tribal applications for TAS status, and, once received,
make sure they are approved.
So it would seem that applying for TAS status to administer water
quality standards would be an efficient use of limited tribal resources
allocated for environmental protection. Water is traditionally one of
the most important environmental aspects of Indian reservations and
an integral part of many tribes' heritage. Therefore, reservation water
quality likely ranks high on the environmental priority list of many
tribes. 43 The EPA has made the path to obtaining TAS designation for
administering water quality standards one of little resistance; or
perhaps more accurately, one where a tribe will be assisted until it
reaches its destination.
As verified by the Seventh Circuit in
within Wisconsin's Indian reservations." Brief for Appellant at 3-4, 13, 16-18,
Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-2618).
Consequently, a federal grand jury indicted Marc Radell, an Associate Regional
Counsel of the EPA, and ClaudiaJohnson, the Region V Tribal Coordinator/Program
Manager. Ms. Johnson died before the disposition of the case against her. However,
Mr. Radell pleaded guilty to contempt of court for his actions and admitted the factual
analyses in the records of the Oneida, Menominee, and Lac du Flambeau (another
TAS tribe) cases did not exist at the time of the TAS decisions. He also admitted that
he had filed false affidavits and had testified falsely at his deposition to conceal the
fabrication of the administrative record. Id.
As a result, the EPA withdrew previously granted TAS designations to the Oneida and
Lac du Flambeau tribes and the Menominee tribe voluntarily relinquished its TAS
status. The Mole Lake Band's application was not affected, however, because "there
was no similar factual findings document in the record of the Band's application."
Without evidence of wrongdoing pertaining specifically to the Band, the original TAS
designation remained in effect and the case proceeded. Id. at 13.
This chain of events certainly legitimizes suspicions that, in practice, the EPA's
process for determining whether a tribe has inherent authority over reservation waters
means nothing; approval of a TAS application is inevitable. After all, why would
government employees, including an attorney, with seemingly no personal interest at
stake conduct such malfeasance? Wisconsin reasonably argues it is a result of the
EPA's institutional bias in favor of granting TAS applications under all circumstances.
However, while such arguments are extremely interesting and intuitively reasonable,
they are only cf peripheral relevance to the situation in Wisconsin v. EPA. Wisconsin
apparently does not dispute the finding that there was no misconduct with respect to
the Band's application. To impute a type of "character evidence" from the
malfeasance involved with a few tribal applications to the entire application and
designation process (including the Band's application) would be legally dubious. The
court of appeals did not even address these matters in its opinion.
343. See,
e.g.,
Mni
Sose
Intertribal
Water
Rights
Coalition,
at
http://www.mnisose.org. The EPA's American Indian Environmental Office also
helps tribal environmental managers make decisions on environmental priorities for
the reservation and provides for EPA implementation assistance for environmental
programs. EPA Office of Water, American Indian Environmental Office, Mission &
EPA Contacts, availableat http://www.epa.gov/indian/miss.htm.
344. See EPA Office of Water, American Indian Environmental Office, Resource
Guide, Chapter Three: EPA's Approach to Environmental Protection in Indian Country, at
http://www.epa.gov/indian/resource/chap3.htm
[T]he Agency will recognize tribal governments as the primary parties for
setting standards, making environmental policy decisions, and managing
programs for reservations, consistent with Agency standards and regulations;
and as impediments in ourprocedures, regulations,or statutes are identified that limit
our ability to work effectively with tribes consistent with this Policy, we will seek to
remove those impediments. (emphasis added).
Id. The mission of the American Indian Environmental Office within the EPA's Office
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Wisconsin v. EPA, a tribe need not be concerned that its efforts in
obtaining TAS status will be for naught because extreme deference will
be afforded the EPA in any judicial review of its decision.
B. GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY CHALLENGES TO "TREATMENT AS A STATE"
DESIGNATION: A FUTILE EXERCISE?

If more tribes apply for and receive TAS designation to administer
water quality standards, then there may be a proportionate number of
competing claims of jurisdiction over reservation waters by
governmental entities. By this point, it should be clear that this article
forecasts that opposition to tribal TAS applications will be futile.
Three main points can be deduced from Wisconsin v. EPA: EPA
approval of a TAS application is virtually guaranteed, courts will defer
to Agency discretion, and almost all conceivable legal challenges by an
"appropriate governmental agency" have been foreclosed.
The court of appeals, however, attempted to leave a glimmer of
hope for other legitimate and successful challenges to TAS
designation. In its conclusion, the court stated:
We have no occasion to say whether, on a different set of facts, the
EPA might extend the notion of a tribe's "inherent authority" to

affect off-reservation activities so far as to go beyond the standards of
the statute or the reulations. If it ever arises, that will be another
case, for another day.
It is, however, extremely difficult to envision the "day" and the "case"
to which the court alludes. If the court was referring to an egregious
hypothetical situation where the EPA is allowing a tribe to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction over an activity completely unrelated to
political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare of the tribe,
then, of course, the court could halt such a warped application of the
Montana test. But, in the more pragmatic context of TAS designation
to tribes for section 303 and 401 purposes, the Seventh Circuit has
foiled realistic challenges by governmental entities to the EPA's
decisions. The court not only gave substantial deference to EPA
determinations, but, more importantly, squarely and convincingly
rejected what may have been the only viable legal arguments for
contesting a TAS designation to administer water quality standards.
A brief reflection on the arguments presented by Wisconsin and
rejected by the court is in order. First, Wisconsin argued that Rice
Lake was not within the borders of the Band's reservation
boundaries.3 6 Although this argument was waived, the court still
of Water is to coordinate the "Agency-wide effort to strengthen public health and
environmental protection in Indian Country, with a special emphasis on building Tribal
capacity to administer their own environmental programs." EPA Office of Water,
American
Indian Environmental
Office, Mission & EPA Contacts, at
http://www.epa.gov/indian/miss.htm (emphasis added).
345. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 750 (7th Cir. 2001).
346. Id. at 746.
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spoke to it and decided that the EPA could reasonably conclude that
Rice Lake was sufficiently within the reservation's borders. 4 7 Second,
the court repudiated Wisconsin's claim that the Equal Footing
Doctrine vested the state with title to and exclusive control over
submerged lands and overlying waters within the reservation's borders
well before the reservation was created. 48 Wisconsin argued that its
title made it impossible for the Band to have inherent authority over
the reservation waters because the EPA construed section 518(e) as
only recognizing preexisting authority of tribes and Wisconsin was
admitted to the Union before creation of the reservation. This legal
argument is complicated and troubling until it is understood that the
Equal Footing Doctrine concerns only the "shores of and lands
beneath navigable waters""4 9 and in no way limits "the broad powers of
the United States to regulate the navigable waters under the
Commerce Clause."3 0 That is, the court rejected the assertion that a
state receives title to overlying waters under the Equal Footing Doctrine.
The court also refuted Wisconsin's contention that the Band could
only establish its inherent authority over reservation waters by showing
that impairment of waters from on-reservation activities would affect the
political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare of the tribe.
In rejecting this somewhat backwards argument, the court of appeals
recognized that extraterritorial jurisdiction is not relevant in
considering a tribe's inherent authority over reservation waters in the
first instance, but is only a side effect arising from a grant of TAS
designation. Furthermore, as explained in Arkansas v. Oklahoma,
neither TAS tribes nor states truly exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction
under the CWA. Rather, it is the federal government (pursuant to the
EPA's regulations) that requires upstream states to comply with
downstream water quality standards.
Finally, it should not be
forgotten that an underlying fundamental precept here is that the
federal government is vested with exclusive authority over relations
with Indian tribes.
The points argued by Wisconsin raised substantial questions of law.
And, although this article's position is that the Seventh Circuit
accurately disposed of the issues-Wisconsin's contentions were
formidable. So formidable that it is difficult to conceive of a stronger
challenge a state could mount in opposition to a TAS designation. Is
there really a factual scenario, as the court of appeals muses, which
could give rise to a different result?351 What feasible argument is left
347. Id.
348. Id. at 746-47.
349. Id. at 747 (internal quotations omitted).
350. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 747 (internal quotations omitted).
351. In briefly exploring this question, this article assumes that a court would
scrutinize and likely reverse absolutely outrageous designations of TAS status. For
instance, if a tribe were to apply for and receive TAS status to set water quality
standards for a lake located 300 miles outside the reservation borders (and completely
unconnected through waterways to the reservation), it can be safely assumed that a
successful challenge could be brought. Here, this article will give credit to the tribes
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for a governmental entity seeking review of a TAS designation to
administer water quality standards?
1. The Waterbody Is Not Navigable
One possibility may be for a state to aver the waterbody or bodies a
tribe seeks to regulate are not "navigable waters." As discussed above,
the federal government's broad Commerce Clause jurisdiction creates
an ever-present dominant navigable servitude over the navigable
waters of the United States. Indeed, the CWA itself is borne of such
authority. 52 However, the Supreme Court made clear that "the grant
of authority to Congress under the Commerce Clause, though broad,
is not unlimited."05 In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers, the Supreme Court clarified that
the phrase "navigable waters" as used in the CWA carries significant
meaning. In that case, the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") denied
a consortium of Chicago municipalities a permit to fill some seasonal
and permanent ponds created by abandoned gravel mining pits. The
Corps claimed it had jurisdiction to issue fill permits for the ponds
because the ponds met the definition of "navigable waters" found in
the Corps' regulations and because migratory birds that "crossed state
lines" were using the ponds.
The Court disagreed that the Corps had jurisdiction over the
ponds in the abandoned gravel pits. The Court acknowledged that
under the CWA, Congress "evidenced its intent to regulate at least
some waters that would not be deemed 'navigable' under the classical
understanding of that term,"354 but, this did not make the term
"navigable" devoid of meaning. According to the Court, the term "has
at least the import of showing us what Congress had in mind as its
authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters
that were or had been navigable in fact or which could be reasonably
so made."" However, the isolated ponds formed in the gravel pits
were not adjacent to navigable waters or "inseparably bound up with
the waters of the United States." 56 As a result, the Court concluded
that the ponds were not navigable waters under the CWA subject to
the Corps' jurisdiction. The fact that migratory birds used the ponds
could not be used by the Corps to bootstrap regulatory jurisdiction
under the Commerce Clause. Specifically, the court refused to hold
that "isolated ponds, some only seasonal, wholly located within two
Illinois counties, fall under § 404(a)'s definition of 'navigable waters'
and the EPA and avoid such "improbable hypotheticals." Nixon v. United States, 506

U.S. 224, 238 (1993) (StevensJ, concurring).
352. See supratext accompanying note 287.
353. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173
(2001) (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
354. Id. at 167 (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,
133 (1985) (internal quotations omitted).
355. Id. at 172.
356. Id. at 167 (internal quotations omitted).
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because they serve as habitat for migratory birds." 57 Moreover, the
Court explained that "[p]ermitting [the Corps] to claim federal
jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the 'Migratory Bird
Rule' would result in a significant impingement of the States'
traditional and primary power over land and water use.,051
This leaves open the possibility that a state could claim that TAS
jurisdiction could not be given to a tribe for a waterbody within the
reservation which is akin to an isolated pond not adjacent to navigable
waters and not "inseparably bound up with the waters of the United
States." In Wisconsin v. EPA, Judge Wood specifically noted that "here
no one disputes that the waters at issue are 'navigable waters' for
purposes of either the [CWA] or the Commerce Clause.059 Thus, a
clear inference can be drawn that a set of facts that raises significant
doubts concerning the navigability of waters a tribe seeks to regulate
may lead to an effective challenge of TAS designation.
In the final analysis, however, a "navigability" challenge would
seem an unlikely scenario. First, it would seem less likely that a tribe
would apply for TAS designation over completely isolated water bodies
in the first instance. This may not be an effective allocation of the
tribe's limited resources dedicated to environmental protection.
Protecting reservation waters from transboundary pollution is the
major impetus for tribes seeking power over its water quality standards.
If a waterbody is truly isolated and not connected to navigable bodies
of water, it is unlikely that transboundary water pollution will be a
major concern. Second, if one gives even a modicum of credit to the
EPA, one would anticipate the Agency might filter out TAS
designation claims for waters not falling under the jurisdiction of the
CWA. This is a situation where one may expect the EPA would assist a
tribe with its TAS application by dissuading requests for jurisdiction
over non-navigable waters in favor of navigable water bodies. Third, it
is questionable whether a state would care whether a tribe received
TAS status over a non-navigable waterbody within reservation
boundaries.3 If the waterbody was truly isolated from the other waters
of the state, then even extremely strict water quality standards for that
waterbody would have no restrictive effect on discharges outside the
reservation because there is nothing "upstream" from an unconnected
waterbody.
Finally, even if a tribe receives TAS status over a non-navigable
waterbody within reservation boundaries and the state protests, there
may be a standing issue. As the Seventh Circuit pointed out, "state
laws may usually be applied to Indians on their reservations only if

357. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 171-72.
358. Id. at 174.
359. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 2001).
360. On the other hand, if a state owns fee lands within reservation borders or has
an interest in a private property owner of fee lands within the reservation, a restriction
on non-navigable waters that hinders use of the land may give rise to a jurisdictional
dispute.
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Congress so expressly provides." 6 ' So, even if the waterbody was not
navigable for purposes of the CWA, and a tribe should not have
received TAS status for it, if it is located within reservation boundaries
it is questionable whether the state could enforce its own laws
concerning the water in the first place. 62 For these reasons, while
contesting TAS status for a tribe to administer water quality standards
of a non-navigable waterbody may still be an open avenue, the
practical reality is that the likelihood of success is probably minimal.
2. Impairment of a Reservation Waterbody Will Not Have Serious and
Substantial Effects on the Political Integrity, Economic Security, or
Health or Welfare of the Tribe.
Another more obvious, albeit similarly restrictive, route for a state
to take is to argue that impairment of the waterbody or bodies a tribe
seeks to regulate will not have serious and substantial effects on the
political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare of the tribe.
In other words, a state could attempt to show the waterbody simply has
no value to the tribe and any degradation of it would have no
detrimental effect on the tribe whatsoever. Recall that one of the ways
Judge Wood distinguished Wisconsin v. EPA from Wisconsin v. Baker is
that the Chippewa Tribe in Baker did not claim the conduct it sought
to regulate (public fishing and hunting) posed a threat to the political
integrity, economic security, or health or welfare of the tribe. In
Wisconsin v. EPA, both parties conceded that the waters within the
Mole Lake Reservation "are very important to the Band's economic
and physical existence. " o
Similarly, in the context of a TAS designation, if a tribe fails to
articulate how impairment of the waters it seeks to regulate will
adversely impinge on the political integrity, economic security, or
health or welfare of the tribe, a state may have a strong basis to contest
an EPA grant of TAS status. Since the EPA's generalized findings
ostensibly will be used only to supplement the tribe's factual showing
of inherent authority, a complete failure by a tribe to present facts
elucidating the importance of reservation waters to the tribe should be
insufficient to receive TAS status. However, rather than a total failure
by the tribe to provide, and the EPA to require, a sufficient factual
showing, the more likely circumstances in which a state would lodge
this type of challenge is when it believes a tribe is overstating the
importance of the reservation waters it seeks to regulate. That is, no
matter how useless or remote the waterbody, a tribe would always aver
that any impairment thereof would harm the political integrity,
economic security, or health or welfare of the tribe.
While taking the position that a tribe has misstated or the EPA has
361. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 747.
362. A response to this argument is that, notwithstanding the state's inability to set
standards for reservation waters, the state would still prefer federal standards to be
used rather than those set by the tribe.
363. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 750.
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misconstrued the true significance of reservation waters may lead to
spirited debate about who is best equipped to answer such a question,
the ultimate result will likely be the same: the challenging state will be
unsuccessful. First, as a practical matter, it would seem less likely that a
tribe would waste its time and limited resources in applying for TAS
designation for water bodies that are completely irrelevant to it.
Similarly, if TAS status were granted, the tribe would be dedicating its
valuable regulatory assets to something inconsequential to the tribe.
In addition, courts will trust the EPA to make decisions concerning
the importance of reservation waters. Given the deferential standard
of review of TAS decisions, a court would be hard-pressed to substitute
its judgment in favor of the Agency's in a sensitive area such as the
Absent egregious
significance of reservation waters to tribes.
malfeasance by the EPA,3 the Agency will be considered the more
capable arbiter as to the consequences arising from impairment of
tribal water resources.
It is also difficult to conceive a factual scenario where a reservation
waterbody would be considered irrelevant to the tribe. Given the
breadth of the EPA's "generalized findings rearding the relationship
and the undemanding
of water quality to tribal health and welfare,
factual showing a tribe must make, virtually any waterbody located
within the reservation would have some effect on the tribe if impaired.
Even if a tribe does not consistently use the waterbody, is not
dependent on it for water, food, or materials, or the water is already
polluted; the traditional relationship between the waterbody and the
political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare of the tribe
is not necessarily disconnected. It must be considered that "[N]ative
Americans have.., views that are very different from mainstream
world views and that what happens to land and resources matters a
great deal to Native Americans."5 6 Indians generally believe that all
resources on their homelands are essential and interconnected, and
thus, it would be very difficult to posit that certain water bodies lack
the requisite importance for a tribe to obtain authority over them. "In
non-Indian parlance, traditional [Indian] wisdom is systems thinking. It
is a discipline for seeing wholes, recognizing patterns and
interrelationships, and learning how to structure human actions
accordingly.""' Therefore, it would be repugnant to Indian heritage
for a state challenging TAS designation to attempt a division of
reservation water resources into those whose impairment would be
364. See supra note 342.
365. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,879 (Dec. 12, 1991)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131); see also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir.
1998).
366. EPA Office of Water, American Indian Environmental Office, Resource Guide,
at
Native
Americans,
Understanding
Chapter
One:
http://www.epa.gov/indian/resource/chapl.htm.
367. Id. (citing NATIvE HERITAGE, PERSONAL AccouNTs BY AMERICAN INDANs 1790 TO
THE PRESENT xix-xxii (Arlene Hirschfelder ed., 1995)).
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significant to a tribe's way of life and those whose impairment would
have no serious impact.
Nevertheless, there could be factual circumstances where a state
could make a compelling argument that it was arbitrary and
capricious, or otherwise contrary to law, for the EPA to grant TAS
status for certain reservation waters. For example, what if there was a
small navigable lake located on the outskirts of a reservation's
boundaries that the tribe had explicitly or impliedly "disowned" on the
day the reservation was created? The tribe constructed a barrier to the
lake so no one on reservation land could gain access to it and it was
never used for drinking, hunting, fishing, materials, industry or Indian
rituals. So, although the lake was within the reservation boundaries,
for all intents and purposes it was detached from the tribe's use and
way of life. Furthermore, the lake is connected by rivers to upstream
states, but is not connected by waterway to other water bodies in the
reservation. The tribe then applies for and receives TAS status to
administer water quality standards for the cordoned-off lake. In this
situation, a state may have a legitimate, fact-based argument that TAS
designation was improvidently granted because impairment of the
lake's water quality would not have substantial or serious effects on the
political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare of the tribe.
Such hypotheticals, while not impossible, do seem extreme. In
addition, the state will encounter similar problems discussed above in
the context of a navigability challenge. Again, it would be doubtful
that a tribe would expend its resources on waters without relevance to
it. And, of course, a court will generally trust the EPA's reasonable
scrutiny of such circumstances, especially when the facts are on the
margin. There would be other hurdles as well; one would be
establishing a genuine schism between the waterbody and the health
and safety of the tribe. For instance, even if no surface waters connect
the lake to other water bodies or lands the tribe utilizes, it is very
possible that contamination of the cordoned-off lake could have a
groundwater effect potentially reaching drinking water, crops, and
other water bodies.
Furthermore, just because the tribe has chosen to detach itself
from the waterbody does not necessarily mean that it did not have
preexisting authority over it. Similarly, it does not mean the tribe will
not choose to utilize the water in the future for economic growth, food
and water, or other purposes. While the test for inherent authority
over reservation waters examines whether their impairment may
seriously or substantially affect the political integrity, economic
security, health or welfare of the tribe, there is no requirement that it
be the tribe's current political integrity, economic security, health or
welfare. Such a requirement would be counterintuitive to the whole
rationale of preventing harm to the waters before it happens. The
point is that even in the unlikely event that it could be genuinely
shown that the impairment of a reservation waterbody is currently
inconsequential to a tribe, a detrimental effect on the tribe's future
utilization of the water resource may be sufficient for the tribe to
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establish inherent authority3 s In any event, should such strange
scenarios arise, a challenging state will wage its word against the EPA's
and the tribe's as to whether the impairment of a reservation
waterbody really would be germane to the tribe. A state taking such a
stance would be wise to have a sound factual basis to avoid not only
quick defeat in the courts, but also an appearance of offensive
presumptuousness.
In sum, it appears that most of the strictly legal arguments a state
would use to contest a TAS designation, especially in the course of
judicial review of the EPA's decisions, have been foreclosed. The little
room left by the Seventh Circuit to contest TAS designation revolves
primarily around very specific factual situations, and even then,
provides little assurance that such challenges will bear any fruit. The
inexorable bottom line is that, absent entirely novel factual
circumstances, state opposition to the grant of TAS status to a tribe to
administer reservation water quality standards is futile.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH - WATERSHED
MANAGEMENT
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to expound
thoroughly upon possible alternative approaches to water regulation
in the United States, it would be remiss to conclude without at least
superficially touching upon the subject. After all, this article foretells
the coming of a new age in water pollution regulation where
numerous Indian tribes apply for, receive, and assert the authority
made available to them by Congress in section 518(e) of the CWA and
approved by various federal courts of appeal. What if all or a majority
of the tribes located on the 278 United States Indian reservations did
in fact apply for and receive TAS status to regulate reservation water
quality? And what if these TAS tribes set water quality standards with
an extremely high level of stringency as anticipated?
Such a
situation-whether it happens relatively rapidly or at a measured
pace-theoretically has the potential to create a national water
pollution program with over 328 independent sovereigns setting water
quality standards within their borders.36" Not only would such a
situation increase the incidence of transboundary conflicts, but also it
would alter the entire character of the CWA. Is this the best way to
operate a comprehensive federal statute intended "to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters?"
The fundamental problem with this framework is simple-it draws
regulatory lines along political boundaries rather than geographic
368. Such an approach raises additional questions such as whether a tribe should be
required to explain whether it actually intends to integrate the waterbody in the future

or whether it need merely raise the possibility of doing so.
369. Under the CWA, "States" includes states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(3) (1994).
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boundaries. This method is incongruous to the character of the
regulated resource. The Nation's waters, the lands that surround and
affect them, and the sources of their pollution all transcend the
political boundaries of states and Indian tribes. Water pollution is an
intricate problem. An extremely broad range of chemical, physical,
and biological factors causes injury to the country's waters and their
aquatic ecosystems." Effective restoration and protection of the water
resources in this country are not amenable to easy fragmentation and
distribution of regulatory power based simply on each sovereign
controlling what will be tolerated within its borders. As aptly stated by
one commentator:
The current structure of the Clean Water Act, which vests regulatory
authority in political units unrelated to environmental geography, is
fractured along lines that lead away from either good economics or
good environmental policy. Moreover, giving tribes the status of
states under the Clean Water Act opens the fractures even wider,
something the basic principles of ecology and economics would
surely counsel against. We do not need less integrated planning on a
basinwide scale.... Political boundaries are contingencies of human
history 71we come to geographical boundaries with our hats in our
hands.
The EPA acknowledges that while the original framework of the CWA
prompted significant progress in improving the country's waters,
"[today's problems require more creative, comprehensive
solutions."3 7 The rigidity of state and reservation borders form
inflexible jigsaw-puzzle-ike regulation that is simply mismatched to the
mobile, multifaceted, and complex water resource.
This mismatch sets the stage for discord among not only states and
tribes, but also the many "on the ground" users and influencers of
water resources. "By locating regulatory authority along political
boundaries-that is, by vesting it in individual states as opposed to a
collective association of all affected parties-the Clean Water Act
inevitably begets conflicts among upstream and downstream users
asserting superior rights."073 The scale of these conflicts is not trivial.
For example, in Albuquerque v. Browner, the Isleta Pueblo tribe set its
standards for arsenic 1,000 times more stringent than New Mexico's
standards, and almost 2,500 times more stringent than the EPA's
standard for safe consumption.
In addition, the level of the arsenic
that occurred naturally in the Rio Grande was above the levels set by
the tribe so that even if Albuquerque's wastewater was 100 percent
pure when discharged, the arsenic levels in the reservation waters
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would still have exceeded the tribal standards.7 5 To comply with the
arsenic standard, Albuquerque would have been "required to build a
reverse osmosis tertiary level treatment facility at a capital cost of
$250,000,000, with approximately 26 million dollars per year in
operating costs." 7 6 According to Albuquerque, the term "comply" in
these circumstances is somewhat misleading because the treatment
facility would serve no real purpose. The tribe's arsenic standard was
"below levels measurable by modem laboratory equipment [and] the
ambient level [of arsenic would] never improve due to the natural
background conditions in the groundwater." " In the end, however,
Albuquerque lost. The point here is that the tensions created by the
CWA are real and substantial, and that the border-based framework
can lead to sub-optimal results. Add a considerable number of TAS
tribes to the mix, and the friction increases exponentially.7 '
So what is all this talk of "geographical boundaries" and how do
they work in the water regulation context? The concept of regulating
water pollution using "geographical boundaries" simply means
regulation and management on a watershed basis. As mentioned
earlier, a watershed is:
[T]he land area that drains water to a particular stream, river, or lake.
It is a land feature that can be identified by tracing a line along the
highest elevations between two areas on a map, often a ridge. Large
watersheds, like the Mississippi River basin contain thousands of
smaller watersheds.379
Thus, the borders of sovereigns do not define watersheds.
"Watersheds are nature's boundaries. They are the areas that drain to
water bodies, including lakes, rivers, estuaries, wetlands, streams, and
the surrounding landscape. Groundwater recharge areas are also
considered."'80 The idea is that by regulating swaths of naturally
375. Id
376. Id.
377. Id. at 903.
378. The EPA's regulations (required by Congress in section 518(e) of the CWA)
setting forth a dispute resolution mechanism for disputes arising between states and
tribes as a result of differing water quality standards on common bodies of water are
not the panacea for these conflicts. 40 C.F.R. § 131.7 (2001). The regulations provide
for two mechanisms. The first is mediation in which the EPA appoints a mediator who
simply acts as a neutral facilitator "whose function is to encourage communication and
negotiation between all parties to the dispute." Id. § 131.7(f)(1)(ii). The mediation
process has no binding effect on the parties. The second mechanism provided for is
arbitration. Under this process, "[t]he parties are not obligated to abide by the
arbitrator's or arbitration panel's recommendation unless they voluntarily entered
into a binding agreement to do so." Id. § 131.7(0(2)(iv). Participation in either
mediation or arbitration is strictly voluntary. Id. § 131.7(0 (1) (i), (f) (2), (f) (3). Thus,
it is arguable the dispute resolution mechanism, although venerable in name and
concept, lacks efficacy to solve transboundary conflicts.
379. U.S.
Geological
Survey,
Water Science
Glossary of
Terms,
at
http://wwwga.usgs.gov/edu/dictionary.html.
380. EPA Office of Water, Office of Wetlands, Oceans & Watersheds, EPA's Most
Frequently Asked Questions Related to Wetlands, Oceans & Watersheds, at
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interrelated lands and aquatic ecosystems, water pollution is being
addressed on a more holistic and thoughtful level rather than looking
one-dimensionally at sovereign borders. The EPA observed that,
"because watersheds are defined by natural hydrology, they represent
the most logical basis for managing water resources. The resource
becomes the focal point, and managers are able to gain a more
complete understanding of overall conditions in an area and the
stressors which affect those conditions.""8 ' The ultimate hope of
watershed management is optimal pollution control with minimal
conflict.
Watershed management is a broad area, and is the subject of
extensive writing. It is only cursorily touched upon in this article to
show that stark divisions between TAS tribes, states, and other
interested parties in the water pollution arena do not necessarily have
to be the norm. A watershed management development plan typically
follows certain distinct phases: watersheds are identified and mapped;
the "stakeholders" in the watershed including federal, state, tribal, and
local agencies are assembled to analyze threats to the watershed and to
devise responses to these threats; the selected responses are applied to
the watershed; and progress in achieving water quality goals are
regularly monitored, with adjustments made as necessary. The effort
is aimed at being a cooperative, integrated approach, devoid of power
mongering and autocracy.
The EPA has articulated three "guiding principles" on which to
build all watershed programs. The first is "partnerships,"whereby those
parties "most affected by management decisions are involved
throughout and shape key decisions.""' This, according to the EPA,
"ensures that environmental objectives are well integrated with those
for economic stability and other social and cultural goals. It also
provides that the people who depend upon natural resources within
the watersheds are well informed of and participate in planning and
implementation activities.""' The second principle is a "geographic
focus," which changes the boundaries for water pollution management
to those created by nature rather than the mere political borders of
sovereigns.35 The third is "sound management techniques based on strong
science and data," whereby the stakeholders in the watershed collectively
employ sound science to set goals, implement action plans, and
monitor results.3 M The idea behind this approach is that "actions are
http://www.epa.gov/owow/questions.html (emphasis added).
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based upon shared information and a common understanding of the
roles, priorities, and responsibilities of all involved parties." , The
obvious motivation and hopeful result of these idealistic guiding
principles is to manage and reduce water pollution with a minimum of
conflict.
To accomplish this, entire jurisdictions are divided into geographic
management units based on hydrologic connections, with existing
regulatory programs and political boundaries "factored into" decisions
about the formation of the units.m Thus, the regulatory framework is
founded upon the practical realities of how water pollution really
works and merely adds in the existence of political boundaries as a
supplemental, but not primary, consideration. States, tribes, and local
interests can then compare priorities, develop plans, reach
compromises, and "leverage their limited resources to meet common
goals."" 9 The result is a water pollution regulatory system that
transcends political borders by defining and regulating water using
hydrologic boundaries, and fostering cooperation by all stakeholders
in the watershed from the outset.
So, unlike the confrontational posture the state/TAS tribe
dichotomy creates, the watershed approach envisions cooperative
efforts from those affected and affecting the waterbodies of the
country. By creating an atmosphere of teamwork between states, TAS
tribes, local governments, and individual parties, "the watershed
approach can build a sense of community, reduce conflicts, increase
commitment to the actions necessary to meet societal goals and,
ultimately, improve the likelihood of sustaining long-term
environmental improvements.""' The EPA believes that states and
tribes are the principal players in implementing a watershed approach
because they already manage many of the existing water and natural
resource protection programs."' Indeed, "[ft or the long term, EPA
envisions locally-driven, watershed-based activities embedded in
comprehensive 92state and tribal watershed approaches all over the
United States."
Implementing such a utopian paradigm is, of course, no simple
94
matter.393 And, multi-party settings have their own set of difficulties.
The EPA, however, is taking major steps to encourage watershed
management and provide support for its development. The Agency

387. Id.
388. Id. (emphasis added).
Watershed
Approach
Framework,
at
389. EPA
Office
of
Water,
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/framework.html.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. See generally William Goldfarb, WatershedManagement: Slogan or Solution ? 21 B.C.
ENVrL. ArF. L. REv. 483 (1993).
394. See Harbison, supra note 66, at 491-92 (explaining certain potential difficulties
in watershed management with multiple parties involved that, while formidable, are
not insuperable).
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has made a "[c]onsiderable effort... in streamlining program
administrative requirements that hinder watershed approaches and
" 9s
[has invested] in developing useful watershed tools and services.
The EPA has also recognized the damaging nature of transboundary
conflicts to internal political relations as well as to the protection of
the country's water resources. The Agency's Office of Water has
announced that it has put a "[h]igh priority... on developing and
supporting comprehensive state and tribal watershed approach
strategies that actively involve public and private interests at all levels
to achieve environmental protection."396 Thus, the push is on to
fundamentally change the model of water regulation in this country to
a watershed approach, and this article submits that such a plan is a
potent alternative to the divisions and conflicts inevitably produced by
the current framework.
VII. CONCLUSION
The decision by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Wisconsin
v. EPA was important in that it both confirmed TAS Indian tribes'
status as co-equal sovereigns for authorized functions under the CWA,
and correctly foreclosed the most feasible legal challenges to a tribe's
TAS designation. In fact, it now appears that in all practicality, any
opposition by a state to the grant of TAS status is futile. Put simply,
the court's opinion and the EPA's regulations and operating
procedures make clear that TAS status to administer water quality
standards is available for the tribes' taking. The importance of water
resources to tribes and this latest affirmation of the ease in which TAS
status may be obtained will likely persuade many Indian tribes to direct
their limited environmental resources to obtaining control over
reservation waters. As more tribes assert this control, transboundary
water pollution conflicts will increase on a scale not yet seen. The
EPA, however, is trying to stem this potential tide of conflict and
discord between sovereigns by redrawing the regulatory lines to those
created by hydrologic boundaries rather than those marking political
borders. Such watershed management practices envision cooperation
over conflict and environmental protection over environmental
protectionism. Thus, the CWA itself is at a crossroads. It will be up to
at
Why
Watersheds?,
of
Water,
Office
395. EPA
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/why.htmi.
at
Framework,
Approach
Water,
Watershed
of
Office
396. EPA
On January 25, 2002, the
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/framework.html.
EPA announced that President Bush is including $21 million in his 2003 budget for
new watershed protection initiatives. The money will be used to "target up to 20 of
this country's most highly-valued watersheds for grants. EPA will be working
cooperatively with state governors, tribes and other interested parties on this
In her enthusiastic statement announcing the allocation, EPA
initiative."
Administrator Christie Whitman stated: "I have heard a watershed defined as
'communities connected by water,' a good reminder that we all live downstream from
someone." U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Newsroom, EPA Announces
at
Waterways,
America's
Preserve
Protect
and
to
New
Initiative
http://www.epa.gov/epahome/headline4_012502.htm (last updated Mar. 19, 2002).
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the CWA's integral participants-the EPA, states, and empowered
Indian tribes-to take the path that restores and protects the water
resources of the United States while also preserving and protecting a
cooperative spirit among its inhabitants.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article began as a presentation on interjurisdictional
watershed management. "Interjurisdictional" is really just verbiage. A
watershed, defined by physical rather than political boundaries, rarely
falls under the management of a single entity. The land area that
drains to a single body of water such as a river or lake is the watershed
itself.' Also, a few acres may drain to a small stream or wetland while
those small streams and wetlands may drain into larger rivers, which in
turn drain into estuaries. 2 Watershed management, therefore, "uses
t Kara Gillon is Wildlife Counsel with Defenders of Wildlife, a biodiversity

advocacy organization based in Washington, D.C., with a field office, inter alia, in
Albuquerque, NM. Since 1994, Defenders has embarked on a legal, scientific and
political strategy to protect and conserve the Sonoran Desert ecosystem, including that
oasis which is the Lower Colorado River and Delta. Ms. Gillon is also a participant in
the Middle Rio Grande ESA Collaborative Program.
1. This has become the popular definition, as the U.S.G.S. defines watershed as
The divide separating one drainage basin from another and in the past has

been generally used to convey this meaning. However, over the years, use of
the term to signify drainage basin or catchment area has come to
predominate, although drainage basin is preferred .... Used alone, the
term "watershed" is ambiguous and should not be used unless the intended
meaning is made clear.
W.B. LANGBEIN & KATHLEEN T. ISERI, GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND HYDROLOGIC
DEFINITIONS, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY WATER-SUPPLY PAPER 154-A (1995), available at

http://water.usgs.gov/wsc/glossary.html. This article will refer to basin-"A part of
the surface of the earth that is occupied by a drainage system, which consists of a

surface stream or a body of impounded surface water together with all tributary
surface streams and bodies of impounded

surface water"-interchangeably with

watershed. Id.
2.

See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PROTECTING AND RESTORING AMERicA's
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hydrologically defined areas (watersheds) to coordinate the
management of water resources" as well as "all activities within a
landscape that affect watershed health."3 One look at a topographic
map of North America can tell you that virtually any comprehensive
watershed management is by definition interjurisdictional.
But imagine if it were not. In 1890, John Wesley Powell, then
director of the United States Geological Survey, suggested that the
federal government organize the western United States into
watersheds. Powell drafted a map that divided the lands west of the
hundredth meridian into twenty-four river basins, which were further
divided into approximately 150 watershed units.4 Each watershed unit
would be a self-governing body.' As we can see, Congress did not
West.
realize Powell's vision, and "desert islands" dot the
Two major rivers of the American West-the Colorado and the Rio
Grande-are prime examples of the clash between Powell's vision and
our reality. The Colorado River serves Los Angeles, San Diego,
Denver, Salt Lake City and tens of other cities that lie outside of the
river's watershed . The river has even been engineered to direct a
portion of its flow to the Rio Grande. Moreover, early compacts
divided these rivers to measure and enforce water deliveries,
continually partitioning the basins, 8 and leading to the peculiar
phenomena of prohibiting water flow within a river simply because it
would move from an upper to a lower basin.9
Renewed emphasis on watershed management faces the challenges
left by centuries-old fragmentation of the watershed. 0 Since Powell
(2001),
availableat http://www.epa.gov/owow/protecting/.
3. Id. at 10.
4. Alex Philp, John Wesley Powell's Watershed Commonwealths: Mapping a West that

WATERSHEDS: STATUS, TRENDS, AND INITIATIVES IN WATERSHED MANAGEMENT 9

Might Have Been, CASCADIA PLANET, (1998) (citing UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
ARID REGION

OF THE UNITED

STATES, SHOWING DRAINAGE DISTRICTS,

ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT, 1889-1890, PART II, IRRIGATION

PL., LXIX,

(1891),

available at
http://www.tnews.com/text/powell-story.html.
5. Id.
6. See Todd Wilkinson, Roman Aquaducts of New West: Water Pipes, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, May 3, 2001.

7. See MILTON N. NATHANSON, UPDATING THE HOOVER DAM DOCUMENTS 1 (1978)
(population of 2.5 million within the basin, but twelve million receive some portion of
their water supply from the Colorado River).
8. The Colorado River is divided at Lee Ferry into an Upper and Lower Basin, not

inclusive of Mexico. Colorado River Compact, 123 Colo. Sess. Laws 684, COLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-61-101 to 104 (2001). The Rio Grande is commonly divided into four
reaches: Upper Rio Grande (within Colorado); Middle Rio Grande (Colorado/New
Mexico state line to Elephant Butte Reservoir); Paso del Norte (Elephant Butte to
Presidio Dam, "the Forgotten Reach"); and Lower Basin (Presidio to Gulf of Mexico).
William A. Paddock, The Rio Grande Compact of 1938, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1, 4-10

(2001).
9. See David

J. Guy, When the Law Dulls the Edge of Chance: TransferringUpper Basin

Water to the Lower Colorado River Basin, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 25 (1991).
10. See generally A. Dan Tarlock, PuttingRivers Back in the Landscape: The Revival of
Watershed Management in the United States, 6 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 167

(2000).
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first drew his map, the lands of the West have been divided among
cities, states, and countries rather than connected to streams, lakes,
and rivers. The United States has developed separate laws for clean
water, clean air, endangered species, irrigated agriculture, and land
use management, for implementation at the federal level." Each of
the western states has developed similar, yet diverse, laws governing
the allocation and use of water rights, administration of groundwater
resources, and wildlife management. 2 Separate agencies administer
these laws at federal, state, and tribal levels. 3 Each entity has different
missions, authorities, and modes of operation.
What we are left with is a patchwork of statutes that recognize
jurisdictions of state, federal and tribal agencies regarding countless
issues affecting a watershed. Where these authorities overlap, it is
often difficult for governmental entities to cooperate and share power
among themselves as well as the regulated community. Where issues
arise that do not fall squarely within existing structure, it is difficult for
these entities to cross political and historical boundaries. Therefore,
watershed initiatives must overcome fragmented, incomplete and
shared regulatory schemes-existing among and within different levels
of government.
Because property and political boundaries of
countries, states, tribes, counties, and municipalities are largely
unrelated to watersheds, stakeholders have found it4 difficult to
coordinate watershed protection and restoration efforts.
The Colorado River and the Rio Grande provide a fascinating case
study of the interplay of political boundaries and watersheds in
resource management. Both rivers' headwaters are in Colorado, in the
Rocky Mountains and San Juan Mountains, respectively, both head
south collecting water from tens of tributaries, and both form part of
our border with Mexico. Political boundaries have not respected
geographic ones, and the contradiction has generated Congressional
enactments, Supreme Court decisions, interstate compacts, and
international treaties.'" Despite the fact that these rivers supply water
11. See, e.g., Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. § 661 (2000);
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 12511387 (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7671 (1994). Land use management also
encompasses the watershed concept, see Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 528 (2000); National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1600 (2000); Federal Land
Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701-1785 (1994) (commanding the Forest
Service, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e), (g) (3), and Bureau of Land Management, 43 U.S.C. §
1702(c) to consider the watershed in its land use plans and multiple use decisions).
12. See generally UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, THE NATURE
CONSERVANCY,

PRESERVING OUR NATURAL

HERITAGE,

VOLUME

II

STATE AcTVITIES

(1978).
13. Several statutes provide that qualifying Tribes be treated as states in
implementing parts of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e); Safe Drinking Water
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300h-l(e); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7474(e).
14. For a discussion on whether watershed initiatives are practicable or preferable,
see Robert W. Adler, Addressing the Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVrL. L. 973
(1995); see also BETSY RIEKE & DOUG KENNEY, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AT THE
WATERSHED LEVEL (1997).

15.

Both rivers live and die according to each's "Law of the River." The Law of the
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to two of the fastest growing regions in the world, there has been little
ecological coordination between the two countries. Rather than
allowing the watersheds to serve as boundaries, the rivers themselves
do, and the international border severs both basins. 16 Adding insult to
injury, the United States federal government has further scorned the
watersheds of the two rivers by turning the Colorado River into a
tributary of the Rio Grande, diverting approximately 110,000 acre-feet
of water from a Pacific watershed to an Atlantic one, each year."
This article will first discuss in more detail the multitudinous
obligations of federal, state, and tribal entities under the patchwork of
laws and jurisdictions currently governing the majority of operations
on the Lower Colorado River and Middle Rio Grande. The next
section will examine several tangible examples of the overlap and gaps
created by the exercise of these authorities and the fulfillment of these
obligations. The last section will describe existing river restoration
efforts in the two basins and their ability to overcome these obstacles
and achieve watershed management and protection.
II. PATCHWORK OF EXISTING STATUTES AND AUTHORITIES
THAT RECOGNIZE JURISDICTIONS OF FEDERAL, TRIBAL, AND
STATE AGENCIES.
When dealing with river basins, the landmark Clean Water Act
("CWA") sets the stage." The CWA sets out to "restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters"
and establishes national goals to achieve such: the elimination of "the
discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters;" the prohibition of
"the discharge of toxic pollutants;" and "water quality which provides
for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and
provides for recreation in and on the water."1 9
In general, the CWA institutes various regulatory structures to
achieve these goals. First, the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") must set effluent limits based on what is technologically and
economically feasible for hundreds of pollutants for categories of
dischargers. 0 At the same time, states must set ambient water quality
Colorado River is the subject of lawsuits as well as novels. See, e.g., MARC REISNER,
CADILLAc DESERT (1993) (general history of federal, state, and private water
development).
16. See Multi-Species Conservation Program (MSCP) for the Lower Colorado River,
Arizona, Nevada and California, 64 Fed. Reg. 27,000, 27,001 (May 18, 1999) (calling
the MSCP a "comprehensive conservation approach" for the Lower Basin, to the
Southerly International Boundary).
17. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON,

CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN, LAND, WATER AND THE

FUTURE OF THE WEST 222 (1992). The waters of the Navajo, Little Navajo and Blanco
Rivers, which would flow west into the San Juan and then into the Colorado, are sent
instead into the Azotea Tunnel and transported across the Continental Divide to
Azotea Creek, a tributary of the Rio Chama in the Rio Grande watershed, which drains
into the Gulf of Mexico. Id.
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1387 (1994).
19. Id. § 1251(a).
20. 1& § 1311.
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standards for the receiving waters.2 ' Dischargers must obtain a permit
that certifies the discharged pollutant(s) satisfy both the effluent
limitations and the water quality standards.'
The process of setting water quality standards is where the
watershed itself comes into play. To establish the standards, states
must first inventory all state waters and identify those not protected by
EPA-set effluent limits. 2 1

State standards divide the waters into

segments, determine the present and attainable uses for each segment
(endangered species, recreation, domestic use, etc.), and set numeric
21
limits on pollutants that will protect these uses.
In addition to setting water quality standards, states are required to
assign the "total maximum daily load" ("TMDL") for water bodies that
do not meet existing water quality standards. 2' TMDLs are, in effect, a
"pollution budget" among both point and nonpoint sources of
pollution. 26 The key elements of an EPA regulatory strategy for
dealing with the vast number of polluted waterbodies call for
identification of polluted waterbodies, of pollutants and their sources,
and a quantification of a pollutant load.2 ' The allocations may require
land use controls for nonpoint sources of pollution since technological
control of point sources have not satisfied state standards.2 ' A bill
introduced into the Senate in 1994 included a title on watershed
planning, in part to address the contentious issue of nonpoint source
pollution.29

21. Id. § 1313. If state law is absent or insufficient, the EPA will promulgate water
quality standards. Id. § 1313(a) (3) (C).
22. The EPA, or a state, if delegated federal permitting authority through an
acceptable program, may issue "a permit for the discharge of any pollutant." Id. §
1342(a)(1). A tribe may also issue discharge permits. Id. § 1377(e). Furthermore, if
existing water quality is better than state water quality standards, discharges may not be
permitted if they degrade the water to meet the standards-the antidegradation
requirement. Id. § 1313(d) (4) (B).
23. Id. § 1313(d)(1)(A).
24. 40 C.F.R. § 131.2 (2001).
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (1994).
26. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water, Final TMDL
Rule:
Fulfilling
the
Goals
of
the
Clean
Water
Act,
at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/finalrule/factsheetl.html. The fact sheet also notes
that over 20,000 waterbodies in the United States have been identified as polluted,
including 300,000 river and shoreline miles and five million acres of lakes.
27. See Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and
Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support
of Revisions to Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg.
43,586 (July 13, 2000). However, this rule acknowledged the EPA's inability to
implement the TMDL rule until October 31, 2001, id. at 43,660, and has since
postponed implementation until April 30, 2003. Effective Date of Revision to the
Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 66 Fed. Reg. 53,044 (Oct. 18,
2001).
28. See generally Oliver A. Houck, The Clean Water Act TMDL Program:Law, Policy, and
Implementation, 32 ENVrL. L. RPTR. 10,358 (2002).
29. S. 2093, 103d Cong. (1994). As of this writing, the Bush administration and
EPA announced a request of $21 million for fiscal year 2003 for watershed protection
for the same purposes. John Heilprin, EPA Plans Watershed ProtectionProgram, WASH.
PoST, Jan. 28, 2002, at Al9.
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In contrast, the Endangered Species Act's role in protecting
ecosystems has united stakeholders, resource managers and
enforcement agencies in an effort to protect and recover endangered
species in a river basin. While the trigger is usually endangered
aquatic species, such efforts to protect the species have the potential to
expand their scope to riparian and terrestrial species. 30
Congress passed the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") in order to
"provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered
species and threatened species depend may be conserved, [and] to
provide a program for the conservation of such [] species."3 The ESA
contains procedural and substantive requirements that serve to carry
out the conservation and recovery goals of the Act, including the
development of recovery plans, the duty to conserve listed species, the
duty to avoid jeopardizing listed species via consultation with the Fish
and Wildlife Service or National Marine Fisheries Service, and the
prohibition on taking listed species.
In order to trigger these
protections, the services must list species as threatened or endangered
and designate the critical habitat of that species.3
Once listed, it is illegal for anyone to "take" an endangered or
threatened species.34
The federal government has additional
obligations: to utilize their authorities and carry out programs for the
conservation of listed species, and to ensure that any action they
authorize, fund, or carry out is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any federally listed species or result in the destruction or
adverse modification, of designated critical habitat.35 In the event that
a federal agency determines that its action "may affect" a listed species
or designated critical habitat, the agency is required to consult with
the Fish and Wildlife Service regarding the degree of impact and
30. For more detail, see infra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing the initial
impetus behind the Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program and its
eventual scope).

31.

16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000) (emphasis added).

32.

Id. §§ 1533(f) (recovery plans), 1536(a)(1) (duty to conserve), 1536(a)(2)

(duty to consult), 1538 (taking).
33.

See id. § 1533(a). An endangered species is defined as "any species which is in

danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range." Id.
§ 1532(6). While the Act requires designation of critical habitat to occur concurrently
with listing, this rarely occurs. In fact, the Service often designates critical habitat only
after a court decision mandating such. See DEFENDERS

OF WILDLIFE, CONSERVATION IN
ActiON: SAFEGUARDING CITIZEN RIGHTS UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES Acr (2001).

34. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B); 50 C.F.R. § 17.21(a), (c), 17.31 (2001). The term
"take" is broadly defined to include "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
trap, capture, or collect, or... attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(19). The FWS has further defined "harm" to include "significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife" and "harass" to
include activities that disrupt normal behavioral patterns, including but not limited to,
breeding, feeding or sheltering. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3.
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1)-(2). 'Jeopardize the continued existence of [a species]
means to engage in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly,
to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed
species in the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that
species." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
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measures available to avoid or minimize the adverse effects."6
In addition, pursuant to the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act
("FWCA"), the Fish and Wildlife Service, National Marine Fisheries
Service, and state wildlife agencies must review federal water projects
that may impound, divert, or otherwise modify a waterbody for the
impacts to wildlife "with a view to the conservation of wildlife resources
by preventing loss of and damage to such resources."37 While the
consultation process under the FWCA may not stop a project, the Act
does extend to fish and wildlife not covered by the ESA.s
Naturally, the most encompassing federal obligation originates
from the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")-"our basic
national charter for protection of the environment."3 9 Its purpose is to
"promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the
environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of
man,"40 and to "help public officials make decisions that are based on
understanding of environmental consequences, and take actions that
protect, restore and enhance the environment.",4
In one way or
another, these watershed efforts will undergo NEPA analyses.
Section 102 of NEPA contains action-forcing provisions, aimed at
fulfilling NEPA's intent, that require all federal agencies to prepare an
environmental impact statement for "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment," that
includes "the environmental impact of the proposed action," "any
adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided," and
"alternatives to the proposed action."4 2 Without these provisions,
public participation would be less meaningful.43
Development of alternatives to the proposed action is the heart of
the EIS. 44 The Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") regulations
call on federal agencies to "[r]igorously explore and objectively
evaluate all reasonable alternatives ..... [d] evote substantial treatment
to each alternative considered in detail including the proposed action
so that reviewers may evaluate their comparative merits[,]
....[i]nclude the alternative of no action ....[and] [i]nclude
appropriate mitigation45measures not already included in the proposed
action or alternatives."

36. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)-(b).
37. Id § 662(a).
38. See itd§ 661 (declaring a purpose of the Act to provide "that wildlife
conservation shall receive equal consideration and be coordinated with other features
of water-resource development programs .....
39. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (2001).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994).
41. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
43. See Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139,
143 (1981) (NEPA fully informs the public of environmental effects and facilitates
public input into the decision-making process).
44. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14.
45. Id. § 1502.14.
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The environmental consequences section of the EIS "forms the
scientific and analytic basis" for the comparison of alternatives.46 This
section discusses the direct and indirect effects of the alternatives, the
significance of the environmental effects, and the means to mitigate
adverse impacts. 7 Once an action is considered to have significant
impact, mitigation measures must be developed where it is feasible to
do so.4
In a discussion of western watersheds, the Reclamation Act may
have left a greater legacy than any environmental law.
Local
irrigation interests did not have the capital to build and sustain private
irrigation projects; federal resources were required for the widespread
irrigation envisioned in the arid west." The Reclamation Act hastened
settlement and irrigation of the federally owned desert; since then, the
Bureau of Reclamation alone has built 133 water projects in the
western United States 5'
Under the Reclamation Act, Congress restricted the use of water
delivered by federal projects to that reasonably needed for beneficial
use." Many states have similar rules, as one court observed:
water is too valuable to be wasted, either through an extravagant
application for the purpose appointed or by waste by misapplication
which can be avoided by the exercise of a reasonable degree of care
to prevent loss, or loss of a53volume which isgreatly disproportionate
to that actually consumed."

46. Id. § 1502.16.
47. Id. Direct effects are caused by the action and occur at the same time and
place, indirect effects are"
[C]aused by the action and are later in time or farther removed in distance,
but are still reasonably foreseeable. Indirect effects may include growth
inducing effects and other effects related to induced changes in the pattern
of land use, population density or growth rate, and related effects on air and
water and other natural systems, including ecosystems.
Id. § 1508.8.
48. Id. §§ 1502.14(0, 1502.16(h), 1508.14.
49. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. §§ 331-616 (1994)) (establishing the purpose of Bureau of Reclamation to
construct and operate irrigation facilities in the sixteen arid western states).
50. The All-American Canal in southern California is a prime example. As the
Colorado River continually silted up the canal and eventually flooded the entire works,
farmers cried out for a canal built entirely in the United States that could withstand
the wildly varying flows and courses of the Colorado, but this could not be done
without an upstream dam (eventually Hoover Dam). See Imperial Irrigation District,
How it Works, The ImperialDam, at http://www.iid.com/water/works-imperialdam.html.
51. WESTERN WATER PoLicY REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION, WATER IN THE WEST:
CHALLENGE
FOR
THE
NEXT
CENTURY
4-3
(1998),
available
at
http://www.den.doi.gov/wwprac/reports.htm.
52. 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1994) (beneficial use is the basis, measure, and limit of water
use under the Reclamation Act); see also N.M. CONST., art. XVI, § 3; Jicarilla Apache
Tribe v. United States, 657 F.2d 1126, 1133-34 (10th Cir. 1981).
53. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 657 F.2d at 1134 (citations omitted); see also Imperial
Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 250, 255 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (estimates of water loss by the district's system ranged from 53,000 to 135,000
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In addition to this express limitation, federal reclamation projects
generally must conform with state water laws, unless doing so would
interfere with other federal requirements or interests. 4
The CWA, ESA, and NEPA are federal statutes that apply
throughout the United States. A report to Congress on the proper
federal role in western water management well summarizes the
intricacies:
The federal role continues to be fragmented, with multiple agencies,
each with specific and narrow legal mandates and constituencies,
managing or controlling certain aspects of water uses. For example,
Reclamation built and manages specific projects primarily for the
benefit of agricultural water users, although this mission has
broadened considerably in recent decades.
The Corps [of
Engineers] manages projects, maintains navigation channels, and
operates and maintains reservoirs and levees to control floods and for
such incidental uses such as hydroelectric power generation. The

Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) and the National Marine Fisheries
Service administer the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act (FWCA) to protect the fish and
wildlife whose survival may be jeopardized by a federal activity or
where private actions, such as a diversion, threaten to harm the
secies when water is removed from stream channels. More recently,
e Clean Water Act allowed a new federal agency, the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA), to set water quality standards for and
control discharges into surface waters, but specifically exempted
agricultural return flows as nonpoint sources.

When one delves into the complexities of a river system,
particularly a western river, these authorities transform to a maze of
laws. Each major river basin will inevitably acquire its own "Law of the
River"-the product of decades of litigation and negotiation among
these and other parties.
III. THE LAW OF THE COLORADO RIVER
The Secretary of the Interior serves as the "Watermaster" for the
Lower Colorado River, the only river system in the country that has
been so federalized. 6 The Secretary delegated the responsibility of
acre-feet per year through "canal spill" and 312,000 to 559,000 acre-feet per year
through excessive "tailwater"); Erickson v. Queen Valley Ranch Co., 99 Cal. Rptr. 446,
450 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (finding five-sixths of flow of water lost in delivery via earthen
ditch inefficient and wasteful and therefore not beneficial use even though it was
consistent with local custom); Doherty v. Pratt, 124 P. 574, 576 (Nev. 1912) (allowing
two-thirds of the water diverted to become lost in a swamp is not a reasonable and
economical method of diversion).
54. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1994); California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978);
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 589 (1963); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken,
357 U.S. 275, 291 (1958).
55. WESTERN WATERPOLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 51, at 4-3 to 46; see also id. at 4-4 to 4-5 for a table of Major Federal Laws and Actions Affecting
Western Water Resources.
56. Historically, the basin states have feared California's rapid water consumption.
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 555 (1963). For most of the twentieth century,
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operating and maintaining the extensive network of dams, reservoirs,
water diversions, levees, canals, and other water control and delivery
systems on the river to the Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau"). The
Bureau's authority and discretion is guided by a body of treaties,
Congressional enactments, 57compacts, and other agreements known as
the "The Law of the River."
Significant components of the Law of the River include the
Colorado River Compact of 1922,58 the Boulder Canyon Project Act of
1928,"' the Treaty Respecting the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado
and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande of 1944,60 the Supreme
Court's decision and subsequent decree in Arizona v. California," and
the Colorado River Basin Project Act. 62 Environmental laws, including
the ESA, NEPA, and CWA must also be considered part of the Law of
the River due to the substantial obligations they impose on the Bureau
of Reclamation. 6 South of the border, Mexican federal law is
pertinent.
The Colorado River Compact of 1922 created the Upper Division
(Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah) and the Lower Division
(Arizona, Nevada and California), and allocated 7.5 million acre-feet
of water each to the Upper and Lower Basins. 4 Soon after, Congress
only California was able to acquire water rights due to its population and the amount
of farmland. REISNER, supra note 15, at 124. Arizona's fears were particularly intense
and spawned "five lawsuits in the United States Supreme Court, a filibuster in the
Senate, a muster of troops by Arizona at the California border, and hundreds of
thousands of words in congressional hearings and judicial proceedings." Charles J.
Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (1966). Arizona was concerned
that the doctrine of prior appropriation would apply in this situation, giving California
the right to the water because it was the first to put the water to a beneficial use. The
other less developed basin states wanted to assure that water would be available for
them in the future. See Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922). Thus, the
Supreme Court held that Congress placed the "full power to control, manage, and
operate the Government's Colorado River works and to make contracts for the sale
and delivery of water" in the hands of the Secretary. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at
594.
57. Eric L. Garner & Michelle Ouellette, FutureShock? The Law of the Colorado River
in the Twenty-First Century, 27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 469, 470 (1995).
58. Colorado River Compact, 123 Colo. Sess. Laws 684, COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-61101 to 104 (2001).
59. Boulder Canyon Project Act of Dec. 21, 1928, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1994)).
60. Treaty Respecting the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers
and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, U.S.- Mex., 59 Stat. 1219 [hereinafter Water
Treaty of 1944].
61. Arizona v. California I, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Arizona v. California II, 376 U.S.
340 (1964) (decree implementing opinion of 373 U.S. 546).
62. Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1556 (1994).
63. Arizona v. California , 373 U.S. at 594 (recognizing that "Congress still has
broad powers over this navigable international stream [and] can undoubtedly reduce
or enlarge the Secretary's power if it wishes"); see also BUREAU OF REcLAmATION, FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, COLORADO RIVER INTERIM SURPLUS CRITERIA 1-10

(2000).
64. 70 Cong. Rec. 324, 325 (1928). The Lower Basin, for example, "means those
parts of the states of Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah within and
from which waters naturally drain into the Colorado River System below Lee Ferry,"
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quantified, and the Secretary contracted, the allocations to the Lower
Basin states of California, Nevada and Arizona in the Boulder Canyon
Project Act ("BCPA").6 The Water Treaty of 1944 then allocated 1.5
million acre-feet to Mexico, with the prospect of another 200,000 acrefeet to Mexico if the United States determines a surplus exists.66 Later,
the Upper Colorado River Compact of 1948 allocated percentages of
the Upper Basin's 7.5 million acre-feet share to Colorado, Utah, New
Mexico, Arizona and Wyoming.
The Supreme Court approved the States' apportionments and set
the priorities for Colorado River waters in Arizona v. California.
Although Congress and the Supreme Court approved the States'
apportionments, they amended the Colorado River Compact, via the
BCPA and Decree respectively, by reestablishing the priorities for
Colorado River waters. Top priorities include controlling floods,69
improving navigation, and regulating the flow, the secondary priorities
are water for irrigation and domestic purposes, and the lowest priority
is power generation." The Decree enjoins the Secretary to release
water in accordance with these priorities."' The other top priorities,
regulating the flow of the river and improving navigation, are purely
within the Secretary's discretion.7
and all parts within the states but outside the basin which will be served by those
waters. Id. art. II(g).
65. See Boulder Canyon Project Act of Dec. 21, 1928, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (codified
as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 671 (1994)) (apportioning the 7.5 million acre-feet per year
among the Lower Basin states: 300,000 acre-feet per year to Nevada; 2.8 million acrefeet per year to Arizona; and 4.4 million acre-feet per year to California). The BCPA
also requires parties using water to have contracts with the Secretary of the Interior
whose terms are for permanent service, "under such general regulations as [the
Secretary] may prescribe." Id. § 617d. Between 1930 and 1944, the Secretary entered
into contracts for water delivery with five California agencies, the State of Nevada, and
the State of Arizona for their full entitlements. The Secretary has contracts with water
users in California amounting to 5.362 million acre-feet per year, almost one million
acre-feet greater than its apportionment. See MILTON N. NATHANSON, UPDATING THE
HOOVERDAm DocuMEiNTs 1-27 (1978).
66. Water Treaty of 1944, supra note 60, art. 10. However, average annual flows
immediately before the Compact negotiations were approximately 18.1 million acrefeet per year (1906-21). WESTERN WATER POLIcy REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra
note 51, at 2-3. Long-term annual average flow is closer to 13.5 million acre-feet per
year, leaving the river seriously overappropriated. DALE PONTIUs, COLORADO RIVER
BASIN STUDY6 (1997).
67. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, 63 Stat. 31, 33, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 3762-101 to 106 (2001) (allocating 51.75 percent to Colorado, 11.25 percent to New
Mexico, 23 percent to Utah, 14 percent to Wyoming, and 50,000 acre-feet to Arizona).
68. Arizona v. California I, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Arizona v. California II, 376 U.S.
340 (1964).
69. The Corps of Engineers dictates flood control for Lake Mead; the Bureau
manages for flood control related to the Davis and Parker Dams. See Flood Control
Act of 1944, 33 U.S.C. § 709; U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, WATER CONTROL MANUAL
FOR FLOOD CONTROL: HOOVER DAM AND LAxE MEAD COLORADO RIVER, NEVADA AND
ARIZONA (1982).

70. 43 U.S.C. § 61 7 e (1994).
71. Arizona v. CaliforniaII, 376 U.S. at 341.
72. Laughlin River Tours, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 730 F. Supp. 1522, 1524
(D. Nev. 1990).
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In the decree, the Court held that the Secretary controls Colorado
River water in the Lower Basin. s Congress granted the Secretary
" 5
"broad power"74 to "make contracts for the distribution of the water.
Nothing in the BCPA changes the decision that the Secretary's
contracts "control the apportionment of water among the States"" and
that the Secretary "is not bound by these sections to follow state law."77
The Colorado River Basin Project Act directed the Secretary to
adopt "operating criteria" for the long-range operation of Colorado
River reservoirs in order to comply with and carry out the provisions of
the Colorado River Compact, the Uper Colorado River Basin
Compact, and the Water Treaty of 1944.' Each year, the Bureau of
Reclamation consults with the seven basin states, the general public
and other interested parties in preparing the Annual Operating Plan
("AOP") for Colorado River reservoirs.9 The AOP is developed with
"appropriate consideration of the uses of the reservoirs for all
purposes, including flood control, river regulation, beneficial
consumptive uses, power production, water quality control, recreation,
enhancement of fish and wildlife, and other environmental factors."80
The plan also determines the amount of water available for delivery
pursuant to the 1944 U.S. Mexico Water Treaty.81 Finally, the AOP
determines whether the reasonable consumptive use requirements of
users in the Lower Basin will be met under a "normal," "surplus," or

73. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 588-90. The Court held that the Boulder
Canyon Project Act's provisions were:
[P]ersuasive that Congress intended the Secretary ...both to carry out the
allocation of the waters of the main Colorado River among the Lower Basin
States and to decide which users within each State would get water ....
[H] ad Congress intended so to fetter the Secretary's discretion, it would have
done so in clear and unequivocal terms.
Id. at 580-81.
74. Id.at 585.
75. Id.
76. Id,at 586.
77. Id.; see also id. at 589.
78. 43 U.S.C. § 1552 (1994); U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Criteriafor Coordinated
Long Range Operation of Colorado River Reservoirs Pursuant to the Colorado River Basin
Project Act of September 30, 1968, at http://www.lc.usbr.gov/-glOOO/pdfiles/opcriter.pdf
[hereinafter OperatingCriteria].
79. Articles I-IV of the Operating Criteria require the Secretary to prepare an
Annual Operating Plan, the purposes of which are to determine: (1) the projected
operation of the Colorado River reservoirs under varying hydrologic and climatic
conditions; (2) the quantity of water considered necessary as of September 30, to be in
storage in the Upper Basin reservoirs as required by Section 602(a) of the CRBPA; (3)
water available for delivery to Mexico; (4) whether the Secretary will declare a
"normal," "surplus," or "shortage" condition as outlined in Article III of the Operating
Criteria; and (5) whether water apportioned to, but unused by, one or more Lower
Basin States exists and can be used to satisfy beneficial consumptive use requests of
mainstream users in other Lower Basin States as provided in the Arizona v. California
decree. i; see also United States Bureau of Reclamation, 2002 Annual OperatingPlan
for ColoradoRiver System Reservoirs, at http://www.lc.usbr.gov/g4000/aop02.final.pdf.
80. OperatingCriteria,supra note 78, art. 1(2).
81. Id. at preamble.
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"shortage" condition.2 While the AOP purports to take fish and
wildlife values into account when planning operations, the guidelines
do not contain any environmental criteria.
If the Secretary determines that surplus water is available, he may
allocate water to the states in excess of their apportionments, pursuant
to Article II(b) (2) of the Decree-50 percent to California, 46 percent
to Arizona, and 4 percent to Nevada.13 At the close of its term, the
Clinton administration promulgated Interim Surplus Guidelines to
establish criteria for determining and allocating surplus waters until
2016.4
In recent years, Congress and the basin states have become more
alert to the ecological problems facing the Colorado River. Water
quality concerns in the 1970s led to the Colorado River Basin Salinity
Control Acte' and environmental and aesthetic concerns in the Grand
Canyon led to the Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992.W
Additionally, efforts to include the river's delta in United States
discussions have increased our understanding of Mexican
environmental laws.
To begin, the General Law on Ecological Balance and
Environmental Protection is the principle federal environmental law
in Mexico and sets forth general principles that guide ecological
policies as well as instruments for implementing those policies. 7 Most
environmental protection functions are the responsibility of one
agency, the Secretariat for Environment and Natural Resources
(Secretarfa de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales or
"SEMARNAT"), who implements the Federal Ecology Law.8 8 The
federal government implements matters under this general law by
issuing regulations, which are in turn implemented by technical
standards, known as Official Mexican Norms. 9 Under this process,
Mexico has established four levels of protection for sensitive species:
endangered, threatened, rare and species under special protection.8
82. Id. art. 111(3).
83. Arizona v. California II, 376 U.S. 340, 342 (1964).
84. RECORD OF DECISION COLORADO RIVER INTERIM SuRPLuS GUIDELINES, FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (2001). The Interim Surplus guidelines define

surplus according to the level of Lake Mead rather than by hydrology and forecast,
providing a more reliable supply.
85. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1571-1599 (1994).
86. Pub. L. No. 102-275, tit. XVIII, 106 Stat. 4669.
87. Ley General del Equilibrio Ecol6gico y ia Protecci6n al Ambiente, at
http://www.cddhcu.gob.mx.leyinfo/148/ [hereinafter Federal Ecology Law].
See
generally ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW INSTITUTE, DECENTRALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION IN MEXICO: AN OVERVIEW OF STATE AND LOCAL LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS 5-30

(1996) [hereinafter DECENTRALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN MEXICO],
available at http://www.eli.org/pdf/resreportdecen.pdf.
88. With the new administration, SEMARNAT formed out of SEMARNAP when the
"P" (Pesca or Fisheries) was relocated to SAGAPA, the Secretariat of Agriculture,
Livestock, Fisheries and Food.
89. DECENTRALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN MEXICO, supra note 87, at
6.
90. "Normas Oficiales Mexicanas, Que Determina las Especies y Subespecies de
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This norm lists over 2,000 species, including several in the Lower
Colorado River basin-vaquita, totoaba, razorback sucker, Yuma
clapper rail, and desert pupfish.1
Agencies within SEMARNAT include the Comisi6n Nacional del
Agua ("CNA") and Instituto Nacional de Ecologia ("INE"). CNA has
jurisdiction over water quality, water resources and planning, and
administers Mexico's system of water rights and pumping permits.92
CNA is encouraging decentralization of its decisionmaking by
participating in local watershed councils called District Water
Committees (Comit6s Hidrdulicos)." INE carries out environmental
research and development, evaluates Mexico's environmental policies
and implements its natural resource programs." INE administers the
National System of Protected Natural Areas and is responsible for
managing the Biosphere Reserve of the Upper Gulf of California." A
reflection of his administration's priority on the U.S.-Mexico border,
President Fox has created a new executive position for border affairs. 6
IV. THE LAW OF THE RIO GRANDE
The Law of the Rio Grande is quite similar to that of the Colorado;
it contains an interstate compact, federal and state laws, and
international treaties. It also retains vestiqes of indigenous culture and
Spanish and Mexican laws and grants. ' Although not addressed
Flora y Fauna Silvestres Terrestres y Acuiticas en Peligro de Extinci6n, Amenazadas,
Raras y las Sujetas a Protecci6n Especial y que Establece Especificaciones para su
Protecci6n," D.O., 16 de mayo de 1994 (NOM-059-ECOL-1994), available at
http://www.ine.gob.mx/dgra/normas/rec-nat/no-59.htm.
91. Id.
92. DECENTRALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECrION IN MEXICO, supra note 87, at
18.
93. Jennifer Pitt et al., Two Nations, One River: ManagingEcosystem Conservation in the
Colorado River Delta, 40 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 819, 839 n.86 (2000).
94. DECENTRALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN MEXICO, supra note 87, at
18.
95. Pitt, supra note 93, at 838-39. Mexico established the Upper Gulf of California
and Colorado River Delta Biosphere Reserve (El Alto Golfo de California y Delta del
Rio Colorado). It is recognized by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), has a management plan, and contains a core zone
and a buffer zone totaling 934,755 hectares. See Wendy Laird et al., Cooperation across
Borders: A BriefHistory of Biosphere Reserves in the Sonoran Desert, 39 J. OF THE SOUTHWEST
307, 309 (1997).
96. See David A. Shirk, Mexico's New Border Commission: A First Look, BORDERLINES,
April 2001. Also in 2000, Mexico adopted a new federal wildlife law, Ley General de
Vida
Silvestre,
D.O.F.
7
de
marzo
2000,
available
at
http://www.ine.gob.mx/dgvs/leyvs.html; see William Snape III et al., Protecting
Ecosystems Under the EndangeredSpecies Act: The SonoranDesert Example, 41 WASHBURN L.J.
14, 45-48 (2001).
97. After the war with Mexico, Mexico ceded nearly half its territory (529,000
square miles) to the United States Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement
with the Republic of Mexico, Feb. 2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., 9 Stat. 922 [hereinafter Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo]. Subsequently, the Gadsden Treaty clarified boundary issues
unresolved by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and Mexico ceded an additional
29,142,000 acres to the United States Boundary Treaty, Dec. 30, 1853, U.S.-Mex., 10
Stat. 1031; see also ERNIE NIEMI & TOM McGuCKIN, WATER MANAGEMENT STUDY: UPPER
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above, but just as applicable, are Indian water rights and trust assets."
In the Middle Rio Grande, there are approximately eighteen Indian
pueblos (Acoma, Cochiti, Isleta, Jemez, Laguna, Namb6, Picuris,
Pojoaque, San Felipe, San Ildefonso, San Juan, Sandia, Santa Ana,
Santa Clara, Santo Domingo, Tesuque, Taos, Zia), "the Navajo Nation
and certain Navajo allottees, and the Jicarilla Apache Nation.""
Annual flow of approximately one million acre-feet engenders a
constant balancing of supply and demand; the presence of
unquantified, senior water rights threatens to tip the scales."'
Winters v. United States established the "doctrine of reserved rights,"
which ensures that lands set aside by the federal government have
sufficient water for the purposes for which they were set aside.' ' The
reservation of water dates back to the establishment of the
reservation.0
Later, the Supreme Court developed the "practicably
irrigable acreage" ("PIA") standard by which to calculate the water
Indian water rights were thus established and
rights of a reservation.'
to be met from each state's entitlement.
In turn, the United States holds Indian land and resources in trust,
with the beneficiary interest residing in the tribe. This fiduciary
relationship has imposed a responsibility on the federal government to
protect tribal property, treaty rights, and culture, including water
rights.0 4 The trust responsibility imposes "most exacting fiduciary
standards" on every federal agency.' p Inevitably, this fiduciary duty
Rio GRANDE BASIN 11 (1997); James M. Burson, Middle Rio Grande Regional Water
Resource Planning: The Pitfalls and the Promises,40 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 533, 537-38 (2000).
98. There are generally recognized thirty-four tribes in the Lower Colorado River
basin with both quantified and unquantified water rights. See WESTERN WATER POLICY
REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION,

supra note 51, at 75.

99. Memorandum from the Regional Director, Region 2, to Area Manager,
Albuquerque Area Office, Bureau of Reclamation 6 (June 29, 2001) (on file with
author).
100. See generally Allen V. Kneese & Gilbert Bonem, Hypothetical Shocks to Water
Allocation Institutions in the Colorado Basin, in NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER:
MAJOR ISSUES FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 87, 94-98 (Gary D. Weatherford & F. Lee Brown

eds., 1986).
101. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908) (holding that water rights
exist because reservation lands were practically useless without irrigation and
argument for retention of waters is of more force since ambiguities are resolved in
favor of Indians).
102. In the case of some Pueblos, whose sovereignty was recognized by prior Spanish
and Mexican governments, their water rights may predate the reservation. NIEMI &
McGuCKIN, supra note 97, at 20; see also Burson, supra note 97, at 545-48.
103. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 595-601 (1963) (granting approximately
761,000 acre-feet to five tribes along the mainstem and applying the reservation of
water to other types of federal reservations, such as wildlife refuges and parks).
Recently, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected PIA as the standard for determining
allocation, and established a set of factors based on history and culture of the tribe and
geography, topography, population growth and groundwater availability of the
reservation. In re Gen. Adjudication of all Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. &
Source, 35 P.3d 68 (Ariz. 2001).
104. See generally Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native
Sovereignty: The Trust DoctrineRevisited, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 1471 (1994).
105. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942); see also Sec. Order
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comes into conflict
with implementation of other federal statutes and
6
obligations."1
Just as Colorado River basin states sought to protect their rights
from California's use, downstream users on the Rio Grande, including
the governments of Mexico and Texas, sought guaranteed delivery of
historic water rights in response to increased withdrawals by Colorado
and New Mexico. The U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1906 obligates the
United States to deliver 60,000 acre-feet of water each year to the
International Dam at Ciudad Juarez."'7 To help fulfill its delivery
commitment, the United States built Elephant Butte Dam and
Reservoir, the southern boundary of the Middle Rio Grande.' °s In
1938, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas entered into the Rio Grande
Compact, again to ensure the delivery of water to downstream users in
New Mexico and Texas." Each state's share is based on runoff, rather
than a set numerical allocation."
Federal involvement in the Middle Rio Grande began in earnest
when it launched the Middle Rio Grande Project. In 1947 and 1948,
the Bureau of Reclamation and Army Corps of Engineers prepared the
Rio Grande Flood Control Program-detailed studies and a joint
proposal for development of federal reclamation and flood and
sediment control works on the river."' The project called for the
Bureau to rehabilitate the dam and diversion facilities of the Middle
Rio Grande Conservancy District ("District" or "MRGCD"), which had
fallen into disrepair, channelize 127 miles of the river, and acquire the
District's outstanding debt."2 In return, the District conveyed its
property interests in the facilities to the Bureau."3 In 1962, Congress
No. 3206: American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal-Tribal Trust Responsibilities, and
the Endangered Species Act (June 5, 1997) (on file with author); Department of
Justice Policy on Indian Sovereignty And Government-to-Government Relations With
Indian Tribes, Op. Att'y Gen. (1995) (on file with author).
106. See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
107. Convention between the United States and Mexico, Equitable Distribution of
the Waters of the Rio Grande, Jan. 16, 1907, U.S.-Mex., art. II, 34 Stat. 2953, 2954.
The Water Treaty of 1944 also divides the Rio Grande waters, requiring delivery of
1.75 million acre-feet every five years from tributaries in Mexico to the river below
Elephant Butte. Water Treaty of 1944, supranote 60, art. IV.
108. NIEMI & MCGUCKIN, supra note 97, at 4, 9.
109. Rio Grande Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-66-101 to 102 (2001), 53 Stat.
785.
110. 1&
111. Congress approved those proposals in the Flood Control Acts of 1948 and
1950. Pub. L. No. 80-858, ch. 771, 62 Stat. 1175; Pub. L. No. 81-516, ch. 188, 64 Stat.
170.
112. See Middle Rio Grande Water Users' Ass'n v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy
Dist., 258 P.2d 391, 393 (1953) (holding the 1951 contract between MRGCD and the
Bureau valid).
113. By the late 1940s, 60 percent of farms in MRGCD, totaling 90 percent of
MRGCD's acreage, was delinquent in their taxes.
See MIDDLE RIO GRANDE
CONSERVANCY DISTICr WATER POLICIES PLAN 21-23 (C.T. DuMars & S.C. Nunn eds.,
1993). The United States would thus assume ownership of all MRGCD diversion and
storage facilities until project costs were repaid and Congress ordered a transfer back
to MRGCD. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 491, 498 (1994).
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approved the San Juan-Chama Project, which currently diverts up to
110,000 acre-feet of water from the San Juan River basin into the Rio
Grande." 4
The Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") also has a hand in
managing the reservoirs in the Middle Rio Grande. The Corps owns
and operates two major and several minor dams and reservoirs on the
river that trap sediment and prevent overbank flooding in the Middle
Rio Grande." 5 Abiquiu Dam and Reservoir are on the Rio Chama
below El Vado Reservoir, thirty-two river-miles upstream from the
confluence with the Rio Grande, and were completed in 1963.116
Abiquiu has a storage allocation of nearly 600,000 acre-feet for
sediment and flood control, but Congress has authorized up to
200,000 acre-feet for storage of San Juan-Chama or native Rio Grande
water.11
The second major Corps facility, Cochiti Dam and Reservoir,
located on the mainstem Rio Grande about fifty miles north of
Albuquerque, began filling in 1975.11 Cochiti has a storage capacity of
over 600,000 acre-feet for sediment and flood control purposes, but
has a 50,000 acre-foot "pool" dedicated to recreation and fish and
wildlife purposes.19
Other Corps dams and reservoirs that are part of the Middle Rio
Grande Project are Jemez Canyon Dam, located on the Jemez River
about 2.8 miles upstream from its confluence with the Rio Grande;
Platoro Dam on the Conejos River; and Galisteo Dam on Galisteo
Creek.'20 The various Flood Control Acts authorized all of these dams
for flood control and sediment retention, preventing overbank
flooding and sediment deposition.
V. SHARING POWER, CROSSING BOUNDARIES
As we have seen, there are myriad authorities influencing river
management to varying degrees. Domestic and international affairs,
federal, state and Indian governments have their own niches. As a
result, it is difficult for agencies to cooperate and share power among
themselves as
well as the regulated community and to cross political
12
boundaries.

1

114. 43 U.S.C. § 620a. New Mexico is still looking for additional ways to tap into the
Colorado. See Tania Soussan, State Considers Drawing on Gila Water, ALBUQUERQUEJ.,
Aug. 21, 2001, atAl.
115. Flood Control Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-645, 74 Stat. 480 (setting the
operating criteria for the Corps dams).
116. See supra note 111.
117. Pub. L. No. 97-140, 95 Stat. 1717, § 5(b) (authorizing SanJuan-Chama storage);
Pub. L. No. 100-522, 102 Stat. 2604 (authorizing Rio Grande storage).
118. Flood Control Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-645, 74 Stat. 488.
119. Pub. L. No. 88-293, 78 Stat. 171.
120. U.S. ARMY CoRPs OF ENGINEERS PROGRAMMATIC BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF U.S.
ARMY CoRPs OF ENGINEERS WATER-OPERATION RULES ON THE MIDDLE RIO GRANDE, NEW

MExico 7 (2001).
121. See Pitt, supranote 93, at 836-42.
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The most illustrative example is the perceived tension between the
United States Departments of Interior and State when dealing with
Lower Colorado River issues. In the Lower Basin, the Secretary of
Interior, through the Bureau of Reclamation, is the "Watermaster,"
who has a great deal of authority and discretion in the operation of
federal facilities. However, United States management of the entire
basin has severely degraded the Colorado River Delta and Upper Gulf
of California. 2
The delta once spanned approximately 780,000
hectares of wetlands and riparian areas-nearly the size of Rhode
Island.'
In the past century, river flows into the Delta have been
reduced nearly 75 percent; from 1906 to 1921 flows averaged 18.1
million acre-feet, 4 but from 1984 to 1999 they averaged 4.2 million
acre-feet.12 1 With the construction of Hoover Dam in 1936, the Delta
began to dry up as the river filled huge reservoirs and was diverted to
agricultural and municipal use. 26 When Glen Canyon Dam was
completed and Lake Powell began filling, forty-five years and over
twenty dams later, water rarely made it all the way to the Gulf.2 7 The
delta has shrunk to about 60,000 hectares, but is still a major stopover
on the Pacific Flyway and supports numerous species listed by one or
both countries as endangered, threatened, or sensitive.
Despite the Secretary's enormous influence in managing the river,
the Water Treaty of 1944 has placed consultation with Mexico
regarding these impacts in the domain of the International Boundary
and Water Commission ("IBWC"), subject to its different mission and
priorities and diplomatic process.
The IBWC, known as the
Comisi6n Internacional de Lfmites y Aguas ("CILA") in Mexico, is a
binational institution with authority over surface waters in the border
region and is responsible for carrying out the Water Treaty of 1944.12s
122. See generally Peter Friederici, Stolen River: The Colorado River and Its Delta Are
Losing Out, 11 DEFENDERS 10 (1998).
123. Edward Glenn et al., Effects of Water Management on the Wetlands of the Colorado
River Delta, Mexico, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1175, 1176 (1996).
124. WESTERN WATER POLICYREvIEwADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 51, at 2-9.
125.

EDWARD

P.

GLENN,

IMPORTANCE OF UNITED STATES' WATER FLOWS TO THE

COLORADO RIVER DELTA AND THE NORTHERN GULF OF CALIFORNIA, MEXICO

14

(unpublished manuscript) (1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter IMPORTANCE OF
UNITED STATES' WATER FLOWS].

126. Glenn, supra note 123, at 1177.
127. Id.
128. NORTH AMERICAN WETLANDS CONSERVATION

COUNCIL, WETLAND MANAGEMENT &

RESTORATION IN THE COLORADO RIVER DELTA: THE FIRST STEPS 4 (1998).

129. Water Treaty of 1944, supra note 60, art. II.
130. The 1944 Water Treaty provides that the IBWC shall consist of a United States
Section and a Mexican Section.
The Treaty further provides that it shall in all respects have the status of an
international body, that the head of each Section must be an Engineer
Commissioner and that wherever Treaty provisions call for joint action or
joint agreement by the two Governments such matters shall be handled by or
through the Department of State of the United States and the Secretariat of
Foreign Relations of Mexico.
The
International
Boundary,
United
States
and
Mexico,
at
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/ORGANIZA/aboutus.htm.
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Their scope of work includes boundary maintenance, reclamation
projects, allocation of water resources, construction of sanitation works
and resolution of treaty and water quality disputes."'
Until recently, IBWC/CILA focused on issues of water supply and
quality rather than environmental protection. A look at past treaty
minutes and technical reports demonstrates the emphasis on
construction, delivery, and water quality."' In 1997, IBWC established
a work group covering studies of the Colorado River delta.'33 More
technical than policy oriented, the objective of the Fourth Work
Group is to "perform a joint baseline study of the water and natural
resource conditions in the Cienega de Santa Clara and the adjoining
lowermost part of the Delta of the Colorado River to guide the
participating agencies in making recommendations .... 14 The Work
Group has several proposals before it, but has yet to act on any.131
Notwithstanding the international diplomacy, it has been the
Department of the Interior who has spurred great advances for
binational Colorado River and Delta restoration. 3 6 The delta issue has
gathered momentum over the past decade, with the publication by
environmental organizations and scientists of various studies noting
the importance of continuous flows to the delta and the likelihood
that increasing use in the United States will end these flows. 3 7 The
Department, with so many agencies active in the border region, has
worked closely with its counterparts in Mexico, signing the Letter of
Intent with SEMARNAP,
the Joint Declaration, 9 and other cross131.

CharlesJ. Meyers & Richard L. Noble, The ColoradoRiver: The Treaty with Mexico,

19 STAN. L. REv. 367 (1967).

132.

See generally Stephen P. Mumme, Reinventing the InternationalBoundary and Water

Commission, BORDERLINES,July 2001.

133.

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER COMMISSION,

IBWC-34-97,

MEETING OF

THE COMMISSION TO FORM A FOURTH COLORADO RIVER MATTERS TASK FORCE REGARDING
THE COLORADO RIVER DATA MEXICALI, BAJA CALIFORNIA (1997) (on file with author).
134. TERMS OF REFERENCE, LOWER COLORADO RIVER DELTA TASKFORCE (October 28,

1997) (on file with author).
135. The work group has recently coordinated and approved proposals to develop
an ecological-scientific studies database, a water flow inundation model, and a pilot
restoration project. INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER COMMISSION, ANNUAL
REPORT 2000, at 7 (2000) (on file with author).
136. For example, the IBWC even leads consultation with the government of Mexico
when the Department or an agency proposes an action that may impact the delta or
Gulf. See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER INTERIM SURPLUS CRITERIA: FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT vol. I, at 5-7 (2000); BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT/FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT VIII-3

(1994) (describing the IBWC's consultation process with Mexico, with the assistance of
the Bureau of Reclamation) (on file with author).
137. See, e.g. DANIEL F. LUECKE ET AL., A DELTA ONCE MORE: RESTORING RIPARIAN AND
WETLAND HABITAT IN THE COLORADO RIVER DELTA (1999); Glenn, supra note 123, at
1184.
138. In 1997, Secretary Babbitt and Secretary Carabias signed ajoint Letter of Intent
announcing plans
to expand existing cooperative activities in the conservation of contiguous
natural

protected

areas, ...

to harmonize

activities

directed

at the

conservation of biological diversity.... beginning with pilot projects... in
Mexico, the Biosphere Reserves of the Alto Golfo de California y Delta del
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border initiatives between the FWS and SEMARNAT and INE.'4 °
IBWC, on the other hand, has moved exceedingly slowly in
recognizing the delta issue, despite its direct role in implementing the
Treaty.'
While attending a meeting held by the Department of the Interior,
in follow-up to the Joint Declaration, members of the United States
section of the IBWC suggested a "conceptual minute" to the Water
Treaty of 1944.14' A conceptual minute does not call for action such as
construction or boundary work, but instead calls for cooperative
43
work-in this case, assessing the threats to and restoring the delta.
On December 12, 2000, the United States and Mexico signed such
a minute-an agreement on a framework for cooperation on studies
and recommendations regarding the riparian and estuarine ecology of
the Delta.' 41
Minute 306 recognizes the growing binational
collaboration among government authorities and scientific, academic
and non-governmental organizations interested in preserving the
Delta and Upper Gulf.4 4 The minute will establish a framework for
Rio Colorado... [including] harmonization and coordination of policies
leading to the conservation of natural and cultural resources.
Letter of Intent between the Department of Interior (DOI) of the United States and
the Secretariat of Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries (SEMARNAP) of the
United Mexican States forJoint Work in Natural Protected Areas on the United StatesMexico Border (May 5, 1997) (on file with author).
139. In May 2000, the United States and Mexico collaborated on ajoint Declaration
that recognizes the increasing efforts of non-governmental organizations and
communities and the IBWC Task Force. Joint Declaration between the Department of
the Interior (DOI) of the United States of America and the Secretariat of
Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries (SEMARNAP) of the United Mexican
States to Enhance Cooperation in the Colorado River Delta (May 18, 2000) (on file
with author). The countries have committed to support the Task Force, coordinate
research efforts and "[s]trengthen cooperative action and mechanisms, to improve
and conserve the natural and cultural resources of the Colorado River Delta, including
the river and associated wetland habitats." Id.
140. See, e.g.,
North American Wetlands Conservation Council Participation in
Conservation Efforts in the Delta of the Colorado River, Mexico and Summary List of
Delta Projects [where DOI is involved] (distributed at United States Stakeholders
Workshop, Colorado River Delta, Oct. 11, 2000) (Oct. 2000) (on file with author).
141. While the Fourth Work Group formed in 1997, it was inactive for two years.
Pitt, supra note 93, at 837 n.77. The lack of activity may also be due to "the position of
the United States State Department through the United States Section of the
International Boundary and Water Commission that the United States does not
mitigate for impacts in a foreign country."
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT COLORADO RIVER INTERIM SURPLUS CRITERIA, vol. I,

at 3.17-3 (2000).
142. U.S. Stakeholder Meeting for the Implementation of the DOI-SEMARNAP
Joint Declaration on the Colorado River Delta (Oct. 11, 2000) (on file with author).
143. Minute 302 to the 1944 Treaty is another example of a conceptual minute. See
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/FORAFFAI/MINUTES/minindex.HTM.
144. Conceptual Framework for United States-Mexico Studies for Future
Recommendations Concerning the Riparian and Estuarine Ecology of the Limitrophe
Section of the Colorado River and its Associated Delta (Minute 306), available at
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/FORAFFAI/MINUTES/minindex.HTM;
see also Ken
Ellingwood & Tony Perry, U.S., Mexico Pledge to Save ColoradoDelta,L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26,
2000, at A3.
145. Minute 306, supranote 144.
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cooperation between the United States and Mexico, including
examining possible approaches to ensure use of water for ecological
purposes, and a forum for public participation and exchange
4 6 of
information, and will develop joint studies and recommendations.'
Before Minute 306, the primary obstacle facing Delta restoration
was the absence of a binational forum facilitating comprehensive
restoration and long-term planning while also empowering
nontraditional
decisionmakers
such
as
non-governmental
organizations and academic institutions. 4 Minute 306 was the catalyst
for the U.S.-Mexico Binational Symposium on the Colorado River
Delta. 48 Unfortunately, the tragedies of September 11 impeded the
participants' full attendance and attention and 4 9 we wait for the
Symposium's proceedings to discuss the next steps.1

Lest the reader think this an extreme example of interagency
cooperation, the presence of Indian pueblos and tribes in a river basin
presents a similar dynamic because tribes too are sovereigns. Adding
another cook to the kitchen, the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA")
represents Indian Trust assets for over thirty-four Indian tribes in the
Lower Colorado River Basin, as well as approximately twenty tribes and
pueblos in the Middle Rio Grande. Even the Department of Interior
itself may have conflicting mandates in these situations, where
protecting Indian trust assets may
conflict with operating Bureau water
5
projects or enforcing the ESA. 1
The trust relationship requires the Department of Interior (or any
federal agency) to conduct government-to-government consultation
with Indian tribes and Pueblos. 5 When a federal agency plans to take
action that may affect trust assets, including water rights, the agency
must consult with the affected tribes and thereafter represent those
concerns and rights in the federal government and in environmental
and other compliance processes for the action.'52
146. Id.
147. Press Release, United States and Mexico Sign Agreement on Colorado River
Delta, (Dec. 13, 2000) (recognizing growing influence of these stakeholders), available
at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/PAO/CURPRESS/ColoradoMin3O6final.htm.
Cf
Roberto Sanchez, Public Participationand the IBWC: Challenges and Options, 33 NAT.
REsOURcEsJ. 283 (1993) (discussing the historic lack of public participation in IBWC
processes).
148. Colorado River Delta Symposium, Welcome and Objectives, Mexicali, Baja
California, Sept. 11-12, 2001 (on file with author).
149. See Brent Israelsen, Rejuvenating Colorado River Delta Remains at Odds With Water
Rights, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 17, 2001.
150. See, e.g., Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D. D.C.
1972), modified on other grounds, 360 F. Supp. 669 (D. D.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds,
499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975); Tim Vollmann, The
Endangered Species Act and Indian Water Rights, 11 NAT. RES. & ENvr. 39 (1996).
151. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
Government-to-Government Relations with Native American Tribal Governments, 59
Fed. Reg. 22,951 (May 4, 1994) (Government-to-Government Directive); see also Exec.
Order No. 13175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000).
152. See supra note 151; see also Klamath Tribes v. United States, 1996 WL 924509 (D.
Or. 1996).
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The difficulties inherent in such an arrangement are manifest
when it is the Department of the Interior itself undertaking the action.
In the Middle Rio Grande, the FWS is currently involved in ESA
litigation involving the endangered silvery minnow and southwestern
willow flycatcher.' 5' Early in 2001, therefore, FWS quickly issued a
biological opinion on the impacts of federal and nonfederal activities
on these species in the Middle Rio Grande. Before issuance of the
biological opinion, the Fish and Wildlife Service must consult with
Indian governments.
After the government-to-government consultation, the Department
must reconcile the duty of the FWS to enforce the ESA for the
conservation of the silvery minnow and southwestern willow flycatcher,
with the duty of the FWS as manager of national wildlife refuges in the
Middle Rio Grande, with the duty of the BIA as trustee for the Indian
trust assets, and with the duty of the Bureau of Reclamation to comply
with the ESA. 5 4 Given a short timeline and numerous tribal
governments, the FWS cannot always accomplish this successfully.
On the state level, water resources departments, fish and game
departments, environment departments and river commissions are
very heavily invested in river management. Of course, irrigation
districts have long-standing interests since they hold significant water
rights and contracts.' 55 With the advent of federal environmental laws,
new stakeholders are demanding input into decisionmaking. Here
too, the state-federal nexus often generates conflict, where state and
local interests often resent enforcement of federal laws, regarding
them 56
as unfunded federal mandates and impositions on states'
rights.
For example, in the Middle Rio Grande, there is extensive
information showing that the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy
District's ("MRGCD") water diversions are wasteful, far beyond any
reasonable beneficial use under both federal and state law.", MRGCD
received a state permit in the 1920s which has since expired.'
The
District has not applied for permanent water rights-called a "proof of
beneficial use"-to detail how much land is irrigated and with how
153. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, No. CV-99-1320 JP/RBM-ACE (D. N.M.
filedJuly 2, 2001) (challenging the adequacy of ESA Section 7 consultation).
154. For a general overview of Departmental responsibilities, see Mary Christina
Wood, Fulilling the Executive's Trust Responsibility Toward the Native Nations on
Environmental Issues: A Partial Critique of the Clinton Administration's Promises and
Performance,25 ENVrL. L. 733, 754 n.80 (1995).
155. See Lisa D. Brown, The Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District's Protected Water
Rights: Legal, Beneficial, or Against the Public Interest in New Mexico ?,40 NAT. RESoURcESJ.

1(2000).

156. See, e.g., Isabel Sanchez, IrrigationDistrict Can't Shake Feds,ALBUQUERQUEJ., May
31, 2001, at D1; Tania Soussan, Farmers' Water Called Safe, ALBUQUERQuEJ., Feb. 2, 2001,
at B3.
157. Ben Neary, Water DistrictMight be Headedfor Restrictions,SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN,
Mar. 7, 2001, at Bl.
158. Mike Taugher & Tania Soussan, Middle Rio Grande Water District's Use, Rights
Unknown, ALBUQUERQUEJ., Aug. 30, 1999, at Al.
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much water. 5 9 The State and Bureau have MRGCD reports showing
diversions averaging 609,000 acre-feet per year for 53,685 acres-more
than 11 acre-feet per acre.'6 This amount is double other irrigators in
New Mexico.16' The State Engineer has announced that these
diversions are excessive and that he expects an efficiency of greater
than 22 percent. New Mexico will only allow
62 consumption of 2.1 acrefeet per acre, a reduction of over one-third.'
By exceeding any reasonable beneficial use requirement,
MRGCD's diversions are thus unlawful under both federal and state
law. Yet MRGCD has not reduced its demand for water deliveries from
federal reservoirs, the Bureau still delivers all water MRGCD calls for,
and the State Engineer has not enforced beneficial use requirement
via a Proof of Beneficial Use ("PBU"). As long as neither the state nor
the federal government exercises its authority, the river suffers from
lack of certainty and inability to move forward.
Inertia can also set in when no entity has clear authority for a
necessary or proposed action. Instream flows, a challenge to obtain
and enforce in even the smallest stream, are nearly impossible to
discuss in the context of an international river. In the Lower Colorado
River basin, the Delta has received water in recent years largely due to
luck; this will end unless legal mechanisms are created to ensure
continued flows.' 63 The concept of instream flow rights has been
recognized by most western states and federally established with such
conservation laws as the Wild Scenic Rivers Act of 1968,'6 Grand
Canyon Protection Act of 199265 and the Central Valley Project
Improvement Act.'
The Upper Basin of the Colorado River has
provided for minimum streamfiows in a recovery program for
endangered fish. 61
Before we can extend these concepts
internationally to our neighbors in Mexico, we must first overcome the
159. Ben Neary, Make Do With Less Water, IrrigatorsTold, SANTA FE NEW MExICAN, Mar.
24, 2001, at Al.
160. Id. In addition, the original permit was for 120,000, so the District has also
shrunk. Id.
161. Lowry McAllen, A River of Discord,ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Mar. 31, 2001, at Al.
162. Tania Soussan, Effective IrrigationAdvocated, ALBUQUERQUEJ., Mar. 24, 2001, at
Al.
163. Glenn, supra note 123, at 1184.
164. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (2000).
Portions of eight tributaries and the
mainstream have been studied for designation as wild and scenic rivers. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1276 (a)(34), (36), (38), (39), (43), (47), (55), (56).
165. Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, tit. XVIII, 106 Stat.
4669. As a result of the Act and an EIS, daily releases from Lake Powell are strictly
limited and occasional releases of 30,000 to 40,000 cfs are allowed to build sandbars
and stream channels. In 1996, for seven days the Grand Canyon was flooded in order
to restore sandbars and beaches. Scott K. Miller, Undamming Glen Canyon: Lunacy,
Rationality, or Prophey 7,19 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 121, 162 (2000).
166. Pub. L. No. 102-575, tit. XXXIV, 106 Stat. 4706.
167. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE RECOvERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FOR
ENDANGERED FISH SPECIES IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN 5-7 (rev. 1995); see also

David H. Getches, Competing Demandsfor the Colorado River, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 413,

447 (1985).
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obstacles of the Law of the River. Two challenges are apparent: the
ability to transfer water from the Upper Basin to the Lower Basin, and
from the Lower Basin to Mexico. State and federal entities in both
basins believe these challenges are actually impossibilities.'6
VI. FACING THE VOID
These are just some of the conflicts in each region. How do
basinwide projects deal with them? Watershed protection efforts must
continually face fragmented, incomplete and shared regulatory
schemes.
Current watershed or basin initiatives generally fall under the
auspices of federal environmental statutes. Examples are the Lower
Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program ("LCR MSCP")
and the Middle Rio Grande ESA Collaborative Program ("Program").
However, these programs arose out of crisis and exist solely to resolve
it-in these cases, ESA compliance. As a consequence, the scope and
coverage of these programs fail to encompass the problem watershed.
For example, the Middle Rio Grande ESA Collaborative Program
initially covered only that stretch of the Rio Grande where the
endangered silvery minnow still survives-from Cochiti Dam to
Elephant Butte Reservoir.'69 This stretch of river is only 5 percent of
the minnow's current habitat.'
It is not a complete watershed effort
because it lacks actions that will address additional endangered species
in the region. On the other hand, the LCR MSCP covers nearly 100
endangered and sensitive species, but has limited its geographic scope
to the United States portion of the river.'
Despite the limited
purpose and scope of these programs, they still have difficulty
overcoming the obstacles of a fragmented and overlapping regulatory
framework.
The Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program
168. SeeJames S. Lochhead, An Upper Basin Perspective on California's Claims to Water
from the ColoradoRiver Part I: The Law of the River, 4 U. DENV. WATERL. REV. 290 (2001)
(asserting that interbasin transfers violate the Compact and Arizona v. California
Decree); BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
COLORADO RIVER INTERIM SURPLUS CRrITERIA, vol. I, at 2-4 (2000).
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169. The biological opinion of 2001 expanded the scope to cover all activities from
the Colorado state line south to Elephant Butte Reservoir. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE
SERVICE, PROGRAMMATIC BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON THE EFFECTS OF ACTIONS ASSOCATED
WrI THE U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION'S, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS', AND NONFEDERAL ENTrrEs' DISCRETIONARY ACTONS RELATED TO WATER MANAGEMENT ON THE

MIDDLE Rio GRANDE, NEW MEXICO 56 (June 29, 2001) (on file with author).

170. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule to List the Rio
Grande Silvery Minnow as an Endangered Species, 59 Fed. Reg. 36,988 (July 20, 1994)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
171. Multi-Species Conservation Program (MSCP) for the Lower Colorado River,
Arizona, Nevada, and California, 64 Fed. Reg. 27,000, 27,001 (May 18, 1999). The
boundary between the United States and Mexico is delineated by the Northern
International Boundary ("NIB") between California and Baja California until it meets
the Colorado River, where, for twenty-two miles the River forms the boundary (known
as the limitrophe), and meets the Southern International Boundary ("SIB"), the
boundary between Arizona and Sonora.
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was formed in 1995 in response to the critical habitat designation for
the Colorado pikeminnow, razorback sucker, bonytail, and humpback
chub in 1994' and the listing of the southwestern willow flycatcher as
endangered in 1995.'
The Bureau of Reclamation and the lower
Colorado River Basin states of California, Arizona, and Nevada began
negotiations over the development of a conservation plan and
incidental take permit application to obtain regulatory certainty for
continuing dam operations and water diversions. The Department of
Interior and Lower Basin states formalized their partnership with a
Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") on August 2, 1995.174 The
intent of the MOA was to provide interim regulatory assurance during
a three-year program development period and long-term assurance
with the end conservation program, the MSCP.1 75 Instead of consulting
with FWS, who would develop a reasonable and prudent alternative
("RPA") to the agency's actions, (so that the Bureau could ensure its
activities did not jeopardize listed species), the signatories designed
the MOA to serve as the RPA, thereby postponing ESA section 7
consultation. 176 Conservationists threatened to sue the federal agencies
if the Bureau did not begin consultations with FWS as the ESA
required.177 In response, the federal and state agencies issued a
Memorandum of Clarification ("MOC") that ostensibly recognized
that the agencies participating in the MSCP could not avoid the legal
requirements of the ESA.7'T
The LCR MSCP is a partnership of state, federal, tribal, and other
public and private stakeholders with an interest in managing the water
and related resources of the Lower Colorado River Basin. The
purposes of the LCR MSCP are to:
(1) conserve habitat and work toward the recovery of threatened and
endangered species as well as reduce the likelihood of additional
species listings under the Federal Endangered Species Act ....

(2)

accommodate current water diversions and power production and

optimize opportunities for future water and power development...,
and (3) provide the basis for take authorization pursuant to

172. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Critical
Habitat for the Colorado River Endangered Fishes: Razorback Sucker, Colorado
Squawfish, Humpback Chub, and Bonytail Chub, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,374 (Mar. 21, 1994)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). The Colorado squawfish has been renamed the
Colorado pikeminnow.
173. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants ; Final Rule Determining
Endangered Status for the Southwestern Willow Flycatcher, 60 Fed. Reg. 10,694 (Feb.
27, 1995) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
174. Memorandum of Agreement for Development of a Lower Colorado River
Species Conservation Program (Aug. 2, 1995) (on file with author).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See Letter from Gregory Sater, Defenders of Wildlife, to Bruce Babbitt,
Secretary, United States Department of the Interior et al., (Feb. 6, 1996) (outlining
the Bureau's attempts to avoid consultation and the agency's legal obligations under
the ESA) (on file with author).
178. Memorandum of Clarification (July 17, 1996) (on file with author).
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The overarching goal of the LCR MSCP is to provide long-term
compliance with the ESA for federal and non-federal entities for the
next fifty years.'80
There is, however, no representation of environmental and
Mexican interests because of the limited geographic scope. Despite
this, the MSCP is widely touted as an ecosystem approach to
conservation planning.' In late 1998, the Bureau of Reclamation had
supported a proposal to fund a study of conservation needs and
opportunities of the basin south of the Southern International
Boundary ("SIB") with Mexico." 2 The MSCP Steering Committee,
however, refused to agree to this proposal and instead limited the
geographic scope of the MSCP planning area to the river corridor
from Glen Canyon Dam to the SIB and restricted its binational
involvement to receiving progress reports on the Bureau's work in
Mexico.'
Conservationists felt that the MSCP's continued refusal to
adopt a conservation strategy that followed ecosystem boundaries, in
favor of a plan that left the status of Mexico and the delta in limbo,
would doom the effort to failure.'84 As a result, the last conservationists
on the MSCP steering committee, the Center for Biological Diversity
and Defenders of Wildlife, withdrew from the process.'85
Although the MSCP Steering Committee may have intended to
limit the scope of the MSCP in order to concentrate their efforts and
funds on a manageable project, the effect might be to compromise the
final product. For example, withdrawal of all four environmental
groups from the committee has raised questions about the adequacy of
representation and public participation in the MSCP. More recently,
questions have arisen regarding the MSCP's reliability, particularly
over the long-term, given that environmental impacts in Mexico have
not been addressed.
For example, after seeing that the MSCP would not effect, but

179. Department
of
the
Interior,
http://www.lcrmscp.org/noi-2000.html.

Bureau

of

Reclamation,

at

180. MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION PLAN, REVIEW DRAFr INTRODUCTION, PURPOSE AND
NEED, DESCRIPTION OF COVERED AcTIONs, EFFECr OF COVERED AcTIONs, AND No ACTION

ALTERNATIVE 3-5 (1999) (on file with author).

181. See Multi-Species Conservation Program (MSCP) for the Lower Colorado River,
Arizona, Nevada, and California, 64 Fed. Reg. 27,000 27,001 (May 18, 1999).
182. Facilitation Team Issue Paper Recommendation (Sept. 21, 1998) (on file with
author).
183. Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program, Steering
Committee Meeting (Nov. 5, 1998) (on file with author).
184. See November 5, 1998 MSCP Steering Committee Meeting Notes, Comment,
Myopia on the Colorado,ARIZONA DAILYSTAR, Nov. 12, 1998, at 14Ao(on file with author).
185. See Letter from John Fritschie and David Hogan, Defenders of Wildlife and
Center for Biological Diversity, to Robert Johnson, Regional Director, Bureau of
Reclamation (Nov. 9, 1998) (on file with author); see also John Kostyack, Habitat
Conservation Planning: Time to Give Conservationistsand Other Concerned Citizens a Seat at
the Table, 14 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE 51 (July-Aug. 1997).
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could instead foreclose protection and restoration of the Colorado
River Delta, four non-governmental organizations from the United
States and four from Mexico challenged the adequacy of the ESA
consultation over the Bureau of Reclamation's operations and
maintenance of dams, reservoirs and water diversions along the Lower
Colorado River.1 6 The consultation did not fully consider the adverse
impacts to listed species that have some or all of their habitat in
Mexico, either in the Delta and/or Gulf of California. By excluding
species such as the totoaba, vaquita, Yuma clapper rail and
southwestern willow flycatcher from the consultation,P the Bureau has
hastened the demise of several endangered species. Whatever the
outcome of this litigation, it will have a profound effect on the scope
of future ESA consultations, and particularly the LCR MSCP, which is
still in development.
In addition to the outstanding issues of the Defenders of Wildlife
litigation, binational implementation of Minute 306 also implicates the
LCR MSCP. Not only are the two processes quite separate, but also
they are likely to remain so, given the inability (thus far) for the
Departments of State and Interior to reach a reciprocal working
relationship. Furthermore, the divergence of the two processes will
put one to the disadvantage of the other. The MSCP aims to lock in
river operation and management, and accompanying mitigation
measures, for the next fifty years. Non-federal entities in particular will
rely on the "no surprises" policy, which provides assurances to a permit
holder that no additional land use restrictions or compensation will be
required even if unforeseen circumstances indicate that additional
mitigation is required.88 As a result, MSCP members will resist any
additional mitigation requested via Minute 306.
On the other hand, in the interests of international diplomacy, the
Department of State, in one, five or twenty years, could impose a
bilateral agreement or new Treaty minute on United States interests. 8 9
In January 2000, the government of Mexico delivered a demarche,
accompanied by a diplomatic note, in which Mexico officially objected
to the adoption of the Interim Surplus Guidelines ("ISG") because it
186. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, Civ. No. 00-1544 (D. D.C. filed June 28,
2000). At press this important case has been fully briefed on the merits and the judge
has heard oral argument.
187. See generally 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2001); see also 60 Fed. Reg. 10,694 (Feb. 27, 1995)
(southwestern willow flycatcher); 51 Fed. Reg. 10,842 (Mar. 31, 1986) (desert pupfish);
50 Fed. Reg. 1056 (Jan. 9, 1985) (cochito); 44 Fed. Reg. 29,478 (May 21, 1979)
(totoaba); 32 Fed. Reg. 4001 (Mar. 11, 1967) (Yuma clapper rail).
188. See Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances ("No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed. Reg.
8859 (Feb. 23, 1998) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). Just as the Secretary may
permit incidental takings by federal entities after section 7 consultation, the Secretary
may also issue incidental take permits to private parties under section 10. 16 U.S.C. §
1539(a) (2000). First, the parties must submit a habitat conservation plan ("HCP")
that specifies impacts, steps to minimize and mitigate impacts, any available funding,
and other necessary measures. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A). Thus there will also be an HCP
component of the MSCP for non-federal interests.
189. In fact, the treaty itself, and Mexico's allocation, was finalized to the dismay of
the seven basin states. See Meyers & Noble, supranote 131, at 381-86.
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did not take into account or mitigate for the transboundary impacts
Mexico warned of, asked for postponement of the ISG to allow time
for bilateral consultations, and invited the United States government
to initiate diplomatic negotiations on the matter in order to prevent
any adverse transboundary impacts. 9" Mexico is also reported to have
filed an objection to the United States lining of the All-American
Canal, which will prevent seepage that currently recharges an aquifer
pumped by Mexicali Valley farmers. 9 ' The United States took eleven
months to respond to the demarche, and the Secretariat of
SEMARNAT, Victor Lichtinger, has stated that he is concerned about
the current method of allocating waters between the United States and
Mexico and that a primary issue of his agency will be to deal with water
supply and quality issues in Mexico. 92
Second, addressing the question of international instream flows is
made more difficult by the separation of these two processes. In
November of 1999, more than thirty-five non-governmental
organizations from Mexico and the United States sent a letter to both
governments urging them to establish international instream,
perennial flow rights in the Colorado River from the United States into
Mexico's Colorado River Delta and Upper Gulf of California, and
so.193
describing the treaties, laws and agreements relevant to doing
Establishing instream flow rights would require the United States to
deliver water to the border specifically for conservation purposes as
well as a joint commitment from Mexico to use this water for the
ecosystem.'
The Minute 306 process, without the LCR MSCP, will
have difficulty securing a source(s) for instream flows and a
mechanism for protecting that flow while instream. Therefore, recent
attempts to inject the idea or the principle into river management
have had to go through existing channels, and have been rebuffed. 95
190. See Semarnat, en desacuerdocon la decisidn unilateral:Afecta a Miico cambio de EU
en el manejo del rio Colorado, LAJORNADA, Jan. 24, 2001; Mexico Warns United States Over
Risks to River, REUTERS NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 7, 2001.
191. Haley Nolde, Fate of region high and dry after canalfix, SANJoSE MERCURY NEWS,
Dec. 17, 2000.
192. Carlos Reyes, Urgen Mexico y EU Aclarar Uso del Agua, EL NORTE, Feb. 23, 2001,
availableat http://www.elnorte.com/nacional/articulo/092521/.
193. Letter from Defenders of Wildlife et al., to Rosario Green, Minister of Foreign
Affairs; Arturo Herrera, Commissioner, CILA; Julia Carabias, Secretaria de Medio
Ambiente Recursos Naturales y Pesca (SEMARNAP); Comision Nacional del Agua
(CNA); Madeleine Albright, Secretary, U.S. Department of State; John Bernal,
Commissioner, IBWC; George Frampton, Chair, Council on Environmental Quality;
Bruce Babbitt, Secretary, U.S. Department of the Interior; William M. Daley, Secretary,
U.S. Department of Commerce; Carol Browner, Administrator, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (Nov. 24, 1999) (on file with author).
194. See Frank S. Wilson, A Fish Out of Water: A Proposalfor InternationalInstream Flow
Rights in the Lower ColoradoRiver, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVrL. L. POL'Y 249 (1994).
195. See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
COLORADO RIVER INTERIM SURPLUS CRITERIA, vol. I, at 2-4 (2000) (rejecting Pacific
Institute surplus criteria alternative that would provide perennial base flows and
periodic flood flows to the Colorado River Delta); Courses Of Action Identified At The
Symposium On The Delta Of The Colorado River Held Sept. 11-12, 2001 (developed
by the Mexican delegation, proposing "[tihat both governments promise to provide
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It remains to be seen how successful independent efforts are.

6

A. MIDDLE RIO GRANDE
The Middle Rio Grande Endangered Species Act Collaborative
Program ("Program") has roots similar to those of the LCR MSCP.
Through 1999, an informal group of federal, state, and environmental
representatives had been meeting to exchange information and
discuss ways of improving the river's environmental health. That year
also saw the designation of critical habitat for the silvery minnow,'97
severe minnow populations losses,'9 the suppression of an adverse
biological opinion on the Middle Rio Grande,'" and the subsequent
filing of a complaint challenging the failure of the federal agencies to
complete ESA consultation. 0 Realizing that all parties needed to take
a step forward with meaningful, coordinated action to save the
minnow, stakeholders from the federal, state, and city governments,
the
MRGCD,
and
the environmental
community inked
a
Memorandum of Understanding establishing the Program.'O
The
purpose of the Program is to protect and improve the status of
endangered
species, "while existing and future water uses are
20

protected."

1

The Program is still a work in progress, and of several issues

remaining, two have been alluded to already: tribal participation and
commitments for water. First, although no tribes or pueblos are
signatories to the MOU, representatives have attended several

Program meetings and have provided valuable input. However, recent
events may have strained the relationship between the Program and
volumes of water to protect and restore the ecosystems of the Delta.") (on file with
author).
196. See, e.g., Jo Clark et al., IMMEDIATE OPTIONS FOR AUGMENTING WATER FLOWS IN
THE

COLORADO

RIVER

DELTA

IN

MEXICO

(May

2001),

available

at

http://www.sonoran.org/pdf/ColoradoRiver.pdf (exploring sources of water in the
United States and Mexico for Delta restoration).
197. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife; Final Designation of Critical Habitat for
the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,274 (July 6, 1999) (to be codified at
50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
198. Mike Taugher, Silvey Minnow Losses Send Biologists into Crisis Mode,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov. 11, 1999, at Al (asserting that the minnow was closer to
extinction than ever seen before).
199. Mike Taugher, Feds Ask Biologists to Redo River Report, ALBUQUERQUEJ., Nov. 3,
1999, at Al. The Fish and Wildlife Service had produced a draft biological opinion on
the effects of federal activities on the minnow and flycatcher, but did not release or
finalize it. Instead, they agreed to issue a new biological opinion, which was not
produced until June 29, 2001. See Letter from Regional Director, Region 2, to Area
Manager, Albuquerque Area Office, Bureau of Reclamation (June 29, 2001) (on file
with author).
200. Plaintiffs' Complaint, Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Martinez, Civ. No. 99-1320JP/KBM-ACE (D. N.M. filed Dec. 3, 1999). After the issuance of the June 2001
biological opinion, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint challenging the adequacy of
the consultation, particularly the scope of federal actions analyzed.
201. Memorandum of Understanding, Middle Rio Grande Endangered Species Act
Collaborative Program (Jan. 3, 2000) (on file with author).
202. Id.
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pueblos and tribes. During the fiscal year 2001 appropriations cycle,
the Senate made clear that future funding requests would have to
come through one collaborative group."3 Several parties interpreted
this as an ultimatum for tribal sovereigns (as well as other entities) to
become Program participants, or risk future funding for river
restoration initiatives.
This ultimatum relates to a more encompassing tensionperception that absence of tribal signatories hinders the Program's
progress. In addition to the underlying question of various parties'
commitments, there is a misconception that the need for governmentto-government consultation between the Indian governments and the
federal government is a barrier to the Program process.0 4 This can
hardly be true, since the Program still must settle critical substantive
issues and undergo NEPA and ESA compliance, among other things.
In addition, the consultation on the June 2001 biological opinion was
rushed, and not performed to the satisfaction of the pueblos.0 5 The
Department of the Interior would like to, and needs to, do a betterjob
this time.06 In the meantime, the process of requesting and funneling
money for ESA and restoration projects through the Program, with the
to break new ground, and
involvement of tribal entities, continues
2 17
hopefully, forge better relationships.
A second outstanding issue imperiling the Program's success is the
lack of commitment to securing water for the minnow. The lack of
quantification or proof of beneficial use by MRGCD, coupled with
allegations of wasteful water use, have targeted MRGCD as a logical
source of supplemental water. Because the Bureau and Corps manage
the river to supply the MRGCD, they too are under the microscope. A
crucial issue in the ongoing Rio Grande Silvery Minnow litigation is the
extent of federal control over the facilities (reservoirs, dams, etc.) in
the Middle Rio Grande, and the corresponding ability to use that
control for the benefit of endangered species. 28 Therefore, a program
203. See S. REP. No. 106-395, 95 (2000) (in appropriating funds to the Bureau of
Reclamation:
But more can and must be done to establish a single entity, reflecting the
range of interests, along the Rio Grande if the recovery effort is to be
successful and to ensure the efficient use of available resources. Further, a
single comprehensive group will ensure that activities undertaken are based
on sound science and contribute directly to silvery minnow recovery. Future
funding will be dependent upon a program plan for recovery activities that is
supported by State and local governments, Federal agencies, Tribes, and
water users.).
204. See Norman Gaume, Director, New Mexico Interstate Stream Commission
Presentationat the CLE InternationalLaw of the Rio GrandeConference, ENDANGERED SPECIES
Acr IN THE MIDDLE Rio GRANDE (Jan. 18, 2002) (presentation available in CLE
International Course Materials, Law of the Rio Grande) (on file with author).
205. ESA Work Group Meeting, at 9 (July 27, 2001).
206. ESA Work Group Meeting, at 7 (Aug. 3, 2001). The Bureau of Reclamation
and Corps of Engineers, as parties to the Program, must also consult.
207. See ESA Work Group Meeting, at 2-4 (Sept. 17, 2001) (devising ways to involve
the pueblos in the Program's fiscal year 2002 funding request).
208. See Plaintiffs' Opening Case Brief on Second Amended Complaint, Rio Grande
Silvery Minnow v. McDonald, Civ. No. 99-1320-JP/RLP-ACE (D. N.M. filed July 16,
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whose purposes are not only to protect imperiled species, but also to
recover these species, allows the Rio Grande to go dry-a serious threat
to silvery minnows.2 ° It is the hope of environmental representatives
that before the Program is finalized, there will be firm commitments to
supply water to the river to prevent its going dry.
VII. CONCLUSION
Even though these groups were formed to address one problem,
they still have difficulty overcoming the obstacles of a fragmented and
overlapping regulatory framework. Furthermore, and ironically, the
self-imposed, limited scopes of both programs are poised to cause the
delay that the participants had originally hoped to avoid. Challenges
like those of Indian water rights, the Colorado River delta, and the
definition and proof of beneficial use will require commitment by all
stakeholders in the river basin. If we are to learn anything from the
Law of the River(s), it is that there is no "permanent and definitive
solution0 10 when difficult questions are not addressed.
Put simply, the mere presence of these efforts, whether in response
to, or in anticipation of, a crisis is a start. Although problems such as
sufficient funding and equitable decisionmaking remain,' increased
interaction and openness will better frame the issues and solutions to
reach a broader spectrum of concerns and achieve lasting, though not
likely permanent, accord.

2001) (alleging that in issuing its biological opinion, FWS simply accepted the
Bureau's position on its discretion, and thus did not consult on the full range of
operations or consider the full spectrum of mitigation measures). Shortly before this
article went to press, Judge Parker issued a decision finding that the Bureau violated
the ESA by failing to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service about using water from
two federal reclamation projects. Rio Grand Silvery Minnow v. Keys, Civ. No. 99-1320
JP/RLP-ACE (D. N.M. April 19, 2002).
209. Associated Press, Draft Species Protection Plan Allows Dry Rio Grande at Times,
ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Mar. 15, 2001.
210. Commentators often sarcastically refer to Minute 242 and the 1944 Water
Treaty, titled "The Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of
Salinity at the Colorado River," because it is hardly that.
211. Ann Brower et al., Consensus versus Conservation in the Upper ColoradoRiver Basin
Recovery ImplementationProgram,15 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1001 (2001).
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I. INTRODUCTION

Spring has returned to the West once again. The carpet of natural
grass and desert foliage has turned green as vegetation blooms across
the varied landscape. Runoff from mountain snow rises in the rivers,
and for farmers, irrigation season has begun. In California and across
the West, the risk of conflict grows between those who divert water and
those who defend the water needs of fish. Fish need water in the
streams to survive-the same water humans divert out of the stream for
t J.D. 1988, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley. During
the early stages of the conflict discussed in this article, the author represented the City
of Los Angeles on the Board of Directors of Metropolitan Water District of Southern

California. Since 1997, he has worked for the United States Department of the
Interior. This article reflects the author's personal perspective, not the views of the
United States Department of the Interior.
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consumptive uses. Many of today's western water conflicts are sparked
by the listing of threatened or endangered fish species under the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). Once listed, those responsible for its
survival work intensely, often in the face of challenges from the
consumptive users, to bring it back from the brink of extinction. From
salmon in the Columbia River to the silvery minnow in the Rio
Grande, stakeholders and government agencies confront the conflicts
that accompany the listing of an endangered species of fish.
After a decade of conflict, however, California has initiated a series
of projects reflecting a more cooperative approach, under the banner
of the CALFED Bay-Delta Program! Among these projects, the
Environmental Water Account ("CALFED EWA") offers one of the
most important tools for healing relationships between the ecosystem
and the water stakeholder community in a time of farmer/fish
conflicts.
In addressing its ESA water issues in the last decade, California has
used a combination of regulation and water acquisitions to provide the
water that its listed fish species need to avoid jeopardy and move
toward recovery. In the early 1990s, when California confronted
conflicts arising out of ESA listings and the state experienced its worst
drought in history, its multitude of water stakeholders joined with state
and federal governments to find a way out of the quagmire. A 1994
accord on water quality regulation provided time to craft a long-term
solution for the state's water flashpoint; the San Francisco
Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta ("Delta").
At that time, the
governments and stakeholders shared a common goal: recovery of
listed species. Because of the government mandate to protect listed
species, water users needed to find a solution that not only recognized
their long-term interests in a reliable water supply, but also stabilized
and restored important fish species that had suffered dramatic
declines. The solution was to establish an environmental water
account that would set aside water for fishery needs. Thus, the
CALFED EWA was born.2
The CALFED EWA creates a water supply for fishery needs without
relying on regulatory edicts. Instead, its operators in state and federal
agencies acquire water for the environment from existing water right
holders or from maximizing the use of water project facilities. With
this water supply at their disposal, state and federal water project
operators can make timely, critical adjustments in operations to make
1. The term "CALFED" originated from the combination of the state (CAL) and
federal (FED) governments working together to resolve the environmental and water
management conflicts in the San Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta.
2. See CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, PROGRAMMATIC REcORD OF DECISION 54-58
(2000) [hereinafter CALFED ROD]. The reader may access the Record of Decision at
http://www.calfed.water.ca.gov. The Record of Decision establishes a comprehensive
ecosystem recovery and water management program of which the CALFED EWA isjust
one part. The CALFED EWA, however, required the most attention from the federal
and state government CALFED negotiators. This article will use the term "CALFED
EWA" to refer specifically to the CALFED account.
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water available to fulfill the needs of listed species and project
contractors while preventing reductions in deliveries due to such
adjustments. These adjustments either use the CALFED EWA's assets
directly for reservoir releases and instream demands, or indirectly to
compensate project water users for reductions in project diversions.
While the CALFED EWA developed over a two-year period, its origins
date back more than a decade to the 1990 listing of winter-run salmon
as threatened pursuant to the ESA, and the conflict that followed.
That conflict forged some of the ingredients necessary for the
CALFED EWA, including the research and identification of the water
needs of listed species and a consensus on a regulatory baseline of
protection necessary to stabilize fishery populations.
The lessons that California has learned in creating and
implementing the CALFED EWA may provide insight for water
stakeholders in other watersheds. An environmental water account
offers a more efficient and effective method of drawing together
conflicting stakeholders to work toward recovery. It creates and uses a
water budget with maximum flexibility for restoring an entire aquatic
ecosystem rather than prescribing standards that restrict water project
operations for the benefit of a particular listed species.
An
environmental water account can lead toward recovery with minimal
water losses to consumptive water users, or at least compensation for
any such losses.
The California experience shows how an
environmental water account can contribute to conflict resolution, the
elements required to create an account, and the challenges that
account managers face in implementing an environmental water
account. The CALFED EWA does not resolve all difficulties and
conflicts. Instead, it offers an essential tool for addressing those
conflicts.
The CALFED EWA is a framework for continued
cooperation in helping the watershed's fishery recover.
H. WHY AN ENVIRONMENTAL WATER ACCOUNT IN
CALIFORNIA?
In moving from the jeopardy avoidance stage to the start of
recovery with the CALFED EWA, California spent a decade in varying
degrees of conflict between the water needs of the fish and the needs
of consumptive users. The stages of that conflict were not too
different from conflicts in other watersheds where excessive diversions
had brought species to the brink of extinction. As in other watersheds,
at each stage, the federal and state governments in California worked
with the watershed's stakeholders to resolve the immediate conflict
and the particular needs of the Central Valley watershed. The
CALFED EWA's development in the later stages of the conflict
reflected a concerted effort to address the long-term needs for fishery
recovery.
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A. BACKGROUND
The CALFED EWA arose out of a conflict in California's
Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta, which flows into the San
Francisco Bay. The Delta serves-both figuratively and literally-as the
heart valves for the state's north-south water conveyance system and
the most valuable estuary ecosystem on the West Coast. Water from
upstream reservoirs on the Sacramento River and its tributaries flows
into the Delta to mix with flows from several other river systems and
out to the San Francisco Bay. At the Delta's south end, large federal
and state pumping facilities take water south to San Joaquin Valley
farms and southern California cities. At the same time, the Delta's
unique mix of waters-both fresh and salt-creates a rich estuary
ecosystem for fish and wildlife. These competing demands for the
Delta's waters led to conflict, which led to the CALFED EWA.
The roots of the Delta water conflict can be traced back to the
earliest days of diversions in the Sacramento Valley.' The more recent
legal conflict over regulation for fishery needs dates back to 1978,
when the State Water Resources Control Board ("SWRCB") adopted a
water quality control plan for the Delta ("1978 Plan") and an
accompanying water rights decision ("D-1485").
D-1485 imposed
conditions on the permits for federal and state water projects that
pumped water from the Delta.'
The state and federal agencies
operating the water projects, as well as several other parties,
challenged the 1978 Plan and D-1485 because they restricted project
operations in order to protect fish. Those challenges resulted in a
landmark California court decision rejecting the 1978 Plan and D-1485
because they did not adequately address fishery needs and consider
water right permits throughout the watershed.5 The SWRCB issued a
new draft water quality control plan and decision in December1992, in
the midst of California's worst drought and after Delta fishery
conditions had changed dramatically with the listings of certain
salmon species in the Central Valley. At the Governor's request, the
SWRCB withdrew the draft decision, deferring to federal regulation
under the ESA.6
In the early 1990s, several events changed the nature of water and
ecosystem management in the Delta. First, the Fish and Wildlife
Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service (collectively "ESA
Agencies") listed as threatened certain fish species that lived in or

3. See Town of Antioch v. Williams Irrigation Dist., 205 P. 688, 689 (Cal. 1922)
(conflict over saltwater intrusion into the Delta due to upstream diversions).

4. In re Permit 12720, Decision No. 1485, 1978 Cal. ENV LEXIS 41 (Aug. 16,
1978).
5. United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1986). See
also Alf W. Brandt, United States v. State Water Resources Control Board: A Comprehensive
Approach To Water Policy In California,14 ECOLOGYL.Q. 713 (1988).

6. Phase of the Bay-Delta Estuary Proceedings, Apr. 22, 1993 [hereinafter SWRCB
Order No. 90-5].
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passed through the Delta
Adding listed species to the system
required the Federal Central Valley Project ("CVP") to consult with
the ESA Agencies as to how to avoid jeopardizing survival of the listed
species.
Initially, the CVP was required to maintain cooler
temperatures in the Sacramento River to support salmon spawning.8
In 1991, the federal Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
disapproved the state's 1978 Delta water quality standards as not
meeting the requirements of the Clean Water Act, which ultimately led
environmentalists to sue to require the EPA to promulgate federal
water quality standards.9 Second, in 1992, the "take" of listed salmon
at the Delta pumps led to temporary pumping reductions at both CVP
and State Water Project ("SWP") facilities, whose close coordination
was required by statute and allowed for ESA coverage of the state's
pumping.
Finally, in 1992, President Bush signed legislation that
added fish and wildlife protection as one of the CVP's authorized
purposes and dedicated 800,000 acre-feet of CVP yield to fish
restoration purposes."
The environmentalists' lawsuit against the EPA provided the lever
to force resolution of the immediate conflict over Delta water quality
standards for fishery needs. The resulting consent decree required the
EPA to promulgate federal water quality standards for the Delta by
December 15, 1994.2 All of the federal and state agencies involved in
the Delta agreed to work together in addressing the Delta's needs.' s
Those agencies then engaged the Delta's stakeholders in negotiating
new standards, ultimately agreeing to the 1994 Bay-Delta Accord
("Accord") in compliance with the December 15 deadline." The
Accord provided for close coordination of the state and federal water
projects in complying with new water quality standards and fulfilling
Delta fishery needs for an interim period of three years. 5 Those three
years were intended to provide time for state and federal agencies to
7. Listing of the Sacramento River Winter-run Chinook salmon, 55 Fed. Reg.
49,623 (Nov. 30, 1990) [hereinafter Chinook Listing]; Fish and Wildlife Service Delta
Smelt Listing, 58 Fed. Reg. 12,863 (Mar. 5, 1993).
8. See SWRCB Order No. 90-5, supra note 6.
9. Golden Gate Audubon Soc'y v. Browner, No. 93-646-LKK (E.D. Cal. 1994)
(consent decree requiring EPA promulgation pursuant to the Clean Water Act) (on
file with author).
10. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001).
11. Amendments to Central Valley Project Authorizations, Pub. L. No. 102-575, §
3406(b) (2), 106 Stat. 4714.
12. Golden Gate Audubon Soc'y, No. 93-646-LKK.
13. FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT BETWEEN GOVERNOR'S WATER POLICY COUNCIL OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND THE FEDERAL EcosYSTEM DIRCTORATE 1-2 (1994) [hereinafter
FRAMEWORKAGREEMENT) (on file with author).
14. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR ET AL., AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE STATE OF CAIFORNIA FOR COORDINATED OPERATION
OF THE CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT AND THE STATE WATER PROJECT (1994) [hereinafter

BAY-DELTAACCoRD]. See also Elizabeth Ann Rieke, The Bay-DeltaAccord: A Stride Toward
Sustainability,67 U. COLO. L. REv. 341(1996).
15.

BAY-DELTAACCORD, supranote 14.
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work with urban, agricultural and environmental stakeholders to craft
long-term Delta solutions. 6
Those long-term solutions developed into the CALFED Bay-Delta
Program, a cooperative program of twenty-one state and federal
agencies with responsibilities in the Bay-Delta and its watershed.
CALFED addresses four primary concerns for the Delta: ecosystem
restoration, water management (including storage and conveyance),
water quality, and levee system integrity.7
As the conflicts developed, the Department of the Interior began
implementing the Central Valley Project Improvement Act ("CVPIA").
In addition to shifting 800,000 acre-feet of CVP yield to environmental
purposes, the CVPIA also required re-operation of the federal project
to protect anadromous fish, so long as the re-operation did not affect
deliveries to CVP contractors." Additionally, the CVPIA required the
Secretary of the Interior to develop a plan for increasing Project yield
to replace the 800,000 acre-feet dedicated to environmental
purposes." These and many other CVPIA requirements shifted the
attention of CVP operators to a broader range of Project purposes.
B. SHORT HISTORY OF CALFED EWA

As the CALFED agencies worked with stakeholders during the fall
of 1998, the ESA Agencies proposed additional periods of reduced
project pumping to protect and promote the recovery of listed fish
species.2 Shortly thereafter, agencies and stakeholders working with
Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt and the governor's chief of staff
proposed establishing a collection of water assets to satisfy the needs of
the Delta's fish.2
With preliminary support from the state and federal governments
in December 1998, agencies and stakeholders began to study and
pursue development of the CALFED EWA. Michael J. Spear of the
Fish and Wildlife Service and Timothy Quinn, representing the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, led the discussions
with a small group of stakeholders, biologists, and water project
16. I&
17. CALFED ROD, supra note 2.
18. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Central Valley Project
Improvement Act, available at http://www.mp.usbr.gov/cvpia/index.html, required the
Secretary "to modify Central Valley Project operations to provide flows of suitable
quality, quantity, and timing to protect all life stages of anadromous fish... from
other sources which do not conflict with fulfillment of the Secretary's remaining
contractual obligations to provide Central Valley Project water for other authorized
purposes."
19. Id.
20. CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, REVISED PHASE II REPORT 38-39 (1998)
[hereinafter
12/98
PHASE
II
REPORT],
available
at
http://calfed.water.ca.gov/historical/phase2/chapter2/chapter2.html.
21. The formal EWA proposals developed during stakeholder meetings hosted by
Secretary Babbitt during the fall of 1998. Secretary Babbitt and California Governor
Pete Wilson's Chief of Staff decided to pursue an EWA at stakeholder meetings at the
Los Angeles Airport Hilton during the first week of December 1998.
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modelers."
The group considered several possible structures,
including a water project contractor for the environment, an
environmental water credit account within each water project, and an
independent environmental water broker, ultimately studying a range
of CALFED EWA designs to determine what worked best for the Delta
and those who rely on the Delta.2 3 After this small group completed
their analysis, the CALFED agencies convened in the fall of 1999 with
another group of senior agency and stakeholder representatives to
negotiate the CALFED EWA and other CALFED programs. Despite
intense debate among stakeholders, those discussions failed to achieve
consensus on the terms for creating the CALFED EWA.
In 1999, as agencies and stakeholders began developing how the
CALFED EWA might work, new crises arose where the state and
federal export projects were required to make operational adjustments
and/or reduce pumping from the Delta pursuant to the Delta Water
Quality Control Plan or the ESA.25 While there was some discussion of
creating an EWA pilot project for the 1999 water year, the ESA
Agencies determined that too many issues required resolution before
an EWA could be demonstrated effectively-from how to account for
26
use of the environmental water to what assets the fish needed most.
The 1999 operational adjustments, however, made the creation of an
environmental water account that much more urgent, particularly for
the water user stakeholders.
The water users who were dependent on the two water projects
objected to the 1999 operational adjustments because of the risk of
lower project water deliveries. They believed that the creation of a
water account for the environment would provide the water needed to
"make up" for the reduced deliveries they had experienced due to
fishery needs.
The water users therefore advocated immediate
acquisition of water for the environment to replace their losses.
Proposed acquisitions included existing groundwater from actively
22.

CALFED BAY-DELTA

[hereinafter

6/99

PROGRAM,

PHASE

REVISED PHASE II REPORT 98-99
II

REPORT],

available

(1999)
at

http://calfed.water.ca.gov/historical/phase2/chapter2/chapter2.html.
23. 12/98 PHASE II REPORT, supra note 20, at 115.
24. CALFED, Water Management Development Team ("WMDT") Report
(contained in 12/99 CALFED Policy Group Agenda Package) (on file with author).
Compare Letter from Ag/Urban WMDT Members, to The Honorable Gray Davis,
Governor of California and The Honorable Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of Interior (Nov.
5, 1999), with Letter from Environmental Water Caucus, to Mike Spear, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service and Steve Macaulay, Department of Water Resources (Nov. 15, 1999)
(all on file with author).
25. In May 1999, the Delta pumping facilities exceeded their take limit for delta
smelt and responded by reducing the level of pumping to 3500 cfs. In November
1999, salmon began migrating down the Sacramento River and the Delta CrossChannel was closed to prevent salmon from being drawn into the central Delta. The
Delta Cross-Channel was designed to improve water quality in the central Delta and
near the export pumps. Due to a dry fall, the closure led to water quality degradation
at the pumps and pumping was again reduced.
26. 6/99 PHASE II REPORT, supra note 22, at 98-101.
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managed groundwater basins (recently refilled by several wet years),
drainage water, and water from other non-project storage facilities."
Stakeholder pressure during early 2000, including a state legislature
hearing on the 1999 reductions, encouraged the federal and state
administrations to proceed with final negotiations for the CALFED
Bay-Delta Program, with particular emphasis on the EWA.
C. THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL WATER AccouNTs

The premise behind an environmental water account is that it
provides an efficient and flexible mechanism to acquire and use water
assets to adjust water project operations in response to changing
hydrology and fishery needs.Y An environmental water account allows
maximum flexibility to respond to the changing needs of the fishery
and the ecosystem as a whole, working better than fixed prescriptive
standards that restrict water project operations for the benefit of
several particular listed species.
Such an account can share the
benefits of wet hydrology and new facilities, allowing both the
ecosystem and water users to enjoy improved conditions.1
The key aspects of the CALFED EWA operation include water asset
development and use for fishery needs, or in other words, deposits and
withdrawals. The CALFED EWA starts with a baseline of regulatory
protection for listed species. This baseline serves as both an initial cap
on project yield reductions arising out of regulatory decisions, and
from an accounting perspective, the "zero point" for tracking deposits
and withdrawals from the account. The EWA grows by water
acquisitions and "reoperation" of project facilities. Reoperation is the
use of excess project pumping or storage capacity and increased
project yield arising out of operational adjustments during periods
when listed species are not at risk. 2
Such project reoperation for the EWA arises out of the unique
attributes of the Delta system. For example, a key asset is the EWA's
access to "joint point of diversion," where the state and federal water
projects may use each other's Delta pumping facilities. This asset
particularly benefits the federal CVP because its smaller pumping
capacity (4,600 cfs compared to the state's 10,000 cfs) makes it more
27. See, e.g., DRAFr WATER PURCHASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN KERN COUNTY WATER
BANK AuTHORrlY AND UNITED STATES BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (1999) [hereinafter
KERN AGREEMENT] (on file with author).

28. Testimony of Lester A. Snow, Regional Director, Mid-Pacific Region, Bureau of
Reclamation, at a Joint Hearing, Senate Agriculture and Water Committee and
Assembly Water, Parks and Wildlife Committee, Feb. 1, 2000 (on file with author).
29. 12/98 PHASE II REPORT, supra note 20, at 115; 6/99 PHASE II REPORT, supra note
22, at 95.
30. 12/98 PHASE II REPORT, supra note 20, at 115; 6/99 PHASE II REPORT, supra note
22, at 96.
31.

12/98 PHASE II REPORT, supra note 20, at 115-20; 6/99 PHASE II REPORT, supra

note 22, at 95-101.
32. This paragraph reflects a summary of the Environmental Water Account
Operating Principles Agreement [hereinafter EWA Op. Prins.], which is Attachment 2
to the CALFED ROD, supra note 2.
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difficult to fill its share of the San Luis Reservoir, south of the Delta,
which the two projects operate jointly. The State Water Project
("SWP") can therefore increase CVP yield by pumping CVP water after
it fills its share of San Luis Reservoir. At other times, however, the
SWP can benefit when listed fish congregate near its Delta intake,
requiring reduced SWP pumping to limit "take." In such situations,
the CVP can pump water for the SWP. The EWA gets credit for 50
percent of the CVP benefits from "joint point," increasing its deposits.
Another reoperation example is the ESA Agencies' discretion to allow
increased pumping during certain periods when listed fish are not
near the pumps and therefore not at risk. Still another EWA asset is
"borrowing," where pumping may be reduced in one year without
affecting that year's deliveries, and if the following winter is wet
enough, the water debt may be repaid by increased pumping during
periods of high Delta outflow.3
The CALFED EWA's assets can be used directly for either instrean
water needs or indirectly to compensate water project users for
reduced diversions that result in reduced water deliveries. Additional
releases out of upstream reservoirs or reduced diversions upstream
from the Delta may supplement instream water flows. Alternatively,
EWA managers may call for reduced state and federal water project
pumping in the Delta to reduce take at the pumps or to support
anadromous fish migration to the ocean. Although the EWA generally
promotes recovery of listed species, its assets may be used for any
reason that supports the fishery, including reducing take to prevent
incidental take limits from being exceeded. The
assets therefore may
34
help avoid jeopardy as well as support recovery.
While California water users have focused on compensation for
water "lost" to the environment, the CALFED EWA is more than a
mere mechanism to acquire water for "makeup" to water users for
environmental actions. Its intent is to maximize project efficiency and
flexibility, allowing the projects to provide both fish and water users
with reliable water supplies. Setting seasonal pumping restrictions by
biological opinion under the ESA generally does not allow for a
response to constantly changing hydrologic and fishery conditions.
Only when project operations exceed ESA take limits do the fishery
agencies seek additional pumping reductions, and, at that point, the
reductions are often substantial, and are too late to prevent the excess
take. With an EWA as collateral, the fishery agencies can call for early
and moderate pumping reductions that minimize both the take of
listed species and the need for subsequent, substantial pumping
reductions.35 In some cases, subsequent hydrology may allow project
33. CALFED ROD, supra note 2, at 54-58; EWA Op. Prins., supranote 32.
34. CALFED ROD, supra note 2, at 54-58; EWA Op. Prins., supranote 32.
35. Although the EWA had not been created yet, the water projects and ESA
Agencies agreed to reduce pumping in the early spring of 2000, which helped delta
smelt to pass the project pumps early and avoided a substantial violation of take limits
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contractors to avoid any delivery reductions resulting from the
pumping reductions. In other cases, avoiding delivery reductions may
require drawing down the EWA.

M. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CALFED EWA
Although the final negotiations to create the CALFED EWA did
not last much longer than six months, the roots of its development
date back a decade. In order to achieve the consensus support for the
EWA, federal and state governments and the stakeholders needed to
resolve several issues, including identifying the biological needs of fish,
resolving initial conflicts, building a stable state-federal relationship,
and establishing a regulatory baseline. At that point, the key agencies
and stakeholders could turn their attention to creating an EWA to
serve the peculiar needs of the Bay-Delta watershed.
A. CONFLICT/COMPETITION
The need for the CALFED EWA did not arise until conflict ensued
when fishery water requirements reached a critical point in the 1990s.
Populations of salmon and delta smelt had declined precipitously,
particularly during the drought of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The
ESA Agencies listed those fish and focused their efforts on drawing the
species back from the brink of extinction. 6
Initially, salmon
protection efforts focused on maintaining cool temperatures in the
Sacramento River and minimizing take by upstream diversions.37 The
CVP and SWP did not reduce pumping from the Delta due to
excessive take until 1992, two years after listing the winter-run
salmon. 38 At that point, the perilous condition of the fish allowed the

ESA Agencies to use the ESA's powerful regulatory tools to take drastic
steps to preventjeopardy of the fish. 9
The biological need for an environmental water account may not
become obvious until a water project has been in operation for many
years, the biological need becomes critical, and conflict becomes
intense.
Intense conflict in California helped agencies and
stakeholders alike recognize the risks of long-term conflict and
promoted greater creativity when resolving more than the immediate
dispute.
Intense regulatory conflict saps financial, natural and
emotional resources, without improving the environmental conditions

in May. When May pumping exceeded take limits slightly, the ESA Agencies did not
call for any additional pumping reductions.
36. Determination of Threatened Status for the Delta Smelt, 58 Fed. Reg. 12,854
(Mar. 5, 1993) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); Listing of the Sacramento River
Winter-run Chinook Salmon as Threatened, 55 Fed. Reg. 49,623 (Nov. 30, 1990) (to
be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
37. SWRCB Water Rights Order 90-5, supra note 6.
38. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 315-16
(2001).
39. See discussion infraPart II.E for a more complete description of ESA regulation.
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at the heart of the conflict. 4 Antagonists will pay their lawyers to go to
court, their lobbyists to the Capitol, and their chief executives to
regulatory agency executive suites. As the conflict continues, delayed
regulation may result, and environmental conditions may deteriorate
further, risking heightened restrictions on water use to save an
environment in a more dire condition. The listed fish in California
suffered from just such a delay. 41
Still, opportunity also arose from California's conflict. Although
California stakeholders and government agencies had been litigating
the Delta's water quality standards for fishery needs for more than a
decade, the ESA listings brought the water conflict into sharper focus
and helped frame the debate over how to restore the ecosystem. The
disputing stakeholders paid not only for lawyers, but also for a broad
array of biologists from agencies who contributed to a better
understanding of the biological needs of the listed fish. The debate
among biologists led to identification of remedies that did not require
water, such as habitat restoration.4 ' The conflict turned agency and
stakeholder attention to restoration of the ecosystem. If the ESA
Agencies had not listed salmon and delta smelt, the conflict would not
have reached crisis proportions. Without the crisis, stakeholders
would not have invested in the research identifying watershed-specific
needs of the listed fish; attention would never have turned to the
recovery of these species.
An environmental water account offers flexible tools to achieve
recovery, provided its managers have access to dedicated biological
research and monitoring. Each listed species' lifecycle will lead to
different kinds of water needs at different times of the year or in
different types of hydrologies. Defining these needs requires careful
The importance of investing in research cannot be
research.
overstated, as each scientific conclusion, particularly by regulatory
agencies, will be carefully analyzed and often challenged by
stakeholder scientists. In California, the conflict led agricultural,
urban and environmental stakeholders to hire scientists to review the
At times of particular
biological conclusions of the ESA agencies.4
40. As a Metropolitan Water District ("MWD") director, I participated in that
conflict. The MWD Board created the Delta Political Advisory Committee in order to
address the ongoing legal and political conflict over the Delta's waters.
41. Seven years after a California court rejected the 1978 Delta water quality
control plan and D-1485 in 1986, the SWRCB still had not adopted new Delta water
quality standards and withdrew its new draft Delta water quality control plan. While
the water quality standard debate continued, new fishery conflicts at the pumps arose

and the Fish and Wildlife Service issued a jeopardy opinion for water project
operations later that same year. See Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 49 Fed. Cl. at
315-16.
42. Although NMFS biologists had advocated spawning habitat restoration, water
user biologists touted these non-water projects as the answer for listed salmon. A key

part of the 1994 Bay-Delta Accord was funding for habitat restoration. See BAY-DELTA
ACCORD, supra note 14.
43. When the ESA Agencies presented their 1993 biological opinions at a public
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frustration, some stakeholder agency managers would denigrate the
biological opinions and decisions as emanating from "third-level
biologists."" At the point that agencies and stakeholders invest in
creating an environmental water account, no doubt about the
biological need for environmental water can exist. The biological
need must be clear to achieve cooperation, win the necessary
commitments, and successfully implement the environmental water
account.
Conflicts over environmental water needs continue to rage across
the West, but should be recognized for the opportunities they may
present. The California conflict of the early 1990s showed that conflict
provides the opportunity for a shift in the water supply/use paradigm.
Instead of focusing only on defending existing urban and agricultural
water supplies, antagonists should recognize the larger need for
healing the conflict and resulting damage to the watershed's
ecosystem. Without healing, the conflict will only make those water
supplies less reliable, risking a downward spiral of environmental
damage and increasing regulatory requirements. Recognition of that
risk, which can only arise out of intense conflict, sets the cornerstone
for building an environmental water account that can lead to
ecosystem healing.
B. THE REGULATORY BASELINE
Clearly establishing a regulatory baseline, against which use of
environmental water will be measured is critical to success. Achieving
a consensus baseline, however, is not easy. Creating a baseline
requires three steps: (1) establish the historical facts of water demands
and environmental conditions; (2) determine baseline conditions that
would best stabilize the fishery; and (3) draft precise regulatory
requirements for that baseline."
With those pieces in place,
structuring the environmental water account can begin.
The most hotly debated issue in any environmental water conflict
is the "cost" of changing water project operations for
environmental/fishery needs. Measuring that cost requires a baseline
against which to compare new operations. In the early stages of the
California conflict, each stakeholder measured these costs against the
baseline that favored its particular interests. As a result, stakeholders
battled over baselines.
They argued over alternative legal
meeting, stakeholder scientists attended and analyzed each statement in the biological
opinions at the meeting.
44. During the early years of the California conflict, I represented the city of Los
Angeles on the Board of Directors of the MWD, a major participant in the Delta
conflict. I heard the "third-level biologist" phrase on several occasions during the
1992-94 period when SWP pumping was reduced.
45. California achieved this baseline when the agencies and stakeholders adopted
the 1994 Bay-Delta Accord. The parties were fortunate to have more than seventy
years of hydrologic data and fifty years of fishery data. See discussion supra Part I.A.
46. As the Environmental Water Account concept began to germinate, Secretary
Babbitt urged stakeholders to put aside their "baseline theologies."
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interpretations of regulatory baselines as well as differing theoretical
baselines of current water demands. 47 The stakeholders then debated
fish had a right to use based on the different
how much water the
"existing" baselines.48 In a world of conflicting and shifting baselines,
it is impossible to calculate precisely what losses water users actually
suffer from water project operational adjustments for fish, thus the
conflict continues.
The CALFED EWA would not have taken shape without the
regulatory baseline established by the 1994 Bay-Delta Accord. The
Accord was achieved at the end of the state's worst drought, when
stakeholders could see the risks of long-term conflict in the next
drought if the environmental problems were not resolved. The
stakeholders and agencies therefore conceded to significant water
project operations changes and agreed to a regulatory baseline.
With the 1994 Bay-Delta Accord baseline in place, California then
turned its attention to improving environmental conditions and
avoiding a future debacle during which listed species populations
could drop precipitously, risking jeopardy and causing substantial
curtailment of project pumping. The stakeholders and agencies
focused on addressing those occasional crises that arise even with a
regulatory baseline, as occurred in 1997 and 1999. The intent of the
CALFED EWA was, in part, to address such unpredictable events. 4 9 If,

however, the parties were still at war over basic environmental
protections, then the EWA would have had little opportunity to
succeed because its resources would have been needed to maintain the
regulatory baseline.
Without a clear and agreed upon baseline of environmental
protection and water demands, accounting for an environmental water
account may become impossible. The baseline is the necessary starting
As
point at which to begin building environmental assets.
47. See, e.g., BAY-DELTA Accord, supra note 14 (establishing a thirty day spring
period where pumping could not exceed the inflow from the San Joaquin River (i.e.
one-to-one standard)). The subsequent 1995 biological opinion for delta smelt,
however, indicated that smelt needed pumping to be no more than half of San
Joaquin River inflow (i.e. the two-to-one standard). Less pumping means a higher risk
of reduced project water deliveries. In addition, the projects had agreed to meet that
standard pursuant to an agreement with San Joaquin River water right holders and a
subsequent SWRCB order. During the final EWA negotiations, SWP contractors
argued successfully that the SWP should abide only by the Accord's "baseline" one-toone standard. Some environmentalists argued that the SWP had already agreed to
abide by the two-to-one standard. The EWA now compensates the SWP for the
difference between the two standards.
48. Interview with Michael Thabault (Nov. 11, 2001). In California in 1993, for
example, storage facilities downstream from the Delta were virtually full, and there was
not much agricultural water demand because the soil was still moist in late spring
when NMFS called for reduced pumping in response to excessive take of salmon. The
State Water Project operators asserted that late-spring pumping reductions were not
part of the regulatory baseline, and the reductions therefore caused substantial water
losses, even though there was no where to put the water.

49. CALFED ROD, supra note 2, at 54; EWA Op. Prins., supra note 32, at 1.
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environmental water assets are contributed, they may be needed just to
stabilize the ecosystem, to keep moving toward that baseline. The
debate will rage as to allocation of all water resources in the watershed,
as well as how to measure the water used for the environment. When
does the environmental water account incur charges? When do the
account's assets grow? When the watershed enjoys a high precipitation
year and instream flows are substantial, does the account get charged
for the additional instream flows? How much is the charge? By
establishing the baseline of protection and water project operations
(or water use) in various types of hydrological conditions, the
environmental water account operators can begin accounting for
growth and declines in the account's assets based on changes from
baseline conditions.
The regulatory baseline also can provide a different kind of water
asset that an environmental water account does not effectively provide:
the minimum conditions that the fishery requires in every type of
hydrological year. The drafters designed the CALFED EWA to
respond to changes in hydrology or fishery needs. The basis for its
initial moderate size was an estimate of fishery needs beyond the
regulatory baseline, so the listed fish could move toward recovery.0 In
contrast, regulatory requirements provide for the minimum needs of
listed species that are consistent year in and year out. If the EWA were
required to provide the baseline of regulatory protection, the water
costs would deplete the EWA's assets in many years, and preclude the
flexible responses necessary for improving fishery conditions and
moving toward recovery.
The California experience shows that
creating a strong foundation for an environmental water account starts
with setting the baseline.
C. FEDERAL-STATE COOPERATION
Dominant federal regulation of endangered species and water
quality, combined with state control of water rights, make federal-state
cooperation an important element of a successful environmental water
program. Each government can contribute particular legal authority,
expertise, and experience. If one level tries to direct policy alone, it
faces roadblocks to success, which only the other government can
remove. By working together, the federal and state governments can
avoid such barriers and engage a much broader array of contributions
to an environmental water account's success.
The federal and state governments each play important roles in
managing the West's water resources. Congress has passed a number
of federal laws related to water, from sweeping regulatory laws5' to

50. CALFED Bay-Delta Program, CALFED EWA Fishery Needs 3 (Dec. 21, 1999)
(Staff Draft) (on file with author).
51. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994); Safe
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. Sub. Ch. XII (1994); Endangered Species Act of 1973,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
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water project authorizations and appropriations."2
The federal
government, however, has deferred the regulation of water rights to
the states 3 and delegates to them key regulatory functions under the
Clean Water Act.5 4 Both levels of government typically share in the
expense of a water project development, such as the CALFED BayDelta Program."'
The state and federal roles in developing an
environmental water account therefore remain an important element
in an environmental water account's success.
California generally has taken aggressive steps to store, manage
and protect water resources and the aquatic environment. Governors
have often staked their place in history on their water resource
activities, from Pat Brown's building of the State Water Project to Gray
Davis' prominent role in establishing the CALFED Bay-Delta Program
in concert with Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt.6 The
California Legislature also has assumed leadership in drafting statutes
that promote effective use of limited water resources." Finally, not to
be left out of the equation, the California Supreme Court has
recognized the Public Trust Doctrine 8 and confirmed a broad role for
state agencies that regulate water.59 The state's many innovative
approaches to water policy allowed it to play a leading role in the
CALFED EWA development.
However, when California tried to set its own course in water policy
without federal participation, stakeholders and government agencies
alike recognized the necessary and valuable role the federal
government must play if resolution of key water issues is to be
achieved. A state court had rejected the SWRCB's 1978 Delta water
quality standards in 1986." Five years later, the federal EPA formally
rejected those same state standards and encouraged the state to
develop new standards.6 ' The following year, Governor Wilson set out
the state's water policy for the Delta and appointed both a stakeholder
advisory group ("Bay-Delta Oversight Council" or "BDOC") and a
52. See, e.g., Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1994); MARK REISNER,
CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMEIcAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER (1986).
53.
54.

See California v. Arizona, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
SeeFederal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994).

55. See S. REP. No. 107-39 (2001); CALFED

BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, ANNUAL REPORT

2000, at 49-51 (2000)
[hereinafter 2000 ANNUAL REPORT], available at
http://www.calfed.water.ca.gov.
56. See generally ARTHUR L. LrlLEWORTH & ERic L. GARNER, CALIFORNIA WATER
(1995); CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, CALIFORNIA'S WATER FUTURE: A FRAMEWORK FOR
ACTION (2000) [hereinafter FRAMEWORKFORACTION].
57. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1725-1745 (West 2002).
58. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied
sub noma., Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 464 U.S. 977
(1983).
59. United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 202 (1986),
cert. denied, Supreme Ct. Minute 09-18-1986.
60. Id. at 196.
61. Press Release, EPA, (Sept. 3, 1991) (on file with author).
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working group of his water agency leaders ("California Water Policy
Council") .62 Neither group included federal representatives. 6 After
the SWRCB proposed a new set of aggressive Delta water quality
standards, Governor Wilson urged his own SWRCB to scrap the
proposal in 1993." During this same period, the SWP suffered Delta
pumping reductions arising out of both federal and state ESA
consultations. 65 The governor's state-only groups failed to end the
conflicts in the Delta. Certain stakeholders withdrew from BDOC, and
environmental groups pursued their suit against the EPA to impose
federal Delta water quality standards. 66 Recognizing the need to work
with the federal government, the governor's Water Policy Council
agreed to cooperate with federal agencies to resolve Delta issues. The
Accord followed six months later."
California learned an important lesson about water policy
development in the West: the federal government must participate
with the states in the ultimate resolution of water resource conflicts.
The coordination of state and federal government activities promotes
broader participation in an environmental water program, and greater
success in achieving common environmental and water resource goals.
In addition, an environmental water account will benefit from
cooperation with local governments (particularly counties) and
stakeholders. Local cooperation in establishing an environmental
water account will ensure ready sources of water assets and operational
creativity in applying those assets. Where water conflicts develop, the
watershed's water resources are generally completely allocated, or even
over-allocated. When environmental water needs become apparent,
the conflict over reallocating those resources ensues. The only way to
resolve that conflict with an environmental water account is to engage
local water right holders and users in taking action that allows water to
go to environmental purposes. Those actions range from water
transfers to conservation to shifting to the use of groundwater
aquifers. 68 A successful account will rely on every option to build its
account of available water assets. The diversity and abundance of
those assets depends on broad-based cooperation and creativity among
federal, state and local authorities.
62. GOVERNOR'S WATER POLICY PRINCIPLES (on file with author).
63. See Memorandum from John Amodio, Executive Officer, Bay-Delta Oversight
Council, to Council Members (June 20, 1994) (on file with author).
64. See Press Release, EPA, U.S. EPA Reaches Settlement With Sierra Club on
Bay/Delta Suit, (Sept. 17, 1993) [hereinafter EPA Press Release] (on file with author).
65. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 315-16

(2001).
66. Golden Gate Audubon Soc'y v. Browner, No. 93-646-LKK (E.D. Cal. 1993) (on
file with author). See EPA Press Release, supra note 64.
67. Compare FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT, supra note 13, and BAY-DELTA AccoRD, supra
note 14.
68. The Department of the Interior, for example, is currently considering water
acquisitions to provide instream flows in two tributaries to the Sacramento RiverButte Creek and Mill Creek. Both of those acquisitions depend on cooperation with
local water right holders.
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D. FUNDING
Creation of an environmental water account does not come cheap,
particularly in fully appropriated watersheds where the competition
for limited water resources is intense. The need for such an account is
nevertheless the greatest in these watersheds. The West's established
and emerging urban centers increasingly rely on water from distant
watersheds.
The entrance of an urban water supplier into an
agricultural watershed drives up the value of water resources,
particularly as the urban area grows and its water demands expand.69
When the need arises to restore water to the environment, all those
who rely on the watershed's resources will share the cost. Creators of
an environmental water account will confront the substantial
challenge of equitably allocating the account's financial costs among
all of the existing users.
After extensive debate regarding the distribution of the CALFED
EWA's costs and benefits, California chose to seek annual
appropriations to fund the EWA. On one hand, many in the
environmental community suggested that the water projects'
contractors pay for the CALFED EWA because when EWA operations
reduced deliveries, the water users benefited most from the EWA's
reimbursement of water to the projects. The CALFED Bay-Delta
Program considered seeking legislation to require those who divert
water from the Delta to pay a use fee, which might fund the EWA.7"
The SWRCB's draft Decision 1630 also considered imposing Delta user
fees.7' On the other hand, water users argued that an environmental
program benefits the broader public, and therefore taxpayers should
fund the program. Alternatively, there were proposals to divide the
EWA's water assets among the needs to aid species recovery, to comply
with biological opinions, and to avoid jeopardy.2 Some water users
suggested they would be willing to pay for biological opinion
compliance, but not recovery. Whenever anyone suggested that the
CALFED EWA might help comply with the Delta water quality
standards, the EPA refused to support public funding for such
compliance.
The EWA negotiators therefore sought annual
appropriations from taxes without specifying whether it was a recovery
or compliance tool.7"

69. When MWD began seeking water acquisitions throughout the Central Valley in
the early 1990s, many water right holders refused to "sell out" to Los Angeles, and
those few project water users who were interested proposed prices significantly higher
than they had paid for the water.
70. See FRAMEwoRK FOR AcION, supra note 56.
71. State Water Resources Control Board, Draft Decision 1630 (1992).
72. An attorney for the State Water Contractors, Clifford Shultz, proposed this
concept during a 2000 meeting with the agency leaders developing the EWA.
73. See FRAMEwoRx FOR AcnoN, supra note 56.
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E. STRUCTURE

Determining the most effective institutional structure for
administering an environmental water account will depend on the
nature and expertise of the institutions involved in the particular
watershed. The analysis starts with the federal, state and local agencies
that either operate or regulate water storage or conveyance facilities.
Next, the non-governmental stakeholders, including organizations and
individuals, who have committed the time and resources, may get
involved in environmental water issues within the watershed. Finally,
the elected officials who care about these issues will substantially
influence the implementation of the account. Analysis of these actors'
institutional authority over water use within the watershed is the
foundation for structuring the institution responsible for the
environmental water account.
The scope of existing agencies' legal authority will determine how
best to structure the environmental water account's administration.
For a federal agency to play a substantial role in the account's
operations, it must have statutory authority to acquire and use water to
support the fishery or other environmental needs." State and local
agencies that seek an institutional role will need to consider how the
operation of an environmental water account will complement or
compete with their existing programs and responsibilities.
Options for the governance of an environmental water account
may include placement of the account within an existing federal, state
or local agency; creation of a new governmental organization under
elected or appointed official(s); or the appointment of a non-profit
organization as an environmental account steward. In watersheds with
a history of intense conflict, agencies and stakeholders often do not
trust each other.
Each participant in the structuring of an
environmental water account, therefore, will seek support for, and
perhaps bias toward, its interests. Whether it seeks representation on a
governing board or direct authority over the environmental water
account's operations, each participant seeks a governing structure that
reflects its perspective on the problem the environmental water
account addresses. Determining how best to structure institutional
control over an environmental water account offers the opportunity
for the many agencies and stakeholders to disclose their interests and
achieve consensus on the critical challenges of the watershed and how
the environmental water account should address those challenges.
The state and federal entities responsible for operating the Delta
waterways and regulating the needs of listed species in the Delta
agreed to cooperatively implement the CALFED EWA and assume
responsibility for EWA management." The CALFED EWA negotiators
divided responsibility for implementing the EWA between the water
74. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1534 (1994); Central
Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4706.
75. EWA Op. Prins., supra note 32, at 1.
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project agencies (Bureau of Reclamation and the California
Department of Water Resources) and the fisher , agencies (FWS,
NMFS and California Department of Fish and Game).76 The water
project agencies ("project agencies" or "PAs") took responsibility for
acquiring the environmental water, while the fishery agencies
("management
agencies" or "MAs") managed the use of the EWA
77
assets.

Engaging existing regulatory and operational agencies in the
administration of an environmental water account ensures their
continued interest, involvement and commitment to its success.
Ultimate success, however, depends on achieving broad stakeholder
support of an environmental water account. That support provides
the necessary cooperation and funding for the environmental water
account and allows account operators the discretion and flexibility
necessary to use the environmental water account's assets effectively.
An alliance of government agencies is best equipped to operate an
environmental water account because government agencies frequently
must balance the type of diverse interests that collide in the operation
of an environmental water account.
Closely related to the institutional structure is the legal structure
for establishing the environmental water account and building its
assets. California considered a wide range of options for legal
protections of the EWA assets and, ultimately, chose a mix of assets
and the protections for those assets. In initial CALFED EWA
discussions, the legal structures ranged from water rights to water
project contracts for an environmental steward." In the end, because
the project agencies and management agencies were so integral to the
EWA operations, those agencies chose agreements or water project
contracts as the key legal tool for the EWA. Those contracts range
from water acquisitions to project operations agreements.79
The CALFED EWA's assets and their corresponding legal
protections are by no means exhaustive of all possibilities.8" Water
rights are one type of asset that is notable for its absence in the EWA's
initial endowment. However, because the EWA focuses its resources
on resolving conflicts at the Delta export pumps, operational
agreements with the project agencies gave the EWA an asset that has
greater influence over control of the pumps-access to excess project
storage or conveyance capacity.8

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
See 6/99 PHASE II REPORT, supra note 22, at 96-97.
See EWA Op. Prins., supra note 32.
Id..
Id.
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F. REGULATORy AssURANCES: "THE COMMITMENTS"
Water users support the CALFED EWA because it offers the hope
that their water supplies will be more reliable and stable. They gained
this confidence from the "ESA Commitments" s2 and the U. S. Fish and
Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service, which
indicated that the water projects will have " ... no reductions, beyond
existing regulatory levels, in CVP or SWP Delta exports resulting from
measures to protect fish under FESA and CESA."' The ESA provides
the legal framework for such regulatory assurances. When an ESA
Agency lists a fish species as threatened or endangered, it gains various
protections."' Among these, two important legal protections stand out.
First, ESA section 9 makes it unlawful to take listed species. 5 Second,
ESA section 7(a) (2) requires each federal agency to "insure that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency.., is not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species
or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species.

,,

The ESA allows take under certain conditions. ESA section 7
allows the ESA Agencies to issue, after consultation, a biological
opinion with an "incidental take statement" concluding that such take
does not jeopardize the species. 7 Exceeding the limits of the
incidental take statement generally requires that the federal agency
reinitiate consultation with the ESA Agencies, which, in turn, may lead
to other changes in the terms of the biological opinion. ESA section
10 authorizes the ESA Agencies to permit some take as part of an
otherwise lawful activity by non-federal entities that propose and
implement a Habitat Conservation Plan ("HCP"). Such non-federal
actors who receive section 10 permits can also receive "No Surprises"
assurances, which assure that they will not have to take any other
conservation actions beyond the HCP's requirements.88 While federal
agencies may not receive the same "No Surprises" assurances under
section 7, the ESA Agencies may craft biological opinions that set the
consultation requirements and other provisions high enough to
provide some assurance to the federal agency and its permittees.
Due to the close coordination between the federal CVP and
California's SWP,89 the SWP participated in the CVP's consultation
with the ESA Agencies pursuant to ESA section 7 with respect to Delta
export pumping.
As a result, "No Surprises" assurances were
82. CALFED ROD, supranote 2, at 57.
83. Id
84. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
85. Id. § 1538; see also Endangered Wildlife, 50 C.F.R. § 17.21 (1999).
86. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2).
87. Id.§ 1536(b).
88. Id. § 1539; see also 50 C.F.R § 17.22 (1999); 50 C.F.R. § 17.32 (1999); 50 C.F.R. §
222.22 (1998) ("No Surprises" regulations).
89. Act of Oct. 27, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-546, 100 Stat. 3050.
90. Memorandum from Field Supervisor, Ecological Services, Sacramento Field
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unavailable to either the federal or state projects. At one point,
certain contractors reportedly approached members of Congress
inquiring whether California might obtain unique statutory protection
similar to "No Surprises" assurances for both state and federal water
contractors in conjunction with the CALFED Bay-Delta Program.
Those inquiries, however, did not result in statutory changes."
To avoid confusion with section 10 "No Surprises Assurances," the
ESA Agencies and the project agencies ultimately provided
"commitments" within the Record of Decision, the CALFED biological
opinion, and the EWA Operating Principles Agreement.
The
commitments applied to the export parties, relying on the export
pumps where the CALFED EWA would be most effective. The basis
for the commitments is three tiers of protection for listed species: the
first tier is the regulatory baseline, the second tier is the EWA, and the
third tier "is based upon the commitment and ability of CALFED
Agencies to make additional water available should it be needed."93
The additional third tier depends on the water projects' ability to
acquire water or, if absolutely necessary, draw on other project
supplies. It fulfills the section 7 responsibility of the federal agencies
to avoid jeopardy and ensures that listed species are not at risk.
While "No Surprises" assurances enjoy a more established
regulatory structure, the Bureau of Reclamation's participation in
most western watersheds suggests that the California commitments
may apply more readily to watershed-wide environmental water
accounts. The scope of the account, its intended effects, and the
assurances sought will dictate how best to provide assurance to water
users. If the account is only for a tributary watershed and assurances
are sought only for non-federal diversions, then section 10 provides
the strongest assurances. However, if the account covers an entire
watershed, then federal diversions are more likely involved. At that
point, the commitments provided in the CALFED Program still
provide assurances to water users, only on a more limited basis.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
Establishing an environmental water account only begins the
challenge of managing the environment's water assets.
The
environmental water account is a tool for more effective water
management. It will not resolve all environmental water conflicts, but
it will provide a framework for responding to the environmental water
needs that lead to conflict. It can therefore minimize or shorten those
Office, to Regional Director, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Sacramento, California
(Mar. 6, 1995) (on file with author).
91. Reports of this lobbying effort reached the author in 1999 and were confirmed
in an interview with Tim Quinn. Interview with Tim Quinn, Vice-President,
Metropolitan Water Dist. of S. Cal. (Jan. 9, 2002).
92. See generally CALFED ROD, supra note 2.
93. CALFED ROD, supra note 2, at 54-58.
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conflicts. At the same time, the account's operation may lead to new
debates about how to manage environmental water supply. New
debate may promote greater dialogue about water use priorities, needs
for improved water infrastructure and management, and the water's
value within the watershed. Successful resolution of this dialogue
depends upon continued cooperation, creativity and flexibility in
responding to nature's hydrological and biological challenges. To
operate water facilities more precisely, and enlarge and carefully
manage the account's assets, all agencies and stakeholders in the
watershed need to work closely.
In 2001, California completed one year of CALFED EWA
operation. The EWA worked, albeit not to the complete satisfaction of
every stakeholder. Questions existed about the ESA Agencies' choices,
namely, applying a substantial portion of the CALFED EWA assets to
salmon protection in the winter, early in the water year.94 As the
CALFED EWA proceeds, the watershed's stakeholders must move past
their contentious history and allow trust and confidence to grow as the
EWA operators learn how to effectively use the CALFED EWA assets
and operate the EWA within its water "budget."
A. BUILDING THE ASSETS
Circumstances surrounding the creation of the CALFED EWA
shape its growth opportunities. The CALFED EWA gained assets in its
first year, and it now enjoys access to more assets through defined
processes, particularly project reoperation and water acquisitions.
Successful development of a broad range of EWA assets, however,
requires varied skills and processes, including legislation, contract
negotiation, water right change applications, new storage and
conveyance facility construction, and water project operational
modeling. For most of these activities, the federal agencies need to
complete an environmental analysis pursuant to the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 9- while state agencies complete
parallel analysis pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act.
CALFED EWA operators have already faced perhaps the most difficult,
on-going challenge: obtaining annual state and federal appropriations.
During the first year, the EWA relied exclusively on state funding
because Congress could not agree on CALFED authorization or
appropriation legislation. 96
The most significant challenge in building the CALFED EWA's
assets will be reoperating the state and federal water projects to take
94. CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT (2001) (on file with
author); EWA REvIEw PANEL, FIRST ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL WATER
CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM (2001), available at
FOR THE
AccOUNT
http://www.calfed.water.ca.gov; THE BAY INsTITUTE, THE FIRST ANNUAL STATE OF THE

ENVIRONMENTAL WATER AccouNT REPORT

(2001) [hereinafter FIRST REPORT] (on file

with author).
95. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370e (1994)
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 55.

96. See 2000
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advantage of excess project storage or conveyance capacity for the
EWA's benefit.
Successful reoperation depends upon close
cooperation between biologists and engineers. The EWA operators,
including both the ESA Agencies and the water project agencies, will
need to operate two large water storage and conveyance facility
networks with smaller margins for error. Only through such precise
water project operation will the relationship improve between water
project operators and ESA Agency biologists. Not only will state
project operators and biologists join the relationship, but also all EWA
operators will acquire new skills. Engineers will learn more about
listed fish species' sensitivities. Biologists will learn more about
minimizing water project yield costs. All will need to learn how to
develop the EWA through project reoperation, taking advantage of
periods when the projects have minimal effect on fish and project yield
can grow. This deepening relationship between the ESA Agencies and
the Project Agencies offers one of the most important, yet unstated,
benefits from the EWA's development.
CALFED EWA water acquisitions may assume many forms, from
water rights acquisitions, to physical water conveyance agreements, to
waiver of contractual rights, to water deliveries. Determining the most
effective water acquisitions depends on the watershed's resources:
where water is available, where environmental water is needed, and
where account operations necessitate water replacement. Answering
these questions demands a broad dialogue among agencies and
stakeholders throughout the watershed. Acquisition targets may arise
from unexpected sources.
A range of other issues will also influence the CALFED EWA
operators' water acquisition choices. First, California's water law
regime affects the acquisitions because of how the law allows water
transfers, 97 protects water for instream uses,"9 and regulates other water
project development in the watershed.'
Second, other water
management and ecosystem restoration projects' progress may affect
water availability or fishery water needs. South-of-Delta storage
facilities (both underground and surface), for example, may expand
the availability of CALFED EWA storage options when the EWA has
access to pumping capacity and needs asset storage facilities. Finally,
CALFED EWA operators may receive "water deals," which are offers
benefiting both EWA and the offeror. The EWA operators have
already considered agreements to reoperate other projects' facilities,
to shift water demands to groundwater and to finance groundwater

97.
98.
99.

CAL. WATER CODE § 1725 (West 2002).

Id. § 1707.
See, e.g., STATE OF CALIFORNIA, STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD,

DECISION 1644: IN THE MATTER OF FISHERY RESOURCES AND WATER RIGHT ISSUES OF THE
LOWER
YUBA
RIVER
(2001),
available
at

http://www.waterrights.ca.gov/decisions/wrdec1644.pdf
instream flows, which ultimately flow to Delta).
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storage development."' The challenge facing CALFED EWA operators
will be selecting among the many acquisition options and judging their
value to the EWA as well as to broader water management goals.
B. ACCOUNTING/MEASUREMENT

From early in the California conflict, the parties debated how to
account for water dedicated to the environment. The accounting
debate arose as each stakeholder group compared each operational
change to its favored baseline and thus, affected its interest. The water
users, particularly project contractors, argued, and continue to assert
today, that the environment was taking their water rights every time
export pumping was reduced to protect listed species.'0 '
Environmentalists argued that the projects had no right to destroy the
0
environment and take listed species into their pumps."
They also
argued that the environment was not to blame for stopping such
diversions.
The accounting debate's primary focus arose out of Congress' CVP
"yield" allocation to certain environmental purposes pursuant to
CVPIA Section 3406(b)(2). The "(b)(2)" debate has persisted for
most of the last decade.0 3 Initially, the Department of the Interior
("Interior") did not account for the use of each acre-foot of so-called
"(b) (2) waters." Instead, Interior modeled the CVP yield impacts for
various environmental actions in different hydrological years and
committed water to those actions, allowing for the fluctuating water
amounts required for such actions.
In addition, Interior had
committed CVP yield from (b) (2) for the federal share of complying
with the 1994 Accord.0 4 A 1997 legal challenge resulted in a federal
court order for Interior to adopt an accounting system,' 5 which the
court then reviewed and generally accepted.'
The (b) (2) accounting
system provided a foundation for the EWA's accounting system
100.

See, e.g., SAN JOAQUIN RIVER GROUP AuOmIoiy, THE SAN JOAQUIN RIVER

AGREEMENT (2000); AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SACRAMENTO GROUNDWATER AUTHORITY
AND THE UNITED STATES BUREAU OF RECLAMATION FOR THE ACQUISITION OF WATER FOR
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ENVIRONMENTAL

WATER ACCOUNT

(draft

2002); UNITED

STATES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, AGREEMENT FOR THE AcQUISrION
OF WATER BY THE UNITED STATES FROM THE KERN WATER BANK AUTHORITY (2000) (all on

file with author).
101. See Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 31418 (2001).
102. Dept of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist., 8 Cal. App. 4th
1554, 224-28 (1992) (pump diversion killing listed salmon violated California ESA);
People v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 15 P.2d 549 (1932) (diverting water in a
manner that caused fish to be killed was nuisance).
103. The debate over "(b)(2)" accounting originated in Congress' instruction to
"dedicate and manage annually 800,000 acre-feet of Central Valley Project yield." It
defined CVP "yield," but did not define how to account for its use.
104.
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because it focused on effects on water project deliveries.
The California accounting debate led to many general questions
concerning proper accounting methods, such as:
. Should the basis for accounting be hydrologic water use
modeling or actual measured application of water?
* Should the CALFED EWA suffer a charge for every reservoir
release, even when diverted for consumptive uses downstream?
. Should the CALFED EWA suffer a charge for every pumping
reduction, even when there is no reduction in deliveries?
. Should a CALFED EWA charge occur only when water project
deliveries drop?
. Should a CALFED EWA charge occur for every diversion
reduction, even when the water remains in an upstream reservoir?
While there may be many ways to approach the accounting, two
broad categories become apparent: accounting for water released and
dedicated to environmental benefits, and tracking losses to established
water users.
While the (b) (2) accounting principles generally applied to the
CALFED EWA, its operators continue to develop its precise accounting
rules, as the EWA Operating Principles Agreement requires.' 7 That
agreement grounded EWA accounting generally on effects on
deliveries to state and federal water project contractors. Although
there has not been any legal challenge to EWA accounting at this
point, this accounting will continue to challenge the operators.
In assessing the best accounting method for an environmental
water account in a particular watershed, start with the nature of the
conflict from which the environmental water account proposal arises.
The conflict often begins when environmental demands lead to
reduced deliveries for consumptive uses. In that case, accounting
based on the effect of account operations on those deliveries may
provide the best gauge of its success. Charges would occur only when
the account is required to compensate for lost deliveries, not for
modifying project operations when no delivery reductions occur. As
for accounting for deposits, account operators will need to assess the
nature of each water acquisition or reoperation to determine how
much the account benefits. At times, such accounting may require a
modeling comparison between existing conditions and the changes
As with so many
arising out of the acquisition/reoperation.
environmental water account issues, the best accounting method will
depend on the watershed.

107.
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C. COORDINATION WITH OTHER PROGRAMS/GOALS

As Californians have learned, building an environmental water
account can benefit both environmentalist and traditional water user
interests. It can bind together those two historically warring factions.
In addition to drawing the factions into a closer working relationship,
an account's operations may support other projects that require
mutual support. An environmental water account gives all sides
incentives to ensure there is a sufficient water supply for all needs,
including agricultural, urban and environmental. However, achieving
these benefits requires coordination between the environmental water
account and the other programs that serve the needs of each
stakeholder group. Other programs may include water storage
development, particularly groundwater aquifer/conjunctive use
projects, multiple use projects, including recycling, and affiliated
ecosystem restoration projects.
1. Conjunctive-Use Groundwater Storage.
In analyzing how best to build the CALFED EWA assets, the EWA
agencies learned that long-term storage of EWA water assets could
provide the most reliable environmental supply in wet or dry years.' 8
Developing the EWA, therefore, fostered support for new storage,
particularly projects that would not cause additional substantial
environmental damage. In addition to expanding existing reservoirs
to meet both water supply and fishery needs, the agencies committed
to expanding groundwater storage used in conjunction with existing
surface storage reservoirs.
Active management of groundwater
aquifers in the southern part of California's Central Valley provided a
model for how to enhance water supply reliability for consumptive
uses.n° The CALFED EWA began pursuin such groundwater storage
opportunities in its first year of operation.
2. Multiple Use/Multiple Objectives.
Operation of an environmental water account can create benefits
for other water demands, particularly water quality and water supply.
Instream uses may improve water quality by dilution or pushing
saltwater out of the river's estuary and back toward the ocean, as is
possible in California's Delta. Instream uses also may promote natural
streams as a means of conveyance to downstream consumptive uses.
An account's central benefit to water supply is the certainty or
108. This conclusion arose out of the extensive modeling completed during the

development and negotiation of the CALFED EWA. The modeling revealed that EWA
storage rights would ensure that the EWA could store water in wetter years when it did
not need all of its allocation. See 6/99 PHASE II REPORT, supra note 22.
109. CALFED ROD, supra note 2, at 46-47.
110. See 12/98 PHASE II REPORT, supra note 20, at 79-83.
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reliability. An account can act as a limitation on environmental
demands for water and therefore enhance water supply reliability.
Finally, an account may provide a reliable demand for reclaimed water
from upstream consumptive users. In each case, the key is multiple
uses of the same valuable water resource.
While the creators of an environmental water account can set lofty
goals of fulfilling a variety of needs, such goals can create risk of
missing the primary goal of restoring an ecosystem. Setting several
goals for an environmental water account may create conflicts among
competing demands for the account's assets, leading to conflicts
among account operators as to water priorities. Such debates may
recreate the conflicts from which the account developed and impede
resolution of conflicts between environmental and consumptive use
demands. The challenge for the creators and the operators of an
environmental water account is to balance the many separate
environmental needs with each other and with the watershed's
established consumptive uses.
California chose a middle course in establishing the CALFED
EWA. It set the needs of listed species as the first priority, without
trying to resolve water quality concerns with the same supply. At the
same time, however, the EWA creators committed to no degradation
of water quality arising from the EWA's operation, compared to
historical pre-EWA conditions. The CALFED EWA takes one more
step in focusing use of its assets to address fishery needs in the vicinity
of the state and federal project export pumping facilities in the
southern part of the Delta, but allows for instream uses upstream from
the pumps."'
A key factor in the success or failure of an environmental water
account is the scope of its objectives. Defining scope requires a
difficult balancing: too broad a scope will make achievement of
multiple, contradictory objectives nearly impossible; too narrow a
scope will allow achievement, but possibly at the cost of other closely
related environmental improvements. Ultimately, focusing on a
narrow set of goals while allowing account operators to use available
assets to achieve other related environmental goals might provide the
best option. Flexibility allows an appropriate response on those
occasions when a comparatively small amount of water may contribute
substantially to valuable, related ecosystem improvement.
3. Other Environmental Programs.
Linking an environmental water account to other ecosystem
restoration programs can improve both programs. Other non-water
ecosystem improvements may ultimately reduce the need for applying
additional water to create fishery habitat. Promoting other local
environmental water programs also may contribute to reduced
112.
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demand for account water downstream within the same watershed.
Coordinating diverse ecosystem restoration projects may be difficult,
but often advantageous to both environmental and competing
consumptive demands.
The ESA's determined focus on single-species recovery can hinder
broader ecosystem recovery for multiple species.
When an
environmental water account is to resolve ESA-generated conflicts, it
may respond to a particular species. Close coordination of the
account's operations with other environmental programs that promote
a diverse ecosystem recovery can provide synergistic benefits for all.
Both listed and unlisted species benefit from a healthier ecosystem.
D. DECISIONS
While the creators of an environmental water account deserve
credit for making many difficult decisions as to the nature of the
account, other difficult decisions remain. Making an environmental
water account work demands constant analysis and deliberation about
how to make the most effective use of limited environmental water
resources. Courageous people must make these critical decisions and
face the ensuing debate as to the propriety of those choices.
If agency leaders or stakeholders assume this responsibility,
account operators need clear authority to operate the account in an
effective and timely manner. The purpose of an environmental
account is to respond quickly to sudden or developing ecosystem
changes that can threaten valuable fishery resources. Those who must
react quickly need the authority to change those dangerous conditions
immediately, whether the change requires releasing water from
reservoirs or reducing diversions. The decision-makers must be able to
respond with the confidence that affected water users will be able to
recover water from the account's water assets.
Freedom and authority to make such decisions requires
unequivocal objectives for operation of the environmental water
account. The account cannot afford to have decisions clouded by any
hint of conflict of interest on the part of the decision-makers. Account
operators' first priority must necessarily be ecosystem protection and
restoration. A successful operation must be free from contradictory
demands, such as simultaneously improving water supply or drinking
water quality. Too often, agencies face conflicting legislative direction
to accomplish many purposes. The Supreme Court has said that
government officials, by definition, cannot have conflicts of interest
despite contradictory legislative direction. In those situations, the
officials must weigh those contradictory directions and seek balance of
competing objectives.113 While the legislative branch may seek to satisfy
a variety of interests, success of the account will suffer.
California achieved this clarity by dividing responsibilities between
the fishery agencies and the water project agencies. The fishery
113.
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agencies ("Management Agencies") enjoy the luxury of making only
the bioloical decisions of where to use the CALFED EWA's limited
resources. . The water project agencies ("Project Agencies") hold the
responsibility for acquiring the necessary water assets and operating
the projects as necessary for the CALFED EWA."' Other agencies and
stakeholders still have an oversight role in the CALFED EWA
operation, but at the end of the year or when the assets have been
exhausted and listed species still face jeopardy in the continued
operation of the water project export facilities. 1 6 The CALFED EWA
operators therefore do not face day-to-day interference or challenges
to their decisions in times of crisis. In this way, the role of each group
of CALFED EWA participants remains distinct.
1. Setting Priorities Throughout the Watershed.
The first task of environmental water account operators is setting
priorities for acquisitions and for development and application of the
account's assets. In a world of limited financial and water resources,
identifying the account's priorities will allow the account operations
staff to work on the most important projects first. Acquiring water will
require time and funding to complete environmental analysis pursuant
117
to NEPA or similar state requirements.
Identifying the most
important environmental needs will allow operators to choose the
most valuable assets to respond to those particular needs. As the
environmental water account begins operation, biological conclusions
may change and lead to shifting biological priorities. When the
biological priorities change, the nature of the necessary assets shifts as
well. The ability to respond to these changing conditions is one of the
most valuable benefits of implementing an environmental water
account. An environmental water account allows flexibility that fixed
regulation cannot offer.
California was fortunate in that it was required to start developing
recovery priorities before the conception of the CALFED EWA. While
the biologists were studying the needs of the listed fishery species to
avoid jeopardy, the Central Valley Project Improvement Act ("CVPIA")
set the ambitious objective of doubling anadromous fish (mostly
salmon) populations within ten years." 8 By imposing restoration fees
on water deliveries and authorizing water purchases for fishery needs,
the CVPIA provided funding, authority and mandates to move beyond
jeopardy avoidance."9 Funding, limited by the amount of CVP water
114. EWA Op. Prins., supra note 32, at 1.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., FiRsTREPORT, supra note 94, at 29.
117. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370e (1994);
CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21000 (West 2002); Laub v. Babbitt, CV-F-00-6601 (E.D. Cal.
Dec. 11, 2001) (on file with author).
118. Act of Oct. 30, 1992, § 3406, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4714.
119. Id. § 3406(b) (3), 106 Stat. at 4716; id. § 3408, 106 Stat. at 4728.
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sold to contractors, obligated both the Bureau of Reclamation and the
Fish and Wildlife Service to engage in determining the biological and
funding priorities for the Central Valley.
Setting priorities must take precedence in the early development
and implementation of an environmental water account. While fishery
agencies have a statutory duty to study fishery needs and to use the
best available science,' stakeholders can still play a role in developing
those restoration priorities. A broad-based debate about the account's
recovery priorities will help ensure that the ecosystem requirements of
the entire watershed will receive the attention they need, and that the
account's priorities are not so narrow as to consider only the recovery
of listed species.
V. CONCLUSION
California's experience creating and operating an environmental
water account reflects the Central Valley watershed's unique
characteristics. The conflict of the early 1990s arose out of a unique
estuary ecosystem and its use as a conveyance system for California
water projects. The CALFED EWA addresses the watershed's unique
biological and hydrological conditions, which are constantly changing.
The EWA's success depends on how well its structure works despite
those constantly changing conditions. Success requires continued
cooperation and creativity among the agencies and stakeholders that
work within the Central Valley watershed.
Those from other watersheds nevertheless may learn from
California's lessons during the past decade. That knowledge may
come from making choices based on their watershed's specific needs.
The most important lessons, however, come from the process that
California has implemented. It is possible to distill those process
lessons into three principles:
Recognize the opportunity conflict can create.
Conflict
promotes careful analysis and exposes the long-term risk of failure to
resolve the environmental problems within the watershed.
Cooperate and coordinate openly. The EWA depends on
federal and state water projects to provide reliable deliveries to water
users and for instream flows for fish. Attaining those sometimescompeting goals is possible only if all interested parties work together.
When the ESA Agencies and the water project operators work together
in public view, stakeholder trust and confidence in agency decisions
can grow.
Build consensus on priorities.
Continued conflict over
fundamental priorities for the watershed's future impairs the ability to
work together on any common program, particularly an
environmental water account. Combatants must find common ground
if they hope to resolve the conflict and move forward. While
consensus is a common objective in western watersheds today, it is
120. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1) (A) (2000).
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difficult to achieve. By building trust and enhancing common
knowledge, the agencies and stakeholders can at least find consensus
on the fundamental priorities for moving ahead.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Citizens of Colorado and tourists from around the world have
enjoyed floating Colorado's world class rivers for years. They have
made the rafting industry into an economic force, producing more
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than $125 million per year in revenue.' More people go whitewater
rafting in Colorado than in any other state.2 Recreational boating also
draws countless kayakers, canoeists, and rafters to the rivers and
streams of the state. Running the rivers of Colorado is part of
Colorado's continuing frontier heritage-essential to the state's quality
of life and vital tourism economy. Indeed, the state of Colorado is
named for the mighty river that rises here and cuts rugged canyons as
it traverses the state.
The Colorado Supreme Court addressed public use versus
exclusive private use of Colorado's waterways as long ago as 1906,
when the court held that ownership of a non-navigable streambed in
Colorado included exclusive rights to fish the water flowing over the
streambed.3 The rights of public boaters to float rivers through private
propery in Colorado came to the forefront in the state with People v.
Emmert, decided in 1979, where the court upheld the criminal trespass
conviction of a boater who stepped on the bed of a non-navigable
river.5 The court in Emmert concluded the public has no right under
the Colorado Constitution to use non-navigable waters overlying
private lands for recreational purposes without permission from the
owner of the bed.6
Because the holding in Emmert addressed criminal trespass from
recreational use of a non-navigable river, what remains unresolved in
Colorado is whether boaters who float through private property on
navigable rivers without touching the beds and banks (absent
emergency portage), are subject to civil liability for trespass. This issue
is now wending its way through the Colorado state courts. When
resolved, it will either reaffirm the public's right to float the state's
navigable rivers, or provide riparian owners with control of the waters
of Colorado's navigable rivers and streams simply because they own
the beds or banks.
Those who argue citizens are prohibited from floating certain
stretches of Colorado rivers that pass through private land do not take
into account the history and law surrounding citizen access to rivers in
this state and around the country. This article summarizes the
historical nature of such public access over waters, and discusses the
principles of federal and state constitutional, statutory, and common
law that create and protect the public's right to float waters through
private property in Colorado. First, the article explains how this public
access exists under a doctrine known as the federal navigational
servitude, which is rooted in the traditional principle that navigable
waterways cannot be privately owned. Second, the article explains the
1.

COLORADO RIVER OUTFITTERS ASSOCIATION (CROA), COMMERCIAL RIVER USE IN

1988-2001 (2002).
Id.
Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685 (Colo. 1905).
597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979).
Id.
Id. at 1027.

THE STATE OF COLORADO

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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bases under Colorado statutory law for the right to float navigable
rivers in the state. Third, the article takes the reader on a journey
through the mazes of the common law doctrines of equal footing and
public trust, and describes how these doctrines provide a foundation
on which public access over navigable waters is constructed where
private ownership of the underlying streambed is asserted. Fourth, the
article explains how the right to public access to waters flowing over
privately owned beds and banks might exist, not only under the
Colorado Constitution, but also pursuant to a public trust in the state's
waters. Finally, the article demonstrates how citizens may have the
right to boat particular navigable rivers through private property in
Colorado based on other principles of real property law.
11. NAVIGABILITY
A. OVERVIEW OF NAVIGABILITY.
For waters subject to federal commerce authority, "navigability" is
the 'legal benchmark for defining the realm of public use."' In the
Daniel Ball,' decided in 1870, the Supreme Court articulated the well
established definition of navigability in the following context:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which
are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are
used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as
highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. And
they constitute navigable waters of the United States within the
meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinctionfrom the navigable
waters of the States, when they form in their ordinary condition by
themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over
which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign
countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is
conducted by water. 9

Public rights of passage and use may be assumed for waters
designated as navigable under this definition.'0 This principle is the
core of the federal navigational servitude, a doctrine based on the
federal Commerce Clause providing the federal government with the
authority to protect and improve public navigation over such waters,
regardless of who owns the beds and banks.
This oft-cited passage from the Daniel Ball also recognizes the
7.

DAVID GETCHES, WATER LAW IN ANUTSHELL 217 (1997).

8. Steamer Daniel Ball v. United States, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
9. Id. at 563 (emphasis added) (holding the English common law definition of
"navigability," which was limited to waters influenced by the ebbs and flows of the
tides, was inadequate for the United States in which many major water courses
essential to interstate and foreign commerce were non-tidal, inland waters).
10. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 645 (1970) (holding
navigable waterways "shall be and remain public highways ...for the public purposes
of commerce, navigation and fishery.").
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second context in which navigability may shape public use rights.
Specifically, states may develop (and, indeed, many have developed)
their own definitions of navigability for distinguishing public from
private waters for state purposes. In this regard, a waterway that is nonnavigable by federal standards may nonetheless be "public" under a
state navigability standard for determining public use rights.
Finally, a federal definition of navigability that is based on, but is
significantly more expansive than, the Daniel Ball definition
determines title to lands underlying waterways." Lands beneath waters
that are navigable under the federal test for title vested in the original
colonies before nationhood" and, in other states, upon their entry into
the Union" under the equal footing doctrine. 4 Because such waters
are navigable under a federal definition and the lands beneath them
belong to the states, logic dictates public use rights would attach.
Technically, navigability for title is a federal question.' 5 However,
because many such waters "are not adapted to, and probably will never
be used to any great extent for commercial navigation,",6 they have not
invited federal regulatory attention. Therefore, state courts have had
to interpret federal law in resolving questions concerning navigablefor-title and appurtenant public use rights for many water bodies, with
predictably uneven results. 7
Most recorded disputes have not been between federal and state
claimants. Rather, they have arisen when a riparian landowner, who
had assumed title to submerged lands within or adjacent to his or her
property, comes into conflict with a state agency or citizens'
organization claiming title in the state, often for public access and/or
environmental reasons.
In this regard, navigability for title is
frequently the threshold question for determining public use rights to
any given water body.

11. See Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding navigability for
title turns on a river's susceptibility to commerce, not whether it was actually so used);
see also discussion infra pp. 8-10.
12. Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367 (1842) (holding the Duke of York held
title to tidelands in public trust for the state and, therefore, had no authority to grant
title in such property to private individuals).
13. Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 196 (1987); Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1894) ("[T]he navigable waters and the soils under
them.., shall be held by the United States in trust for the future States, and shall vest
in the several States, when organized and admitted into the union."); see also Pollard's
Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845).
14. See, e.g., Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwatersof Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the
Source and Scope of the TraditionalDoctrine, 19 ENvrL. L. 425, 444-45 (1989).
15. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1926).
16. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893).
17. Compare State ex reL Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1356 (Kan. 1990) (holding Shoal
Creek was non-navigable because it lacked the capacity "for valuable floatage in
transportation to market of... products;" therefore, the state did not own creek bed
and riparian landowner could fence the creek to prevent canoe passage), with
Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 175 P. 437, 442 (Or. 1918) ("[W]e do not see why
boating or sailing for pleasure should not be considered navigation, as well as boating
for mere pecuniary profit.").
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Unfortunately, the case law and commentary have not arrived at
consistent terms to distinguish the three types of navigability described
above. To minimize confusion, and for the purposes of this article:
"Navigable for federal purposes" or "federal navigability"
refers to whether a water body satisfies the navigability test
for federal regulation of interstate commerce, as well as the
navigability test for determining title to submerged lands,
unless otherwise specified for one or the other purpose.
"Navigable for title" refers specifically to waters for which
underlying lands passed from the federal government to the
state at statehood.
"Navigable for use," "navigable for state purposes," or "state
navigability" refers to state standards of navigability for waters
that are not navigable under any federal definition or test.
Where "navigability" stands alone, it is used in its generic sense
unless otherwise defined. Note also, the term "navigable in fact" is
avoided. The term has been used widely, but inconsistently, in both
case law and commentary. At times, the term means "navigable for
federal purposes" and, at others, it means "navigable for use," as those
terms are defined above.
B. THE NAVIGABLE SERVITUDE
1. Traditional Federal Navigational Servitude
The federal navigational servitude is a doctrine under which the
federal government protects the public right of navigation on the
nation's naturally navigable waterways, including the right of free
public passage. Under the navigational servitude, when federal action
to improve navigation damages littoral or riparian owners' interests in
navigable waters, no compensation for a taking under the Fifth and
The
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution is required."
servitude extends only to the ordinary high water mark of the
navigable waterway, and does not cover waterways that have become
navigable through private expenditures."
The federal navigational servitude originates from English
common law, which viewed navigable water as incapable of being
privately owned, giving the Crown dominion over such waters to
protect the public's right to free passage.20 The United States
Constitution incorporates this concept in the Commerce Clause,

18. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 177 (1979); see also Law of Water
Rights and Resources, § 9.04 [2] [a] and [b].
19. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967); see also KaiserAetna, 444 U.S.
at 179-80.
20. Theresa D. Taylor, Determiningthe Parametersof the Navigation Servitude Doctrine,
34 VAND. L. REV.461, 463 (1981).
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giving the federal government the power to regulate activities affecting
commerce.21 The power to regulate commerce encompasses the
authority to regulate and improve navigation.
Moreover, the
Supreme Court has ruled that the power to regulate commerce
includes control of all the navigable waters of the United States for
navigational purposes, and, therefore, such navigable waters are the
"public property of the nation."2s By implication, the federal
24
navigational servitude is a component of the Commerce Clause.
Tide to lands beneath navigable waters can be held by a state as a
condition of its admission into the Union under the equal footing
doctrine, or by Indian tribes or private parties through pre-statehood
federal grants, 25 or post-statehood transfers by the state.2 The federal
government has a paramount interest in maintaining the flow of
commerce over the nation's navigable waterways, and it has the
authority to do so under the Commerce Clause. Therefore, interests
in such waters, including title to the underlying beds and banks held
by a state, an Indian tribe, or a private party, are qualified interests that
remain subject to the federal government's exercise of the
navigational servitude power. The Supreme Court has described the
nature of the federal navigational servitude and its relationship to
private interests in navigable waterways:
If the public right of navigation is the dominant right and if, as must
be the case, the tile of the owner of the bed of navigable waters holds

subject absolutely to the public right of navigation, this dominant
right must include the right to use the bed of the water for every
purpose which is in aid of navigation.
In Lewis Blue Point, the lessee of privately owned land beneath a
navigable bay located in New York state challenged a federal dredging
project that would destroy an oyster plantation located on the bay bed.
The purpose of the dredging project was to deepen the channel across
the bay to improve navigation. The owner/lessor of the bay bed
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941).
22. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 7 (1824).
23. Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724-25 (1866). The Court
similarly recognized that "great navigable stream[s]" are incapable of private
ownership. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 228 (1956); United
States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913).
24. See Wilkinson, supranote 14.
25. States are free to transfer public trust lands, such as the beds and banks of
navigable waters, if such a transfer is consistent with trust purposes. See Ill. Cent. R-R. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455-56 (1892).
26. Transfer of title to the states under the equal footing doctrine was subject to
pre-statehood federal grants of such lands to patentees. Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. (9
How.) 471, 478 (1850); see also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1894). Federal
authority to make pre-statehood grants of such lands that defeated a future state's
equal footing title was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Shively, and
again in Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997). But see State v.
Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231, 1236-38 (Nev. 1972).
27. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 87 (1913).
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received title to the land through royal patents, issued prior to New
York's statehood. The Court addressed the issue of whether the
dredging project constituted a taking that required compensation."
The Court held the owner of legal title to oyster beds underlying
navigable waters in New York had no private property rights entitling
him, or his lessee, to compensation for the destruction of the oyster
plantation by a federal dredging project.2 The Court emphasized that
title to the beds of navigable waters was qualified in nature and subject
to the dominant servitude the federal government owned, which the
government could exercise for the public's benefit. This servitude
includes the right to use the privately owned beds to aid navigation."
The Court reached a similar conclusion in United States v. Cherokee
Nation of Oklahoma." In Cherokee, the Court held that although the
Cherokee Nation received fee simple title by treaty to certain portions
of the bed of the Arkansas River in what later became the state of
Oklahoma, the federal government was not required to pay
compensation to the Indian Nation for damage to these beds by a
navigational improvement project." The Court concluded the federal
government has a dominant servitude over navigable waters, which
extends to the entire stream and streambed below the ordinary highwater mark, and the navigational servitude "applies to all holders of
riparian and riverbed interests.""
In United States v. Willow River Power Company, the Court reiterated
that riparian owners' rights in navigable streams are subject to a
dominant public interest in navigation. 4 In Willow River Power, a
company that owned the title to the bed of a navigable river sought
compensation from the United States for impairment of the
company's hydroelectric power plant, caused by a federal project that
raised the water level to improve navigation on the river. The Court,
citing United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Company, stated that private
ownership of running water in a navigable river is "inconceivable," and
concluded that the riparian owner has no right, as against
improvements of navigation, to a constant water level below the
ordinary high-water mark. Where private interests in navigable waters
conflict with the function of the government in improving navigation,
those private interests must bow to the federal government's superior
navigational right.3 5
In United States v. Twin City Power, a case based on facts similar to
those in Willow Creek, the Court described the navigational servitude as
a "dominant one which can be asserted to the exclusion of any
28. Id. at 85-86.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 88.
Id. at 87-88.
480 U.S. 700 (1987).
Id. at 700.
Id. at 704, 706.
United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 507 (1945).
Id. at 509-10.
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The Court concluded that even
competing or conflicting one."
though the private owners of riparian land had interests in the
navigable water recognized by state law, navigable water falls under
federal domain; therefore, Congress can completely preempt, leaving
no vested private 7claims that constitute private property under the
Fifth Amendment.
Thus, through this series of cases, the Court established the
principle that private interests held in navigable waters, including title
to the underlying beds and banks, are held subject to a federal
navigational servitude. In each of these cases, the Court ruled that
exercise of a federal navigational servitude, which extinguished or
damaged private interests, relieved the federal government of the duty
to pay compensation or reduced the total amount of compensation
paid to the owner of taken riparian property.
The Court has placed limits on the federal government's exercise
of a navigational servitude, recognizing that the federal navigational
servitude does not create a blanket exception to the takings clause of
the Fifth Amendment." Kaiser-Aetna does not undermine the principle
that privately held interests in navigable waters are subject to a federal
navigational servitude. Rather, the Court in Kaiser-Aetna merely
limited the exercise of a navigational servitude, where private
expenditures transformed a non-navigable waterway into a navigable
waterway.
In this case, Kaiser Aetna leased Kuapa Pond, a privately owned
pond located in Hawaii, from the private owner in 1961. For purposes
of developing a marina on the pond, Kaiser-Aetna dredged a canal to
link the pond to Manuala Bay, a navigable bay, and to the Pacific
Ocean for boat passage. Private ownership of Kuapa Pond originated
from Hawaii's pre-statehood feudal system. The United States Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps") claimed Kaiser Aetna was precluded
from denying public access to Kuapa Pond, arguing it had become a
navigable water of the United States subject to a navigable servitude as
a result of the improvements made to the pond.39
The Court held although Kuapa Pond was a navigable waterway,
the owners were not required to provide free public access to the
pond, and the Corps' exercise of a navigational servitude did not
preclude compensation to the owners. The Court noted Kuapa Pond,
which was considered private property under state law, was previously
not navigable and, therefore, incapable of being used as a highway for
navigation or commerce. Furthermore, the owners had invested a
substantial amount of money to make the pond navigable." The Court
concluded that although Kuapa Pond had become a navigable
waterway, therefore subject to regulation under the Corps' general
36. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1956).
37. Id. at 227-28.
38. Kaiser Aetnav. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 165 (1979).
39. Id. at 164.
40. Id. at 176.
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Commerce Clause powers, the Corps could not secure free 4public
access to the pond without paying compensation to the owners.
Notwithstanding this holding, the Court reaffirmed Congress'
expansive authority over the nation's navigable waters under the
Commerce Clause, indicating exercise of a federal navigational
servitude to assure the public right of navigation over interstate waters
used for commerce does not require compensation. 4 Further, the
Court noted, whatever the nature of the interests of a riparian owner
in the submerged lands bordering on a public navigational water, title
to such lands is qualified and to be held subordinate to the use of such
submerged lands and overflowing waters for public navigation at all
times.
Thus, under the traditional federal navigational servitude, the
Supreme Court has ruled that interests held in navigable waters,
especially title to beds and banks, are subordinate to the federal
government's power to regulate commerce on the nation's waterways.
The federal government's authority to exercise a navigational
servitude to protect and improve navigation on these waters is a
constitutionally based power that operates to protect the public's use
of navigable rivers for navigational purposes, regardless of ownership
status of the river's beds and banks.
2. Modern Federal Navigational Servitude
Under the traditional federal navigational servitude doctrine, the
federal government may take necessary actions to protect the
navigability of waterways and avoid paying compensation to private
parties whose property interests are adversely affected as a result of
federal actions. Therefore, as the Court held in Lewis Blue Point, Willow
River Power, and Chandler-Dunbar,the federal government may destroy
privately owned beds of navigable waters, reduce or extinguish water
power, and flood banks of fast lands if such government actions are
related to a navigational purpose.
Under a modern application of the navigational servitude, courts
have recognized the federal navigational servitude serves as the basis
for the federal government's protection of the public's right to access
over navigable waters, even where the submerged lands of such waters
are privately owned. As the Court in Kaiser Aetna observed, "[t]he
navigational servitude, which exists by virtue of the Commerce Clause
in navigable streams, gives rise to an authority in the Government to
assure that such streams retain their capacity to serve as continuous
4
highways for the purpose of navigation in interstate commerce.
Other courts have also applied the navigational servitude to permit
or protect public use of navigable waters over privately owned

41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 178-79.
Id. at 175.
KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 176.
Id. at 177.

WATER LAWREVIEW

Volume 5

submerged lands. For example, in Atlanta School of Kayaking Inc. v.
Douglasville-DouglasCounty Water & Sewer Authority, a county water and
sewer authority denied non-residents access to a public reservoir and
boat ramp, thus preventing use of the Dog River.4 ' The plaintiffs, a
non-resident kayaking school and private canoeing instructor, asserted
the federal navigational servitude existed in favor of all individuals,
apparently as members of the public, and created a constitutional
right of public access under the Commerce Clause.46 The court held
the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits of their
claim that the subject waterway was navigable under federal law, and
that a navigational servitude existed in the waterway to create a public
right of access, entitling them to a preliminary injunction. 7 The court
noted that "[t]he federal navigational servitude to which the plaintiffs
refer generally provides the federal government, particularly Congress,
the power to regulate navigable bodies of water by allowing it to
obstruct or modify the flow of waterways and by preventing others
from illegally obstructing or modifying those same waterways." Other
federal courts have recognized the modern federal navigational
servitude doctrine to permit public access over privately owned beds
and banks.
3. Elements of Federal Navigational Servitude
The federal navigational servitude applies only to navigable waters
that are capable of carrying interstate commerce. The Court in Kaiser
Aetna made this clear in affirming the government's authority under
the federal navigational servitude to assure that navigable waterways
"retain their capacity to serve as continuous highways for the purpose
of navigation in interstate commerce." 5° The Court stated that in
determining whether a federal action taken pursuant to a navigational
servitude constitutes a taking, "the important public interest in the
flow of interstate waters that in their natural condition are in fact
capable of supporting public navigation" must be considered'.5
45.

Atlanta Sch. of Kayaking, Inc. v. Douglasville-Douglas County Water & Sewer

Auth., 981 F. Supp. 1469 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
46.

Id. at 1472.

47. Id. at 1473-74.
48. Id. at 1472 n.6.
49. See, e.g., Dardar v. LaFourche Realty Co., 985 F.2d 824, 832 (5th Cir. 1993)
("When a navigational servitude exists, it gives rise to the right of the public to use

those waterways as 'continuous highways for the purpose of navigation in interstate
commerce'."); United States v. Harrell, 926 F.2d 1036, 1041 (11th Cir. 1991) ("If the
navigational servitude of the Tombigbee River, as a 'navigable waterbody,'
encompasses Lewis Creek, [then] Lewis Creek is public property and appellants may,
subject to state law, have a right of public access."); Goodman v. City of Crystal River,
669 F. Supp. 394, 398 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (holding Three Sisters Springs is a navigable
water of the United States and therefore subject to a federal navigational servitude).
Consequently, the plaintiff, who owned the land surrounding the Three Sisters
Springs, had no right to restrict public access by water to Three Sisters Springs except
pursuant to a Corps of Engineers permit. Id.

50. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 177.
51.

Id. at 175.
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Although the federal navigational servitude derives from the
Commerce Clause, the question whether the general federal
regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause, including a federal
navigational servitude, extends to a particular waterway, depends on
whether the waterway is deemed navigable under the basic federal
navigability test articulated in the Daniel Ball case. Courts have
extended the general authority to regulate waterways under the
commerce clause to control waters that are in fact presently navigable,
non-navigable tributaries, waters that were once navigable but no
longer so, and waters neither formerly nor presently navigable but that
can be made navigable by reasonable improvements."
The Court in KaiserAetna, however, explained that navigability of a
waterway for purposes of extending: (1) the power to regulate
navigation under the Commerce Clause; (2) the authority of the Corps
under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899;"' or (3)
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, is broader than navigability for
purposes of a navigational servitude. The Court acknowledged that for
purposes of extending the Corps' power to regulate commerce, Kuapa
Pond is navigable water. However, this conclusion does not mean the
pond is subject to a navigational servitude:
It is true that Kuapa Pond may fit within definitions of "navigability"
articulated in past decisions of this Court. But it must be recognized

that the concept of navigability in these decisions was used for

purposes other than to delimit the boundaries of the navigational
servitude: for example, to define the scope of Congress' regulatory

authority under

the Interstate

Commerce Clause

[citing

to

Appalachian Power and the Daniel Ball], to determine the extent of

authority of the Corps of Engineers under the Rivers and Harbors

Appropriation Act of 1899 [citing United States v. Republic Steel Corp.,

362 U.S. 482 (1960)1, and to establish limits of the jurisdiction of the
federal courts conferred by Art. III, § 2, of the United States
Constitution over admiralty and maritime cases.... Thus, while
Kuapa Pond may be subject to regulation by the Corps of Engineers,
acting under the authority delegated it by Congress in the Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act, it does
not follow that the pond is also
4
subject to a public right of access.5

As the Court in Kaiser Aetna explained, the navigational servitude
52. See, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). The
Supreme Court recently signaled the start of a possible trend towards reducing the
scope of navigability for purposes of the Corps' regulatory authority in Solid Waste
Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). The Court held that

isolated intrastate wetlands were not navigable waters for purposes of the Corps'
regulatory authority under the Clean Water Act, narrowing this authority to waters that
tend to fall more within the classical definition of "navigable" waters by having some
hydrological connection to navigable waters. This case, however, is not applicable for
purposes of determining whether a federal navigational servitude applies to a

waterbody, as the holding turned on the agency's interpretation of a specific statutory

provision.
53. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1994).
54. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 171-73.
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involves "the important public interest in the flow of interstate waters
that in their natural condition are in fact capable of supporting public
navigation.""5 The court in Dardarv. LaFourcheRealty stated, "[w]aters
so encumbered are subject to public use as 'continuous highways for
the purpose of navigation in interstate commerce'." 6 Thus, waterways
subject to a navigational servitude must meet the federal test of
navigability and cannot become navigable for federal navigational
servitude purposes through improvements, even though such
waterways are subject to regulatory authority under the Commerce
Clause or statute. Therefore, the scope of navigability for a servitude is
narrower than the scope of navigability for regulating commerce in
general.
A waterway deemed navigable for federal purposes must be
capable of carrying interstate commerce, which courts have defined
broadly." In Wickard v. Fillburn, the Court addressed the regulation of
commerce in general, noting:
[E]ven if appellee's activity be local and though it may be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if
it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and
this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier
time have been defined as "direct" or "indirect."

The interstate commerce element of the federal navigable
servitude derives from the definition 59of "navigable waters of the
United States" set forth in the DanielBall.

The Court in Kaiser Aetna, at least for purposes of regulation of
55. Id. at 175 (citing United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917)). The court in Cress
held the servitude applies to rivers that are navigable in fact in their natural condition.
In discussing the concept of navigable in fact, the court cited the reasoning in the
Montello. Montello, 87 U.S. 430 (1874).
The capability of use by the public for purposes of transportation and
commerce affords the true criterion of the navigability of a river, rather than
the extent and manner of that use. If it be capable in its natural state of
being used for purposes of commerce, no matter in what mode the
commerce may be conducted, it is navigable in fact, and becomes in law a
public river or highway.
Id. at 441-42.
56. Dardar v. LaFourche Realty Co., 55 F.3d 1082, 1084 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979)).
57. See 4 WATES AND WATER RIGHTS § 30.05 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1996) ("The
[servitude navigability test]-presumably reflecting the historic, if puzzling, commerce
clause association-demands susceptibility to use for navigation in interstate
commerce.") (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)).
58. Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
59. Steamer Daniel Ball v. United States, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
And they constitute navigable waters of the United States within the meaning
of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the
States, when they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by
uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or
may be carried on with other States or foreign countries in the customary
modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.
Id. at 563.
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commerce in general, noted that "a wide spectrum of economic
activities 'affect' interstate commerce and thus are susceptible of
congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause."0 The Court
reasoned Congress, therefore, could prescribe rules to regulate
running lights on boats, to remove obstructions to navigation, and for
any other reasons that further navigation or commerce. The opinion,
however, suggests that to satisfy the interstate commerce element of
the navigational servitude, the waterway, in its natural state, must be
physically capable of transporting interstate commerce, i.e., floating
vessels.
The lower district court in KaiserAetna concluded that Kuapa Pond
was used for interstate commerce because Kaiser Aetna, the lessee,
used the pond to raise revenue and to transport both residents and
non-residents in and out of the attached bay.6" The Ninth Circuit
ruled Kuapa Pond was transformed into a navigable water of the
United States, subject to a federal navigational servitude even though
it was privately owned and had never been used for interstate
commerce purposes.6 3 The Supreme Court, however, did not address
the "effect" of the pond on interstate commerce. Instead, the court
seemed to focus on whether interstate commerce could, in fact, be
conducted on the waters of the pond:
It is clear that prior to its improvement, Kuapa Pond was incapable of
being used as a continuous highway for the purpose of navigation in
interstate commerce. Its maximum depth at high tide was a mere two
feet, it was separated from the adjacent bay and ocean by a natural
barrier beach, and its principal commercial value was limited to
fishing. It consequently is not the sort of "great navigable stream"
that this Court haspreviously recognized as being "' [incapable] of
private ownership'."
The Supreme Court noted that before the private improvements,
while Kuapa Pond was still a fishpond, fishermen operated a few flatbottomed boats on the pond, but no evidence existed that these boats
could acquire access to the adjacent bay and ocean from the pond. As
such, Kuapa Pond "clearly was not navigable in fact in its natural state,"
apparently because of the lack of physical links to other navigable
waters, i.e., the open ocean.65
In Boone v. United States,6 the Ninth Circuit reached a similar
conclusion based on the ruling in Kaiser Aetna. In Boone, the owner of
a man-made lagoon in Hawaii, formed from a littoral fishpond and

60. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 174.
61. See generally id.
62. United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 408 F. Supp. 42, 53-54 (D. Haw. 1976).
63. United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 584 F.2d 378, 378-79 (9th Cir. 1978).
64. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 178-79 (citing United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co.,
229 U.S. 53,69 (1913)).
65. Id.at 179 n.10.
66. 944 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1991).
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separated from open ocean, brought an action against the Corps to
secure the right to deny public access to the lagoon." Similar to the
facts in KaiserAetna, the lagoon owner expended private funds to make
the lagoon navigable, and the Corps subsequently claimed the lagoon
was subject to a naviational servitude; therefore, it was open to the
public for free access.
The court drew a direct analogy to Kaiser Aetna, holding that
although the pond was navigable for purposes of regulation by the
Corps under the Commerce Clause, it was not subject to a navigational
servitude because the fishpond was "incapable of use as a continuous
highway for purpose of navigation in interstate commerce."69 The
court also noted that although the maximum depth of the pond was
three feet, the pond was separated from open ocean by the artificial
barrier, and there was little evidence in the record of any commercial
use of the pond since 1957. 70
The court indicated that the possible prior navigability of the area
comprising the lagoon in its natural state, although insufficient to
impose a navigational servitude, was a relevant factual consideration in
determining whether a navigational servitude applied. Although the
pond may have been navigable prior to construction of the stonewall,
the lagoon was not the sort of "great navigable stream" susceptible to a
navigational servitude.7'
Other courts have also struggled in determining whether a
waterway meets the interstate commerce element of the federal
navigational servitude doctrine. For example, in Loving v. Alexander,
riparian owners sought a declaration that the Jackson River was nonnavigable, and requested an injunction to bar public access over the
river. The Corps claimed regulatory jurisdiction over the river under
section 10 of the River and Harbors Act of 1899. 73
The Jackson River is relatively narrow, crooked, rocky, and shallow,
with depths ranging from ten inches to six feet and a width of
approximately forty to one hundred feet wide. Although the river is
located entirely within the state of Virginia, it joins with the
Cowpasture River to form the James River, which ultimately flows into
the Chesapeake Bay.74 The court held the evidence introduced at trial
was sufficient to show the river was historically used as a highway for
useful commerce, especially by lumber companies floating logs to
sawmills. The court also noted that even though the river in its
present condition could not support commercial log floating, it was

67. Id. at 1489.
68. See generally id.
69. Id. at 1501.
70. Id. at 1501-02.
71. Id. at 1502.
72. Loving v. Alexander, 548 F. Supp. 1079 (W.D. Va. 1982), affd, 745 F.2d 861
(4th Cir. 1984).
73. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1994).
74. Loving, 548 F. Supp. at 1084.
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susceptible to use for recreational canoeing and cold-water fishing.75
The court concluded that although the river was navigable,
therefore susceptible to regulation under the Commerce Clause, it was
nonetheless exempt from the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction. The
court found that under section 10 of the River and Harbors Act of
1899, pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 59(1), bodies of water located entirely
within one state, and considered navigable solely on the basis of
historical use in interstate
commerce, are exempt from section 10's
6
permit requirements.
Notwithstanding this holding, the court proceeded to rule that the
Jackson River was subject to a navigational servitude, and therefore the
Corps could guarantee free public access over the river without paying
compensation to the riparian owners." In addressing the interstate
commerce element of navigability for purposes of a navigational
servitude, the court noted that as a navigable water of the United
States, the Jackson River was subject to the exercise of federal authority
because future recreational use by out-of-state visitors of a proposed
federal fishery would affect interstate commerce.78
The court
concluded that under these circumstances, a federal navigational
servitude would traditionally apply to the river. 9
The court then considered whether a navigational servitude would
apply in light of the holding and reasoning in Kaiser Aetna.0 In
distinguishing Kaiser Aetna, the court concluded that although the bed
of Jackson River was considered privately owned under Virginia law,
unlike the pond in Kaiser Aetna, it was not previously a non-navigable
waterway made navigable by private expenditures.
Rather, the
evidence showed the Jackson River was historically navigable in its
natural state, as manifested by past use of the river to float railroad ties,
lumber, and furs."1
In Atlanta School of Kayaking,2 the court granted a preliminary
injunction to the plaintiff recreational floaters, permitting them to use
a navigable reservoir and access ramp linked to the Dog River. 3 The
court stated that when considering whether a body of water is a
navigable waterway to which individuals have a right of access, a court
must first ascertain whether the waterbody is navigable in fact, and
75. Id. at 1085.
76. Id. at 1090.
77. Id. (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)).
78. Id. at 1090-91 (citing United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979)). In
Byrd, the court held, based on Wickard v. Fillburn,that a landowner's filling of wetlands,
though local, had the potential for exerting substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce because out-of-state visitors used the lake affected by the filling activities for
recreation. Id. at 1209-10. The case, however, did not involve a federal navigational
servitude, and it was decided approximately two months before the Kaiser Aetna
decision.
79. Loving, 548 F. Supp. at 1091.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id. at 1089, 1091.
981 F. Supp. 1469 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
Id. at 1470, 1475.
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then determine whether a "navigational servitude exists creating a
public right of access." 4 A waterway is navigable in fact "if it is used or
susceptible of being used in its ordinary condition to transport
[interstate] commerce."" The court concluded that the plaintiffs had
a substantial likelihood of success on a finding that the Dog River was
navigable in fact because it was susceptible of being used as a highway
for commerce at statehood. 8
The court noted that while there was then little use of the Dog
River as a major source of interstate commerce, "'the presence of
recreational craft may indicate that a water body is capable of bearing
some forms of commerce, either presently, in the future, or at a past
point in time,"' to support a finding of navigability."
The court
concluded that the plaintiffs could show the waterway was navigable
because kayaks and canoes could travel down the Dog River, and
students paid to float down the river.8 " The court addressed the
interstate commerce requirement by pointing out that the fact that the
Dog River was entirely within the state of Georgia did not make it
incapable of carrying interstate commerce, pursuant to 33 C.F.R. §
329.7.9

In Dardarv. LaFourcheRealty Co.,9° the owners of a series of canals in
Louisiana constructed levees and gates limiting public access through
the canals.91 Commercial fisherman and the state of Louisiana
brought suit claiming a federal navigational servitude applied to the
waterways, providing a right of public access. Based on the reasoning
in KaiserAetna, the Fifth Circuit held that a navigational servitude did

84. Id. at 1472 (citing United States v. Harrell, 926 F.2d 1036, 1040 (11th Cir.
1991)).
85. Id. at 1472-73 (internal quotations omitted). 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (2001) provides
that "[n]avigable waters of the United States are those waters that are subject to the
ebb and flow of the tide and/or are presently used, or have been used in the past, or
may be susceptible for use to transport interstate or foreign commerce."
86. Atlanta Sch. of Kayaking, Inc. v. Douglasville-Douglas County Water & Sewer
Auth., 981 F. Supp. 1469, 1473 n.8 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (citing the Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 557, 563 (1870)).
87. Id. at 1473 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 329.6(a)).
88. Id. at 1473-74.
89. Id. at 1473 n.11. 33 C.F.R. § 329.1 addresses the required interstate nature of
"navigable waters of the United States" for purposes of the Corps of Engineers'
regulatory authority. 33 C.F.R. § 329.7 provides that:
[a] waterbody may be entirely within a state, yet still be capable of carrying
interstate commerce. This is especially clear when it physically connects with
a generally acknowledged avenue of interstate commerce, such as the ocean
or one of the Great Lakes, and is yet wholly within one state. Nor is it
necessary that there be a physically navigable connection across a state
boundary. Where a waterbody extends through one or more states, but
substantial portions, which are capable of bearing interstate commerce, are
located in only one of the states, the entirety of the waterway up to the head
(upper limit) of navigation is subject to Federal jurisdiction.
Id.
90. 55 F.3d 1082 (5th Cir. 1995).
91. Id. at 1083.
92. Id. at 1083-84.
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not apply to the canals because evidence presented at trial showed that
the waterways could not, in their natural state, serve as "highways for
commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in
customary modes."93 Specifically, photographic and cartographic
exhibits and testimony showed that the waterways were too shallow
(eighteen inches and seven inches in some places) and discontinuous
in nature for passage, were isolated and/or were connected to outlying
bodies of water only by man-made ditches dug with private
expenditures, thus becoming passable only by private dredging. The
court held that the waterways were not navigable in fact.95
The court further reasoned that even if the waterways were
navigable, a federal navigational servitude would not exist because due
to "the shallow depth and discontinuous nature" of the canals, they
could not be considered "akin to the 'sort of great navigable stream
that ... has [been] previously recognized as being incapable of private
ownership'." 96 Moreover, the canals could serve as highways of
commerce only after private dredging efforts.(" Thus, similar to the
court in Kaiser Aetna, the Fifth Circuit emphasized the fact that the
canals were incapable, in their natural state, of transporting interstate
98
commerce.
The capability of a waterway to carry interstate commerce in its
natural state, including the waterway's unimpeded connection to open
waters, which themselves are capable of carrying commerce, was one
factor the Court in Kaiser Aetna applied to determine whether a
navigational servitude existed. The expenditure of private funds to
make the water susceptible of carrying commerce, as well as traditional
Hawaiian law that designated the pond as private property, were the
other primary factors that the Court emphasized in reaching its
conclusion. The Supreme Court in Kaiser Aetna never explicitly
rejected the lower district court's conclusion that use of the pond by
out-of-state boaters made the pond susceptible to interstate commerce.
This conclusion by the lower court, and the similar reasoning by the
court in Loving, focused on the "substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce" principle from Wickard v. Fillburn to determine
whether a waterway is susceptible to use in interstate commerce.
Moreover, the court in Atlanta School of Kayaking made it clear that an
isolated waterway is capable of carrying interstate commerce for
purposes of applying a federal navigational servitude.
As the series of cases discussed above underscore, a federal
navigational servitude exists on navigable waters of the United States.
That is, a water that, in its ordinary condition, by itself or uniting with

93.

Id. at 1084-86 (citing the Daniel Ball, 77 U.S (10 Wall.) 557, 563(1870)).

94. Id. at 1085-86.
95. Id. at 1085.
96. Dardar,55 F.3d at 1086 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178-

79 (1979)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1085-86.
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other waters, is used as a continuous highway for the purpose of
navigation in interstate commerce. In many cases, the Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") has designated a waterway a "navigable water of
the United States" in accordance with the agency's definition of
navigable waters of the United States contained in 33 C.F.R. § 329.4.
For instance, the Corps' Sacramento District office" has specifically
designated Navajo Reservoir and the thirty-nine mile length of the
Colorado River from Grand Junction to the Utah-Colorado border as
"navigable waters of the Unites States" within the district's regulatory
boundaries'
The Corps acknowledges that "[p]recise definitions of 'navigable
waters of the United States' or 'navigability' are ultimately dependent
on judicial interpretation and cannot be made conclusively by
administrative agencies," although the policies and criteria contained
in the Corps' regulation "are in close conformance with the tests used
by Federal courts.""0 ' The Corps' regulations also note that "the lists
[of waters determined navigable waters of the United States] represent
only those waterbodies for which determinations have been made;
absence from that list should not be taken as an indication that the
waterbody is not navigable."' 2 Thus, the lower Colorado River and
Navajo Reservoir are not necessarily the only "navigable waters of the
United States" that exist in the state of Colorado.
In the absence of specific Corps designation, evidence of a river's
ability to transport interstate commerce now and in the past will
support the interstate commerce element of a navigational servitude.
Such evidence could show that the river, in its natural condition, was
historically used for transportation of commerce such as floating logs
or other commercial products and that it is presently being used for
commercial purposes, including commercial and recreational boating.
As an example, one Colorado court has ruled that based on historical
use by boats and rafts, the Gunnison River from Almont downstream
to Cimarron is a navigable stream and the waters therein public
waters.' 5 In addition, evidence showing that out-of-state visitors use a
river for recreational purposes also indicates that the river is used for
interstate commerce purposes, as the Fourth Circuit in Loving, the
Seventh Circuit in Byrd, and the district court in Kaiser Aetna all
concluded, therefore making the river navigable for federal
99. The Corps' jurisdiction over Colorado's watersheds is divided among four
different districts, with the Sacramento District overseeing the western slope
watersheds, and the Albuquerque, Omaha, and Kansas City districts overseeing the
state's eastern watersheds.
100. United States Army Corps of Engineers, Sacramento District, Waterways within
Sacramento District Regulatory Boundaries, at www.spk.usace.army.mil/cespkco/regulatory/navigable.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2002).
101. 33 C.F.R. § 329.3 (2001); see also id. § 329.14 ("Although conclusive

determinations of navigability can be made only by federal Courts, those made by
federal agencies are nevertheless accorded substantial weight by the courts.").

102. Id. § 329.16(b).
103. Arnett v. Trouthaven, Inc., No. 5702 (Gunnison County Dist. Ct., Sept. 13,
1961) (on file Gunnison County Dist. Ct.).
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navigational servitude purposes.
III. STATUTORY BASIS FOR RIGHT TO FLOAT IN COLORADO
Two statutory provisions, Colorado Revised Statutes sections 18-9107(1) (a) and 18-4-504.5 respectively, support the concept of a public
right to float the navigable rivers and streams of the state of Colorado,
either independently or in conjunction with other legal principles. l 4
Under section 18-9-107(1) (a), it is a misdemeanor to obstruct a
waterway "to which the public or a substantial group of the public has
access. "
This provision indicates that the legislature intended to
keep Colorado's waterways open to boaters and free of dangerous
obstructions. There are no reported cases interpreting or applying
this law.
Private landowners would argue that the public has no access to
the segment of any Colorado waterway that flows through their land.
In a typical situation, however, the public accesses a river by starting a
trip at a recognized boat ramp or "put-in" on public land and ending
at a similarly designated boat ramp or "take-out" spot downstream.
Many such trips are made subject to permits or regulations issued by
the public land management agencies that own and regulate use of the
put-ins and take-outs, with the understanding that the float trip will
pass through private land at some point in the floatable stretch.
Under such a scenario, the public has legal access to the river, and the
question remains whether, consistent with section 18-9-107(1) (a), a
private landowner may deny all use of the floatable stretch. In an
analogous situation, the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the right to
float against a trespass claim:
We are of the opinion and hold that the river in question is navigable
in fact and that plaintiff owns the land to the middle of the stream
but that the water is in the nature of a street or highway so that
eople who get on the river without committing an act of trespass has

ic] the right to boat on either side of the middle of the stream,

either up or down stream.

The second statutory provision relevant to the right to float is
section 18-4-504.5.1°7 In 1977, while the Emmert case was pending, the
General Assembly amended Article 4 of Title 18, "Offenses Against
Property," by adding section 18-4-504.5, which defined the term
"premises" so that boating on a non-navigable stream was not a
trespass.'
More specifically, the definition of premises refers to "real
property, buildings, and other improvements thereon, and the stream
104.

COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-9-107(1)(a), 18-4-504.5 (2001).

105. Id. § 18-9-107 (1)(a), (3).
106.

Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933, 936 (Okla. 1969).

107. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-504.5 (2001).
108. Id.; Hearing on Second Reading of Senate Bill 360 Before the Senate, 51st Gen.
Assembly, First Regular Sess. (Colo. 1977) [hereinafter Hearing on Second Reading]
(unpublished Transcript on file with Author).
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banks and beds of any non-navigable fresh water streams flowing
4
through such real property."O
A review of the legislative record
reveals the legislature deliberately amended the trespass statute in
order to approve of floating through private property." The mention
of banks and beds, but not the mention of "water" or "channel," was
intentional. The result is that boating a river is not a trespass under
the statute, so long as the boaters stay in their boats and do not get out
onto the real property.
During the Senate Committee Hearing on Senate Bill 360, which
became section 18-4-504.5, the "intent" expressed by Senator Soash
was "to make sure ... they stay on the water, don't get out and roam
around and interfere with these people's property." " With this, the
Senate addressed the problem with people getting out of their boats
and causing trouble on adjacent private land, and not with people
staying in their boats." 2 The problem perceived by many senators
regarding an earlier version of the bill, however, was with the meaning
of the term "channels" and whether that would result in a trespass for
boaters who stayed on the water." Several senators expressed concern
that this draft of the bill might impair long-standing kayak and raft
races, and other existing boating uses."' Likewise, Senator Cooper
expressed the need to represent people who use streams for tubing
and the like." 5 These comments reflected the Senate's desire to
maintain the existing public boating uses unhindered.
At the Second Reading of Senate Bill 360 before a full Senate on
March 31, 1977, Senate sponsor, Senator Kinnie offered a floor
amendment to "strike channels and substitute stream banks."11 6 He
proposed this amendment to address the concern by some that
"channels ... might mean water of these streams."'1 7 The Senate
subsequently struck the language to ensure "no inference to the
water.""'
More importantly, Senator Kinnie stated that the bill
protected landowners, but "will not stop tubing, canoeing, or boating

109. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-4-504.5 (2001).
110. See generally Hearing on Senate Bill 360 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 51st Gen
Assembly, First Regular Sess. (Colo. 1977) [hereinafter Senate Hearing on 360]
(unpublished Transcript on file with Author); Hearing on Second Reading, supra note
108.
111. Senate Hearingon 360, supra note 110, at 8 (statement of Sen. Soash).
112. See, e.g., id. at 16, 19-20, 22-25, 29. By way of examples: "when you are talking
about trespass on the bank, that's one thing; and trespass certainly on the buildings
and that sort of thing, you bet... [b]ut that's quite different than the bed and
stream." Id. at 22 (statement of Sen. Cooper); "[I]f the guy was riding on the water
and wasn't on the bed of the stream, then he wouldn't be in violation of the law." Id. at
25; "They wouldn't bother.., if you stay in your boat." Id. at 20; "It's the.., ones that
get out and get on your land." Id.
113. Id. at 23-26.
114. Id. at 18-19, 21, 26.
115. Id. at 25.
116. Hearingon Second Reading, supra note 108, at 2.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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on the water."" 9 In other words, the bill essentially ensured that those
existing uses could continue. Senator Kinnie repeated himself later by
noting "[i]f they want to canoe or tube or stay on the water, not bother
the properties, why there would be no problem." 2 °
The revised bill then went to the House Judiciary Committee on
April 15, 1977. The revision was explained as necessary because one
could misconstrue the term "channels" to mean water, and "we are not
talking about the water, we are talking about the stream beds, the real
property.' 2' A representative informed the House Committee that the
amended bill "is not to interfere with [a boater's] right to go down the
creek or the river." 22 The following testimony also supports that
intent:
[P]eople said that they could use the streams in the state-I don't
think there's any question about that-for people boating down, to
fish in the streams, but what people were doing was running jeeps
down the middle of the streams claiming that this is all public
property 23and they had the right to use it. That's the intent behind

this Bill.1

The changes to the bill were further explained as necessary because
the earlier version of the bill may have "prevent[ed] people from...
floating the boats down the stream, and there was never any intent to
prevent that in the Bill, and that was pointed out; that's what resulted
in the change
to stream banks to make that clear, that didn't include
24
water."
Did the legislature act with the stated intent to ensure the longstanding right to boat a river without interference, while still intending
that the very same right be impossible to exercise by allowing civil
lawsuits for damages against boaters? Further, did the legislature act
to ensure that boating was possiblewhile at the same time make boating
impossible by subjecting boaters to liability and injunction for civil
trespass? Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the legislature's
expressed intent. Transcripts of the debates in both the House and
the Senate demonstrate that the legislature was consciously trying to
protect the interests of floaters as well as adjacent landowners.
Additionally, the transcripts show that the legislature thought it was
doing so in passing subsection 504.5, the effect of which was to allow
floaters to pass through private land so long as they did not touch the
bed or banks as they floated through.
The definition of premises in the criminal code is both the clearest
119. Id. at 3.
120. Id. at 4.
121. Hearing Before the House Judiciay Comm. on Senate Bill 360, 51st Gen. Assembly,
First Regular Sess. 3 (Colo. 1977) [hereinafter House Hearing on 360] (unpublished
transcript on file with Author).
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 4 (statement of Mr. McLain).
124. Id. at 6-7.
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and the only statement by the legislature on whether boating through
private property is a trespass. Neither common law nor case law
defines "premises" for purposes of the alleged civil trespass for
floating; therefore, it is appropriate to rely upon the criminal code to
provide the definition. The legislative history supports this assertion,
illustrating that when the legislature defined "premises," it intended to
speak broadly to the right to boat rivers free from trespass liability.
People v. Emmert2 ' does not alter the above conclusions. The
legislature enacted subsection 504.5 prior to the Emmert decision. The
trespass statute at issue in Emmert was the version in effect before the
legislature acted in 1977.26

The Supreme Court referred only in

passing to the 19777 amendment and noted that the legislature had
"clarified" the law.
Because the definition of "premises" was not at
issue in Emmert, the Court did not interpret or apply the new statutory
definition. The present statute addressing trespass contains the best
and clearest statement by the legislature on whether boating is a
trespass.
Colorado Attorney General Duane Woodard reached much the
same conclusion in 1983, when he issued a formal opinion ("Woodard
Opinion") interpreting the impact of the statutory trespass
amendment.12 8 The Woodard Opinion answered two key questions:
(1) are boaters subject to criminal prosecution if they float across
private lands without touching the riverbed or banks? (2) Does the
law of trespass, which defines "premises" to exclude the stream channel,
authorize private property owners to prohibit boating?'29 The Attorney
"3
General concluded that the answer to both questions was "no. 0 0
Consistent with the legislative statements of purpose, the Woodard
Opinion indicates that the legislature modified the common law.
Specifically, the Woodard Opinion notes that the Emmert discussion of
the "ad coelum" doctrine was "arguably dictum." 31

Even assuming the

"ad coelum" doctrine was not dictum, however, the Woodard Opinion
noted that the legislature has authority to modify the common law
and, based upon the new definition of "premises," concluded that the
"ad coelum" doctrine was necessarily repealed in the criminal trespass

125. 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979).
126. Id. at 1026 (applying the 1973 Colorado Revised Statutes section 18-4-504,
which did not include a definition of "premises" until the General Assembly added
subsection 504.5 in 1977). Subsection 18-4-504 simply stated, "A person commits the
crime of third degree criminal trespass if he unlawfully enters or remains in or upon
premises. Third degree criminal trespass is a class 1 petty offense." COLO. REV. STAT. §
18-4-504 (1973).
127. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1029-30.
128. Purpose and Effect of C.R.S. 1973, 18-4-504.5 (1978 repl. vol. 8), 1983 Colo. AG
LEXIS 42, at 1 (1983) [hereinafter Woodard Opinion].
129. Id. As discussed in greater detail supra, Colorado law makes it a crime for any
person to obstruct passage on a waterway to which the public has access. See also COLO.
REv. STAT. § 18-9-107 (2001).
130. Woodard Opinion, supra note 128, at 1-2.
131. Id. at 4.
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context. 32 The Woodard Opinion squared this finding with the clear
legislative intent and ultimately
found that a private property owner
3
cannot prohibit boating.

lV. THE EQUAL FOOTING DOCTRINE AND THE PUBLIC
TRUST IN THE STATE'S STREAMBEDS
Another legal basis for the public's right to float is the state's
property interest in lands underlying navigable waters as provided by
the Equal Footing Doctrine. Under the Equal Footing Doctrine, when
a state entered the Union, the federal government granted it title to
lands beneath navigable watercourses within its boundaries.14 The
foundation for the modern Public Trust Doctrine is the well-settled
principle that such lands belong to the states. The Public Trust
Doctrine imposes upon the states a responsibility to manage these
lands consistent with public trust interests."'
Whether a watercourse is navigable for purposes of determining
title to its streambeds is a federal question.
The "starting point in
determining navigability for resolving title" 137 is the test the United

States Supreme Court set forth in the Daniel Ball, and discussed in
section II above.
In applying this test, which originally developed in
the context of determining congressional authority to regulate
navigation under its Commerce Clause authority,19 the courts have
interpreted its provisions expansively in the title test context.
For example, in Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held
navigability for title turned on a river's susceptibility to commerce, not
actual use.4 Ahtna, Inc. involved a title dispute in which the state of
Alaska successfully challenged the Bureau of Land Management's
conveyance of lands beneath the Gulkana River to a Native American
corporation under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.14 ' The
stream segment at issue was on average three feet deep and frozen
132. Id. at 5-8.
133. Id. at 10-14. Although the Woodard Opinion primarily addresses the criminal
trespass issue, it does state, for example, "[t]hat statute [18-4-504.5] therefore, does
not authorize either law enforcement officials or the owners of stream beds or of
adjoining property to prohibit such activities." Id. at 13-14. Also, "[b]ecause section
18-4-504.5 speaks to criminal trespass and does not address civil remedies, it cannot be
viewed as authorizing the owners of stream banks and beds to prohibit or otherwise
control the use for floating of waters passing over their lands." Id. at 14.

134. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845); Martin v. Waddell,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842); see also Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis
Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935).
See generally Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwatersof the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the
Source and Scope of the TraditionalDoctrine, 19 ENVrL. L. 425, 439-48 (1989)).
135. Ill.
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
136. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1926).
137. Alaska v. United States, 563 F. Supp. 1223, 1226 (D. D. Alaska 1983).
138. Steamer Daniel Ball v. United States, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1970).
139. See discussion supra Part II.
140. Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1989).

141.

Id. at 1402-03.

WATER LAWREVEW

Volume 5

seven months of the year.'
Most of the river's use was recreational;
including guided fishing and sightseeing trips beginning in the
1970s.11 The court observed that the aluminum powerboats and rafts
customarily used for such trips exceeded the 1,000-pound capacity of
watercraft used by hunters and anglers on the river during the 1940s
and 1950s before statehood.'4 4 Accordingly, the court found the
watercraft customarily used at statehood could have "at least supported
commercial activity of the type carried on today, with minor
modifications due to a more limited load capacity and rudimentary
technology." 4 5 In so holding, the court rejected the argument that
recreational industry activity did not
4 6 constitute commerce as "too
narrow a view of commercial activity."
As a result of Ahtna and other case law, the modern definition of
navigability for title places primary emphasis on whether the "natural
conditions" of a stream at statehood were "susceptible to commerce,
rather than whether the stream was actually used for commerce. "",
Because many such waters "are not adapted to, and probably will never
be used to any great extent for commercial navigation,"" they have
not invited federal regulatory attention.
Therefore, questions
concerning navigability for title and any appurtenant public use rights
for many water bodies have required state courts to interpret federal
law, with predictably uneven results.'49
In 1912, the Colorado Supreme Court declared in dictum that
"[t] he natural streams of this state are, in fact, non-navigable within its
territorial limits."5 0 This declaration, presumably, has given rise to the

142. Id. at 1402.
143. Id. at 1403.
144. Id. at 1403, 1405.
145. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d at 1405.
146. Id.
147. Id.; see also A. DAN TARLOGK, LAw OF WATER RiGHTs AND RESOURCES § 8:12 (Supp.
2001) (citing United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935); United States v. Utah, 283
U.S. 64 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926)).
148. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893).
149. See, e.g., State v. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231,1236 (Nev. 1972) ("No case has been
found which holds that there is exclusive federal jurisdiction to determine title
navigability.... [TJhe uniform federal 'test' ... has been applied by both state and
federal courts to determine title to submerged lands."). CompareKansas ex rel. Meek. v.
Hays, 785 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Kan. 1990) (holding Shoal Creek was non-navigable
because it lacked the capacity "for valuable floatage in transportation to market of
products," therefore, the state did not own the creek bed and its riparian landowner
could fence the creek to prevent canoe passage), with Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1143 (" [W]e
do not see why boating or sailing for pleasure should not be considered navigation, as
well as boating for mere pecuniary profit."). See also Bunkowski, 503 P.2d at 1234
(holding that because the Carson River had historically been used for floating timber,
it satisfied the federal test for navigability for title, after noting other states had
"adopted varying and less stringent tests... in order to establish the right of public
use.").
150. Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P. 220, 222 (Colo. 1912), overruled on other grounds by
United States v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 16-17 (Colo. 1982) and Denver
Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. School Dist. No. 1, 535 P.2d 200, 204 (Colo. 1975);
accord In re German Ditch & Reservoir Co., 139 P. 2, 9 (Colo. 1913) ("The natural
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widespread assumption that, because Colorado's watercourses are nonnavigable, the state has never acquired an ownership interest in its
streambeds."' Left unchallenged, this assumption suggests that unless
a stream flows through public property, its streambed is presumptively
privately owned.
At least one jurisdiction has declared, however, that a state has an
obligation to make particularized assessments of the navigability of its
watercourses before it can disclaim its equal footing interest to the
beds beneath them. In Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, the Arizona Court
of Appeals held that the state could not disclaim or relinquish its
putative title to streambeds without first determining their navigability
under the federal test for determining streambed ownership.
The
court based its determination, in part, on leading United States
Supreme Court decisions that "made it clear that the states owe a
fiduciary obligation to the general public" regarding management of
"sovereign resources" including "public trust" lands underlying
navigable waters."' As authority for requiring the Daniel Ball test to
determine navigability for title, the court cited the "constitutional
nature of the equal footing doctrine, 5 ' the indisputably federal basis
for the navigability for title definition"'5 and state courts'
"'constitutional obligation' . . . to uphold federal law."5 7
At issue were legislative efforts beginning in the late 1980s to
relinquish Arizona's interest in its watercourse bedlands after state
officials began asserting state ownership rights to streambeds beneath
navigable waters. 1'
Arizona, like Colorado, historically had not
asserted claims to such streambeds"' Until 1985, Arizona did not
assert equal footing claims in any watercourse except for the Colorado

streams of the state are non-navigable within its limits.").

151.

2

GEORGE VRANESH, COLORADO WATER LAW

§ 6.9 n.454 (Margaret Nagel Dillon

ed., 1987) ("It is generally assumed that Colorado's streams are non-navigable for
purposes of bed title.").
152. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 729 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001)
(invalidating a statute that would have allowed the state to disclaim its ownership of
streambeds under a definition of navigability more restrictive than the federal
definition of navigability for title).

153. Id.
154. Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988)).
155. Id. at 731 n.l1; see Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.
429 U.S. 363, 374 (1977); see also 4 WATERAND WATERRIGHTS, supranote 57, § 30.01 (a)
(citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 566-67 (1911) ("[tlhe equal footing doctrine is
treated by the Supreme Court as a federal constitutional dimension.")).
156. Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 731 (internal citation omitted).
157. Id. (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980)).
158. Id. at 727.
159. Id. at 726. Though the state had allowed its right of ownership to lie "dormant"
for more than seventy years, the court noted such dormancy did not invalidate the
state's claims, because "[n) either doctrines of laches nor statutes of limitations [could]
defeat the state's sovereign title to trust lands." Id. at 726 n.1 (citing State ex rel. Bd. of
Univ. & Sch. Lands v. Andrus, 506 F. Supp. 619, 625 (D. N.D. 1981) rev'd on other
groundsby Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273 (1983)
(internal quotations omitted)).
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River.'60 Predictably, Arizona officials' state ownership claims "upset
longstanding assumptions about title to riverbed lands" 6' and
"clouded the title held by political subdivisions, private individuals,
and corporations that had for years exercised control over, made
improvements to, and paid taxes upon these affected stretches of
land." 61 In 1987, the Arizona Legislature, concerned about "economic
displacement," enacted a statue ("1987 Act") designed to resolve the
state's claims without "lengthy, difficult and expensive fact-finding,"
while recognizing titleholders' "accrued equity in taxes, improvements
and family and social ties."16 The 1987 Act intended to confirm titles
held by private parties and political subdivisions in the beds of waters
other than the Colorado River, while compensating the state for
viable. 6 4
relinquishing lands where the state's claim appeared more
The act also provided for public recreational surface use of navigable
waters. 65
The 1987 Act sought to achieve these ends by, inter alia, providing
for: (1) "an uncompensated quitclaim of the state's equal footing
interest in all watercourses" except the Colorado, Gila, Salt and Verde
Rivers; (2) a $25 per acre fee by which a record titleholder could
obtain from the state a quitclaim deed for all of the state's equal
footing interests in lands in or near the Gila, Salt or Verde riverbeds;
(3) conveyance of the state's equal footing interest in any state land
patent issued after the statute's effective date; and (4) the state's equal
footing claims to be subject to statutory and equitable time bars, from
which the state was previously exempt.
In Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest v. Hassell,
representatives of both taxpayers and recreational users of Arizona's
riverbeds successfully challenged these provisions as violating both the
Public Trust Doctrine and the "gift clause" of the Arizona
Constitution. '
The legislature responded to Hassell by creating a commission to
investigate the navigability of the state's watercourses. This move
subsequently provided the basis for legislation disclaiming the state's
"right, title or interest based on navigability and the equal footing
The wildlife conservation
doctrine" to the beds of several streams.
organization Defenders of Wildlife challenged the statutory standards

160. Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 162 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1992).

161. Id. at 161.
162. Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 727.
163. Hassel4 837 P.2d at 162 (citing H.B. 2017, 1987 Leg., First Regular Sess. (Ariz.

1987)).
164. Id.

165. Id.
166. Id. at 162-63.
167. Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 727 (citing Hassell, 837 P.2d at 173). ARIz.
CONST. art. IX, § 7 states in relevant part, "neither the state, nor a subdivision shall...
make any donation to any individual, [association], or corporation ......
168. Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 727 (internal quotations omitted).
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for determining navigability enacted in 1994 ("1994 Act"), 69 as
contrary to the federal navigability-for-title test and "deliberately
designed to defeat trust claims." 7 '
The Arizona Court of Appeals agreed and invalidated the statutory
standards. The court first rejected an argument that the state's prior
appropriation system was "irreconcilable with the state's equal footing
claims based on navigability," which the Farm Bureau argued was
impossible to separate from the riparian water rights doctrine. 7' The
court responded that, although both equal footing and riparian rights
are common law doctrines and invoke "'navigability' to define the
scope of their respective applications, they are two distinct systems
that
72
address two different issues-water use versus land ownership.'
The court then identified conflicts between the statutory standards
and the federal DanielBall navigability-for-title test. 73 For example, the
1994 Act required "clear and convincing evidence" as proof of a
stream's navigability for title. 1'' But the court cited an Eighth Circuit
case establishing a "preponderance" of the evidence as the requisite
burden of proof.17 In fact, the court suggested only a "scintilla" of
evidence might be sufficient proof of navigability. 76
Additionally, in the 1994 Act, the court found several
presumptions and evidentiary limitations that essentially prohibit a
determination of navigability in conflict with the federal test.'17 The
provision that if any "portion or reach of a watercourse" is found nonnavigable, the entire watercourse is presumed non-navigable was
78
among the presumptions the court found violative of federal law.1
The court cited Supreme Court precedent finding navigability
established in part of a waterway might be enough to support
navigability for the entire watercourse. 79 The 1994 Act also established
the presumption that a watercourse was non-navigable unless it was

169. A~iz. REv. STAT. § 37-1128 (West Supp. 2001) (original version at 1994 Ariz.
Sess. Laws, ch. 277, §§ 1-14 (effective April 25, 1994)).
170. Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 728 (internal quotations omitted).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 728 n.4.
173. Id. at 731-37.
174. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 37-1128 hist. & stat. n.(B), (D), (G) (West Supp. 2001).
175. Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 731 (citing North Dakota v. United States, 972
F.2d 235, 237-38 (8th Cir. 1992)).
176. Id. at 731-32 (citing Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1971) (finding
susceptibility for navigation supported solely on evidence that farmers had transported
livestock across a lake). But see, e.g., North Dakota v. United States, 972 F.2d at 238-40
(implying more than a "scintilla" of evidence is required by holding an isolated tie
drive in unusually high water, the historical use of ferries for transportation across the
river, present-day recreational canoe use, previous boat use by Indians and
inconclusive evidence from explorers' journals combined did not support a finding of
navigability).
177. Id. at 732.
178. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 37-1128 hist. & stat. n.(B) (West Supp. 2001).
179. Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 732 (citing United States v. Appalachian Elec.
Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 410 (1940)).
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susceptible for commercial trade, as well as travel. 80 To the contrary,
the court found the federal test did not require both trade and travel,
The court rejected the
nor did it require a commercial nexus."8
statute's presumption of nonnavigability for waters never used for
profitable commercial enterprise." It also rejected the presumption
of nonnavigability for waters not used by "' [vessels customarily used
for commerce on navigable watercourses [at statehood], such as
keelboats, steamboats or powered barges'." 8 3 Instead, the court
adopted a federal district court standard that "'ordinary modes of
trade and travel,'" as set forth in the DanielBall test, "are not fixed and
need not be construed with reference only to the 'ordinary modes of
trade and travel' in existence" at statehood.' 84 With respect to the
presumption that recreational-rather than commercial-boating and
fishing rendered a watercourse non-navigable, 5 the court adopted the
Ninth Circuit and the New York Court of Appeals' liberal construction
of recreational use consistent with the federal standard.8 6
To bolster its position, the court held "determinations regarding
the tide to beds of navigable watercourses in equal footing cases must
begin with a strong presumption against defeat of state's title."'8 7
Additionally, "the equal footing doctrine is co-existent with a strong
presumption of state ownership."

88

Furthermore, the court held that

the conflict between state and federal law rendered the Act's
navigability standards invalid under the Supremacy Clause and the
preemption doctrine.'89
Whereas other jurisdictions have based the public trust on state
ownership of navigable waters,' 90 Arizona emphasized the state's
property interest in the land beneath navigable waters. In Colorado,
180. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 37-1128 hist. & stat. n.(C)(1) (2001).
181.

Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 732 (citing Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9,

11(1971)).
182. Id. at 733 (citing ARIz. REv. STAT. § 37-1128 hist. & stat. n.(D)(2) (West Supp.
2001)).
183. Id. at 733-34 (citing ARiz. REv. STAT . § 37-1128 hist. & stat. n.(D)(3) (West
Supp. 2001)).
184. Id. at 734 (citing Alaska v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 455, 463 (D. Alaska
1987)).
185. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 37-1128 hist. & stat. n. (D) (5) (West Supp. 2001).
186. Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 734-35 (citing Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d

1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1989) ("'To deny that.., use of the River is commercial because
it relates to the recreation industry is to employ too narrow a view of commercial
activity"'); Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 706 N.E.2d 1192, 1194 (N.Y.
1998) (".. .evidence of the river's capacity for recreational use is in line with the
traditional test of navigability, that is, whether a river has a practical utility for trade or
travel."). In following these recent precedents, the court noted two prior cases where
federal courts declined to find navigability based solely on recreational boating and
fishing activities. These cases were nineteenth century decisions, while a third was
decided in 1935. Defenders of Wildlfe, 18 P.3d at 734.
187. Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 737 (citing United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 34
(1997); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935)).
188. Id. (citing Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 284 (1997)).

189. Id.
190. See Discussion infra Part V.
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although Chief Justice Mullarkey once noted that the Colorado
Supreme Court has not recognized a public trust related to water,9' the
court has not addressed whether the public trust might apply to the
lands beneath navigable waters in this state. Nor has Colorado
established a system for making particularized determinations as to the
navigability of any of its watercourses.'9 2 If Colorado adopted Arizona's
reasoning, the public's right to float on a given stream or river could
not be precluded without first ascertaining whether the state retains an
equal footing interest in the streambed based on a particularized
assessment of its navigability under the federal standard.
Furthermore, the issuance of a federal or state patent to a private
landowner for lands traversed by a navigable watercourse does not
necessarily defeat state title to such lands. 9 ' Nor is a state estopped
from claiming title to streambeds simply because it has not previously
asserted its ownership.'94 States in their sovereign capacity may use and
dispose of state owned lands as they elect.'
However, the public trust
doctrine dictates that the sale or conveyance of lands beneath
navigable waters is "subject to a reserved easement in the state for trust
purposes" unless "irrevocably conveyed in absolute private ownership"
after a legislative determination that such lands may no longer serve
trust purposes.196
In Nevada v. Bunkowski, the Nevada Supreme Court determined
the Carson Creek was navigable under the federal title test. The court
found the state held title to the creek bed in trust for public use,
notwithstanding claims of ownership by private landowners, pursuant
191. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd., 901
P.2d 1251, 1263 (Colo. 1995) (MullarkeyJ., dissenting) (emphasis added).
192. See Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 739-41. In a separate opinion, Judge
Thompson concurred with the majority in requiring a "particularized assessment" of
the state's equal footing claims, consistent with federal standards for navigability for
title. Id. at 739. However, he objected to the presumption that equal footing lands
could not be alienated, arguing that in the arid west, conveyance of such lands into
private ownership would "not necessarily violate the public trust doctrine." Id. at 740
(analogizing Arizona statutory language providing "state waters belong to the public
and are subject to appropriation and beneficial use" to similar language in the
Colorado Constitution, which the Colorado Supreme Court construed as "'primarily
intended to preserve the historical appropriation system of water rights upon which
the irrigation economy in Colorado was founded, rather than to assure public access
to waters for purposes other than appropriation'.") (citing People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d
1025, 1028 (Colo. 1979) (discussed infra Part V)).
193. State v. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231, 1236-38 (Nev. 1972).
194. Id. at 1238.
195. Id. at 1237 (citing United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 54 (1926)).
196. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971); see also Defenders of Wildlife, 18
P.3d at 730 n.9.
Although individual states are free to pass laws that address the disposition of
public trust lands, this power is subject to the obligation of the state to
preserve the trust. Thus, trust land may only be used in ways that promote
the trust's purposes or improve the public's use of the resource. In short, a
transfer of public trust property is valid as long as the grantee's use does not
impair or interfere with the public interest.
Id. (citing Ariz. Ctr. for law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 166-69 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1992)).
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to pre-statehood federal and state patents.9
Here, the court noted
that when the United States granted patents without restriction, it
"assented to... construction [of such patents] according to the local
law." 98 Thus, the court construed "unrestricted federal and state
patents by the same criterion."1" Like the Arizona court in Defenders of
Wildlife, the Nevada court established a presumption of state ownership
of lands beneath navigable waters as the starting point of its analysis.
The court quoted United States v. Oregon for the proposition that...
Dominion over navigable waters and property in the soil under them
are so identified with the sovereign power of government that a
presumption against their separation from sovereignty must be
indulged, in construing either grants by the sovereign of the lands to
be held in private ownership or transfer of sovereignty itself. For that
reason, upon the admission of a State to the Union, the title of the
United States to lands underlying navigable waters within the states
passes to it, as incident to the transfer to the state of local
sovereignty ....
200

Because the record did not rebut the presumption that "the
federal government held the subject lands in trust for the State of
Nevada ....
[T]he federal government did not have control over the
bed, and it would appear obvious that the federal patents conveyed
none of the submerged lands." 201 With respect to the state patents, the
court ruled, absent an express legislative determination to the
contrary, the state in its sovereign
capacity "did not grant away the
22
public land of the river bed."

1

In rejecting the landowners' claim that the state was estopped from
claiming title because Carson Creek was not included on a list of
legislatively declared navigable waters, the court stated that public
rights cannot "be impaired by an
estoppel growing out of a mere
2
failure to object to encroachment."

1

The Defenders of Wildlife and Bunkowski cases suggest Colorado
courts should reexamine the presumption that all of Colorado's rivers
and streams that flow through private property are non-navigable for
title purposes.
V. THE COLORADO CONSTITUTION AND THE PUBLIC TRUST
IN THE STATE'S WATERS
At least forty-two
jurisdictions
have recognized that the state holds
•
•
204201
206
an interest in its waters0 or streambeds
in trust for the public.
197. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d at 1236-38.
198. Id. at 1236-37 (citing Wear v. Kansas, 245 U.S. 154 (1917)).

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 1237.
Id. (quoting United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935)).
Id,
Id. at 1238.
Bunkowski, 503 P.2d at 1238 (citing State v. Hutchins, 105 A. 519, 523 (1919)).
As discussed, infra this section, New Mexico and Wyoming, for example, have
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This trust responsibility gives rise to public use rights which preclude
riparian landowners from claiming exclusive and exclusionary rights to
surface waters even, in some jurisdictions, when the streambeds are
privately owned."7 Additionally, courts have held that a state has a
fiduciary obligation to the public to manage such trust assets, and this
obligation limits a state's ability to dispose of or disclaim the public's
declared that all waters within their boundaries are "public waters" for the purpose of
establishing public use rights notwithstanding streambed ownership.
205. See discussion supra Part IV. See, e.g., Elder v. Delcour, 269 S.W.2d 17 (Mo.
1954) (holding the title to the bed of a non-navigable stream that the federal
government conveyed to a private landowner before statehood, was not absolute but
burdened with a public easement that entitled the public to fish by canoe and
wading); Collins v. Gerhardt, 211 N.W. 115, 118 (Mich. 1926) (holding lands beneath
navigable streams that the federal government ceded to the state and which the state
granted to private owners were impressed with a perpetual trust that secured the
public's rights to float, fish and hunt water fowl).
206. See Mobile Transp. Co. v. City of Mobile, 44 So. 976, 977 (Ala. 1907); Owsichek
v. Alaska Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 494-95 (Alaska 1988); Arizona
Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 162 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992);
Anderson v. Reames, 161 S.W.2d 957, 960 (Ark. 1942); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v.
Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983); Lovejoy v. City of Norwalk, 152 A. 210,
212 (Conn. 1930); Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 492 So. 2d 339, 342
(Fla. 1986); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 310 (Haw. 1982); Kootenai Envtl.
Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Idaho 1983); People
ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773, 779 (Ill.
1977); State ex relO'Connor
v. Sorenson, 271 N.W. 234, 238 (Iowa 1937); Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl.
Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1154 (La. 1984); Opinion of theJustices, 437 A.2d
597, 607 (Me. 1981); Caine v. Cantrell, 369 A.2d 56, 58 (Md. 1977); Opinion of
Justices to Senate, 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1098 (Mass. 1981); Bott v. Comm'n of Natural
Res., 327 N.W.2d 838, 860 (Mich. 1982); Nelson v. De Long, 7 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn.
1942); Cinque Bambini P'ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 512 (Miss. 1986), affid sub nom.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); Elder v. Delcour, 269
S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. 1954); Gait v. Montana Dep't of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 731 P.2d
912, 915 (Mont. 1987); State v. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Nev. 1972); New
Hampshire Water Res. Bd. v. Lebanon Sand & Gravel Co., 233 A.2d 828, 829-30 (N.H.
1967); Lusardi v. Curtis Point Prop. Owners Ass'n, 430 A.2d 881, 886 (N.J. 1981); New
Mexico ex rel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421, 440 (N.M.
1945); Coxe v. State, 39 N.E. 400 (N.Y. 1895); State ex rel. Rohrer v. Credle, 369 S.E.2d
825, 828 (N.C. 1988); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation
Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 461 (N.D. 1976); Thomas v. Sanders, 413 N.E.2d 1224,
1227 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979); Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands, 590 P.2d 709, 711 (Or.
1979); Alburger v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 535 A.2d 729, 731 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988);
Jackvony v. Powel, 21 A.2d 554, 557 (R.I. 1941); Hobonny Club, Inc. v. McEachern,
252 S.E.2d 133, 135 (S.C. 1979); Hillebrand v. Knapp, 274 N.W. 821, 822 (S.D. 1937);
State ex rel. Cates v. W. Tenn. Land Co., 158 S.W. 746, 752 (Tenn. 1913); Cameron
County v. Velasquez, 668 S.W.2d 776, 780 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Colman v. Utah State
Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 635 (Utah 1990); State v. Cent. Vt. Ry., 571 A.2d 1128, 1130
(Vt. 1989); Darling v. City of Newport News, 96 S.E. 307 (Va. 1918), affid. 249 U.S. 540
(1919); Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (Wash. 1987); Campbell Brown & Co. v.
Elkins, 93 S.E.2d 248, 260 (W. Va. 1956); Wis's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Dept. of Natural
Res., 271 N.W.2d 69, 72 (Wis. 1978); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 145 (Wyo. 1961).
207. See, e.g., S. Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d 1295,
1298 (Idaho 1974) (holding the public was entitled to boat, swim, hunt and engage in
any other recreational activity on any stream which was suitable for such public uses
regardless of streambed ownership). But see Brosnan v. Gage, 133 N.E. 622, 624 (Mass.
1921) (holding title to streambed entitled private landowner to assert exclusive fishing
rights, but that his title was impressed with a public easement for business and
pleasure boating).
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rights to such assets.
The jurisdictions that have recognized some form of public trust
doctrine have relied on several different, although often interrelated,
sources of authority. These include the Equal Footing Doctrine,
or state statutes declaring public
state constitutional provisions
ownership of the Waters within a state.21 ' Although the Colorado
Supreme Court has declined on more than one occasion to adopt the
public trust doctrine based on any of these or other theories,212 a
divided court in the 1979 Emmert case did not completely reject the
concept and left the door open for the legislature to do so.215
Additionally, other prior appropriation states in the West have relied
on constitutional language similar to that in Article XVI, section 5 of
the Colorado Constitution to create a public trust based on public
ownership of the state's waters. Specifically, section 5 provides " [ t]he
water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the
state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public, and
the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to
appropriation as hereinafter provided."
The Emmert majority construed section 5 as "primarily intended to
preserve the historical appropriation system of water rights upon
which the irrigation economy in Colorado was founded, rather than to
assure public access to waters for purposes other than
to
Specifically,
the
phrase
"'subject
appropriation. "21
appropriation' . .. simply and firmly establishes the right of
208. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 729 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001)
("'[T]he leading nineteenth century Supreme Court decisions on state sovereignty
made it clear that the states owe a fiduciary obligation to the general public with
regard to the management of their sovereign resources,' which are . . . 'public trust'
lands.") (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988)); 4
WATERS AND WATER RiGHTs, supra note 57, § 30.01 (c).
209. See discussion supra Part IV.
210. See discussion of New Mexico and Wyoming Constitutions as compared with
Colorado's Constitution, infra this Part V.
211. For example, Texas and Mississippi have statutory standards for navigability
that some courts have interpreted as also defining waters to which the public has
recreational access. See Ryals v. Pigott, 580 So. 2d 1140, 1148-49 (Miss. 1990); Port
Acres Sportsman's Club v. Mann, 541 S.W.2d 847, 850 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); see also S.
Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d 1295, 1297 (Idaho 1974)
(relying, in part, on a statute that allows the public to fish on streams capable of
floating logs of a certain dimension); Muench v. Pub. Serv. Co., 53 N.W.2d 514, 519
(Wis. 1952) (applying statute that declared streams that are "'navigable in fact for any
purpose whatsoever'.").
212. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1979) (Groves, J., and Carrigan,
J., dissenting); Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685, 686 (Colo. 1905) (Steele, J., and Bailey,
J., dissenting). More recently, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Mullarkey remarked, in
dicta, "This court has never recognized the public trust with respect to water." Aspen
Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d 1251, 1263
(Colo. 1995) (MullarkeyJ., dissenting) (emphasis added).
213. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1029 ("If the increasing demand for recreational space on
the waters of this state is to be accommodated, the legislative process is the proper
method to achieve this end.").
214. COLO. CONST., art. XVI, § 5 (emphasis added).
215. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1028 (reaffirmingHartman,84 P. at 686).
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The court buttressed this assertion with language

from Article XVI, section
6 providing that the right to divert water
"shall never be denied." 217
In dissent, Justice Groves construed section 5 as establishing that
the state's waters are "the property of the public and are dedicated to
the use of the people of the state."218 He interpreted "subject to
appropriation" as "a caveat establishing that appropriation for a
beneficial use is superior to other uses" without limiting other uses.2 19
Quoting extensively from Judge Bailey's dissent in the earlier Hartman
case, Justice Groves argued the waters of every natural stream were
public, "dedicated to the use of the people.., in such manner as they
see fit," subject only to the right of appropriation for beneficial
220
purposes.
Until the waters are appropriated and diverted from the stream, they
belong to the public. No stronger words could have been used by the
people than are used in this declaration. It is idle to say that the
waters of the streams are dedicated to the public for the purpose of
appropriation, because those are not 221
the words of the Constitution.
It is a grant made subject to that right.
Justice Groves' interpretation is consistent with the analysis of other

states' courts. 222
For example, Article 16, section 2 of the New Mexico Constitution
216. Id.
217. Id. (quoting Hartman, 84 P. at 686). By contrast, the Idaho Supreme Court
construed similar language as imposing no constraints on the state's park agency from
appropriating water for scenic and recreational purposes. State Dep't of Parks v.
Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 926 (Idaho 1974) (construing Article 15,
section 3, of the Idaho Constitution, which states: "'The right to divert and
appropriate the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses, shall
never be denied'."). Although the Idaho case involved a stream flowing over public
land, it illustrates an alternate construction of constitutional language almost identical
to that which the Colorado court relied upon in Emmert to restrict public access to
unappropriated waters. Additionally, this language did not prevent the Idaho court
from allowing public use rights for "all recreational purposes" on waters deemed
navigable under a state definition of navigability, even where the streambed was in
private ownership. See S. Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d
1295, 1297-98 (Idaho 1974).
218. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1030.
219. Id.
220. Id. (quoting Bailey, J., in Hartman,84 P. at 690 (Steele, J., concurring)).
221. Id. (Groves, J., dissenting) (quoting Hartman, 84 P. at 690-91 (Bailey, J.,
dissenting)).
222. See, e.g., Owsichek v. Alaska Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 49198 (Alaska 1988) (construing ALAsKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3); Gait v. Montana Dep't of
Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 731 P.2d 912, 914-15 (Mont. 1987) (construing MONT. CONSr.
art. IX, § 3(3)); State exrel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421,
430-31 (N.M. 1947) (construing N.M. CONST. art. 16, § 2); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d
137, 145 (Wyo. 1961) (construing WvO. CONST. art. 8, § 1). But see State exrel. Meek v.
Hays, 785 P.2d 1356, 1364-65 (Kan. 1990) (analogizing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-702
(1997) to MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3, but following Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1030, in holding
the public has no recreational use rights to non-navigable water overlying private lands
without landowner consent).
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provides "[t]he unappropriated water of every natural stream,
perennial or torrential, within the state of New Mexico, is hereby
declared to belong to the public and to be subject to appropriation for
beneficial use, in accordance with the laws of the state. Priority of
'
appropriation shall give the better right."23
The wording of this
provision is almost identical to that in Article XVI, section 5 of
Colorado's constitution. The New Mexico Supreme Court interpreted
this language as an affirmative statement of the public's ownership and
right to use all waters in the state until they are appropriated for
beneficial use.224
The New Mexico court also held that
unappropriated waters are "public waters," and riparian landowners
did not have the right to claim exclusive use rights.225 Therefore, the
court held the private owner of land adjacent to and beneath two nonnavigable streams could not exclude the public from using the waters
of a man-made lake that inundated his property. 6 To deny public use
of such water, the New Mexico court reasoned, "would be saying that
the public must first appropriate its own property, the very waters
reserved to it and which have always 'belonged' to it, subject,2 27of course,
to being specifically appropriated for private beneficial use.,
The New Mexico court also held that the state's authority over
public water is "plenary."228 Thus, dedicating waters for public
recreational uses does not constitute a "taking" even when such water
overlies private land.2 2 The court admonished that
23 0 to hold otherwise
would "confuse title to the land with that to water."
Like the New Mexico court, the Wyoming Supreme Court found
public ownership of all waters embedded in the state constitution. In
Day v. Armstrong,23 the court held the public had a right to float on
streams flowing through private property, but the public did not have
an unrestricted right to walk or wade on the streambeds of such
waters. 2322 Instead, walking or wading 33on streambeds was limited to
necessary incidents of recreational use.
In authorizing public use of

223. N.M. CONST. art 16, § 2 (emphasis added).
224. Red River Valley, 182 P.2d at 430-34 (acknowledging the similarities between
New Mexico and Colorado Constitutions, but rejecting the Colorado Supreme Court
majority's holding and reasoning in its Hartmandecision).
225. Id. at 427-28.
226. The New Mexico court affirmed title to the submerged lands was vested in the
riparian landowner, whose ownership could be traced to the Pablo Montoya Grant of
1869. Id. at 424-26. However, because the water belonged to the state, the court stated
"justice and common sense" dictated the federal government's confirmation of the
landowner's title to the lands did not purport to "destroy, or in any manner limit, the
right of the general public to enjoy the uses of public waters." Id at 432.
227. Id. at 432 (emphasis in original).
228. Id. at 467 (plurality on second motion for rehearing).
229. Id.
230. Red River Valley, 182 P.2d at 432.
231. 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
232. Id. at 151.
233. Id.
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any waters capable of floating watercraft of any kind,23 4 the court based
its conclusion "solely upon Wyoming's Constitutional
2 35 declaration that
all waters within the boundaries belong to the State."
The Wyoming court acknowledged a "clear case of divided
ownership of the river as an entity" exists when the state holds title to
the water and title to the bed and channel vest in the riparian
landowner.236 The court analogized such divided ownership to the
"horizontal division in land ownership" between surface and
subsurface areas for which "the enjoyment of the rights incident to
separate ,,237ownership may require easement in the property of
another.
Therefore, concomitant with state ownership of its waters,
"there must be an easement in behalf of the State for a right of way
through their natural channels for such waters upon and over lands
submerged by them."238
In prohibiting riparian landowners from interfering with or
curtailing public use, the court emphasized that it was not "creating a
new public right nor even ...giving initial recognition to an unused
public right."2 9 Rather, the court defended "a use long enjoyed by the
public" which belonged to them, but which riparian owners now
sought to deny them.
The Montana Supreme Court examined the Montana
Constitution, which has language similar to Colorado's, to find
authority for public use of the state's waters, including those overlying
private lands. 4' Like the New Mexico and Wyoming courts, the
Montana Supreme Court ruled public ownership precluded riparian
landowners from controlling surface uses.242
Unlike Wyoming,
however, Montana did not restrict public use to floating, but rather
authorized recreational use even on privately owned streambeds and
banks to the extent such
use is "necessary for the public's enjoyment of
243
its water ownership.
The New Mexico, Wyoming and Montana models serve to illustrate
234. Id at 145. ("When waters are able to float craft, they may be so used.").
235. Id. at 146; see WYO. CONST. art. 8, § 1 ("The waters of all natural streams,
springs, lakes or other collections of still water, within the boundaries of the state, are
hereby declared to be the property of the state").
236. Day, 362 P.2d at 145.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 151.
240. Id.
241. Mont. Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170 (Mont.
1984) (construing MONT. CONST. art. IX § 3(3) ("All surface, underground, flood, and
atmospheric waters within the boundaries of the state are the property of the statefor the
use of its people and are subject to appropriationfor beneficial uses as provided by law.")
(emphasis added)); accord Galt v. Montana ex reL Dep't of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 731
P.2d 912, 915 (Mont. 1987); Mont. Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684
P.2d 1088, 1091 (Mont. 1984).
242. Curran,682 P.2d at 170.
243. Galt, 731 P.2d at 915 (invalidating sections of a statute that would have allowed
activities not necessary to water-based recreational activities, but affirming the
constitutional basis for the state's public trust doctrine).
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that, if the Colorado legislature or courts recognized the public's right
to recreate on waters overlying private property, the Colorado
Constitution could serve as the foundation for this right-either
standing alone or in combination with other sources of authority.
VI. OTHER SOURCES OF AUTHORITY FOR THE RIGHT TO
FLOAT THROUGH PRIVATE PROPERTY
A. STATE NAVIGABILITY
As noted above, the federal government obtains its navigational
servitude authority by implication from the federal powers under the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.2"
State
navigational servitude authority is an implicitly reserved power under
the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution."'5 The
navigational servitude is an exercise of the state's police powers in
navigable waters to regulate public health, welfare and safety.246 State
navigational servitude authority is subordinate to the federal
government's authority, but in the absence of the federal
government's exercise of its navigational servitude, the state retains
full authority47 to control ownership and use of the waterways within its
boundaries.

One commentator has characterized state navigational servitude,
similar to the federal version, as "an easement in favor of the public to
use the water for navigation.",4 ' Alternatively, the privately-owned title
to the bed of a navigable waterway may be conceived as a qualified title
not held at the owner's absolute disposal, but subordinate to the
public's use of the overflowing waters for navigation.
Many states apply their own common law interpretation of
navigability to allow what is tantamount to a public easement for
passage, even where a stream is ,not navigable under the federal tests,
or where the federal tests are not applicable.
Given federal
preemption law, it would be futile for states to adopt a more restrictive
navigability standard than the federal standards.29 States, however,
may find additional rivers navigable under their own laws. 25 Colorado
°
courts have not yet set forth a state standard for navigability.

Colorado allows for the development of a common law standard

244. See discussion supra Part II.
245. Jessie H. Briggs, NavigationalServitude as a Method ofEcologicalProtection,75 DIcK.
L. REv. 256, 260 (1971).

246. Id. at 256.
247. Daniel J. Morgan & David G. Lewis, The State Navigation Servitude, 4 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 521, 521-22 (1969); see also Briggs, supra note 245, at 256.
248. Id. at 522.
249. See, e.g., People v. Rister, 803 P.2d 483, 494 (Colo. 1990); see also, Defenders of
Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); discussion supra Part IV.
250.

See, e.g., People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979). One of the stipulated

facts was that the stream reach was non-navigable. Thus, the navigability issue,
whether under federal or state standards, was avoided in Emmert. Id. at 1026.
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for navigability. Colorado adopted the common law of England "so far
as the same is applicable and of a general nature.",2 1 "English common
law gave all subjects rights to navigate and to make other uses of
waterways such as fishing and hunting."22 Under the English common
law, "[t]he one clear right of the public in the use of water was for
travel."5 3 More importantly, the United States Supreme Court has
confirmed that, under the English common law, the public had the
right of passage over waterways to which a private party held the title:
American law, in some ways, enhanced and extended the public
aspects of submerged lands. English law made a distinction between
waterways subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and large enough to
accommodate boats (royal rivers) and nontidal waterways (public
highways). With respect to the royal rivers, the King was presumed to
hold title to the river bed and soil while the public retained the right
of passage and the right to fish. With public highways, as the name
suggests, the public retained the right of passage, but title was
typically held by a private party.
This common law derived first from the law of the sea, then
2 55
became applicable to coastal waters, and then to inland waterways..
This doctrine applies to navigable
inland courses in all of the states,
•
'256
and is not limited to tidal waters.
Incorporating and following the
common law of England, the common law of navigability in Colorado
confirms the public's right to use navigable waterways.
The Colorado legislature has acknowledged the existence of a
common law of navigability. By providing that one does not commit a
criminal trespass on any "nonnavigablefresh water streams" in the state
unless one touches the bed or banks, the legislature distinguished
between streams that are navigable and those that are not for state law
purposes.25 ' The Colorado statutes do not define the terms "navigable"
and "nonnavigable" leaving it to the courts to define both kinds of
waterways. In United States v. Goodrich Farms Partnership258 the court
partially defined a non-navigable stream as a ditch.5 9
In two Colorado cases where navigability was not at issue and
where no navigability standard was applied, the court stated in dicta

251. COLO. REv. STAT. § 2-4-211 (2001).
252. DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN ANUTSHELL 218 (3d ed.
253. 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 57, § 29.02(b).

1997).

254. Idaho v. Coeur d' Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 285 (1997).
255. 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 57, § 30.01(d) (2).
256. Id.; see, Steamer Daniel Ball v. United States, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).

257. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-4-504.5 (2001) (emphasis added); see also discussion
supra Part III. By providing that it is a misdemeanor to obstruct a "waterway" or "any
other place used for the passage of persons, vehicles, or conveyances" when that
waterway or place is one "to which the public or a substantial group of the public has
access," the legislature has indicated that navigable streams in this state enjoy certain
protections. COLO. REV. STAT.§ 18-9-107(1)(a) (2001).
258. 947 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1991).
259. Id. at 908.
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that Colorado streams are not navigable. In Stockman v. Leddy,' 6° the
Colorado Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of a statute
that authorized state scrutiny of federal acts to insure they did not
infringe upon the state's right to control the distribution of its own
waters .... 26' The court stated the "property right... in the natural
streams, and the waters flowing therein, has never been renounced or
relinquished by the state."262 The court also observed that the federal
government knew the natural streams of the state were
nonnavigable. 6 3 In making this observation, the court likely intended
to minimize the potential for federal infringement on Colorado water
resources. While the court did not apply a navigability standard, its
statement in Stockman is not a rejection of a state common law
navigability standard.
One year after Stockman, the Colorado Supreme Court in In re
German Ditch & Reservoir Co. 264 had to decide whether a mostly dry
stream augmented by return flows was subject to appropriation under
the Colorado Constitution.2 65 The court referred to streams as nonnavigable in the context of minimal stream flows, unrelated to the
legal question posed in the case, and without application of any test f'or
navigability.260 Thus, the court's reference is not binding on the state
common law of navigability because the court did not discuss that law.
By necessary implication, Colorado should adopt the English
common law standard of navigability in fact. Many other states have
either adopted the English common law standard or fashioned their
own hybrid common law definitions.
The following cases are
illustrative, not exhaustive.
In Southern Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., the
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's development of a
common law definition of navigability.26 Idaho adopted a navigablefor-use test that is a blend of the traditional log-floating test and the
contemporary pleasure boat test. Although the private landowner
urged the court to adhere to only the federal navigability for title test,
the court unequivocally separated interests in real property-which
remained in the adjacent landowner-from the public's interests in
access and use:
[T]he question of title to the [creek bed] is not at issue in this
proceeding. This is not an action by the State of Idaho or respondent
[hunting and fishing club] to quiet title to the bed of a navigable
stream.... The federal test of navigability involving as it does
260. 129 P. 220 (Colo. 1912).
261. Id. at 221.
262. Id. at 222.

263. Id.
264. 139 P. 2 (Colo. 1913).
265. Id. at 5-9.
266. See id.

267. 528 P.2d 1295 (Idaho 1974).
268. Id. at 1297-98.
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property title questions, does not preclude a less restrictive state test
of navigability establishing a right of public passage....269
California adopted the pleasure boat test and rejected commercial
nexus as the test of state navigability in People v. Mack.270 California
started by adopting the English common law and has refined its
common law definition over time.27 ' While California also legislated
on the subject-designating certain rivers navigable-legislative action
did not supersede the common law doctrine or undercut the general
applicability of the principle set forth in Mack.2n California's test is
whether waters are "capable of being navigated by oar or motor
propelled small craft., 273 If so, "members of the public have the right
to navigate and to exercise the incidents of navigation in a lawful
manner at any point below high water mark...." 274 The court
enjoined riparian landowners from obstructing the river at issue to
hunting and fishing as it
prevent the public from using it for boating,
275
passed through the defendants' property.
New York also derived its definition of navigability from the
English common law. In Adirondack League Club v. Sierra Club,276 New
York's highest court held that if "a river is navigable-in-fact, it is
the fact that its banks
considered a public highway, 27notwithstanding
7
and bed are in private hands."
Oklahoma has also adopted a state common law navigability-in-fact
standard. 27 The Oklahoma Supreme Court held:
We are of the opinion and hold that the river in question is navigable
in fact and that plaintiff owns the land to the middle of the stream
but that the water is in the nature of a street or highway so that
people who get on the river without committing an act of trespass has
[sic] the right to boat on either side of the middle of the stream,
either up or down stream.
Because Colorado has yet to set a state standard for navigability, it
has yet to apply to Colorado waterways the state navigational servitude
other states have adopted. The experience of other states illustrates
that state navigation servitude may protect the right to float on
Colorado's rivers and streams.

269. Id. at 1298.
270. 97 Cal. Rptr. 448, 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
271. Id. at 451.
272. Id. at 453.
273. Id. at 454.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 450.
276.
277.
278.

706 N.E.2d 1192 (N.Y. 1998).
Id. at 1194.
Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933 (Okla. 1969).

279. Id. at 936.
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B. ADVERSE POSSESSION
Colorado's "Public Highways" statute permits creation of "public
highways" by adverse public use of any "roads" for twenty consecutive
years without interruption or objection. 8 ' Colorado courts have
embraced, a broad, flexible definition of road and highway under
which many of Colorado's waterways could logically be "roads" or
"highways."
Western rivers historically were arteries for travel,
commerce, exploration and recreation.
From the Snake and
Columbia Rivers providing a road west for Lewis and Clark to the
Platte River forJohn C. Fremont to the Gunnison for Torrence and his
party in Colorado, rivers have met and still do meet the practical
definition of a road.
The courts have long viewed rivers as highways.""' According to a
recent edition of Black's Law Dictionary, "[i]n [a] broader sense,
[highway] refers to any main route on land, wateror the air."282 In an
earlier edition, Black's states that "a river is called a 'highway'...
Similarly, "highway" has been defined as "a generic term frequently
used in a very broad sense... for all kinds of public ways, whether by
land or by water. 2 4 Thus, the very definition of highway includes
waterways.
In Hale v. Sullivan, the Colorado Supreme Court construed the
term "road" in the Colorado Constitution to include an airport
landing strip. " The court adopted a broad definition of "road" which
included "ferries, canals and navigable rivers.... ,,286 The court rejected

the argument that the term should be limited to the common usage or
to the definition of road at the time the Colorado Constitution was
adopted, and reasoned that the "word has a much broader meaning
and may be said to include 'overland ways of every character' ... [and
that] airports of this nation are links in the transportation system" and
are thus "logically within the term 'roads'.. . 281 Moreover, the cases
280. COLO. REv. STAT. § 43-2-201(1)(c) (2001).
281. See, e.g., Utah v. U.S., 403 U.S. 9, 11 (1971) (ranchers used river as a highway to
transport cattle); Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 645 (1970) (holding
navigable waterways "shall be and remain public highways... for the public purposes
of commerce, navigation and fishery..."); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143
(Minn. 1893) (declaring waters "public highways"); Gaston v. Mace, 10 S.E. 60, 63 (W.
Va. 1889) (referring to the public use of streams as "highways").
282. BLAcK's LAw DIcrIoNARY 656 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). The definition
of "highway" further states, in part:
The term "highway," as generally understood, does not have a restrictive or a
static meaning, but it denotes ways laid out or constructed to accommodate
modes of travel and other related purposes that change as customs change
and as technology develops, and the term "highway," as it is generally
understood, includes areas other than and beyond the boundaries of the
paved surface of a roadway.
Id.
283. BLAcK's LAwDIcnoNARY862 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
284. 39A C.J.S. Highways § 1(1) (2001).
285. Hale v. Sullivan, 362 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1961).
286. Id. at 405 (emphasis added).
287. Id.
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,the court quotes and relies upon from other jurisdictions expressly
compare airports to docks and wharves for boating.2
This suggests
that Colorado courts would consider waterways to be roads.
In Simon v. Pettit, the Colorado Supreme Court relied upon Hale in
interpreting "road" and "public highways" under the Public Highways
statute.2 9 After discussing how airport landing strips are part of the

general "transportation system," the court summarized as follows:
Hale stands for the principle that, in certain situations, a broad
definition of what constitutes a road should be adopted. In other
situations, however, a more restricted definition may be warranted.
We reaffirm our previous statement in Hale that the scoge to be given
the word depends upon the context in which it appears.

The opinion held that narrow footpaths do not constitute roads, but
cautioned that "the footpaths in question are not 'roads'. .. " only after
studying their factual context.2'

Accordingly, Colorado courts have

found public "roads" under Colorado Revised Statutes § 43-2-201 for
transportation ways of all character and based upon public uses that
include recreationm
The other jurisdictions that have considered the issue have treated
rivers as public highways or as subject to adverse possession by public
use. For example, in Buffalo River Conservation & Recreation Council v.

National Park Service, a trial court found that under Arkansas state law,
the public obtained a prescriptive easement on a river by canoeing23
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed,
holding that "in the same way a public highway can be obtained by
prescription, a public right-of-way has been established in the River."
The Court of Appeals held that the Arkansas cases finding prescriptive
rights-of-way on land were directly analogous to rights-of-way over non-

navigable streams and their beds.
The Mississippi Supreme Court applied a similar analysis in
holding that "[w]here the public has enjoyed access to waters for in

288. Id. at 404-05 (quoting Dysart v. City of St. Louis, 11 S.W.2d 1045 (Mo. 1928);
Hesse v. Rath, 164 N.E. 342 (N.Y. 1928)).
289. Simon v. Pettit, 687 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Colo. 1984) (interpreting COLO. REv.
STAT. § 43-2-201 (1973)).
290. I& (citations omitted).
291. Id. (emphasis added).
292. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975, 981 (Colo. 1984)
(unimproved dirt road adversely possessed by public recreational use); Shively v. Bd.
of County Comm'rs, 411 P.2d 782, 782-84 (Colo. 1966) ("a rugged mountain trail"
accessed by the public on foot, horseback, "traversed at least part way by jeep in
modern times," and used for recreation and hauling lumber, deemed a public road).
293. Buffalo River Conservation & Recreation Council v. Nat'! Park Serv., 558 F.2d
1342, 1344-45 (8th Cir. 1977).
294. Id. at 1345.
295. Id.; see also State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 659-60, 663-65 (Ark. 1980) (court
did not find it necessary to determine whether public had acquired prescriptive
easement for use of river as the public's recreational use was adequate to find the river
navigable).
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excess of ten consecutive years, those waters belong to the state by
adverse possession, to be held in trust for the people."26 As in Buffalo
River, the court in Dycus explicitly noted that while the "law well
recognizes that roadways may become public by prescription.... By
analogy, waters may similarly become public." 97
In Elder v. Decour, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the river
in question was non-navigable for purposes of title (i.e., the owner of
the stream banks owned the stream bed), but did not rule on the
broader definition of navigable used for purposes of regulation.299
Instead, the court examined whether the "land within the water area
of the river was a public highway and so subject to an easement for
public travel by boat and wading.... 2 99 In so doing, the court
summarized various cases in which public use of the river resulted in
the "right of the public to use a stream as a public highway .... "' 00 The
court ultimately concluded there was no trespass because the river in
question was public "and the submerged area of its channel.., is a
public highway for travel and passage by floating and by wading ....
VII. CONCLUSION

Across the West, most other states have recognized the right of
citizen access to float on rivers and streams under legal authorities that
would also support, or arguably compel, recognition of such rights in
Colorado. Opponents of public access rely primarily on two flawed
assumptions: first, that all Colorado streams are non-navigable; and
second, for that reason, riparian landowners possess absolute title, free
from any state property interest, to the beds beneath all waters flowing
through private property. At best, such declarations are premature
because the Colorado courts have not had to rule on the navigability
of any of the state's watercourses, which is necessarily a fact-based
inquiry not subject to general pronouncements. More significantly,
public access opponents ignore potential conflicts with the federal,
constitutionally-based, navigational servitude and equal footing
doctrines, as well as Colorado statutes and case law that also can
establish public access rights.
Our neighbors in Wyoming, New Mexico and Utah, among other
western states, including Montana, Idaho and California, protect the
right of public access to their waterways. These states have recognized
that the public use of waterways is not a new right; it dates to the days
of explorers and settlers. Moreover, it is a right that existed at
common law, which both predates private claims to absolute title to an
296. Dycus v. Sillers, 557 So. 2d 486, 501 (Miss. 1990).
297. Id. at 501 n.69.
298. Elder v. Delcour, 269 S.W.2d 17, 22-23 (Mo. 1954); see also State ex rel. Meek v.
Hays, 785 P.2d 1356, 1362-63 (Kan. 1990) (right of passage on river subject to adverse
possession; test not met under facts presented).

299. Elder,269 S.W.2d at 24.
300. Id. at 25.
301.

Id. at 26.

Issue 2

THE RIGHT TO FLOAT

499

inherently public resource and precludes private interests from
interfering with the public's right of access to those resources. For the
Colorado courts to formally recognize such a right would place the
state and its boaters right where they belong-in the mainstream.

LITIGATION UPDATE
ARIZONA SUPREME COURT REJECTS PRACTICABLY
IRRIGABLE ACREAGE STANDARD FOR ALLOCATING INDIAN
WATER RIGHTS

E. BRENDAN SHANE*
In the latest installment of the water rights adjudication for
Arizona's Gila River system, the Arizona Supreme Court entered
"uncharted territory" by rejecting the widely accepted legal standard
for quantifying Indian water rights.1 The court, reviewing a 1988 trial
court decision that applied the practicably irrigable acreage ("PIA")
standard for quantifying water rights on Arizona Indian reservations,
determined that the formulaic PIA approach was inequitable and
economically unrealistic.3 In its place, the court fashioned a multifaceted test and then remanded to the trial court for implementation.
As discussed in Water Rights and Gila River III: The Winters Doctrine
Goes Underground, ("Gila River III")f the Gila River general adjudication
began in 1974 and, since 1990, has focused on the interlocutory review
of six specific issues.' Gila River III discussed Issues Four and .Five
concerning federal reserved water rights to groundwater and the
relative protections afforded federal versus state fights to
groundwater.' The most recent installment of the Gila River cases,
Gila River 1V, addressed Issue Three: "'[w]hat is the appropriate
standard to be applied
in determining the amount of water reserved
7
for federal lands?"

t E. Brendan Shane, Water Rights and Gila River III: The Winters Doctrine Goes
Underground,4 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 397 (2001).
1. In re Gen. Adjudication of all Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. &
Source, 35 P.3d 68 (Ariz. 2001) ("Gila River IV').

2. Id. at 71 (citing unpublished order of the Superior Court of Maricopa County,
Sept. 9, 1988, at 17).
3. See generally id.
4. E. Brendan Shane, Water Rights and Gila River III: The Winters Doctrine Goes
Underground,4 U. DENy. WATER L. REv. 397, 405 (2001).

5. Id. at 404-405.
6. Id. at 407. The Arizona Supreme Court addressed Issue Two in In re Gen.
Adjudication of all Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 857 P.2d 1236, 1238

(Ariz. 1993) and Issue One in In re Gen. Adjudication of all Rights to Use Water in the Gila
River Sys. & Source, 830 P.2d 442, 444 (Ariz. 1992).
7. Gila River IV, 35 P.3d at 71. For discussion of the legal derivation of federal
reserved water rights under the Winters Doctrine, see id. at 71-73; Shane, supranote 4, at
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The trial court answered this question by applying the PIA
standard used by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California ('Arizona
I") to quantify federal reserved water rights for five reservations in
Arizona, California, and Nevada. 9 PIA defines water rights based on
the amount of water necessary to irrigate "'those acres susceptible to
sustained irrigation at reasonable costs'.""
While the Gila River IV court acknowledged the value of an
objective test like PIA, it held that flaws in the approach-when
applied to Indian reservations-outweighed the benefits. The court
highlighted three specific flaws in the PIA standard. First, a standard
based on agricultural viability is inherently inequitable-tribal water
allocations vary according to *a tribe's geographic location rather than
consideration of what it takes to support a viable homeland. Second,
while an irrigation-based standard was reasonable in the
rural/agrarian society of a century ago, strict reliance on agriculture to
support a tribal community no longer appears reasonable. As the
court noted, large agricultural projects today are "risky, marginal
enterprises. " "
Finally, use of a PIA standard undermines another long-standing
legal construct of federal reserved water rights-minimal need." The
concept of minimal need, where federal reserved water rights are
limited to the minimum quantity necessary to achieve the purpose of
the reservation, stems from the Supreme Court holding in Cappaertv.
United States.14 Cappaert clarified that implied federal reserved water
rights are limited to the "minimal need" to achieve the purposes of the
reservation. 5 The Gila RiverIVcourt held that a minimal need analysis
may be undermined by a PIA standard that "creates a temptation for
tribes to concoct inflated, unrealistic irrigation projects .......
In light of these observed flaws, the court refused to adopt the PIA
standard "as the exclusive quantification measure for determining
water rights on Indian lands." 7 In place of PIA, the court crafted a
400-404.
8. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
9. Id. at 595. The Supreme Court applied the method again in a later phase of
that litigation. See generallyArizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983).
10. Gila River1V, 35 P.3d at 77 (quoting In reGen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use
Water in the Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 101 (Wyo. 1988)).
11. Id. at 78. Beginning with Winters v. United States in 1908, the Supreme Court
enunciated the concept of reservation as homeland, holding that the purpose of an
Indian reservation is to create a "permanent home and abiding place" for the affected
tribes. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 565 (1908). However, the meaning of
home or homeland is significantly different today than it was more than a century ago
when many reservations were established and when, according to Winters and its
progeny, federally reserved rights to land and water were vested.
12. Gila River/V, 35 P.3d at 78.
13. Id. at 79.
14. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
15. Id. at 141.
16. Gila RiverIV, 35 P.3d at 78.
17. Id.at 79. While rejecting exclusive application of an irrigation-based standard
for water rights allocation, the court explained that tribes could continue to include
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more subjective, multi-factor test to quantify water rights on Indian
reservations. The court directed the lower court, on remand, to
consider the following six factors, although it noted that the list was
not intended to be exclusive:"
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

a tribe's history with special regard for practices and rituals
requiring water;
a tribe's culture and the cultural significance of water to the
tribe;
the geography, topography, and natural resources available
on the reservation, including groundwater availability;
a tribe's economic base and the alternatives available to
optimize economic development and efficient use of water;
a tribe's past water use as an indication of need and of how
the tribe values water;
a tribe's present and projected population (though this
should "never be the only factor").'

In its conclusion, the Gila River IV court made clear that a bright
line standard will not dispose of the historical, political, and economic
complexities of quantifying tribal water rights. The court directed the
lower court to evaluate the factors outlined above based on "actual and
proposed uses, accompanied by the parties' recommendations
regarding feasibility and the amount of water necessary to accomplish
the homeland purpose. " 'O The court also established the standard of
review for evaluating the application of the new multi-factor Indian
water rights analysis. Under this standard, lower courts have latitude
to define which factors to consider and to identify appropriate uses of
water. " Proposed uses, upon which water rights are based, must be
shown "reasonably feasible," that is, "achievable from a practical
standpoint" and "economically sound."' As noted earlier, the goal of
the water rights quantification remains the satisfaction of the
reservation's minimal need.
The implications of the Gila River IV decision will become clear
over time. While a case-by-case analysis of water rights will be more
complicated and time-consuming than the PIA alternative, such an
approach is not unprecedented. Multi-factor analysis for quantifying
water rights has been successfully applied in the context of negotiated
water rights settlements between tribes and the federal government on
a number of occasions." Optimistically, the new mandate of Gila River
IV may dovetail ongoing litigation and negotiation efforts and speed
agricultural/irrigation projects in economic development plans. See id. at 80.
18. I&at 79-80.
19. Id. at 80.
20. Id. at 79.
21. GilaRiver/I, 35 P.3d at81.
22. Id.
23.

Id. at 79.
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the quantification of Indian water rights in Arizona. It also remains to
be seen how courts in other states and federal jurisdictions, including
the Supreme Court, will view the conclusions in Gila River IV and its
analysis of Indian water rights and the role of the PIA standard in the
twenty-first century.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last quarter century, conservation easements on land
evolved into an established and widely used mechanism to protect the
natural values of real property and historic buildings in perpetuity.
Water rights often support conservation easements on open space and
agricultural lands, and may be essential to maintain associated
conservation values such as wildlife habitat, wetlands, and other water
dependant natural values.
Conservation easements may also offer an economically attractive
way to maintain irrigated lands, wetlands, and other uses of water
independently, including instream flows' and littoral levels2 in
t Attorney at law, Peter D. Nichols LLC, Carbondale, Colorado, Executive
Director, Colorado Water Trust. Former Chair, Colorado Water Quality Control

Commission. B.A., Colorado College; M.P.A., University of Colorado Graduate School
of Public Affairs; J.D., University of Colorado School of Law. The author is indebted to
the following for their critical review and constructive comments: Michael Browning,

James Corbridge, Kelly Custer, David Getches, David Robbins, Charles B. "Barney"
White, and Robert Wigington. Any errors remain, of course, solely the author's
responsibility.

1. The Colorado Water Conservation Board has exclusive authority to appropriate
and hold minimum stream flows to preserve "the natural environment to a reasonable
degree." COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-102(3), -103(4), -305(9) (9) (2001). Colorado's
minimum stream flow program is both generally understood and widely reviewed. See,
e.g., Steven J. Shupe, The Legal Evolution of Colorado's Instream Flow Program, 17 COLO.
LAW. 861 (1988);Jane E. Lein, Protectionof InstreamRows: The Aspen Wilderness Workshop
Decision, 24 COLO. LAw. 2577 (1995).
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Colorado. Donors of conservation easements receive substantial tax
advantages from irrevocable dedications of real property for
Additionally, conservation organizations
conservation purposes.
benefit by obtaining property below market value. The public benefits
from the protection of natural values by private and non-profit sectors.
Although Colorado courts have not addressed conservation
easements on water, this article advances the premise that such
easements are valid under the state's common law. A conservation
easement statute does exist in Colorado, however it does not explicitly
cover water rights. While the Colorado Supreme Court is likely to
uphold a conservation easement on water associated with land, an
amendment is probably necessary to extend the reach of the statute to
include a conservation easement on water rights alone.
Recommendations in this paper explain how to structure a common
law conservation easement on water to enhance its legality.
H. CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
Analysis of conservation easements in Colorado invokes both the
common law and state statutes, which are discussed in turn.
A. WATER RIGHTS ARE PROPERTY RIGHTS IN COLORADO
Only if water rights are property rights will conservation easements
bind successors in interest to meet the goal of permanence; this is the
logical starting place for the inquiry. Early on, Colorado established
that water rights created by appropriation are property rights.3
"Under the Colorado Constitution, the water of every natural
stream within the state is the property of the public, and is dedicated
to the use of the people subject to appropriation."' The Colorado
Supreme Court recently elaborated: "[t]he property right we
recognize as a Colorado water right is a right to use beneficially a
specified amount of water.... that can be captured, possessed, and
controlled in priority under a decree, to the exclusion of all others not
then in priority under a decreed water right." 5

2. The littoral level is the elevation of a standing body of water, such as a lake or
reservoir. As used hereafter, instream flow(s) refers to both water flowing in a natural
stream channel and water retained in a natural lake or artificial reservoir.
3. See Three Bells Ranch Assocs. v. Cache La Poudre Water Users Ass'n, 758 P.2d
164, 169 (Colo. 1988); see also Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson,
990 P.2d 46, 58 (Colo. 1999) (citing Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27, 39
(Colo. 1997)). Conditional water rights are also vested property rights. Purgatoire
River Water Conservancy Dist. v. Witte, 859 P.2d 825, 834 (Colo. 1993).
4. Shirola v. Turkey Cafion Ranch, L.L.C., 937 P.2d 739, 747-48 (Colo. 1997)
(citing COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5). The Court went on to say, "a water right is
usufructuary in nature because it gives its holder the right to use and enjoy the
property of another [the public]." Id,at 748. Interestingly, this description of a water
right sounds like a servitude because of its reference to the right "to use and enjoy" the
property of another.
5. See Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n, 990 P.2d at 53; see also COLO. REv.
STAT. § 37-92-103(12) (2001).
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This description encompasses many of the core concepts of
property rights in general, that is, the rights to possess, to use, and to
exclude others. For water, the right to use and the right to possess are
closely related. The owner of a water right generally takes physical
possession of the water upon diversion from the stream for essentially
immediate use. In contrast, a landowner may possess a parcel of land
but never put it to any use. Unlike land, water rights are lost by non6
user.
In Colorado, a water right is a separate property interest from the
land on which it is used.7 Water rights can be, and routinely are,
conveyed independently of land. Since water rights are real property,8
water rights are treated as real property for purposes of conveyance.
The conveyance of a water right logically should carry the same types
of legal restrictions as the conveyance of land.
B. THE DEVELOPMENT AND REQUIREMENTS OF CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS GENERALLY

Servitudes are a confusing and difficult area of property law for
several reasons."
First, the few reported court decisions often
misname or mis-characterize the various forms of servitudes." In
addition, practicing professionals and scholars often disagree as to the
characterization of servitudes and corresponding requirements for
enforcement. 2
A general review of the development and
requirements of traditional servitudes on land is the necessary starting

6. However, the owner of a water storage right may take possession of water for
use the next year and not actually use it, if for example, natural precipitation is
sufficient to meet needs.
7. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Twin Lakes Assocs., 770 P.2d
1231, 1239 (Colo. 1989).
8. See Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n, 990 P.2d at 53.
9. See Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374 (Colo. 1982); see also COLO.
REv. STAT. § 38-30-102 (2001); First Nat'l Bank v. Hastings, 42 P. 691 (Colo. Ct. App.
1895).
10.
The law in this area is an unspeakable quagmire. The intrepid soul who
ventures into this formidable wilderness never emerges unscarred. Some, the
smarter ones, quickly turn back to take up something easier like the income
taxation of trusts and estates. Others, having lost their way, plunge on and
after weeks of effort emerge not far from where they began, clearly the worse
for wear. On looking back they see the trail they thought they broke
obscured with foul smelling waters and noxious weeds. Few willingly take up
the challenge again.
Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S.
CAL.

L. REV. 1261, 1261 n.1I (1982).

11. "Since the first English case interpreting the first English statute on the subject,
commentators have doubted that the courts understood the law, and a study of
judicial opinions, from Spencer's Case on, is bewildering at best." Id.
12. For a useful and comprehensive discussion of the various characteristics and
requirements applicable to easements, real covenants, and equitable servitudes, see
generally id. Professor French was subsequently chosen as the reporter for the
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, where her views have been extremely
influential and upon the American Law Institute. See discussion infra pp. 15-16.
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point for an analysis of conservation servitudes.
Servitudes (encompassing easements, real covenants, and
equitable servitudes) establish private arrangements for the use of land
enforceable not only between the original parties but also against
successors in interest. The owner of a servitude has the right to use
or restrict the use of property that she neither owns nor possesses.14
The progerty that is subject to a servitude is said to be burdened, or
The right granted is the benefit. 6 When the benefit is
servient.
associated with other property, that property is characterized as
benefited, dominant, or appurtenant. 7 When the servitude does not
benefit other property, the benefit is held "in gross. " " A negative
servitude restricts the use of the burdened property, whereas a positive
servitude obligates the owner of the burdened property to perform
certain acts. 9
The two types of servitudes that are particularly relevant in the
context of water are real covenants and equitable servitudes. Real
covenants can be traced back to Spencer's Case in 1583, where English
common law permitted enforcement at law, the granting of damages,
of covenants by and against successor owners.20 Real covenants are
promises respecting land, often expressed in a deed, and usually
involving affirmative obligations.2 ' A common example is a subdivision
covenant requiring homeowners to maintain landscaping.
Generally, a real covenant must meet five requirements. First, the
covenant must be in writing, as required under the Statute of Frauds. 2
Second, the parties must intend that the covenant should run to
successors. 3 Third, the covenant must touch and concern the land. 4
Fourth, privity of estate between the original parties must exist. 25 Fifth,
the covenant must provide notice to property owners against whom
the terms of the covenant might be enforced. 6 Real covenants are
essentially a matter of contract theory, the main issue being

13. SeeFrench, supra note 10, at 1261-64.
14. See, e.g., Lazy Dog Ranch v. Telluray Ranch Corp., 965 P.2d 1229, 1234 (Colo.
1998).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIvATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS, REAL
COVENANTS, AND EQurrABLE SERvrrUDES 253 (1990). See also discussion infra pp. 13-15
concerning the distinction between personal benefits and benefits in gross.
19. KONGOLD, supra note 18, at 253.
20. Id. at 249 (citing Spencer's Case, 5 Co. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (KB 1583)).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 250. This may not be a requirement in Colorado, however, see Thornton
v. Schobe, 243 P. 617 (Colo. 1925) discussed infra note 71.
23. KORNGOLD, supra note 18, at 250. See also Cloud v. Ass'n. of Owners, Satellite
Apartment Bldg., 857 P.2d 435, 440 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
24. KORNGOLD,supra note 18, at 250. See also Cloud, 857 P.2d at 440.
25. KORNGOLD, supra note 18, at 250-51. See also Farmers' High Line Canal &
Reservoir Co. v. N.H. Real Estate Co., 92 P. 290, 293 (Colo. 1907).
26. KoRNGoLD, supra note 18, at 251.
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enforcement of promises against subsequent property owners.27
Damages are the only remedy for breach of a real covenant."
Equitable servitudes are a creation of English common law,
emanating from Tulk v. Moxhay.! Like real covenants, equitable
servitudes are "'promises respecting the use of land''"'0 An equitable
servitude usually grants a right to restrict the use of property one
neither owns nor possesses, which explains why they are also known
as negative easements. However, under modern American law,
equitable servitudes also may impose affirmative burdens on servient
properties."2
Conservation easements on real property are equitable servitudes.
Like a real covenant, an equitable servitude is enforceable not only
betqveen the original parties, but also against successors in interest. 3
Enforceability of an equitable servitude generally turns on satisfaction
of three requirements:" (1) the equitable servitude must show intent
to bind successors;" (2) it must touch and concern the property;3 6 and
(3) property owners must have notice that the servitude may be
enforced against them. 7 In contrast to real covenants, equitable
servitudes are enforceable in equity. Thus, an injunction is the
38
remedy for breach of an equitable servitude, rather than damages.
Equitable servitudes are understood not as contract rights, but rather
as a property interest appurtenant to the benefited land and
enforceable against the burdened parcel. 9 Since the right exists in the
land itself, privity and a writing are not required. 0
In summary, there are two principal differences between real
covenants and equitable servitudes. First, real covenants are usually
affirmative obligations, whereas equitable servitudes are most often
negative restrictions on the use of property. Second, although real
covenants are enforced through damages, equitable servitudes are
enforced through injunctions.
A "conservation" servitude is well

27. Id. at 250.
28. Id. at 249-50.
29. Id. (citing Tulk v Moxhay, 2 Phillips 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (CA 1848)).
30. Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the
Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements,63 TEX. L. REV. 433, 437 (1984).
31. French, supra note 10, at 1276.
32. Id. at 1277.
33. SeeKORNGOLD, supranote 18, at 249-51.
34. Id. at 251.
35. Id. at 250-51.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. KORNGOLD, supranote 18, at 250.
39. Id. at251.
40. Id. at 251-52.
41. While the discussion emphasizes the usual distinctions between real covenants
and equitable servitudes for explanation, one can find examples of either that look
like the other, i.e., are called one thing but better meet the definition of the other.
There are, in short, no immutable rules. See discussion infra notes 148, 149, 155 and
accompanying text.
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suited to protect conservation values because it is enforceable with an
injunction. The threat of damages for violation of a real covenant,
however, imposes an additional enforcement incentive due to the
difficulty and substantial cost of replacing damaged conservation
values.4
C. COMMON LAW CONSERVATION SERVITUDES

In the few recent American "cases involving conservation
[easements].... courts have not hesitated to enforce them."43
However, a special enforcement problem exists when the benefit is in
gross because the common law historically disfavored both easements
Consequently, courts did not
in gross and negative easements."
Since the benefit of a
enforce negative easements in gross.45
conservation easement is usually held in gross, doubts about legitimacy
may arise. Although at least one court has upheld common law
conservation easements in gross,46 their efficacy is not entirely clear.
Judge Clark,47 in his famous treatise on interests "running with
land," observed that modem servitudes rest on the equitable doctrine
of notice.4" The two most developed theories of enforcement are
through contracts concerning land and through servitudes on land.4
These theories correspond respectively to the modern classification of
real covenants and equitable servitudes.
The contract theory asserts that a restriction is specifically enforced
against both the promissor and those who take from the promissor
with notice." The promissee and those who take from her may also

42. In a typical conservation easement, the parties inventory the conservation
values at the time they create the easement. For example, an inventory might include
ten acres of wetlands. If the grantor subsequently dries up the wetlands, the grantee
could sue for the replacement cost of the lost conservation value, including the loss of
scenic, aesthetic, and environmental values.
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 8.5 rep. note (2000) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (citing Harris v. Pease, 66 A.2d 590 (Conn. 1949) (restrictive
covenant against erection of buildings on part of land conveyed); Sagalyn v. Found.
for Historic Pres. of Georgetown, 691 A.2d 107 (D.C. 1997) (deed of scenic, open
space, and architectural facade easement); Bagley v. Found. for the Pres. of Historic
Georgetown, 647 A.2d 1110 (D.C. 1994) (enforcement of historic preservation
easement agreement held in gross by a private non-profit corporation)).
44. See Federico Cheever, Public Good and PrivateMagic in the Law of Land Trusts and
ConservationEasements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1077,
1080-81 (1996); see also CHARLES E. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS
WHICH "RUN WITH LAND:" INCLUDING LICENSES,
RESTRICTIONS AND RENTS 70, 181 (2d ed. 1947).

EASEMENTS,

PROFITS,

EQUITABLE

45. See Korngold, supra note 30, at 470-71. Korngold notes "[tihese opinions are
troubling for their lack of a clear rationale...." Id. at 471.
46. See supranote 43.
47. Judge Clark served as a Judge for the 2nd Circuit in 1939, and as Chief Judge
on the United States Court of Appeals from 1954-59.
48. CLARK, supranote 44, at 170.
49. Id. at 171.
50. Id. at 172.
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enforce the obligation." Judge Clark criticized the contract theory on
several grounds. Most notably, the contract approach may fail "to
benefit the persons whose interests actually should be protected" and
could potentially give a right where none exists.52 The contract theory
focuses on the personal nature of the interest, although the purpose
may not actually be personal." Such an interpretation limits the
restriction to the promissor, thus negating the promissee's benefit
when the property is transferred.54 In addition, the doctrine of
changed circumstances could render a restriction unenforceable,
effectively giving others the power to overturn the restriction.55
Thompson on Real Property ("Thompson"), a leading treatise, continues to
cite Judge Clark's concern that contract remedies may not protect
56
servitudes in gross "unless property interests are directly threatened."
Still, there are recent American decisions that enforce property
restrictions solely on contract theory.57
In following the property theory, English courts historically did not
American courts,
allow enforcement of benefits held in gross."
however, departed from England with the famous 1913 Illinois case of
Van Sant v. Rose." In Van Sant, the deed provided for construction of a
When the
single private house only, not a flat or a tenement."
landowner began plans to build an apartment house, the sellers
invoked the covenant and sued to enjoin the construction."' The
landowner argued that the restriction was unenforceable because the
sellers did not own other property affected by the breach.62 The
Illinois Supreme Court held that the right to an in unction did not
depend upon whether the covenantee was damaged. The Court also
held that the sellers' right did not depend upon owning property in
the vicinity. 6' Van Sant is cited for the proposition that benefits held in
gross are enforceable.65 Judge Clark subsequently argued, "the benefit
should be allowed to remain in gross while the burden passes with a
servient estate. This is in accord with the American attitude toward
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. at 174.
CLARK, supra note 44, at 177.
Id. at 174.

55.

Id.

56.
1994)
57.
(D.C.
(D.C.

7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITION 516 (David A. Thomas ed.,
[hereinafter THOMPSON] (citing CLARK, supra note 44, at 181).
See, e.g., Bagley v. Found. for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown, 647 A.2d 1110
1994); see also Sagalyn v. Found. for Historic Pres. of Georgetown, 691 A.2d 107
1997).

58. See CLARK, supra note 44, at 181.
59. Van Sant v. Rose, 103 N.E. 194 (Ill. 1913).

60. Id. at 195.
61. I
62. Id.
63. Id. at 196.
64. Van Sant, 103 N.E. at 196.
65. See, e.g., KORNGOLD, supra note 18, at 337. Van Sant has not been cited in
Colorado.
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easements in gross and also covenants in gross.,,66
D. CONSERVATION SERVITUDES UNDER COLORADO COMMON LAW

Consistent with the traditional view of negative easements, in 1953,
the Colorado Supreme Court stated, "in construing a building
restriction [in a deed], all doubts must be resolved against the
restriction and in favor of free and unrestricted use of property." 67

However, the Court subsequently commented that, "[t]his rule may or
may not today have the sanctity that it has possessed in the past. In any
event, it has no application when the language is definite in its terms.

One must follow the dictates of plain English."" Thus, a carefully
crafted conservation easement that benefits appurtenant land should
be enforceable in Colorado in the same manner as other servitudes. 69
The enforceability of a common law servitude in gross is an
unsettled question in Colorado, as in most states.7 A servitude on a
water right is enforced, if at all, on a property theory, like other
servitudes. 1

While no

decisions addressing the enforceability of

66. CLARX, supranote 44, at 182 (citations omitted).
67. Flaks v. Wichman, 260 P.2d 737, 739 (Colo. 1953).
68. D.C. Burns Realty & Trust Co. v. Mack, 450 P.2d 75, 76 (Colo. 1969) (citing 20
AM. JUR. Evidence § 897 (1939)).
69. See infra note 122.
70. See infra note 108.
71. The alternative is that the Colorado Supreme Court would find that restrictions
on the use of water are contract rights. There is some authority for this position. In
Thornton v. Schobe, 243 P. 617 (Colo. 1925), the issue was whether an oral promise
restricting the use of land was void under the statute of frauds. The court held that an
agreement not to erect certain structures "is not a transfer of an estate or interest
therein nor a trust or power over it" and is not subject to the statute of frauds. Id. at
618. But see Nelson v. Farr, 354 P.2d 163 (Colo. 1960). The court was asked to decide
whether to extend deed restrictions on the use of land to an adjacent parcel. Id. at
165. The parcel at issue was withheld from a plat and annexation deed that restricted
the use of the land to unattached single-family dwellings. Id. at 164. The court noted
the lack of a written instrument and contrary testimony of the subdivider regarding his
intent. Id. at 165-66. The court held that the restrictive covenants did not apply to the
disputed property. Id See also Smith v. Clifton Sanitation Dist., 300 P.2d 548 (Colo.
1956), where the district sought to exercise its power of eminent domain to acquire a
tract of land for a sanitary disposal system. On the eve of the condemnation, the
owner of the tract entered into a restrictive use agreement with thirty-seven adjacent
landowners in an eleven square mile area in an attempt to defeat the district's plans.
Id. at 549. The issue was simply whether the covenanters should be permitted to
intervene and recover damages because of the district's condemnation. Id. The court
opined that the scheme was contrary to public policy and "invalid as against the
constitutional and statutory rights of the condemner." Id. In dicta, the court stated
the covenant was an attempt to enforce "what in effect are contractual rights." Id. The
court characterized the agreement as "in the nature of a negative easement or
equitable servitude" that was probably "enforceable in equity as between the parties to
the contract." Id. at 550. The Court then stated "[p]arties may not by contract...
restrict the exercise of the power of eminent domain" (citations omitted). Id. This
case narrowly holds that, at least under these circumstances, the court will not rule
that a condemner pay for mere contract rights. Clifton has only, and infrequently,
been cited in eminent domain cases, and never by a Colorado court. See, e.g., Direct
Mail Servs., Inc. v. Best, 729 F.2d 672, 676 (10th Cir. 1984); Gremillion v. Rapides
Parish Sch. Bd., 134 So. 2d 700, 702 (La. Ct. App. 1961). Secondary sources treat
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servitudes in gross exist in Colorado, 72 the Courts have a variety of
authoritative sources to consult. The most persuasive authority is
discussed below.
Colorado courts usually turn to Thompson73 when confronted with
questions on easements, real covenants, and servitudes. 4 Thompson
notes that servitudes in gross present two kinds of problems:" (1) the
benefit is held in gross while the burden purportedly binds
successors; 6 and (2) attempts to assign the benefit raise further

Clion as an eminent domain case. See, e.g., 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain §§ 4, 19,
175 (1996). Others have similarly characterized Clifton as an eminent domain case.
See, e.g., Case Note, Eminent Domain - CompensationforNeighboringLandownersfor
Taking
of Land for Use Inconsistent with Restrictive Covenantfor Their Benefit, 26 FoRDHAM L. REV.
130 (1958). Schobe and Clifton provide the only authority for the proposition that
Colorado has adopted the contract approach to the enforcement of servitudes. In
contrast, there are numerous Colorado appellate decisions that apply the property
theory of the enforcement to servitudes. See, e.g., infra note 74. The Colorado
Supreme Court, however, has followed principles of contract law in determining
whether a deed is ambiguous. O'Brien v. Village Land Co., 794 P.2d 246, 249 (Colo.
1990) (extrinsic evidence conditionally admitted to determine ambiguity). The Court
then reaffirmed that approach in the context of a servitude contained in a deed. Lazy
Dog Ranch v. Telluray Ranch Corp., 965 P.2d 1229 (Colo. 1998) "[B]oth the O'Brien
approach and the Restatement [Third] approach allow a court to consider extrinsic
evidence to arrive at the meaning of a servitude's language." Id. at 1237.
72. But cf.Steven M. Hoffman, Note, Open Space Procurement Under Colorado's Scenic
Easement Law, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 383, 395 (1989) (citing Upper Eagle Valley
Sanitation Dist. v. Carnie, 634 P.2d 1008 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981)). In Carnie, the Court
of Appeals upheld the award in a condemnation action for an easement for a
previously installed sewer line. The sanitation district argued that it had already
acquired an easement. Id.at 1009-10. The Court estopped the district from
furthering this assertion, but said in dicta that, "where the land is thus already
burdened by such an easement when a purchaser acquires title, he takes that land in
that condition when he acquires title." Id. at 1009 (citing Rogers v. Lower Clear Creek
Ditch Co., 165 P. 248 (Colo. 1917)). The issue in Rogers, as in Carnie, was the
subsequent landowner's right to compensation for previously existing conditions.
Rogers, 165 P. at 249.
73. THOMPSON, supra note 56.
74. A Westlaw search retrieved fourteen Colorado Supreme Court servitudes cases
quoting Thompson twice as many as any other source. The search terms were
"Thompson /2 Real /1 Property /P Easement Servitude Covenant," searched Oct. 13,
2001. See, e.g., Lazy Dog Ranch v. Telluray Ranch Corp., 965 P.2d 1229, 1236, 1238
(Colo. 1998); Salazar v. Terry, 911 P.2d 1086, 1091-92 (Colo. 1996). Similar Westlaw
searches identified seven cases that cited the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY (1944) and
one that cited the RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43. See discussion infra notes 99105. Only three cases in this series failed to also cite Thompson. Three Colorado
Supreme Court cases quoted RIcHARD ROY BELDEN POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY
(2000), a majority of which also cited THOMPSON, supra note 56. See, e.g., Thompson v.
Whinnery, 895 P.2d 537, 540 (Colo. 1995); Isenberg v. Woitchek, 356 P.2d 904, 907
(Colo. 1960). Similarly, one case cited HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY (3d ed. 1995) and THOMPSON, supra note 56. Lazy Dog Ranch, 965 P.2d at
1238.

Two cases cited AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF

PROPERTY INTHE UNITED STATES (A. James Casner ed., 1952), one of which also cited
THOMPSON, supra note 56. See Upper Harmony Ditch Co. v. Carwin, 539 P.2d 1282,
1285 (Colo. 1975). The author found no cites to ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ETAL., THE
LAW OF PROPERTY (1993). Decisions of the Colorado Court of Appeals follow a similar
pattern. (Search results on file with author.)
75. THOMPSON, supra note 56, at 516.
76. Id.
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questions of enforcement." Moreover, the creation of a servitude in
gross may not meet some formulations of the requirement that a
servitude "touch and concern" the property for the burden to run."
Servitudes in gross also may not be enforceable unless they directly
threaten property interests.]
Thompson reviews the policy reasons against servitudes in gross
identified by Professor French,"0 who served as Reporter for the
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes ("Restatement (Third)")."l One
such reason is the enhanced notice provided by an appurtenance
requirement when there is not a fully developed recording system."
Professor French observed that effective recording systems, such as
exist in the United States, allow for the discovery of a servitude in gross
even though the current owner may not be on record. "' Another
policy argument against servitudes in gross is that the holder of a
benefit in gross may obstruct a landowner seeking relief from an
obsolete servitude. Conversely, an appurtenant landowner is likely to
benefit from, and agree to, the change.
Thompson also illustrates the advantages of servitudes in gross,
particularly for conservation easements.
Without conservation
easements in gross, acquisition or retention of anchor parcels would
be necessary
However, Thompson recognizes that combining the
servitude with additional interests, for example a small benefited
anchor parcel, 7 can finesse the legitimacy of servitudes in gross.88
Thompson concludes, "guidance may be found in the fact that 'benefits
in gross are freely permitted'" by the Restatement (Third)."8 Thus,
Colorado courts following the advice in Thompson would uphold a
common law conservation easement in gross.
Colorado courts have occasionally followed the Restatement (First)of
Propert90 ("Restatement") when confronted with questions on
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Professor of Law, UCLA; A.B. 1964 Stanford University;J.D. 1967, University of
Washington.
81. THOMPSON, supra note 56, at 516 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, §

2.6).

82. Id.
83. Id. (citing French, supranote 10, at 1287 n.142).
84. Id. at 516-17 (citing French, supra note 10, at 1287).
85. Id. at 517 (citing Susan F. French, Servitudes Reform and the New Restatement of
Property: Creation Doctrines and Structural Simplification, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 928, 945-47
(1988)).
86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, § 2.6 reporter's note (1998).
87. For example, a water right might be tied to the land on which it was historically
used to preserve agricultural, wildlife habitat, wetlands, or other water-dependant
natural values. One could anchor an instream flow right to a parcel of the streambed
or riparian land that realized environmental benefits from the flow, such as an
enhanced fishery.
88.

THOMPSON, supra note 56, at 517.

89. Id.
90. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. (1944) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
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easements. 9' The Restatement speaks to the alienability of easements in
gross, which are alienable if commercial." A commercial easement in
gross results primarily in economic benefits rather than personal
satisfaction." Most jurisdictions allow the assignment of an easement
in gross if it is created for a commercial purpose.9 4
Noncommercial easements are those in which the use inures
primarily to the personal satisfaction of the owner. 95 One could argue
that simply because water rights have a clear economic value, an
easement in gross on water should meet the Restatement test for
alienability. Agricultural land, for example, has greater economic
productivity when irrigated. Thus, a conservation easement dedicating
a water right to continued agricultural use would be commercial and
alienable under the Restatement. In contrast, an instream flow held for
environmental purposes arguably provides personal satisfaction rather
than economic benefit, and thus may not be alienable under the
Restatement.
The Restatement (Third) sheds some further light on the crucial
commercial/personal distinction. The Restatement (Third) distinguishes
between personal and in gross benefits, but the categories are not
mutually exclusive.96 The enjoyment of personal benefits is limited to
the beneficiary and the beneficiary's immediate circle of family and
friends.
Benefits in gross "can be enjoyed without regard to the
beneficiary's ownership or occupancy of any other interest. " "'
Applying this distinction, if a conservation easement is structured to
maintain instream flows, the benefit extends beyond the grantee's
immediate circle of family and friends because others enjoy enhanced
downstream environmental, recreational and/or aesthetic values.
Instream flows may also benefit commercial rafting and guided fishing,
resulting in an indirect economic benefit. On balance, a conservation
easement on water is easily classified as non-personal, and therefore
commercial. Thus, Colorado courts would find that an easement in
gross on a water right is alienable under the Restatement if they followed
the distinction of the Restatement (Third). Moreover, it would be
pointless to affirm alienability without also making such an easement
enforceable.
Colorado courts also sometimes follow the Restatement (Third) with
91. See, e.g., Salazar v. Terry, 911 P.2d 1086, 1091 (Colo. 1996); Thompson v.
Whinnery, 895 P.2d 537, 540-42 (Colo. 1995).
92. REsTATEMENT, supra note 90, § 489.
93. Id. § 489 cmt. c. Classification as "commercial or noncommercial depends
upon whether the element of economic benefit or personal satisfaction
predominates." Id.
94. Andrew Dana & Michael Ramsey, ConservationEasements and the Common Law, 8
STAN. ENVrL. L.J. 2, 14, (1989) (citing French, supra note 10, at 1268).
95. RESTATEMENT, supra note 90, § 491 cmt. a; see id. § 492. In Westland Nursing
Home, Inc. v. Benson, 517 P.2d 862, 865 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974), the Court of Appeals
implied in dicta that a personal easement is not enforceable against a successor.
96. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, § 2.6 cmt. c.
97. 1&
98. Id.
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regard to easements."
The Restatement (Third) produced a
"substantially simplified doctrinal structure that requires only intent
and compliance with the Statute of Frauds to create express servitudes
and treats all servitudes as valid, except those which are illegal or
violate public policy."0 0 The essential point is, "the intent of the parties
to create servitude benefits in others should be given effect,"
regardless of whether they are appurtenant to a benefited estate or
held in gross.'0 ' The Restatement (Third) imposes "no limits on the kinds
or combinations of servitude benefits that can be created.""' It clearly
states that one may hold the benefits of negative covenants in gross,
and uses a common law conservation easement to illustrate that
point."' The Restatement (Third) Reporter concludes that governmental
bodies should possess the ability to enforce conservation easements in
gross imposed for their benefit. 05
While the common law does not resolve all doubts, 6 Colorado
courts usually follow the authorities that uniformly support
enforcement of negative servitudes in gross, such as conservation
easements.' °7 Many states, including Colorado, authorize conservation
99. See, e.g., Lazy Dog Ranch v. Telluray Ranch Corp, 965 P.2d 1229, 1235, 1237-38
(Colo. 1998).
100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1993). One
possible public policy concern is implicit in the doctrine of maximum utilization of
water announced in Fellhauerv. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968). See also COLO.
REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(1)(a) (2001). The Colorado Supreme Court, however, has only
applied the doctrine within the state's water law, i.e., the appropriation, diversion, and
use of water rights. See Application for Water Rights of Hines Highlands Ltd. P'ship,
929 P.2d 718, 724 (Colo. 1996); City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1,
43 (Colo. 1996); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. United States, 891 P.2d 952, 962 (Colo.
1995) (the "can and will" doctrine); Consol. Home Supply Ditch & Reservoir Co. v.
Town of Berthoud, 896 P.2d 260, 271 (Colo. 1995) (abandonment); Simpson v. Yale
Investments, Inc., 886 P.2d 689, 696 (Colo. 1994); R.J.A., Inc. v. Water Users Ass'n of
Dist. No. 6, 690 P.2d 823 (Colo. 1984); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colo.
Water Conservation Bd., 594 P.2d 570, 574 (Colo. 1979) ( in-stream appropriation
without diversion); A-B Cattle Co. v. United States, 589 P.2d 57, 69 (Colo. 1978)
(reasonable means of diversion); Kelly Ranch v. Southeastern Colo. Water
Conservancy Dist., 550 P.2d 297, 304 (Colo. 1976) (plans of augmentation); Kuiper v.
Lundvall, 529 P.2d 1328, 1331 (Colo. 1974); Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy
Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d 1321, 1325 (Colo. 1974) (saved water); Hall v.
Kuiper, 510 P.2d 329, 332 (Colo. 1973) (tributary groundwater).
101. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, § 2.6 cmt. b.
102. Id. cmt. c.
103. Id. cmt. d.
104. Id. cmt. d, illus. 2.
105. Id. reporter's note. The Reporter did not comment on enforcement by nongovernmental parties.
106. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, § 2.6, reporter's note.
107. In 1976, Glenn Tiedt advanced a statutory construction argument for
conservation easements in gross. He reasoned that statutory references to easements
as interests in land and water implied a general recognition of conservation easements
as fully enforceable interests in land and water in Colorado, but that this was
insufficient for estate and tax planning purposes.
Glenn F. Tiedt, Conservation
Easements in Colorado, 5 COLO. LAw 1265, 1265-66 (1976). For example, the Board of
Parks and Recreation was authorized to:
[a] cquire by gift, transfer, lease, purchase, or long-term operating agreement
such land and water, or interest in land and water, as the director ...deems
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easements in 5 ross by statute to remove any question about their
enforceability.'
E. CONSERVATION EASEMENTS UNDER THE COLORADO STATUTE
Colorado has enacted a statute specifically authorizing
conservation easements in gross.' 9 The legislation created a powerful
and effective tax and estate planning tool for Colorado landowners."'
Before the legislation was enacted, few people were willing to take the
risk that the Internal Revenue Service would disallow a charitable
contribution of a conservation easement for federal income tax
purposes, or ignore it when valuing property for federal estate taxes."'
The Colorado statute provides:
"Conservation easement in gross," for the purposes of this article,
means a right in the owner of the easement to prohibit or require a
limitation upon or an obligation to perform acts on or with respect to
a land or water area or airspace above the land or water owned by the
grantor appropriate to the retaining or maintaining of such land,
water, or airspace, including improvements, predominantly in a
natural, scenic, or open condition, or for wildlife habitat, or for
agricultural, horticultural, recreational, forest, or other use or
condition consistent with the protection of open land having
wholesome environmental quality or life-sustaining ecological
diversity, or appropriate to the conservation and preservation of
buildings, sites, or structures having historical, architectural, or
cultural interest or value (emphasis added).
The statute expressly authorizes "a limitation upon or an obligation to
perform acts on or with respect to a land... or water owned by the
grantor appropriate to the retaining or maintaining of such land...
for agricultural, horticultural, recreational, forest, or other use..."113
The language strongly supports the notion that the statute authorizes
limitations or obligations on water rights designed to ensure the
continued use of those rights under a conservation easement on land
for irrigation or other purposes.
The typical language in a
conservation easement that requires the grantor to retain water rights
necessary for agricultural production"4 and to continue irrigation falls
necessary, suitable, or proper for parks or outdoor recreation purposes or for
the preservation or conservation of sites, scenes, open space, and vistas of
public interest.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 33-30-105(1)(a) (1973). The term "interest in land and water" is
defined to include easements. COLO.REv. STAT. § 33-10-107(1) (a) (2001).
108.

109.
STAT.
110.
111.
112.

RESTATEMENT (THiRD), supra note 43, § 8.5 cmt. a.

Act of May 13, 1976, ch. 153, 1976 Colo. Sess. Laws 750 (codified at COLO. REv.
§§ 38-30.5-101 to 111 (2001)).
Tiedt, supra note 107, at 1267.
Id. at 1267.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-30.5-102 (2001).

113. Id.
114. Deed of Conservation Easement (Mesa Ranch) at 4, (appears of record in the
office of the Delta County Clerk and Recorder under Reception No. 501406).
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within this authority. Whether the statute authorizes limitations or
obligations on water rights in any other context is a more difficult
issue, that Colorado courts have yet to address.
The definition of "conservation easement in gross" uses the terms
"water area" and "water," but does not refer to the term "water
right."".
The question thus arises as to whether the statute is
independently applicable to water rights. No reported Colorado case
on this issue exists.
When construing a statute, the Colorado Supreme Court first looks
to its plain language."1 6 At first blush, the Court would probably
conclude that the Colorado General Assembly understood the term
"water right" very well, and if the legislature intended to include water
rights it would have used that term. It is possible, however, that the
Court would find the terms "water area" and "water" ambiguous. If a
statute is ambiguous, the Supreme Court considers indicia of
legislative intent, such as the "'object sought to be attained'," the
"'legislative history'," and the "'consequences of a particular
construction'. " "
The question of legislative intent is problematic. The legislation
began as an open space bill," 8 and grew to include the "conservation
and preservation of buildings, sites, or structures having historical,
architectural or cultural interest or value."" 9 The legislative goal was
apparently limited to validating conservation easements in gross 20 on
open space land and historic structures, since the General Assembly
believed appurtenant servitudes were valid under the common law.1
The express legislative intent provides:
The general assembly finds and declares that it is in the public
interest to define conservation easements in gross, since such
easements have not been defined by the judiciary. Further, the
115. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-102 (2001).
116.

City of Westminster v. Dogan Constr. Co., 930 P.2d 585, 590 (Colo. 1997).

117. Id. (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 2-4-203(1)(a), (c), (e) (1980)). The current
statute is unchanged. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 2-4-203(1)(a), (c), (e) (2001).
118.

Hearing on S.B. 59 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 50th Legis., 2d Reg. Sess.

(Colo. Mar. 23, 1976) (statement of Lucius E. Woods, Esq., Holme, Roberts & Owen,
drafter of the original legislation for Senator Schieffelin).
119. COLO. HOtJSEJOURNAL 857 (Mar. 25, 1976).
120. The legislative view that conservation easements in gross were not valid appears
traceable to a widely circulated and discussed article citing the AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY. See TRUST DEPARTMENT, THE BANK OF CALIFORNIA (San Francisco, Cal.), Tax
Planningfor Everyman's Future: The ConservationEasement, ESTATE PLANNING STUDIES, 3
(Spring 1972) (citing 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 8.12 (1952) ("a negative
easement is always an appurtenant easement") (attached to Legislative Council, Staff
Summary of Meeting, House Committee on Judiciary (Mar. 16, 1976))). Notably, the
Colorado Supreme Court has rarely relied on the AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
preferring instead other treatises that, in contrast, endorse the enforcement of
negative easements in gross. See generally THOMPSON, supra note 56.
121. Hearing on S.B. 59 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 50th Legis., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Colo. Mar. 23, 1976) (statement of Chairman Jerry Kopel). Rep. Kopel, an attorney,
stated that a conservation easement that is appurtenant is permissible under existing
case law. Id.
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general assembly finds and declares that it is in the public interest to
determine who may receive such
•
122 easements and for what purposes
such easements may be received.
The legislature did not discuss conservation easements on water rights
not associated with land, although some conflicting and ambiguous
23
expressions regarding water rights in the legislative history do exist.
The statute, however, expressly provides that "[n]o provision of this
article shall be construed to mean that conservation easements in gross
were not lawful estates in land prior to July 1, 1976." (emphasis
added) 2 4 This implies that the statute addressed only land and not
other property interests, such as water rights, raising another
complication. The legislature was aware of existing conservation
easements on historic properties,2 and expanded the legislation to
cover them. 6 Surely, the legislature did not intend to simultaneously
nullify existing conservation easements on historic property. This
conclusion is consistent with other statutory language in the savings
clause that "[n]o interest in real property cognizable under the
statutes, common law, or custom in effect in [Colorado] prior to July
1, 1976... shall be impaired, invalidated
or in any way adversely
27
affected" by enactment of the statute.
Additional confusion stems from language that excludes the
transfer or change in a point of diversion of a water right.28 This
language was added to clarify that the statute did not impair the
transfer or change in the point of diversion of a water right.'2 The
amendment implies that the legislature did not want to preclude
changes in water rights, whether authorized before or after the passage
of the conservation easement statute. It is unclear whether this is a
case of extra caution, or a suggestion that the legislature thought the

122. COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-30.5-101 (2001).
123. See, e.g., Hearing on S.B. 59 Before the Senate State Affairs Comm., 50th Legis., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Colo. Feb. 4, 1976). The following exchange took place at 10:50:26 a.m.:
Senator Schieffelin (principal sponsor): "I do have a statement here, two

documents for your file if you care to look at them. One is the effect of this

bill on water rights, which I think one of you, somebody, asked, I don't know
if it was Senator Kinney or Senator Noble, or who, and you can see the last

statement on that: 'In short, S.B. 59 could not be used to lock up the state's
valuable resources."' (The statement is attributed to Glenn Porzak, a water

attorney then practicing with Holme, Roberts & Owen).
Senator Noble (Committee Chairman): "Just one man's opinion, not sure I
agree with it."
124. COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-30.5-110 (2001).
125. Hearing on S.B. 59 Before Senate State Affairs Comm., 50th Legis., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Colo. Feb. 4, 1976) (statement ofJames Bull, Esq., attorney for Historic Denver). Mr.
Bull testified that there were seven historic preservation conservation easements in

gross created in Denver in the preceding three years. Id.
126.
127.

COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-30.5-104(4) (2001).
Id. § 38-30.5-110.

128. "[N] or any transfer of a water right or any change of a point of diversion at any
time.. ." Id. § 38-30.5-110.
129. Debate on S.B. 59 in the Senate, 50th Legis., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. Mar. 8, 1976)
(statement of Senator Fred Anderson).
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bill encompassed water rights. In this context, the former is more
likely.
Absent a clear expression of legislative intent, 3 ' the consequences
of a particular construction become especially important. Most
Colorado attorneys practicing in the area of conservation easements
believe that Colorado's statute covers water rights used on land
covered by a statutory conservation easement.'31 There are probably
$50 million worth of water rights included in such easements in the
state. 32
The13 Internal Revenue Service13 recognizes these
encumbrances, as does the State of Colorado.
IRS recognition is
crucial, since income and inheritance tax benefits provide the
financial incentive to donate conservation easements. An additional
incentive, the Colorado income tax credit, became available on
.January 1, 2000.13' Few donors would create conservation easements
without such monetary benefits.
In order to meet deduction
requirements prescribed by the Internal Revenue Code, it may be
necessary to include the valuation of water rights in a conservation
easement on land.'3 6 For example, irrigated land without water rights
is essentially dry land, and thus entitled to a deduction only for the
lesser value of dry land.
Another aspect producing conflicting interpretations of the issue
at hand is the effect of the Colorado statute on common law
conservation easements. Some believe that while "it may have been
possible to create valid conservation easements under the common law
prior to enactment of article 30.5, Colorado's conservation easement
130. Although not admissible in court, the bill's sponsor, (former) Senator Joe
Schieffelin, and the legislature's reigning water expert at the time and bill co-sponsor,
(former) Senate President Fred Anderson, told the author that there was no intention
to allow conservation easements on water alone and that was the reason for using
indefinite terms. Telephone Interview with (former) Senator Joe Schieffelin and
(former) Senate President Fred Anderson (Sept. 19, 1999).
131. Interview with David L. Kuosman, Esq., Conservation Practice Group, Isaacson,
Rosenbaum, Woods & Levy, P.C., Denver, Colo. (Jan. 4, 2000). Denver University Law
Professor Federico Cheever has identified this firm as Colorado's preeminent land
trust firm. Cheever, supra note 44, at 1077; see also letter from William M. Silberstein,
Esq., Chatir, Conservation Practice Group, Isaacson, Rosenbaum, Woods & Levy, P.C.,
to Robert F. Wigington, Esq., The Nature Conservancy (Sept. 19, 1990) (on file with
author).
1
132. Telephone Interview with William M. Silberstein, Esq., Chair, Conservation
Practice Group, Isaacson, Rosenbaum, Woods & Levy, P.C. (Oct. 12, 2001). The total
value of the water exceeds $50 million if just 10 percent of the land in Colorado
covered by a conservation easement is irrigated, assuming an average water value of
$500 per acre-foot and the statewide average delivery of 3.46 acre-feet per acre. For
acres under easement, see Land Trust Alliance, Summary Data from the National Land
Trust, http://lta.org/newsroom/census-summary-data.htm (posted Sept. 12, 2001).
For water deliveries see COLORADO DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, CuMULATIVE YEARLY
STATISTICS OF THE COLORADO DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES (2000).
133. See, e.g., Strasburg v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1697, 1699 (2000).
134. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-522(2) (2001).
135. See Patricia Templar Dow, The Unique Benefits of Conservation Easements in
Colorado, 30 COLO. LAw. 49, 50-1 (Dec. 2001) (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-522(2)
(2001)).
136. Telephone Interview with Silberstein, supra note 132.
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law now seems to preclude this option."" 7 However, the statutory
language is susceptible to another analytic approach. Servitudes
coming within the statutory definition of "conservation easement in
gross " 138 are valid only if created in conformance with statutory

requirements;' 39 common law governs those servitudes not within the
This interpretation is consistent with the
statutory definition.
legislature's decision to address only conservation easements in gross
and not appurtenant
servitudes, which are presumptively valid under
1 40
common law.

As discussed above, landowners may create enforceable limitations
and obligations on water rights used to maintain land for agricultural
or other recognized uses. ' A statutory conservation easement is
perpetual unless the instrument creating it states otherwise.142 A
conservation easement on water rights not granted by the owners of
the land to which the water rights are appurtenant, apparently is
impermissible under the statute because such easements "may only be
created by the record owners of the surface of the land." 43 Thus, such
easements must take their chances under the common law.
Due to the number of conservation easements in existence and tax
benefits received, calamitous consequences for donors and their
attorneys would follow a Supreme Court decision excluding water
rights from conservation easements on land. Thus, it is unlikely the
Supreme Court would jeopardize existing conservation easements on
water rights associated with land. To avoid that result, the Court could
narrowly hold the statute to cover water rights contained in a
conservation easement on land where the grantor of the easement
owns the water rights, (which is common), and the easement simply
seeks continued historic use of the water rights on that land.
F. THE ACTUAL USE OF EASEMENTS ON WATER IN COLORADO

Conservation easements in Colorado routinely include provisions
restricting the use of water rights on land included in a conservation
easement.'44 Groups such as Great Outdoors Colorado, the Colorado
137. Hoffman, supra note 72, at 386 (citation omitted).
138. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-102 (2001).
139.

Id. § 38-30.5-104.

140. Hearing on S.B. 59 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 50th Legis., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Colo. Mar. 23, 1976) (statement of Chairman Jerry Kopel). Rep. Kopel, an attorney,
stated that an appurtenant conservation easement was permissible under existing case
law. Id.
141. See discussion supra note 113.
142. COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-30.5-103(3) (2001).
143. Id. § 38-30.5-104(1).
144. Interview with Kuosman, supra note 131. In a recent example, the Three Rivers
Land Trust received a conservation easement covering a ranch in Delta County. The
deed also contains a provision explicitly providing that the grantors shall retain and
reserve the water rights to maintain agricultural production and shall not transfer,
encumber, lease, sell or otherwise separate the water rights from the ranch property.
See Deed of Conservation Easement (Mesa Ranch) 4 (appears of record in the office of
the Delta County Clerk and Recorder under Reception No. 501406). The language in
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Cattlemen's Agricultural Land Trust, the Yampa Valley Land Trust,
and The Nature Conservancy, among others, use form conservation
easements that include water rights.'4
There is one particularly notorious example of a "covenant"
effectively restricting future development of conditional water rights
associated with a donation to the Colorado Water Conservation Board
("CWCB"). Only water rights were involved in the transaction; no land
was included. In 1987, the Pittsburgh & Midway Coal and Mining
Company ("P&M") donated certain conditional water rights on the
Gunnison River to The Nature Conservancy ("TNC"), who
subsequently donated the same to the CWCB. However, P&M did not
donate all of their Gunnison River conditional rights to TNC. P&M
also entered into a covenant with TNC not to develop any of its
retained water rights over a thirteen-mile stretch of the Gunnison
River, 46 which was proposed for federal designation as a Wild and
Scenic River. The agreement between P&M and TNC appears to meet
all legal requirements of either an enforceable real covenant or an
equitable servitude,
except that the benefit is in gross. The
agreement looks like a negative easement, that is, an equitable
servitude in gross, thus its enforceability under the common law is not
clear.4 4 A creative alternate analysis is that the restricted water rights
this deed closely tracks the sample conservation easement in Krendl's Colorado
practice manual. See 2 COLORADO PRACTICE, METHODS OF PRACTICE 314 (4th ed. 1998).
These examples, of course, are servitudes that are appurtenant to land and not held in
gross, thus avoiding questions of enforceability.
145. Interview with Kuosman, supra note 131.
146. AGREEMENT

FOR DONATION

AND

COVENANT

OF WATER RIGHTS:

BETWEEN

PITrSBURGH & MIDWAY COAL MINING CO. AND THE NATURE CONSERvANCY 7 (Dec. 31,
1987) (appears of record in the office of the Delta County Clerk and Recorder under
Reception No. 546353).
147. The agreement is written and therefore complies with the statute of frauds. See
id. The covenant touches and concerns the water rights because it prevents their
physical diversion or impoundment in the specified reach of the Gunnison River. Id.
at 7. The parties were in privity. The covenant was recorded; recording gives notice to
successors and assigns. Id. at 11. Both parties intended to bind their successors and
assigns. Id. at 10. However, another provision states that the covenant is "for the
benefit of TNC [The Nature Conservancy] only." Id. at 7. This provision might not
have allowed a successor to TNC's interest to enforce the covenant, although it would
still be enforceable by TNC. Memorandum from Robert Wigington, Esq., Attorney,
The Nature Conservancy, to Michael Dennis, The Nature Conservancy (Aug. 29, 1986)
(on file with author). The covenant was later amended and re-conveyed to clarify that
P&M intended it to run to TNC's successor, the CWCB. (TNC subsequently conveyed
the covenant with the water rights to the CWCB). E-mail from Robert Wigington,
Esq., Attorney, The Nature Conservancy (June 23, 2001) (on file with author).
148. There are other significant legal problems with a covenant restricting future
development of a conditional water right. A threshold issue is whether a conditional
water right restricted by a covenant against development "can and will" be perfected.
Where "circumstances regarding the continuing intent and capability to put the water
to beneficial use under the decreed appropriation may change, [a]ll or part of the
conditional water right may not survive." Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27,
42 (Colo. 1997).
The restriction probably changes the original intent of the
appropriation and would kill the right if the restriction clearly frustrated the original
intent and the right could not be changed to another use that complied with the
restriction. Another issue is whether a covenant not to develop a conditional water
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are appurtenant to the water rights donated to TNC.14 9
In another transaction, the city of Boulder entered into an
"equitable servitude" on Barker Meadow Reservoir with Public Service
Company of Colorado to share the use of the reservoir and
transmission facilities. 50 The servitude covered a water storage right
and associated transmission facilities.'
In addition to using the
reservoir's storage capacity, the company retained the right to take
stored water owned by the city in an emergency.5 2 The agreement
between Boulder and Public Service Company meets the legal
requirements of an equitable servitude, but not a real covenant
5 The agreement
because privity did not exist."
is appurtenant because
both parties have benefited property. Thus, it is not strictly analogous
to the classic form of a conservation easement in gross.

M.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USING CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS ON WATER IN COLORADO

It is eminently possible to structure some conservation easements
mandating particular water rights uses as affirmative obligations as well
as negative restrictions. For example, a servitude tying water rights to
the land and requiring the continuation of their historic agricultural
use implies an affirmative obligation to maintain the means of
diversion and the place of water use. Similarly, a servitude obligating
the use of a water right to maintain a wetland, or other waterdependent natural area, benefits appurtenant land.
Where the only resulting beneficial use is purely instream, the
conservation benefit and water right will lack security unless the
grantor or grantee negotiates with the CWCB to obtain a water court

right implies that the appropriator does not have a use for the water. If so, the water
right could violate Colorado's anti-speculation doctrine. See Colo. River Water
Conservation Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 594 P.2d 566, 568 (Colo. 1979). The
court extended the anti-speculation doctrine to hexennial diligence proceedings in
MunicipalSubdistrict, N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v.Oxy USA, Inc., 990 P.2d 701, 709
(Colo. 1999). Invalidating the right would have the same effect as the covenant from
the beneficiary's perspective; it would prevent development of the conditional water
right. The IRS might deny a charitable deduction on the ground that the restriction
abandons the water right, and thus there was no value to donate. While an attractive
argument to the IRS, it is specious; a water right exists until a court declares it
abandoned. For illustration, a building that burns down after donation had value at
the time of its bequest. Similarly, a water right is capable of donation and has value
until declared abandoned.
149. Memorandum from Wigington, supra note 147, at 2.
150. AGREEMENT BETWEEN PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO AND CITY OF
BOULDER 7-9 (May 7, 1984) (on file with author). The city of Boulder purchased the
reservoir in 2001, thus the servitude is no longer in force.
151. Id.at 6.
152. Id.at 9-10.
153. The agreement is written and therefore complies with the statute of frauds. See
id. Both parties intended to bind their successors and assigns. Id. at 28. The covenant
touches and concerns the water rights because it prescribes the conditions of their use
by both parties. Id. at 8-12. The covenant was recorded giving notice to successors
and assigns. Id. at 30.
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decree changing the water right to instream use.'54 Clearly, a servitude
calling for the release of stored water for instream purposes is an
affirmative obligation. It is also possible to structure a restriction on
the release of stored water as an affirmative obligation to maintain a
littoral level. To the extent any of these instream flow strategies
comprise positive obligations, the common law's avoidance of negative
servitudes in gross is circumvented. Structuring a servitude as an
affirmative obligation should improve its probability of surviving
judicial scrutiny.
All of the approaches using servitudes to maintain irrigation,
wetlands and riparian areas, and to increase instream flows can also
benefit appurtenant property.'55 For example, water used to irrigate
agricultural land, and to maintain wetlands and other waterdependent natural areas benefits appurtenant land. Analogously,
water decreed and released or held by the CWCB for instream use
benefits riparian land. The servitude for an instream flow could be
attached to a riparian and benefited anchor parcel, including one
acquired for this purpose. On public lands, a servitude could benefit
adjacent federal land under the care of the Forest Service,'5 6 or the
Bureau of Land Management. The use of a benefited anchor parcel
avoids the common law problems associated with servitudes in gross. 57
Taken together, these two strategies-creating affirmative
obligations and benefiting appurtenant land-provide an approach
that avoids the few legal uncertainties surrounding conservation
easements on water rights. In order to maximize the enforceability of
the servitude against successors in interest (to control the use of water
in perpetuity), it is prudent to adopt both proposed strategies.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the typical conservation easement in gross on irrigated
agricultural or open space land does not follow the recommended
approach, it is time to revise this practice. Many members of the water
and land trust organizations recognize the problem and are working to
address it.
University of Denver Law Professor Federico Cheever argues "[t ] he
limited, novel, and statutory nature of conservation easements suggests
that any purported conservation restriction that fails to meet the
154. Absent such a decree, the water right would be subject to abandonment for
failure to divert it for its decreed beneficial use. Thus, a water right holder desiring to
convert a water right to instream flow must work with the CWCB to obtain a change of
water right to such a purpose.
155. See id., regarding other legal requirements to secure the conservation benefit
and water right.
156. This appears to be the situation in a conservation servitude granted by the city
of Fort Collins to the Forest Service on Joe Wright Creek. E-mail from Kelly Custer,
Esq., Attorney, Western Water Project, Trout Unlimited, to author (Oct. 17, 2001).
157. To secure an instream flow right also requires a water court decree for instream
flow purposes. The CWCB has exclusive statutory authority to hold instream flows. See
supra note 1.
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requirements of the state statute that authorizes it is invalid, supported
by neither legislative action nor common law tradition."51 8 While a

well-crafted conservation easement should stand up under Colorado
common law, Professor Cheever's admonition suggests a safer course
of action.
Assuming the Colorado General Assembly can be
convinced, legislative clarification of the state's conservation easement
statute on water rights is the most direct approach to resolving the
issue regarding the enforcement of conservation easements on water.

158. Cheever, supra note 44, at 1096.
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There must come a time when water must be apportioned with justice
to all, and a century or more hence we will have it distributed not
upon priority rights, but upon technical rights. We cannot have a
farmer getting more water than he is entitled to, because his greatgrandfather or somebody else happened to secure the water right two
months ahead of somebody else. Water must ultimately be conserved
in the mostjust manner for the general welfare of all citizens.'
-Frederick
Haynes Newell,
Reclamation Service, 1902'

first

Director

of United

States

1. The quotation of the language in the Colorado Capitol building was first
utilized by another research work. See Ernest T. Smerdon, Water Conservation in
Irrigated Agriculture, in THE ROLE OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES IN WATER
RESOURCES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 160, 163 (Duane D. Baumann & Yacov Y.
Haimes eds., 1988).
t B.B.A., Baylor University, Texas (1997), M.S., Public Policy Analysis, University
of Rochester, New York (1999), J.D. Candidate, University of Denver, Colorado
(2003).
2.

See DoNALDJ. PISANI, WATER, LAND, AND LAw IN THE WEST: THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC

POLICY, 1850-1920, at 23 (1996).
3. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A century ago, Frederick Newell believed the prior appropriation
system was in need of change. He suggested conservation of water in
4
the most just manner for the welfare of all citizens. More than a
century later, water lawyers and policy analysts sit on the precipice of a
new era, one where conservation in the most just manner no longer
includes increasing available water supply by building large water
storage projects. As other micro-economies illustrate, the most just
manner for the distribution of resources is for users of a resource to
bear the social cost of increasing use, or the marginal social cost. The
goals of water law and policy-that all citizens have access to waterhave not changed in this new era. What has changed is the notion that
humanity's dominance over earth perpetuates an inexhaustible flow of
cheap natural resources.
The title of this analysis, borrowed from the Colorado Capitol's
rotunda, most aptly reflects water law's significance in the West. The
rotunda wall reads: "here is a land where life is written in water." This
analysis suggests that the conditions present in the West at the
founding of the prior appropriation system are different from those
humankind faces today. As such, the assumptions underpinning the
prior appropriation system have changed, while the law has essentially
stagnated. The result is an antiquated system, guarded more with
historical reverence than any argument beyond the protection of
owners' expectations. This analysis, therefore, suggests updating the
prior appropriation doctrine to allow for an economy better able to
achieve Pareto optimality, "a state in which no reallocation of
resources can make anyone better off without making at least one
other person worse off."
Traditional legal analyses typically proceed by defining the present
system and identifying gray areas where creativity could advance a
client's interest. Here, I refer to this concept as the "is" of water law.
Robert E. Beck writes, "too much legal research merely explains the
law as it is, identifies ambiguities and gaps, and suggests solutions
based on some theoretical construct not necessarily related in any way
to reality."7 This analysis agrees with Professor Beck. It begins with a
detailed discussion of what water law "is" as a starting place to
introduce economic principles that show how people behave in the
face of legal restrictions or legal rights. That there are gaps in the
legal analysis of this article is a criticism of the present system: the
transaction costs created by an elite group (lawyers) force a new
4. Id.
5. See Smerdon, supra note 1, at 163.
6. RUBEN P. MENDEZ, INTERNATIONAL
GLOBALRELATIONS 13 (1992).

PUBLIC FINANCE:

A

NEW PERSPECTIVE ON

7. Robert E. Beck, Assessment of the Role of the Social Sciences in Water Planningand
Management: Legal Systems and Their Impediments to Change, in THE ROLE OF SOCIAL AND
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES IN WATER RESOURCES PLANNING AND

(Duane D. Baumann & Yacov Y. Haimes eds., 1988).

MANAGEMENT

238, 244
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generation of water lawyers to spend a lifetime intellectually wrangling
with the "is" instead of becoming forces for change.
This analysis takes the perspective of what "ought" to occur. What
principles underpin the codification of legal systems? How can microeconomic principles aid in understanding how individuals will behave
in a new system of water law? How might the law be changed to
reduce the amount of water wasted? The answer to these and other
questions raised in this article are not based on the exposition of the
status quo to minds that crave "understanding." Rather, the answers to
these questions are discovered by venturing beyond the last tick of the
clock.
This analysis is divided into three sections. The first section
explores the role of governments, particularly state governments, in
western water law. It begins with a brief historical look at government
involvement and the development of the prior appropriation system.
It then examines the structure of water markets and government
involvement in water allocation from a micro-economic perspective.
Section two, "Problems with the Present System," covers bureaucratic
supply issues, water rights uncertainty, high-transaction costs, and
offers a brief critique of "value integration" (building public interest
criteria into the present system).
Section three suggests some
solutions to the problems identified in section two. Specifically,
section three considers a water auction system, allowing users to
perfect water rights through conservation, and the need for state
systems to precisely define the rights to be transferred in terms of
measurement.
Changing an entrenched system of property law is a daunting task.
Therefore, I encourage readers to "dream" of what "could be." Law is
merely a system of words that tries to contemplate and replicate
human experiences. When it fails to change with the times, the times
must change it.
H. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN WESTERN WATER LAW
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Western water allocation began long before European settlement
of the West.! Spanish settlers and Native Americans populated the
western states and founded systems of water law long before settlement
from the eastern United States began. 9 This section examines some of
the historical aspects of water law in the western United States with
respect to the founding of the prior appropriation system. This
historical overview does not purport to be exhaustive, but rather is a
starting place to examine some fundamental assumptions of the prior
appropriation system and the governmental regimes that implement
8.

See NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND WATER, A

HISTORY 4 (rev. ed. 2001).
9. See id.
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and support the system.
During the nineteenth century the federal government supported
settlement of the West as a means to bring stability to the region.
Under the spirit of manifest destiny, and in what is often referred to as
the largest wealth transfer in the history of the world, the federal
government literally gave land to anyone willing to move west and
work the land."° Also, the mining booms of the mid- to late nineteenth
century brought many to the West from the eastern United States.
The new settlers soon realized the West was particularly arid. The
availability of water was critical to the miners-considered the
architects of the prior appropriation system by many--and to
farmers." What was also apparent was the individualism of the settlers
and the fear of water speculation from large corporate conglomerates.
A rule of capture regarding water began to emerge. Therefore, one
who diverted water and put it to a beneficial use acquired a "use"
right.'2
Many commentators seem to ignore the assumptions regarding the
role of government when explaining the history of the West. Most
western state constitutions plainly suggest that the water resources
within the state's borders belong to the people of the state and are
therefore publicly held. 3 That private property rights exist is simply an
incomplete view of water law in the West. The institutional evolution
of state and federal support for the prior appropriation system is a
critical component in the operation of the system.
The progressive era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century appears to be the most important philosophical movement in
the history of western water law. The progressives of a century ago
attempted to accomplish their goals via "the transformation of a
decentralized, nontechnical, loosely organized society, where waste
and inefficiency ran rampant, into a highly organized, technical, and
centrally planned and directed social organization which could meet a
complex world with efficiency and purpose." 4 Water management
policy consisted of state funded reclamation projects. Hiram H.
10. The Desert Lands Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377.
11. A. DANTARLOCKET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 150 (4th ed. 1993).
12. See id. at 151-54.
13. See generally CAL. CONST. art. X, § 5 ("The use of all water now appropriated, or
that may hereafter be appropriated, for sale, rental, or distribution, is hereby declared
to be a public use, and subject to the regulation and control of the State, in the
manner to be prescribed by law."); COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 ("The water of every
natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby
declared to be the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the
people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided."); MONT. CONsT.
art. IX, § 3, cl. 3 ("All surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric waters within the
boundaries of the state are the property of the state for the use of its people and are
subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as provided by law."); Wvo. CONST. art. I, §
31 ("Water being essential to industrial prosperity, of limited amount, and easy of
diversion from its natural channels, its control must be in the state, which, in
providing for its use, shall equally guard all the various interests involved.").
14. SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EmCIENcY: THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSERVATION MOVEMENT,

1890-1920, at 265 (1959).
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Chittenden, an engineer for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in an
1897 report to Congress, argued "only 'through the agency of the
General Government' would it be 'possible to secure the best
development'." 5 It was a common belief that the government's
purpose was to develop and manage water resources in the interest of
the public."
The progressives believed the involvement of the
government, particularly the federal government, was critical to the
development of water resources.
While the federal government's role in subsidizing water
development projects has largely waned, the assumptions regarding
the proper role of governments in water management persist. State
and local government institutions continue to manage and own water
rights and distribution networks in the western United States. 7 The
settlement of the West achieved marks that the architects of manifest
destiny probably could not have foreseen. Nearly all of the water in
the West is appropriated. This raises new questions regarding the
future evolution of western water law.
State institutions "originally evolved to support new appropriations
of water and to protect those appropriations once achieved."18 Now,
the same institutions created for the purpose of administering the
prior appropriation system are facing new institutional demands,
namely transferring water rights while continuing to protect vested
water use rights. Whether these institutions are properly equipped to
handle the transfer of water rights is a central component of this
analysis. Evaluating potential changes in the law, must therefore
include the notion that change must consider state and local
administration of the process.
State involvement in water use and management extends beyond
the administration of the prior appropriation system.
One
commentator suggests governmental water delivery organizations
provide "a vertical chain of services, including water supply, sewerage
services, and sewage and effluent treatment and disposal, as well as
provision of the local pipeline networks."19 Most commentators believe
local water districts' costs, including "expenses for local networks of
pipes and sewers, a major capital expenditure, [are] an inseparable
cost of the water supply."0 It is also argued that since a "district's water
supply is viewed as common property, no one can claim a legal or even
expectational right to a specific share of the proceeds."'
The
15. HUNDLEY, supra note 8, at 117.
16. Id. at 117-18.
17. Liza Grandia, Public Water Systems Need Commitment, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Feb. 4,
2002, at 12A.
18. Lee Brown et al., Water Reallocation, Market Proficiency, and Conflicting Social
Values, in WATER AND AGRICULTURE IN THE WESTERN U.S.: CONSERVATION,
REALLOCATION, AND MARKETS 193 (Gary D. Weatherford ed., 1982).
19. NIcoLAS SPULBER & ASGHAR SABBAGHI, ECONOMICS OF WATER RESOURCES: FROM
REGULATION TO PRIVATIZATION 209 (2d ed. 1998).

20.
21.

Id. at 208.
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., InstitutionalPerspectiveson Water Policy and Markets, 81
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assumptions about the government's role in water delivery after
appropriation are critical to the proper functioning of a market for
water resources.
Thus, the history of the government's role in western water law
reveals two key assumptions: (1) state institutions are deemed
necessary to the functioning and capable administration of the prior
appropriation system in an age of full appropriation; 'and (2)
governmental water districts are the appropriate institutions to control
the delivery of the water supply. Both of these assumptions receive
thorough examination in this analysis.
B. MARKET STRUCTURE AND THE GOALS OF WATER LAW
This analysis discards the status quo of water law and instead
considers new methods for water allocation. The idea is to create a
system more responsive to the social opportunity cost of water .use.
Because the law enunciates general human assumption, it is critical to
start from the assumptions of the "ought" of the law. While
economists appear to use a scientific method of study, this analysis
assumes economics is really the study of human behavior. Studying
the manner in which individuals respond to incentives allows
economists to structure economies that maximize social efficiency. To
that end, this section rests on scholarly literature to* define the
principles of an effective system"of water law.
The first assumption future water law ought to consider is the
government's role in defining property rights. Property is commonly
viewed as a bundle of sticks, each stick being a right associated with
property.22 Rights restrict individuals' and institutions' behavior.
From a behavioral-economic viewpoint, the purpose of government is
to define precisely the quantity of water a holder is entitled to use.
Diversion, return flow, and other aspects of water use may complicate a
water law scholar's definition.
The second assumption is that the transfer of well-defined property
rights ought to proceed with a minimum of transaction costs. "The
goal for policymakers interested in promoting water markets should be
to eliminate the obstacles that institutions pose to long-distance
transfers while encouraging institutions to continue to play a role in
the promotion and facilitation of water markets."" The idea is that
"[t]he transaction costs for negotiation and execution of a sale should
be no greater than for an ordinary sale of a parcel of real property."2 4
Some transaction costs come from the difficulty in defining a water
right. This second assumption rests more squarely on the costs of the
externalities involved in water transfers, such as third party rights and
ecological concerns.
CAL. L. REv. 671, 732 (1993).
22. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
23. Thompson, supra note 21, at 701.
24. Stephen F. Williams, The Requirement of Beneficial Use as a Cause of Waste in Water
Resource Development, 23 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 7, 15 (1983).
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A new system should take into account externalities that may not
be part of the private cost. Through administrative proceedings, the
present system protects third parties, the environment, and waste. "A
social measure of value, however, also takes into account impacts on
parties affected by the transaction who were not part of the price
negotiation process." 5 The current system protects others whom a
right transfer may damage. Theoretically, state policy should find an
optimal balance between "unrestricted markets which can result in
high third party costs and market restrictions which reduce third party
impacts. ,,26 In short, prices in a water market ought to reflect the
social value of water, and therefore, state policies ought to facilitate
incorporating external costs and benefits into the price of water
resources.
Third, the legal alteration of appropriation mechanisms is simply
not enough to facilitate the transition to a market system where users
face the marginal social cost of water use. The government must divest
itself of ownership and delivery of water systems and resources. The
government does not have the proper day-to-day financial incentives to
effectively manage delivery.
Economic literature includes many
examples of ineffective delivery of services by bureaucratic agencies,
which have no more than a modicum of political incentive to deliver
services efficiently. One commentator remarked:
The fundamental problem with public ownership-government
intervention in developing and managing water resources and supplyoriented policies-has been that government never has been able to
establish effective incentives for relevant agencies and customers alike
in order to globally optimize production and distribution of water
services
and place a value on these services representing opportunity
7
cost.2

Angus Duncan elaborated by describing governmental
involvement: "[b]oth the benefits to human communities and the
costs to other biota are products of conscious government policies to
encourage development that relies on direct and indirect subsidies
and public investments."2 8 A system which is founded on the premise
that governments ought to be involved in the delivery of water
resources may be the antithesis of potential Pareto optimality.
These goals theorize the purpose of the government in the area of
water law. Simply put, the governmental role in maximizing efficiency
is to define property rights, facilitate and remove barriers to the
exchange of property, divest itself of operating like a private firm in

25. Bonnie Colby Saliba et al., Do Water Market Prices Appropriately Measure Water
Values?, 27 NAT. RESOURCFSJ. 617, 620-21 (1987).
26. Bonnie G. Colby, Economic Impacts of Water Law--State Law and Water Market
Development in the Southwest, 28 NAT. RESOURcESJ. 721, 749 (1988).
27. SPULBER & SABBAGHI, supra note 19, at 192.
28. Angus Duncan, Of Time and the River, 16 F. FOR APPLIED RES. AND PUB. POL'Y 88,
91(2001).
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the market-place, and internalize externalities into the market for
water rights. These goals will underpin the remainder of this analysis.
The most fertile ground for change lies where goals derived from the
assumptions of the present system conflict.

m1. PROBLEMS WITH THE PRESENT SYSTEM
A. BUREAUCRATIC SUPPLY
Government agencies deliver water to residential users." Those
agencies and operations that should continue in water delivery include
city water boards, water districts, and operations involving large out-ofbasin water transfers. The present system cannot guarantee water use
efficiency because institutions lack the economic incentives found in
the private sector. This section examines the incentive problems
drowning bureaucratic water supply organizations.
Discretionary budgets provide an example of why bureaucratic
supply is inefficient. Agencies typically have a budget allocation, which
relies on executive discretion.
One can assume that economic
efficiency would encourage executives to produce at minimum cost
with the intent to return the discretionary budget to their sponsors.'
Despite this goal, bureaucratic supply agencies seldom neglect to
spend their budgets.2 This example demonstrates how agencies
delivering water services do not face the same economic pressure as
private, corporate-owned agencies.
Second, bureaucratic agencies do not face competition in the
delivery of water services. In a competitive market, those firms that fail
to use their resources most efficiently are squeezed out of the market
by firms that do."
The lack of competition creates a negative
economic result. The profit motive on the other hand, provides
strong incentive for private firms to research and develop
technological innovation in water delivery, an incentive public
agencies do not face."
Third, bureaucratic agencies cannot value the benefits of new
technologies. A private firm can value the addition of new technology
via the addition to the bottom line. In a public firm, however, since
there is no profit from the sale of resources, there is no way to decide
whether new technologies will decrease or increase costs. Though
public firms may look at similar agencies in other jurisdictions, they
still must deal with valuation problems in order to determine whether

29. Grandia, supra note 17, at 12A.
30. DAVID L. WEIMER & AIDAN R. VINING, POuCY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE

184-85 (3d. ed. 1999).
31.

Id. at 185.

32. Id.
33. Id. at 186.
34. Id. at 187.
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new technologies have actually proven beneficial elsewhere. 5
Finally, the inflexibility in civil service protections renders
bureaucratic agencies unresponsive to consumers. 6 The problem is
that human resource procedures within bureaucratic agencies ensure
continuity and insulation from political pressure and therefore inhibit
releasing employees that are performing inefficiently in an economic
sense. This problem is further complicated by fixed pay schedules that
drive the overqualified to leave the agency and those under-qualified
to remain. 7 Private firms have more control over their human
resources policy and therefore avoid that problem. 8 Thus the
separation of politics and administration arguably limits public
agencies' ability to effectively serve consumers."
These bureaucratic supply problems serve as an impetus for
privatization of water delivery to secure potential Pareto optimality.
One cannot ignore the role of institutions in the transition to a market
system because water institutions are not strictly economic entities
representing the pooled interests of their constituents.4" That a
market system could be successful without solving the problems of
bureaucratic supply is much ignored in the literature on the reform of
western water law and is critical to the transition to a water market
system. The issue is not the inclusion of institutions in the solution,
but rather reformation of the water delivery system to exclude
government market participation as part of a comprehensive
privatization and reform process.
B. WATER RIGHT UNCERTAINTY

A water right is a: right to use a certain amount of water.41 Several
requirements inherent in the prior appropriation system hinder the
definition of rights. Among these requirements are: a diversion, the
prohibition of waste,43 and application to beneficial use. 44 "In order for
market participants to estimate the value of a water right they must be
able to form expectations about the benefits associated with owning
the right and the degree to which the right is protected from
impairment by others." Uncertainty of rights dissuades individuals to
pay for that right when it is unclear what legal implications and

35.

WEIMER & VINING, supra note 30, at 187.
36. Id. at 187-88.
37. Id. at 188.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Thompson, supra note 21, at 678.
41. SeeJanet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for
Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVrL. L. 919 (1998).
42. See Idaho Dep't of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 928
(Idaho 1974).
43. Neuman, supra note 41, at 920.
44. Id.
45. Colby, supra note 26, at 726.
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restrictions may accompany the purchase."'
This section examines some of the uncertainties caused by the
prior appropriation system that impede the transfer of water rights.
First, waste causes uncertainty as to how much water a person actually
uses beneficially. Waste is not an objectively defined concept, and case
law reveals a general uncertainty over what constitutes waste.4 When a
potential transfer is pending, determining whether the current user is
wasting water complicates valuation. Courts are supposed to rely on
only actual, historic, beneficial use when confirming or decreeing a
water right amount.48 A general lack of clarity with regard to waste
predominates, and as a result "[i]f the behavior does not shock the
conscience, it is allowed." 9 Since wasteful practices go clearly beyond
uses encompassed under acceptable water use-often in effect for
many years and in the modern era inefficient-they are difficult to
challenge under case law.'0
Second, "beneficial use" in western water law looks to the courts to
decide whether a use is efficient.5 This scenario eliminates the role of
the market system, arguably the best means of allocating scarce
resources. The market ought to decide which uses are beneficial, and
the law should allow all uses.
There are several reasons why the beneficial use requirement
causes uncertainty in terms of the right a user actually holds.
Beneficial use is a dynamic concept and varies with the conditions. 5 2 It
therefore can be said that beneficial use is a fact-specific and
circumstantial concept. It is this dynamism that creates uncertainty.
Since the definition of beneficial use is constantly evolving in an
attempt to "keep with the times," present beneficial use is not
necessarily future beneficial use. Thus, a potential transferee may have
difficulty ascertaining whether the continuation of the water right
constitutes the present "beneficial use."
This fact-specific determination therefore means that at any
particular point in time, an individual's water rights may be uncertain
and condemned merely because a fact-finder-using a non-static
definition of beneficial use-determines that the use is not beneficial.
Thus, defining a beneficial use is not the enumeration and
understanding of any particular set of principles. Rather, it is the
whim of the not-yet-convened jury who determines "beneficial" based
on subjective perspectives. Leaving valuation of a property right to
fact-finder discretion is problematic.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
1983).
53.
1935).

Saliba, supra note 25, at 621.
See Nueman, supra note 41, at 933-46.
Id. at 929.
Id. at 959.
Id. at 947.
Id. at 925.
United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d 851, 855 (9th Cir.
See, e.g., Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist., 45 P.2d 972 (Cal.
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Third, the requirement of a diversion also complicates the
definition of a water right. Prior appropriation doctrines almost
universally demand that water be diverted for a right to be perfected.
Water lost via diversion is a highly adjudicated issue. Water loss caused
by the proverbial "leaky ditch" problem or evaporation is not part of
the amount of water a user is actually using. As a result, it is difficult to
ascertain which part of the total quantity of water diverted is applied to
a beneficial use. This measurement problem makes it difficult for
parties to a transfer to ascertain what quantity of historic beneficial use
is actually being transferred. This problem is compounded by a system
that creates disincentives for water conservation in diversion methods
by not allowing the innovator to capture economic benefits associated
with innovation or requiring users to divert efficiently. Courts and
agencies disfavor decreasing the amount of water a particular user
diverts or requiring innovative conservation improvements (i.e. lining
ditches or microsprinklers) due to the expense of improving water
efficiency,
unless the users' practices are not within the community
54
norm.
This section briefly describes some of the uncertainty regarding
the valuation of a water right, which may cause problems to both the
transferee and transferor of a water right in a contractual sale. In
order to facilitate, or at least accommodate water rights transfers, the
law must overcome the barriers to defining a right; this is critical to the
functioning of a market for water rights. Put simply, "It]he doctrine of
beneficial use, with its implications of judicial determination of need
and non-use, in effect increases the uncertainty of title to rights in
water, and therefore reduces their marketability.""' The next section
of this analysis focuses on third-party barriers to water transfers as
another set of legal doctrines that creates right uncertainty and
transfer barriers.
C. HIGH TRANSACTION COSTS, UNCERTAINTY: THIRD-PARTY EFFECTS

The right to use water contains a duty not to injure other
appropriators.6 When a transfer occurs, a third-party has a right to
challenge the transfer on grounds that it will injure the third-party's
water right."' A water right, therefore, is uncertain in the sense that
litigation may or may not occur as the result of a transfer from an
unknown and potentially large number of water users. There is no
doubt that third-party
effects, which economists refer to as
"externalities,""8 must play a role in the future of water law. In the
present system, however, protection of third-party rights serves as a
significant barrier to water right transfers.
54. Thompson, supra note 21, at 683.
55. Timothy D. Tregarthen, The Marketfor Property Rights in Water, 6 DENV.J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 363, 369 (1976).
56. Thompson, supra note 21, at 703.
57. Id. at 704.
58. See RH. COASE, THEFIRM, THEMARKET, AND THELAw 23-24 (1998).
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A market system that fails to take third-party effects into account
may not produce a socially efficient mechanism in the delivery of water
resources. A recent movement in economics questions proposed
market systems where the economic architects presumed "frictionless
markets."" A frictionless market is one where the costs of trading
property are essentially zero.6 In the market for water resources, that
assumption completely overlooks reality.
Water right transfers
encompass substantial transaction costs, largely in the legal
proceedings, to determine third-party effects. To that end, this section
examines the nature of these third-party costs.
An informed economic viewpoint would suggest the "proper"
functioning of a market system demands removal of transaction costs.
This viewpoint ignores social efficiency and argues for a system that
protects the rights of those who want to transfer their rights at the
expense of those who wish to retain them. Each water transaction has
third-party effects. Reducing transaction costs and failing to consider
third-party effects means the price of water will not reflect the true
social cost of the water right. "If state policies do not cause buyers and
sellers to account for external values that may be affected by a transfer,
then a proposed transfer may be beneficial to the buyer and seller
even though it is actually inefficient from an overall social
perspective."6 ' Thus, the goal for future water law reformers ought to
be not just the exclusion of third-party effects from transaction costs to
transfers, but the inclusion of third-party effects into the price of water
rights.
The cost of the legal and administrative proceedings for
transferring water rights, and the length of the process, can be
substantial. 2 The expense of statutory transfer proceedings deters
many small or short-term trades.0 In Colorado and New Mexico,
various-sized transfers have cost from a few hundred dollars to as much
as $50,000.6 In fact, "the statutory transfer process can in a typical case
add twenty percent or more onto the cost of small purchases."65 The
average processing time for a transfer ranges from approximately six
months to a year and a half.6" As a result, these delays often deter
short-term transfers and thereby prevent some local regions from
adapting to droughts and immediate water needs.67
Restrictions on third-party rights are governed by return flow rules.
Specifically, an appropriator may not transfer water rights if doing so
would disadvantage a return flow appropriator.6 Barton Thompson
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
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explains:
Appropriators generally have no right to their return flow; water that
returns to a stream is available for appropriation by downstream users
exactly as if it had never been diverted. To protect those downstream
users, all western states have "no injury" rules. These "no injury" rules
prohibit changes in water use that would harm downstream
69 users by
altering the amount, timing, or quality of the return flow."
These rules exist to protect the vested rights of appropriators
downstream. Third-party effects represent substantial costs to those
wishing to transfer water rights, and as suggested above, may deter
many transactions.
This section represents both a justification for, and an indictment
of the present system. As a justification, this section argues it is
important in terms of social efficiency to include third-party effects in
the market for water rights. The present system does this via a costly
judicial proceeding. As an indictment, this section argues the present
system imposes the cost of third-party effects on the party transferring
a property right, and thereby substantially affects the significance of
market activity in water rights transfers. Removing the uncertainty of
third-party effects in defining a water right, theoretically, seems to be
the answer to removing transaction costs while preserving third-party's
vested rights.
D. CRITIQUE OF VALUE INTEGRATION

This section considers the integration of non-monetary values into
the present system of prior appropriation as a means to achieve
environmental goals. Public interest not only adds to the complexity
of the present system, but also may harm vested water use rights, a
concept antithetical to the development of the market system. Since
bureaucratic agencies face only political, and not financial impacts
from public interest decisions, they may force more conservation than
is socially demanded in the face of social cost. In a market system,
agencies and non-profits could raise money and purchase rights to
maintain instream flows and lakes. Since these agencies would
confront the social cost of water in a competitive market, the resultant
amount of conservation would be socially efficient.
The addition of public interest criteria fails to achieve the
structural conditions for optimum efficiency for several reasons. First,
inclusion of public interest criteria is contrary to the development of a
market system where agencies and individuals face the marginal social
cost of water use rights when making a purchase decision. Expanding
the substantive issues administrative agencies and courts must consider
with regard to the transfer of water rights-including the
environment, the local community, and the public interest-will

69. Thompson, supra note 21, at 703.
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complicate matters and raise costs. An increase in transaction costs
would decrease the incentive to shift to a better use, and encourage
maintenance of the status quo. One author agreed:
One of the primary economic effects of public interest criteria can be
to create substantial uncertainty and additional risk for water market
part cipants. This is particularly likely when public interest language
is inc uded in state statutes regarding water transfers but no
definition of what constitutes the public interest is provided. The
lack of specific public interest criteria makes transfer applicants
vulnerable to unpredictable difficulties and costs in implementing a
transfer."
"[W]hen government allocates rights on the basis of vague notions
of merit or public interest," the result seems to be that "applicants
invest enormous resources in hiring high-priced lawyers to put on a
largely meaningless show-meaningless because the criteria for the
public interest are necessarily so elusive.
Interminable and
unmanageable procedures, inconsistent results, and corruption are
also likely."7 ' Thus, in an attempt to protect the environment, these
new criteria reinforce the status quo by heightening transfer costs, all
at the expense of the water right holder.
Second, adding public interest criteria calls into question all
previous vested rights and therefore adds greater uncertainty to the
transfer process. Arguably, the result is a constitutional taking. And
although in its purest form the public trust doctrine could serve to
rescind or modify a vested right, it would be non-compensable, similar
to takings under navigation servitude. 73 Nonetheless, this would call
current rights into question. Thus, those parties involved in a transfer
would have difficulty ascertaining the existence of the rights in
question. Because what constitutes a public interest is relatively
indefinable, it could include any number of special interests.7 . The
uncertainty new bureaucratic micromanagement could create would
lock in the status quo and then define away vested rights holders'
current rights under uncertain definitions of what is in the public
interest. The true public interest ought to be a competitive market for
water rights transfers, where use is defined by willingness-to-pay.
Adding public interest criteria increases what Coase would call the
"friction" in market transactions. At the same time, the pool of vested
rights theoretically would shrink without compensation. Because of
antiquated views of the market economy, many environmentalists
assume that a properly operating market excludes considerations of
70.
71.
72.
73.
Water
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This assumption,
conservation and environmental protection.
however, is patently false. A properly operating market without
friction and with billions of wasted tax dollars of bureaucratic supply of
water via tax dollars partially regained, would allow for the socially
efficient amount of conservation. The effect of public interest criteria
is to introduce greater inefficiency into the system.
As such,
codification of further substantive criteria in the prior appropriation
system should be rejected as it reifies the status quo and prevents
change. The true path of environmental conservation is to make water
users face the true social cost of water use, which includes the future
value of environmental problems.
IV. THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET SYSTEM: SOLUTIONS
A. DEFINING CONSUMPTIVE USE

Defining what rights a transferee will actually gain in purchasing a
water right is critical. From diversion to return flow, much water is lost
either by use or escape from the system. The amount of water diverted
does not equal the amount of water used, which does not equal the
amount of water returned. From the time water is diverted, each step
in the process (i.e., diversion, use, return) involves loss from the
system. To correct this system of loss, state governments must define
the actual quantity of each water right outside of the transfer process
such that the price of the water right is not affected by the cost of
determining the right itself.
Economists have long believed that the key to altering behavior is
market creation and definition. To that end, a new system of water law
ought to distinguish the elements that constitute a water right. In the
present system, a water right holder must divert the water, use it, and
at least in the early days, decide whether to return it (to perhaps allow
downstream appropriation) . The first step in the process is to define
the historical use of each water right. The size of this project is
particularly daunting but critical.
The only reasonably effective cure for the problems presented by the
no-injury rule is to requantify appropriative rights according to the
amount of water that each appropriator can consume rather than the
amount each can divert, thereby eliminatiVA the need to determine

return flow each time a right is transferred.
The problem may be that "states would need to calculate the
return flows of all water rights immediately in order to quantify the
consumptive rights-a tremendous administrative chore that no state
would want to undertake without a compelling reason."" While this

75.
76.
77.

See Thompson, supranote 21, at 703-04.
Id. at 707.
Id.
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undertaking may seem especially large, it is relatively small compared
to the prospect of constructing the physical water infrastructure of a
generation ago. With the same type of "can-do" attitude, a legislature
could order state agencies to define the historical use of water rights.
The purpose of this new quantification is to determine what each
party has to transfer, which involves three critical amounts: quantity
diverted, quantity used, and quantity returned. A potential purchaser
of rights would then understand the duties owed to surrounding water
right holders, diminishing transaction costs necessary to satisfy any
third-party challenges.
B. ALLOW DIVERSION IMPROVEMENTS
The diversion represents a separate part of a water right required
to perfect a right. The quantity of water diverted, minus the quantity
of water used represents the "delivery" portion of a water right. The
present system encourages water users to either "use it or lose it."
Thus, modifications to delivery that increase efficient diversion do not
reward the appropriator because, as the logic goes, it was never his to
begin with. Legislatures ought to allow for efficiency improvements to
become distinct water rights. This could take place either by dividing
the rights into two rights-delivery rights and use rights-or simply
recognizing improvements as water rights.
The right holder
responsible for increasing efficiency would have the burden of
quantifying the amount of water saved. A state agency could certify
private engineering companies capable of measuring water using
recognized scientific techniques and equipment as water accounting
firms.
The principle that market creation arises via market definition is
critical in situations where no market exists. Recognizing diversion as
an independent right would open up a market for water diversion.
Private firms would likely contract with farmers who would rush to
install pipelines. All of the seepage and evaporation could be turned
into income. Private firms could charge for construction, monitoring,
and metering the quantity of water saved through new diversion
technologies.
Facilitating market transaction of these savings from diversion is
more difficult than one may think. Questions about specific priority
dates and diversions would arise. The new set of regulations could
allow for transfers between parties without the necessity of a diversion.
The party who is purchasing the right, probably a municipality (or new
water company, see below) would already have a means to divert
upstream. The portion of water purchased would retain its priority
date. This would turn water saved from diversion into a commodity
that could be sold. To add to this solution, return flows could follow
the same procedure. If an appropriator can show a more efficient
means of returning the water to the stream, then she ought to be able
to capture the savings.
This option would not work in concert with the first option,
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defining historic use. The concept of historic use is the reason savings
in diversion and return flows cannot become water rights. The idea is
that an appropriator is taking water from a stream and returning a
certain amount to the stream in the present system, the present system
encourages this to maintain a water right. Allowing for diverters to
capture the economic profits associated with less waste is an incentive
that would allow for transfers. These transfers would be better than
new appropriations because they would retain the original priority
date.
C. WATER AUcTiONS

A water auction would require condemnation of all present uses
before an auction could take place. Assume the state condemns all
water rights and pays an estimated market value to each water right
holder. The state could then return a pro rata percentage of the
auction proceeds minus the cost of condemning rights to each water
right holder. Once the state estimates the total volume of water
available, it would hold a closed-seal bidding process where each water
user bids on the amount of water he or she wants to use. Since no user
would be aware of another user's bid, each bid would presumably
move toward the actual value of the use to the bidder. The sale would
convey right to use water, not the right to divert it. Any return flows
would have to be measured and could be re-auctioned during regular
auction cycles. Each new water user could divert, as he had in years
past. But the amount of water diverted, not the amount beneficially
used, would be the measure of rights.
A water auction under this proposal presumably would require the
abolition of the prior appropriation system. The right to use water
would be separated from the outdated rule of "capture," a logical
alternative for a resource difficult to "capture" in the traditional sense.
Large and wealthy municipalities would obviously have greater ability
to place large bids, and numerous transfers would put water rights into
many new hands. Consequently, the family farmer could potentially
lose out. Perhaps other areas of the country are better able to produce
agricultural commodities. The best way to find out where products in
a national economy ought to be produced is to have each user face the
actual social cost of water resources. The "next-best-use" is the one
which successfully bid for the water right.
This option would function well with the privatization of water
resource delivery. If private companies distributed water (particularly
municipal water), they could buy water rights via auction. The
company that best estimates its profitability, as reflected in its bid,
would succeed. Water prices would reflect the cost of purchasing the
water against the next best use and the delivery of the water to a user;
consumers would face the actual social cost of providing water; thirdparty effects, such as environmental concerns, would be included in
the auction system. Those wishing to protect an instream flow could
purchase it. Those who wanted drought protection could purchase it,
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by over-buying water rights.
Finally, taking the element of priority date and damage to other
users out of the system would turn water into a commodity and would
facilitate transfer. Each user would have an incentive to conserve
water because that which is conserved could be sold. Return flows
would offer a secondary market for water, which could be purchased
on an on-going basis. Ignoring the role that institutions play would be
catastrophic to a market system. Since government owned delivery
agencies have few incentives, the bureaucratic agencies would distort
the true price of water, and thus could damage the system. Implicit in
an auction system is that bids will reflect the actual social value of each
individual water user's contemplated use. State run institutions cannot
accurately measure the value of the actual contemplated use, since
their cost-benefit ratios often depend on the tax base and a host of
other considerations unrelated to the actual marginal social cost of
water. If state institutions for water delivery were privatized, then the
auction system would function nicely.
D. THE GOVERNMENTS MUST GET OUT OF THE WATER BUSINESS

Government delivery of water resources must end. Government
agencies are incapable of efficiently delivering water services. If
governments continue to use tax dollars to subsidize water services,
individual consumers will not face the social cost of water and will tend
to over-consume. Since government organizations respond to political
pressure and are responsible only to their constituency, their central
purpose becomes to provide services at the lowest cost. As a result,
pricing mechanisms do not reflect the true social cost of providing
such services.
The barriers to the transition from government to private
ownership are entrenched in western thinking and stem mostly from
fear of larger corporations. " [ M] ost water users believe that water is of
sufficient importance and complexity that its delivery cannot be
trusted to commercial institutions even when they are regulated."78
This fear, which founded the prior appropriation system, developed in
an age when the anti-trust laws had not even been contemplated,
much less codified. In the present system, the question of distributing
power between individuals and corporations is a question appropriate
for an anti-trust forum. Any implicit doctrinal assumptions in water
law that seek to influence the outcome of this distributive rights
question ought to be rejected.
One view of what would happen if the government were to sell off
its resources is the following:
In order to promote effective competition in the water industry along
with privatization, the ownership, modernization, and development
of the transmission main systems needs to be severed from the
78. Thompson, supra note 21, at 694.
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integrated water supply and wastewater services provided by other
private and competitive firms. Put differently, the unified water
supply and wastewater companies would provide water of various
qualities in a competitive market, but the pipeline systems would be
owned by separate, private water transmission companies. In this
context, we could view the separately controlled water transmission
systems as new options in the organization of water supply and use.
The separation could involve the creation of one or more pipeline
companies that would invest in pipeline networks and then rent the
distribution installations to water supply and wastewater treatment
companies, or directly charge the customer, depending on the
quantity and quality of water services and the area. Such a separation
of services would promote effective competition in the supply of
uality-graded water services and efficiency in managing the
dstribution networks.
While multiple firms may compete in
treatment and the supply of water of various qualities and provide
sewage services, other regulatedfirms would invest in the transmission79
main systems and rent them to the water supply companies.
This would allow for the functioning and operation of systems that
could deliver water in various qualities to users independent of
political boundaries, and thus better reflect the social cost of water.
State governments, obviously, would need to regulate the industry to a
varying degree.
The nuances of water privatization, such as those arising in Britain,
are beyond the scope of this document. It is important to realize that

the transition to a market system involves more than the transferring
of rights within the prior appropriation system. A true "market"
system is one where each user faces the marginal social cost of each
additional unit of use. Allowing governments to continue to deliver
water services that shield users from the actual marginal social costs of
staying in the shower five minutes longer, or of planting an acre of
high-water use landscaping, prevents the transition to a market system,
which could better determine efficiency than a group of planners in a
government office building.
V. CONCLUSION
The West has changed radically since the creation of the prior
appropriation doctrine. The prior appropriation doctrine guaranteed
survival to the original settlers cut off from food, information, and
other staples of life of which their geographic isolation deprived them.
In the modern day, the best water law is that which facilitates the
privatization of the water system so each individual user, both irrigator
and municipal customer, feels the price impacts of each additional
unit of water used. In this system, one can evaluate for himself how
much water is best used in the face of social cost.
This analysis identified three main changes that could better
allocate water resources. Two of them, clarifying vested rights and
allowing for the perfection of conserved water into use rights, are
79.
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probably the most politically acceptable solutions. The auction system
would require the overthrow of the prior appropriation doctrine, and
therefore would be less palatable politically at present. It is fairly clear
that the price of water in the West, where water is becoming more and
more scarce, is probably too low for the average user. It seems
demand is fairly inelastic at such low prices; otherwise, the average
consumptive use per user would probably be falling. That it is
increasing demonstrates that the actual social cost of water is greater
than the private cost of providing it.
When each consumer of water faces the actual social cost of water
brought about by the negotiation of competing uses, water use will
decrease. Only when the water law of the West is rewritten to include
the new reality will the saying in the rotunda of the Colorado Capitol
ring true, for a whole new generation of westerners.

POETRY
SELECTIONS OF POETRY BY JUSTICE GREG HOBBS
t

In Volume 3 / Issue 2 of the Water Law Review, we published a
selection of poems by Justice Hobbs. In the tradition of updates to
previous publications, we hope you enjoy this additional selection we
have made.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A DUCK
A duck don't know the difference
Between jurisdictional waters
And a pothole, if there's water
He'll land. Sometimes the law
Don't know the difference
Between a duck.

THAT THRONG OF SONGS
That throng of songs
Every New Year
You pack away,
With the fragrant wellSpent tree and silver
Tray of greetings,
Tuck a song where
You belong, then go on
Remembering its tune
In the waning and
The waxing moon,
In every thought that
Verges on a "No!"
'"Yes!" aglow,
Alights.
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TO A FRIEND WHO WOULD BE
SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
Lewis and Clark didn't really know where
They were going, they had a vacant
Map and reports of wondrous geography.
They said to each other at the outset
"Let's go on together, there is no other
I'd rather share the journey withl"
They got prepared for what they didn't
Know, how to keep their eyes open
And loved the land they were passing
Through and every living thing they saw.
They took what they needed to survive
And left the rest untouched, knowing
Others would stop where they had pushed
On. They had a needless fight with a bear.

YESTERDAY THE DENVER POST REPORTED
Yesterday the Denver Post reported
In its Sunday edition, "Intelligence
Found among many animals, New
Studies uncover their skills." I
Was grunting and scratching my
Ribcage, reading this. Apparently,
The brainiest share 99 percent of
Our DNA, can compute enough
To know that one and one is
More than one, can talk to each
Other, teach how tools can crack
A nut or make a cutting edge,
Recognize themselves in the mirror.
I read in Saturday's edition how
The missing 1 percent also learns
From the other chumps who aim rockets
At us, and we at them.
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SPLIT ROCK
just when you think the country
Desolate, a sweet creek bubbles up,
Grasses sprout, what you left behind
Can stay there, air is snappier here,
Light hurts you can see by.

GROUCHES
I've got a case full of grouches,
They like to scratch and shout,
Parade around the table picking
Fights, spitting spite in everybody's
Coffee cup. These grouches
Have heavy gobs of hair in their
Ears to filter all incoming thought.
Only the word or idea that registers
Maximum Irritability to the grouch
Gets through for revving all them fellow
Grouches up. Grouches pour vinegar
On conversations, shrivel buds
Before they bloom. But I get no relief
In letting my load of grouches out,
The more I do the more they breed
Their smelly deposits, and I'm running
Out of Ajax cleaning up. Next time
They try to snatch my tongue and
Hang more hair on my listening devices,
I'm stringing my fiddle for mountain tunes.
I'm fixing to make them grouches dance.

RAINBOWS
Rainbows fade the closer we get to them,
Greens and reds move into violets, mist
Pervades, the slanting sun cuts
In and out, our faces drip dew,
We feel treasured.
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WELCOME, RAIN!
Drip the gutters and the brick,
Drip the benches and the deck,
Drip the sidewalks and the street,
Drip the pathways and the park,
Drip the blossoms and the leaf,
Drip the grasses and the root,
Drip the pages and the book.

MANY RIVERS
Many rivers flow from the mountains,
All would head for the sea, I hear
Your tributary bubbling. Mine
Takes joy in knowing your
Flow also takes shape in the
Struggle that shapes making
Its own way off the mountain.

STORM
A terrible
Terrific storm rolls through
Our bedroom, breaking and flashing
Through the curtain we respectfully
Maintain.
Sparks fly about the sheets,
Boom punctuates boom,
Fear interrupts our felicity
As we separate, one staying, one going.
For how long?
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THE DAY THE MOUNTAINS SCREAM
An ordinary day half a continent away,
Oakbrush and aspen burn gold and scarlet,
Streams are lower and clearer, native trout
Settle below rocks to catch a nymph or
Hellgrammite. But bears are desperate,
They roam for food and scratch for dreams,
The day the mountains scream.
An ordinary day half a continent away,
Breakfast coffee and conversation,
Goodbye to family, the morning newspaper,
A subway ride, another cup of coffee,
Hello to colleagues, booting up, checking
Messages, making plans for client lunch,
The day the mountains scream.
An ordinary day half a continent away,
Lewis writes in his journal, marks fresh charts,
Hunters set out, other men point the tips
Of their long poles West and push upstream,
A native woman, her French husband guide them,
Pilgrims follow, churches, schools, the Grange,
The day the mountains scream.
An ordinary day half a continent away,
Moses, Muhammed, Christ, Siddartha,
Confucius, take up their walking staffs,
Into the hills, into the valleys, into the
Poisoned wells of the most hardened
Hearts, the peoples walk with them,
The day the mountains scream.
An ordinary day half a continent away,
The eagle and the raven land on peaks
And city streets, Daedalus and Icarus
Strap on their wings and launch, they
Do not know if air shall carry them,
They only dare to feel it will some day,
The day the mountains scream.
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The day the mountains scream
Is just an ordinary day, we wake,
We sleep, we work, we play, we
Dance, we scheme, we fight, we
Blame, we weep, we pray, we ask
Forgiveness, we forgive, we bless
An ordinary day half a continent away.

FISHERMAN'S KNOT
Lord, my hands tremble,
I must take off my glasses,
Hold the line to my eye
And twist three or four
Times. This space between
The loop, Lord, help me
Hold it here, grant me
Just a little more light
To thread the gap between
My thumb and forefinger,
Let me cinch my filament
To your swivel. Lord, I am
Complete, I hear the stream
Behind me continuing.

PTERODACTYL WINGS
Grandson wants you to make pterodactyl
Wings, so he can fly through blue bright waters,
Flouncing and gurgling, his digitals
Flaying the flanks of your would be wingspan.
Imported rivers, aren't they all? Through some
Aqueduct cut from the Colorado
Or the Rhone-3 to 5 feet,
Depth of this enraptured precious desert
Perrier, $2. 89 per liter. We drink
And swim and watch Shrek
In this San Diego motel room, wondering
What American westerners can learn
Re-inventing old world ogres into their
Own image and likeness and what's for lunch?

BOOK REVIEW
GREGORY M. SILKENSEN, THE FARMERS' HIGHLINE CANAL AND

RESERVOIR COMPANY: A CENTURY OF CHANGE ON CLEAR CREEK,

North Suburban Printing, Denver, Colorado (2000); 164pp;
softcover.
REVIEWED BYJOHN M. DINGESS
To borrow a clich6 from the popular press, this is a "must read" for
any water rights attorneys, engineers, and other professionals whose
practice deals in any way with Clear Creek.
The author was commissioned by the Farmers' High Line Canal
and Reservoir Company Board of Directors to write a history of the
company. Mr. Silkensen worked on the project simultaneously while
pursuing a Doctorate in History at the University of Colorado.
However, from the text, the hundreds of footnotes, the lengthy
appendix, the numerous photographs and the half dozen useful maps,
the reader quite quickly deduces this composition certainly became a
labor of love for the author.
The book is subdivided into five chapters. They provide a history
and understanding of not only the Farmers' High Line Canal system,
but also the interrelationship between that complex system, and other
mutual ditches and water rights located on Clear Creek.
Chapter One, The Origins of the Farmers' High Line Canal,
begins with the details of a May 1885 meeting between approximately
twenty men on a remote farm owned by Detrick Schrader in what was
then northern Arapahoe County. The group, composed of farmers
like Schrader and a few businessmen, wished to supply additional
water to their irrigated agricultural lands. It is truly astounding to note
that by the following January of 1886, this group had surveyed several
existing and proposed alternate canal routes, incorporated their
mutual ditch company, obtained funding and acquired what was
theretofore known as the Golden Canal, these accomplishments put
them in the position to deliver water during the following irrigation
season. One wonders if a group of investors and professionals today
could accomplish such an undertaking so as to have a major canal
system up and running in approximately'six months.
The initial chapter goes on to detail the history of the region
leading up to the incorporation of the Farmers' High Line Canal. The
text recites a wonderful lineage of both the physical system and owners
and operators of the system. Parts of this chapter are reminiscent of
Genesis 5:1-32 or Luke 4:24-38 with the details of who was a predecessor
in interest to whom. However, with the aid of an excellent illustration,
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the lineage of the physical facilities and the various owners thereof
clarifies what could easily be a hazy understanding of the interaction of
water rights on Clear Creek. The first chapter concludes with a
discussion of the Company's priorities and an excellent explanation of
the so-called "schedule," "statutory," and "stock water." Anyone who
has practiced on Clear Creek or who has dealt with Farmers' High
Line Canal shares knows the different types of water have different
characteristics and different values. This explanation is quite useful
for anyone who wishes to better understand these different classes of
Farmers' High Line Canal water rights.
The second chapter, entitled Fiscal Challenges, provides insight
not only to the early fiscal challenges facing the Farmers' High Line
Company, but also the financing challenges that any of the many ditch
companies of the state faced in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. An interesting discussion is presented regarding the
development of roads, and the often-heated debates between county
commissioners (those who in this era were most often responsible for
road building) and ditch companies regarding the bridging of ditches
and the allocation of costs therefor. The chapter also includes the
history of the first enlargement of the Farmers' High Line Canal
Company and how the company and its shareholders dealt with its first
stock assessment, something that did not occur until nine years after
the company was incorporated. While the annual assessment of the
shareholders in a mutual ditch company is common today, the text
explains that such was not common in the late nineteenth century.
Understanding this history gives one a new appreciation for the
accomplishments of this and other ditch companies while working
under such tight budgetary constraints.
Chapter Three discusses water scarcity. This discussion serves to
remind all readers that not only were 1950-1954 and other more
recent years lacking in precipitation, but also drought events have
consistently occurred throughout the modern history of this state and
will no doubt persist. A particularly intriguing element of this chapter
is a section dealing with the attempt to obtain administration of water
users in former Water District 23 during the first decade of the
twentieth century. Apparently, water rights users in the Upper South
Platte Basin would routinely ignore lawful administration and it was
not until after representatives of the Farmers' High Line Canal
Company and others formed a watchdog group known as Clear Creek
Valley Water Protective Association, that enough pressure was put on
the state water administrative officials that they took action. However,
District 23 administration, or lack thereof, continued to be a problem
It was somewhat humorous to note that
for five decades.
administration in District 23 was still lacking after the 1940s, and that it
was not until the Metro area cities of Denver, Thornton and Aurora
purchased a significant number of District 23 water rights before
legitimate administration occurred.
Chapter Four deals with the canal operation and water quality. In
the same way as the Internet and gauging stations that report using
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satellite telemetry have revolutionized water rights operations in the
last two decades, it is interesting to note that a similar impact was felt
with the development of Portland Cement (used to construct concrete
facilities to replaced wooden flumes and diversion works), the
automobile and the telephone in the reliability and cost effectiveness
of delivering the water.
The fourth chapter also details and provides a greater
understanding of the impact of the mining industry and the stress
between mineral extraction and agricultural production in Colorado.
One can scarcely imagine a better crucible to examine the stress
between these two occupations than Clear Creek with its mining
interests in Gilpin County and agricultural production occurring in
what was originally Arapahoe County and now Jefferson and Adams
Counties. Today, hardly any brief dealing with water quality issues
submitted to either the State Water Courts, the Water Quality Control
Division, or the Colorado Supreme Court fails to mention the seminal
case of Wilmore v. Chain O'Mines, 44 P.2d 1024 (Colo. 1934). Even
those who have read and cited Chain O'Mines on multiple occasions
will find the book's detail concerning the history of the case and the
interaction of the participants very interesting and informative.
The final chapter deals with the Farmers' Company's operations
and activities during modern times. The chapter titled Suburban
Growth in the Post War Era, details the effects of World War II and the
Post War period upon both agriculture and growth in the Metro
Denver area. The chapter also provides a fine history of the attempt to
condemn mutual ditch company water rights by the City of Thornton.
Finally, a candid discussion is made regarding the sale of Farmers'
High Line stock to various municipalities and the cities' use of the
water. Also mentioned is the modern problem of balancing the
maintenance of water quality in the canal, important to its use as a
municipal supply, with the competing demand for the canal to serve as
a drainage facility.
The book is fascinating and can be easily read within a few hours.
However, once read for the first time any practitioner who wishes to
better understand water rights in Clear Creek, will certainly keep this
book on his shelf as a reference and source of information for the
future.

BOOK NOTES
MARQ DE VILLIERS, WATER: THE FATE OF OUR MOST PRECIOUS
RESOURCE, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, N.Y. (2000);

313pp; $15.00; ISBN 0-618-03009-3, softcover.
Marq De Villiers' book, Water: The Fateof Our Most PreciousResource,
guides the reader through the realities of the status of water on the
planet. The book combines science, theory and personal experience
to provide a telling look at the fate of water and everything that
depends on it.
The book is divided into four sections, each with a theme that
carries through the chapters contained within. Part I, tiled The Where,
What and How Much of the Water World, introduces the concept that the
planet's water is in peril. It begins with the debate between Botswana
and Namibia in Africa, chosen because the problems of the small area
of Africa represent the status of water troubles around the world.
Aquifers diminishing, dropping water tables and alarm about
sustainability concern countries the world over, as well as increasing
population and increasing interstate tension about the fate of water.
Through stories of personal experience from different places around
the world, the imminent destruction of the ecosystem becomes
apparent. The supply of water is in peril everywhere; but it is not
merely supply, but management, allocation and distribution problems
that plague the world.
The first section continues with the science of water, discussing
where it came from and how much really exists. The solar system,
hydrologic cycle and the estimation of water on earth are discussed.
Problems such as aquifer depletion, groundwater over drafting and
water mining are introduced. The section concludes with a chapter on
the history of water, chronicling stories of the importance and the
significance of water from history, mythology, folklore, ancient Roman
times and the Bible.
Part II discusses the world of water from its natural existence to the
change and destruction of it caused by humans. Climate, weather and
water are all interrelated. Climate changes alter the hydrologic
systems.
Some climate changes are natural, but anthropogenic
processes have caused and continue to cause desertification and global
warming. Humans are changing the natural relationships between
climate, weather and water for the worse.
Changes are brought about by population growth and
industrialization.
In the past couple of centuries, growth and
industrialization have led to "gross pollution" and a dangerous threat
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to human health and the water supply. Examples from Russia,
Europe, North America, Africa, China, South America and Australia
demonstrate that countries and cultures across the world are all to
blame; destruction of natural water resources is common to all
societies. Different situations that contribute to the poisoning of the
water supply, from termite killing chemicals to ocean bound sewage
pipes are discussed, along with their consequences: waterborne
diseases, modified chemistry of ground water, contaminated rivers and
consequences in the oceans.
The next chapter presents stories of dams. Rationales in favor of
dams are discussed, followed by the "true economics of dams." Dams
affect wildlife, the environment and agriculture; they alter the flow
and temperature of rivers, the sediment loads, saline concentrations of
the rivers, cause silt build up and delta destruction. They also collapse.
Dams modernized irrigation, an ancient technique. The increased
Concentrated salt
saline levels dams create can poison crops.
accumulates, and a cycle begins that is difficult to break. The chapter
concludes with suggestions of how to cure this problem.
Shrinking aquifers are an area of great concern worldwide. Several
aquifers, including ones in Libya and the American West are discussed
in detail. Decreasing aquifers have "human, political and geopolitical
consequences" that must be dealt with before it is too late. Water
mining has become widespread and contributes to the depletion of
the aquifers.
Part III addresses The Politics of Water. Five chapters detail the
histories, politics and near wars over water, as well as the problems
with the natural water systems in different countries. The Middle East,
The Tigris-Euphrates System, and The Nile are discussed. The
Colorado River Basin is addressed, as well as the Rio Grande. Mexico
has experienced a great deal of problems because of the United States'
policies over water usage and allocation. Tension also exists between
the United States and Canada over the Great Lakes and other water
bodies. The disputes over the North American lakes and rivers has left
"Mexicans ... hoping for more water, the Canadians ... determined
on no less and Americans in the middle. Problems in China of
allocation, supply, water quality and management are also presented.
The final section of the book is dedicated to Solutions and
Mainfestos. Four ways of coping with the water crisis are proposed.
The first is to get more water. Suggestions include piping water, both
by land and by sea, melting icebergs, shipping water and
desalinization. Different methods of desalinization are introduced,
with discussion of the benefits (for example, it is cheaper than funding
a war over water). Desalinization has its detriments, however, such as
increasing greenhouse gases and cost.
The second strategy for coping with the crisis is to use less water
and decrease the demand. Human ingenuities from rainmakers to
dew, and fog collectors to fog drip irrigation have existed for a long
time. Agricultural industries can contribute by using controlled water
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stress like some wineries use. Wastewater recycling helps. But
technology is not enough to solve the crisis. Removing water subsidies
could lead to decreased demand by reflecting the true cost of water. It
could be priced so that waste hurts. But this too comes with a
detriment: the urban poor would not be able to afford water.
Controlling and reducing the world population would help
because fewer people would mean less demand. Some population
projections actually estimate that the population increase of India and
China will slow by the middle of this century. The surveys are hopeful,
but a population decrease would likely not be enough to save the fate
of the dwindling water supply.
The final strategy in dealing with the water crisis is to steal it from
others. "The solution to the problems of water is ultimately political."
Violence and war over water, which have been part of the history of
humankind, may decide who gets access to water. "Water wars might
be caused by human folly, but they might still be prevented by human
inventiveness.... We are not without weapons in these wars we are
waging against our own worst nature."
Water is very well written and easily readable. The combination of
science, trivia and personal stories present an enjoyable but important
look at the fate of the world's water resources.
Rachel M. Sobrero
G. EMLEN HALL, HIGH AND DRY: THE TEXAS-NEW MEXICO STRUGGLE
FOR THE PECOS RIVER, University of New Mexico Press,
Albuquerque, N.M. (2002); 304pp; $39.95; ISBN 0-8263-2429-0,
hardcover.
This book tells the story of the battle between Texas and New
Mexico over the water provided by the Pecos River. The river begins
in the Sangre de Cristo mountains, running through New Mexico then
Texas before itjoins the Rio Grande.
The story deals with the politics and personalities involved in the
court case, Texas v. New Mexico. The book describes the original
irrigators in the region, their attempts to harness the flows of the
Pecos River, and the effect of the case on the people involved. It
personalizes the people who rely on the river, as well as those involved
in the courtroom fight over apportionment of the river's flows.
Chapter One, Flying Court, introduces and sets the context for the
case, Texas v. New Mexico. The two states entered into a compact to
apportion flows from the Pecos River in 1948. In 1974 Texas claimed
that New Mexico had deprived Texas of 1,000,000 acre-feet of water
since the date of the compact. The Supreme Court allowed the suit to
proceed in 1976, appointing Judge Jean Breitenstein as Special Master.
Chapter Two, The Tracys' Dream of Carlsbad,discusses the Carlsbad
Irrigation District, which is the New Mexico agency closest to the Texas
state line with control over Pecos water use. The chapter discusses the
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efforts of early settler Francis G. Tracy, and later his family, to harness
and utilize the water in the Pecos River. The history puts a human
face on the apportionment battle, and allows the reader to empathize
with the people that a water decision impacts.
Chapter Three, RoyceJ Tipton Mismeasures the Pecos, deals with one
of the central figures in the 1948 compact between the states. Royce
Tipton was a water engineer from Denver who first applied existing
science (surface water hydrology) to the flows in the Pecos River. He
used this scientific basis to hammer out the Pecos River Compact of
1948, and then spent the rest of his career trying to get the river to
follow the formula and scientific standards he had created. The Pecos
did not cooperate with the scientific formula, and this contributed to
the conflict between the states.
Chapter Four, Morgan Nelson's Pecos River World, introduces the
Nelson family and the Roswell artesian basin in New Mexico. The
Nelsons rely on groundwater wells to irrigate their farmland, and have
been a presence in the area since the 1910s.
However, the
groundwater intercepted by the wells in the basin would run into the
Pecos River, but for the Nelson's and others interceptions. Once
Texas and New Mexico began to litigate, the water used by Roswell
farmers became an issue.
Chapter Five, Leave it to Steve, focuses on New Mexico State
Engineer Steve Reynolds. Reynolds was the state engineer from 1955
until his death in 1990. An expert in water use and the water laws in
New Mexico, he championed the state's cause in Texas v. New Mexico.
Chapter Six, Jean Breitenstein Tackles the 1947 Condition, discusses the
approach Judge Breitenstein used in determining whether New
Mexico had violated the 1948 compact. He repeatedly emphasized
that it would be up to Texas to show that New Mexico had caused,
through human activities, negative departures from the 1947
condition of the river's flow. Judge Breitenstein put the burden on
Texas to show that any flow departures were caused by the activities of
man; otherwise, New Mexico was not responsible.
Chapter Seven, The Presumption of Charles j Meyers, introduces
Judge Breitenstein's successor. Judge Breitenstein resigned his
position as Special Master in 1984 and was replaced by Charles Meyers.
Meyers almost immediately reversed Breitenstein's approach that the
burden was on Texas in the case, and went with the presumption that
New Mexico owed Texas water; the question was simply how much.
Chapter Eight, New Mexico Stumbles, discusses New Mexico's
attempts beginning in 1990 to meet their obligations to Texas under a
new water manual. The case settled for $14 million in damages, paid
to Texas by New Mexico, and required a new method of determining
how much water needed to be delivered to the Texas state line.
Chapter Nine, The Value of Water,wraps up the book, discussing the
impact that Texas v. New Mexico had on the people and communities
that rely on the Pecos River.
John P. Wood
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CHAR MILLER, ED., FLUID ARGUMENTS: FIVE CENTURIES OF WESTERN
WATER CONFLICT, The University of Arizona Press, Tucson, Ariz.
(2001); 3 5 4 pp; $45.00; ISBN 0-8165-2061-5, hardcover.
Fluid Arguments examines western water use from a variety of
historical perspectives, using ethnography, geography and political
science to explore development and distribution of water in the desert
southwest, and suggesting legal and political trends for the future.
This publication developed out of a 1998 conference on water in the
American West, sponsored by the American Society for Environmental
History. The conference brought together scholars, citizens and water
managers to discuss past water policies, present problems and possible
future solutions. Editor Char Miller divides the book into five parts,
beginning with land and water conflicts created by arrival of Spanish
and Mexican settlers in New Mexico and Arizona around 1530.
Subsequent parts discuss Native American reserved rights, the
influence of agricultural interests on water law and policy, western
water projects from the 1920s to the present, and implications for
future water uses in a western service economy.
Part One, Land and Water on New Spain's Frontiers,begins with an
article by Jesus F. de la Teja, an associate professor of history at
Southwest Texas State University.
The article details efforts of
sixteenth century Spanish colonists to develop agricultural settlements
on the borderland between Mexico and what is now Texas. Shelly C.
Dudley, a former senior historical analyst for the Salt River Project in
Arizona, looks at early irrigation development in south-central
Arizona, examining the interaction between Spanish missionaries and
the Pima Indians. Dudley suggests that the result was application of
existing irrigation technologies to new crops, like wheat and legumes,
which increased productivity of Pima lands. However, by the 1860s,
the influx of settlers was too great to adequately sustain demands of
the Euro-Americans and the Pimas on the area's limited water
resources, and the Pimas eventually lost control of their water supplies.
Dudley argues without water, the Pimas also lost control over their
future. In her article on water rights in the Chamas region of New
Mexico, Sandra K. Mathews-Lamb analyzes judicial records from the
late twentieth century, concluding many early adjudications of
property rights were keyed to water rights. However, many of these
records have been inconsistently translated or destroyed, complicating
modern determinations of water rights under New Mexico's
appropriative system.
Part Two, The Native American Struggle for Water, details conflicts
between indigenous tribes and non-native settlers for control of
limited water resources in the desert southwest and along the Pacific
Coast. An article by Bonnie Lynn-Sherow chronicles changing Kiowa
perceptions of water from early views of the resource as a supernatural,
malevolent force to a contemporary understanding of water as a tool
in modern ranching operations. Donald J. Pisani's article on the
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federal government's Indian water policy details the largely
unsuccessful attempt to assimilate Native Americans into the
mainstream capitalist economy. Pisani points out most irrigation
projects in the West used Indian labor for construction, but the
projects mainly benefited white farmers. Further, Indian uses of water
were inconsistent with the prior appropriation doctrine. Thus, Native
Americans were unable to perfect either new or existing rights in
court. Alan S. Newell, a cofounder and principal of Historical
Research Associates, surveys tribal reserved rights and general
adjudications in New Mexico under the Winters doctrine. This doctrine
gave the federal government responsibility for securing water supplies
on federal reservations. Newell details the twenty-year court battle of
the Mescalero Apache Tribe in New Mexico to resolve contemporary
questions involving reserved rights on federal Indian lands. Newell
argues that reserved rights under Winters implicitly included supplies
adequate to maintain existing and future agricultural and stock uses by
Indian communities. Daniel McCool, a professor of political science
and director of the American West Center at the University of Utah,
provides an overview of late twentieth century water right negotiations
between tribes, western states and the federal government. McCool
suggests that tribes might use their federal reserved rights as a means
of regaining control over land and water rights lost in the early
twentieth century.
Part Three, Agricultural Conundrums, begins with an article by
James E. Sherow, an associate history professor at Kansas State
University. Sherow discusses western cattle drives of the 1860s to 1880s
from an ecological perspective, and argues that the Chisholm Trail can
be viewed as a short-lived ecosystem, bridging the gap between early
Indian uses of land and water and the present western agricultural
landscape. An article by Brad F. Raley, a doctoral student at the
University of Oklahoma, details early efforts of private ditch companies
to provide water to farmers and ranchers in Colorado's Grand Valley.
Raley concludes the engineering and financial complexities of these
early irrigation projects led state and federal governments to assist
local entities in arid land reclamation. John P. Tiefenbacher, an
associate professor of geography at Southwest Texas State University
looks at similar efforts in the Lower Rio Grand Valley in the late
nineteenth century. Tiefenbacher examines historical land irrigation
and fertilization techniques as providing an historical framework for
understanding present water contamination problems in the Lower
Rio Grande Valley. Thomas C. Schafer, an assistant professor of
Geography at Fort Hays University, provides a county-by-county study
of cropping practices in southwestern Kansas, linking advances in
irrigation technologies to development of more diverse farming
practices. John Opie, a founder of the American Society for
Environmental History, looks at the transformation of the Dust Bowl
regions of Kansas and the Texas-Oklahoma panhandle from a
Expanding on an argument originally
cartographic perspective.
advanced by John Wesley Powell in the late nineteenth century, Opie
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suggests that it is time to re-map the American West, designating new
boundaries based on the extent and quality of natural resources
available to support human needs.
Opie concludes accurate
representations of existing ecosystems would allow communities to
plan more accurately for future development.
Part Four, Dam those Waters, focuses on the effects of New Deal Era
public works projects on water development in the West. Donald C.
Jackson, a teacher at Lafayette College, emphasizes viability of local
dam-building projects as alternatives to federally dominated systems of
water development. Jackson argues that these projects are not only
more cost-effective than their federal counterparts, but are also more
responsive to regional water concerns. Mark Harvey, an associate
professor of history at North Dakota State University, looks at the
continuing environmental and social effects of large-scale western
water projects. Harvey points out that these projects provided
employment and cheap energy to fuel western development, while at
the same time degrading ecosystems, uprooting established
communities and changing flows of existing watercourses. Thus,
Harvey argues development of western water came at a high social and
environmental price. Raul M. Sanchez, Special Assistant to the
President for Diversity and Human Rights at the University of Idaho,
Moscow, concludes this part of Fluid Arguments with an article on
Mexico's El Cuchillo Dam project. Sanchez notes the willingness of
both Mexico and the United States to tolerate transboundary harms
caused by dam projects in the hope of increasing economic and
industrial growth. Sanchez contends the harms to individuals and
communities on both sides of the border can only be remedied by
enforceable, international claims connected with environmental
human rights.
Part Five, The Coming Fight, consists of a single article by Hal K.
Rothman, a professor of history at the University of Nevada-Las Vegas.
Rothman suggests that the western economy is shifting away from
agriculture and towards service-based industries. Rothman argues that
the future of the west lies in water-based tourism, requiring new
regional water allocation strategies.
Fluid Arguments brings together a diversity of viewpoints on both
past and future sources of conflict in western water law. The content
provides a framework for understanding the interplay of social,
political and environmental forces shaping water allocation policies in
the American West. The content provides invaluable historical
perspective to many of the issues facing practicing water lawyers.
Alan Curtis
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OREGON TROUT, ED., OREGON SALMON: ESSAYS ON THE STATE OF

FISH AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM, (with an Afterword by

GovernorJohn Kitzhaber) Oregon Trout, Portland, Or. (2001);
1 7 5pp; $15.00; ISBN 0-9709798-0-0, softcover.
There are four species of Pacific salmon in the waters of Oregon
today along with two species of Pacific trout. Pictured on the cover of
Oregon Salmon, and described before the Table of Contents, is the
Chinook salmon, Oregon's state fish. The book is divided into five
sections, each beginning with a picture and information regarding the
five other species of Pacific salmon and trout in Oregon. The species
included are the Chum salmon, the Coho salmon, the Sockeye
salmon, the Sea-Run Cutthroat trout and the Steelhead.
Section One, Looking Backward, contains four essays that examine
the past and the influence the Pacific salmon have had on the spirit
and culture of Oregon.
The first essay, "Swimming among the Ruins" by John Daniel,
discusses the history and probable evolution of salmonids. Daniels
goes on to discuss how flooding has effected salmon evolution and
how human involvement has, in recent eras, changed flooding
patterns and damaged salmonid habitat.
The following essay by Rick Rubin, entitled "The Chinook People
and the Salmon," turns to the cultural impact that salmon have had on
one particular population. The Chinooken speaking people of the
Columbia River basin was a population almost entirely dependent on
salmon and the other forms of wildlife that followed the salmon up
river. Salmon thus took on a meaningful role in the mythology and
spirituality of these people.
"The Historical and Cultural Meaning of Salmon," by William G.
Robbins, examines the economic and industrial changes that
metamorphosed salmon fishing and habitat in the Pacific Northwest.
The growth of the agriculture, mining and lumber industries, along
with a growing salmon market, had a profound effect on the habitat of
salmon in the Pacific Northwest. Robbins presents the questions
regarding the development of the Columbia River and its possible
effect on salmon populations as they were presented in 1941.
Section One closes with a call to action by Elizabeth Woody in
"Why I Love With Admiration Every Salmon I See." Woody lends a
personal and historical interpretation to the depletion of Pacific
Northwest salmon populations. She addresses her ancestral reliance
on salmon, and contrasts this directly to the current status of the
Columbia River as the most polluted and radioactive waterway in the
world. The options for action are simple, explains Woody: we can
allow current trends to continue, though we have already recognized a
problem, which will surely lead to more salmon species extinction, or
we can take drastic action to replenish salmon populations and repair
their habitat.
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Section Two, Caught Between the Old West and the New, looks at how
the settling of the west set a tone for development, resource
management and use that clashes with current attempts to protect
salmon.
In "The Politics of Saving Salmon In the New American West,"
Angus Duncan presents the conflict between industry and
environmentalists. Duncan traces the way resource management in
the West has changed through the years, but suggests that in spite of
changes in goals, the conflict is still created by the clash between the
protection of natural systems and the need for economic activity.
Duncan proposes that older western management institutions are
finally being replaced by new systems that are more inclined to protect
natural ecosystems.
Reed R. Benson next provides a brief summary of the prior
appropriation system and Oregon state water regulation in "First in
Time, Last in Right: How Oregon Water Law Fails Salmon." Benson
acknowledges the groundbreaking efforts Oregon law has used to
protect salmon, although these efforts have accomplished little so far.
Benson offers three suggestions. First, create a state water agency that
has the necessary resources and political will to solve the problem.
Second, incorporate a program to acquire senior water rights and
convert them to in-stream uses. Third, improve public awareness and
citizen participation.
In "Dangerous Passage: Oregon's Salmon and the Hydroelectric
System," Phillip R. Mundy lays out the background of hydroelectric
dam development in Oregon, and how it has effected salmon
populations. He gives a salmon's eye view of the obstacle course that
Mundy also discusses mitigation
a hydroelectric dam creates.
techniques that have been incorporated in some dams to aid
anadromous fish in their passages past the dam.
Section Three, The Salmon'sJourney, outlines the complex nature of
the salmon life cycle and the biological needs for species success.
In "Pacific Salmon Life Histories," Jim Lichatowich explains the
correlation between the historical genetic diversity of salmon and their
ability to adapt to environmental stresses. Hatchery or domesticated
salmon runs lack genetic diversity, and Lichatowich believes that no
matter how many hatcheries are utilized, the recovery of salmon will
fail until some natural pathways through the Oregon riverscape are
restored.
Gordon H. Reeves and James R. Sedell address the importance of
forests to quality habitat in their essay "The Role of Oregon Forests in
Restoring and Maintaining Salmon Populations." Forests provide the
raw materials that make streams and rivers productive habitats.
Though lower portions of the watershed are often prime agricultural
or urban areas, salmonid riparian habitat can be recaptured only
through re-connection to forests throughout the watershed.
The final essay in Section Three is "Ocean Conditions and Salmon
Runs" by William Pearcy. Pearcy introduces the seasonal and cyclical
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changes of ocean climate that can drastically effect the population of
anadromous fishes. From upwelling to El Nifios, the effects can be
great, but little scientific data is actually known. New studies are
underway to learn more about the effects of oceanic climate changes
on Oregon's salmon.
Section Four, No Simple Answers, examines management issues for
both the immediate and long-term futures, while recognizing that the
vast alterations to salmonid habitat that have already occurred are in
many ways irreversible.
In "The Enigma of Salmon Hatcheries," Earnest L. Brannon
discusses salmon hatcheries in the Pacific Northwest and how they
have failed to restore salmon. Brannon suggests that the unique
nature of salmon allows them to develop behavior patterns consistent
with their specific environment. Hatcheries must therefore be more
like natural habitat for artificially propagated salmon to have a
successful introduction to natural runs.
In "Bottlenecks, Barges, and Super Fish: Rethinking Conservation
of Estuaries and Salmon," Daniel L. Bottom and Charles A. Simenstad
evaluate estuarine experimentation and its flaws. The amount of time
that a salmon spends in an estuary environment varies by species and
life-history pattern. Hatchery stock introduction has diluted the
natural populations, and instead of solving genetic bottlenecking, has
further simplified the gene pool. The authors suggest that the only
answer is to re-establish natural estuaries and hydrologic connections
to estuarine wetlands.
Dixon H. Landers discusses the importance of the fresh water
system in his essay "Willamette River Main Corridor Restoration: What
is Important to Salmon?" Landers believes that the major conflict
between a natural river ecosystem and human development is a
differing aspect of time. A river system is full of change, but it has
been a gradual change that salmon have evolved with and can flourish
through. Landers further discusses how man-made alterations to the
river often simplify it by removing precious sediment and reducing
connectivity between the river and the surrounding watershed. The
author presents suggestions for how restoration may be achieved, but
emphasizes that a social will to restore the river is necessary first.
Patricia Snow offers a look at Oregon's land use planning system in
"Oregon's Land-Use Planning: Does it Protect Salmon and Water
Resources?" Oregon has one of the most extensive land use planning
programs in the nation, but Snow suggests that it must become even
more aggressive in protecting habitat through use of protective zoning
to corridors, wetlands and water bodies. Snow also emphasizes the
need for habitat enhancement, landowner initiatives and public
education.
Melissa Madenski presents her experience with a local Oregon
creek in "Who Do You Represent?" The surrounding community
expected her to pick a side and represent someone involved as a party.
This expectation made Madenski recognize that there is not just one
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party responsible for the decline of wild salmon populations in
Oregon, and that salmon will not be restored until opponents can stop
pointing the finger and work together.
Section Five, Seeking the Balance, looks to leveling human needs
with the qualitative and quantitative needs for salmon habitat.
In "Life as a Watershed Leader," Robert Stubblefield introduces us
to the many passionate, informed Oregonians that comprise ninetytwo watershed councils in Oregon. The North Fork Council, for
example, brings together tribal, timber, ranching and environmental
interests for monthly meetings. Though watershed councils are
relatively new, the meeting of such various interests represents one of
Oregon's best chances at improving watershed management and
restoring salmon.
Through "Of Salmon, Jobs and Equity," Bob Van Dyk and Phil
Ruder address the disproportionate cost of salmon restoration that
rural areas will have to bear. They suggest, among other things, the
use of economic trade offs for hard hit rural areas so that the proper
balance between economy and salmon habitat can be found.
"Can Law Save Salmon?" is the question that Daniel J. Rohlf
attempts to answer in his brief summary of how law has impacted
salmon. Rohlf begins with the earliest legal treatment of salmon,
which is found in American Indian treaties, and ranges to current legal
efforts. He concludes that law alone will not be enough; people must
adjust their lives to allow for salmon recovery before the law will have
the ability to protect or restore salmon.
Richard N. Williams is the next author featured with "RefugiaBased Conservation Strategies: Providing Safe Havens in Managed
River Systems." This essay traces the acceptance of scientific analysis in
the early 1990s and the new approach to recovery that focused on the
interaction between fish and their habitat. Williams lays out a practical
approach wherein wildlife reserves or salmon refuges serve as a hub in
the preservation and restoration of remaining viable salmon stock.
Authors Bruce Taylor and Sara Vickerman address "The Role of
Private Lands in Salmon Restoration Efforts." They conclude that
conservation mechanisms relying solely on public land will probably
not be enough. Options for management and regulation of private
lands are presented, and admittedly, political will and financial means
for any selected effort will be expensive, difficult, and must occur soon.
Mary Scurlock shifts the restoration effort back to public lands in
"Where the Wild Things Are: Federal Lands in the New Millennium."
Though natural lands are incredibly valuable, they too have become
environmentally degraded. She suggests that federal lands are the
natural anchor for wild salmon, and calls for the increased use of
policy for habitat protection on federal lands.
"The Importance for Anadromous Salmonids of Low-Gradient,
Unconstrained Stream Reaches" by Thomas Nickelson, Jeffrey
Rodgers, and Kelly Moore, suggests that the focus of salmon habitat
restoration should be the low-gradient unconstrained stream reaches.
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Low elevation stream valleys were often the first areas developed, and
development has constrained the streams. The answer again is
suggested to be a reconnection of the stream to its flood plain.
The final essay concluding Section Five is "So What's the Deal With
Community - Based Salmon Restoration?" by Jay Nicholas, the
principal author and leader of the Oregon Plan for Salmon and
Watersheds. Nicholas admits that volunteerism alone will not be
enough to solve the salmon problem in Oregon. Regulation alone will
also be insufficient. Together however, volunteerism and regulation
are greater than the sum of their parts, but all Oregonians must be
personally, spiritually and economically committed to the challenge.
Oregon Salmon concludes with an Afterword by Oregon Governor
John Kitzhaber entitled "The Oregon Ethic in a Global Context."
Governor Kitzhaber appeals to evolution and the place of man in the
chain of life when he charges us all to step up and fulfill our
preservation and restoration obligations to future generations.
Erika Delaney Lew
JEFFERY ROTHFEDER, EVERY DROP FOR SALE: OUR DESPERATE BATLE
OVER WATER IN A WORLD ABOUT TO RUN OUT, Penguin Putman

Inc., New York, N.Y. (2001); 205pp; $24.95; ISBN 1-58542-114-6,
hardcover.
Water is the one thing on earth that nearly all living creatures
cannot survive without. However, as population increases and more
developing countries emerge, water is becoming scarce in many parts
of the world. In Every Drop For Sale, Jeffery Rothfeder addresses the
issue of the growing scarcity of water, and the need for all countries of
the world to make significant changes in the way they consume water.
Population increases occurring in many areas of the world will make
providing clean water to all people extremely difficult. Rothfeder
believes that water is becoming the oil of the twenty-first century. The
value of water has become so significant that conflict and war have
already broken out in countries where there is not enough clean water
for people to drink. Every Drop ForSale offers an informative look into
the impending crisis, and offers the reader a basis to begin thinking
about how they may support positive change.
In Chapter One, Rothfeder focuses on dams and their impact on
water throughout the world. Although dams are created to control
water and create power, they can create devastating problems.
In Chapter Two, Rothfeder tells a story of a trip into the desert
where a project is planned to extract water to supply Southern
California. Rothfeder finds it ironic that in their scramble to find a
future water supply, California is resorting to locations in the desert.
Chapter Three focuses on the implication of considering water a
right compared to a need. If water is a "right," then all governments

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 5

have the responsibility to ensure that every citizen has access to clean
water. Rothfeder gives examples of current situations where tension
exists between countries over water. The examples illustrate a growing
concern that without a universal right, people will go to war over
water.
Chapter Four describes the growing trend of private companies
taking over water supplies in developing nations. Privatization of water
carries both supporters and dissenters. Rothfeder develops both sides
of the argument, and shows the struggles that each side has in the face
of a diminishing water supply.
In Chapter Five, Rothfeder introduces a new trend of shipping
water by bag to areas of the world in need. Shipping water allows
desperate areas to be supplied with water, however conflicts are now
arising regarding the sources of the shipped water.
Chapter Six touches upon some of the environmental concerns
surrounding the water dilemma. Specifically, Rothfeder focuses on
the detrimental impact development and growth has had on Florida's
water supply, and the damage done to Florida's Everglades. Efforts are
now being made to correct the problems caused by past development,
To
however new projects will continue to present difficulties.
illustrate, Rothfeder describes impending problems caused by the
Three Gorges Dam in China, which is currently under construction.
This chapter stresses the importance of correcting old problems and
ensuring that mistakes are not repeated.
In Chapter Seven, Rothfeder goes deeper into the water conflict,
and stresses that many of these conflicts involve actors on a local level.
Rothfeder examines a local example of the effect dams have on
salmon populations throughout the United States.
Chapter Eight reinforces the importance of water for all life on
earth, and the need to research and work on the growing water
problem. Rothfeder emphasizes that funds need to be used more
efficiently on water projects in order to deal with the impending crisis.
Every Drop For Sale provides excellent insight and establishes an
understandable guide to water issues involving the entire world.
Rothfeder not only explains the problems, but also poses possible
solutions, leaving the reader feeling as though corrections can be
made to avoid a worldwide crisis.
Colleen M. Cooley
PAUL F. SCODARI, WETLANDS PROTECTION: THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS,

Environmental Law Institute, Washington, D.C. (1990); 89pp.;
$28.00; ISBN 0-911937-32-3, soft cover.
One problem environmental policy makers routinely face is how to
protect wetlands from being exploited by unwise development. Even
though their value is widely recognized, wetlands continue to be lost at
alarming rates to agriculture, urban development and other
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development projects. In his report, Wetlands Protection: The Role of
Economics, Paul F. Scodari looks at the science of wetland valuation and
the principles and methods for valuing wetlands, and then makes
conclusions and recommendations for the future.
Chapter One begins by giving the reader a background of the
federal government's role in wetlands regulation, focusing on the role
of the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"), which is
responsible for evaluating and constructing projects such as dams,
levees and canals. The author then discusses the Corps' current
cost/benefit framework, and its flaws. He briefly identifies problems
with the current framework related to economic, scientific and
political issues. Scodari concludes the chapter with a discussion about
the theme of his report, which is, "[to explore] the use of modern
economics to improve wetland development decision making, focusing
on the barriers to adequate economic valuation of wetlands."
Chapter Two deals with the science of valuing wetlands. It begins
by giving the definition of wetlands, and then moves on to discuss the
major causes and trends concerning the loss of wetlands. The author
points out that the major reason for wetland loss is the expansion of
agricultural activities, and that the recent trends show the rate of
wetland loss is decreasing. Next, the author discusses the major goods
wetlands provide that benefit human beings, specifically: (1)
intermediate goods, such as water supply and storage; (2) final wetland
goods, such as fishing, hunting, or scenic values; and (3) future
wetland goods, which might include flora and fauna that could
provide new medical cures. The chapter also discusses the ecological
factors that produce those goods, such as groundwater recharge and
discharge, nutrient retention and removal, and wildlife habitat
support. Scodari ends the chapter with a brief discussion of the
scientific barriers that prevent accurate valuation of wetlands.
Next, Chapter Three, discusses the principles and values used to
value non-market wetland goods. Scodari begins by asserting that
because owners of wetlands cannot recoup the value of the benefits
that wetlands provide to society, the market system is not able to
allocate wetlands efficiently and therefore owners find it more
profitable to develop their land. The author defines the term
"economic value," and discusses the need to value wetlands in both
their pre and post development stages. Scodari then takes an in-depth
look at the different methodologies currently used to value wetlands,
such as the Net Factor Income Method, the Travel Cost Method and
the Contingent Valuation Method.
The chapter concludes by
identifying barriers to wetland valuation, such as the extensive data
requirements, complexity and costs.
Chapter Four discusses the implementation of wetland valuation,
focusing on federal laws and guidelines. The chapter begins by
identifying the types of federal projects that can have negative effects
on wetlands and describes some of their impacts. The author moves
on to discuss how the government, and, in particular, how the Corps
uses the guidelines promulgated by the Water Resource Council
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("WRC") to conduct a cost/benefit analysis for individual projects.
Scodari looks in detail at the four accounts the WRC guidelines
suggest setting up to help with the cost/benefit analysis, which include
the National Economic Development Account, the Environmental
Quality Account, the Regional Economic Development Account, and
the Other Social Effects Account. Scodari ends the chapter with a
discussion of the political and institutional barriers to wetland
valuation, which include the fact that the guidelines are structured to
value market goods over non-market environmental goods, and the
fact that there has been a longstanding, nationwide preference for
economic growth at the expense of environmental protection.
Chapter Five deals with the federal system for assessing damage to
public resources. The chapter begins with a discussion about how
public natural resources are allocated. It then moves on to discuss the
damage assessment provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). In analyzing
the damage assessment provisions in CERCLA, the author engages in a
detailed review of type A regulations, designed to calculate damages
for wildlife mortality and closure of recreational areas, and type B
regulations, which set out guidelines to be used when the type A
model does not apply. The chapter ends with an assessment of the
CERCLA framework, and a comparison between the WRC guidelines
and the damage assessment provisions in CERCLA.
In the final chapter, Chapter Six, the author gives his
recommendations for the future. Scodari contends that what is
needed is better science and reform of the administrative framework
for valuing wetland outputs, not radical new economics. Regarding
methodological improvements, Scodari suggests improving biological
and economic databases, and improving communication among
wetland scientists, economists, and decision makers.
As for
administrative reforms, Scodari suggests that the WRC guidelines
should be amended and made mandatory.
David M. Jacob
GREG SHAPLAND, RrVERS OF DISCORD, St. Martin's Press, N.Y. (1997);
183pp; $59.95; ISBN 0-312-16522-6, hardcover.
The Middle East and North Africa comprise one of the driest
regions in the world. In a region already inundated with ethnic and
religious conflicts, the issue of water is yet one more factor that has the
potential to plunge the region into wide-scale conflict. In Rivers of
Discord, Greg Shapland provides his readers with an in-depth view of
the region's water resources and potential for conflicts, while also
exploring ways to resolve those conflicts.
Chapter One is an introduction to the region's water sources and
politics. The author begins by pointing out that the Middle East is the
most arid of the world's major regions, and because of that, when it
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comes to water, the nations in the region are highly suspicious of each
other. He then discusses the fact that most countries in the region
depend on water from outside their borders, and points out that there
are currently no effective regional structures that deal with water. The
chapter moves on to discuss the issue of water resources, pointing out
that the region's resources are coming under ever increasing pressure
from population growth, urbanization and increased expectations for
higher standards of living. Shapland then states the purpose of his
book, which is to consider the present state of disputes between
Middle Eastern states over water, and to consider how those disputes
may develop. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the
difficulty of finding precise, reliable data on the region's water
resources.
Chapter Two deals with water in the Arab-Israeli dispute. It begins
by providing a background of the dispute, beginning with the Zionist
movement and ending with the division of lands and the founding of
Israel. Next, Shapland surveys the resources in question, which are:
(1) the headwaters of the Jordan River (the Dan, the Banias, and the
Hasbani); (2) Lake Tiberias; (3) the Yarmouk River; (4) the lower
Jordan River; (5) the Litani River; and (6) the groundwater contained
in both a mountain aquifer and the aquifer under the Mediterranean
coast. The chapter then moves on to survey the period of time from
the founding of Israel until the 1967 War. Shapland points out that
during this time, it was Israel's intention to "make the desert bloom."
During this period, the countries in the region tried to cooperate on a
regional scale, but even the Johnston Plan, which was an equitably
designed plan devised by the United States, could not be agreed upon.
According to the author, it was this failure to work on a regional scale
that led Israel and the Arab countries to take unilateral actions that
directly led to the 1967 War. The chapter then looks at the time
period of 1967 until the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991. The crux
of this section focuses on Israel's territorial gains in the 1967 War, and
how those gains enabled Israel to monopolize the waters it had control
over in the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights. Moving on, the
author next discusses the time period of Madrid to the present.
Shapland touches on the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel,
which was signed in 1994 and contains a detailed apportionment of
shared water resources, and an agreement to work cooperatively to
He also discusses the 1995 Interim
find new water resources.
Agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, which
contains a recognition by Israel of Palestinian water rights, and
establishes a joint water committee. The author then discusses the
role of the Syrians and the Lebanese, who have not engaged in any
meaningful discussions with Israel pertaining to water. The chapter
closes with a discussion of future challenges pertaining to the ArabIsraeli dispute. Shapland discusses the need to respond to expanding
populations by increasing water supply through both conventional and
unconventional methods, and through conservation.
Chapter Three deals with the Nile. Shapland begins by pointing
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out that ten countries share the Nile basin, and although the Nile is
one of the world's longest rivers, it carries seven times less water than
the Mississippi. The chapter discusses how the Nile has been regulated
in the past, and goes through a chronology of major works on the Nile.
Shapland then moves on to discuss the quality of the Nile's water,
which at most points on the Nile is very high, excepting for the stretch
that runs through Egypt. The next issue presented is that of treaties
and disputes. The author begins in the late 1800s with Britain's
agreements with Italy and Ethiopia, and progresses in time up to the
agreements made in the early 1990s between Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan
and Uganda. Next, the chapter discusses the new demands facing the
countries in the Nile basin that will lead to increased pressure on water
resources, such as population growth, increased agriculture, an
expansion of industry to create new jobs, and climate change.
Shapland suggests several options to deal with the new demands, such
as increased use of groundwater, lowering Lake Nasser, and re-using
water.
The next chapter, Chapter Four, surveys the situation in the TigrisEuphrates basin. This chapter begins, much like the others, with a
brief geo-political background of the basin, which is shared by Turkey,
Syria, Iran and Iraq. The author points out that the Tigris and
Euphrates did not become international rivers until the breakup of the
Ottoman Empire after World War I. Shapland then traces the history
of agreements among the riparian states, beginning with a 1920
agreement between Britain and France, who were acting on behalf of
Iraq and Syria. Next, the chapter deals with Syria and Iraq's fears that
their plans to use the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates will be dashed
by upstream Turkey's plans to make use of the waters to develop the
economic infrastructure of south-eastern Anatolia (known as the "GAP
project"). The chapter then moves on to discuss the impact of the
GAP project, and evaluates the needs of Iraq and Syria. Shapland
concludes that Iraq and Syria both probably have less to fear from the
GAP project than they believe. The author ends the chapter by
predicting that until a trilateral agreement is reached, Iraq and Syria
will try to put financial, and in some rare instances military, pressure
on Turkey to keep Turkey from developing the GAP project as
planned.
Chapter Five is extremely short. It covers the Orontes River, also
known as the Asi River. The author begins by stating that the Orontes
is a small river in comparison to the Tigris and the Euphrates, but it is
still very important. Turkey, Syria and Lebanon share the river. The
chapter begins by surveying the situation with regard to Syria and
Lebanon, who in 1994 signed an agreement to divide the waters of the
Orontes between them. The author goes on to discuss the situation
between Turkey and Syria, which is intriguing because it is the exact
opposite of the situation on the Tigris and the Euphrates (there,
Turkey is upstream, while on the Orontes, Syria is upstream).
Chapter Six deals with disputes that involve groundwater only.
Shapland points out that because surface water resources are so scarce,
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countries in the region are turning to groundwater to help alleviate
the stress on water supplies. The chapter begins with a discussion
about the Qa Disi aquifer, shared by Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The
author discusses the pros and cons of transporting the water in this
aquifer for use in Jordan, and concludes that the only hope forJordan
to make efficient use of this water would be to cooperate with the
Saudis, who have been uncooperative up to this point. The chapter
briefly discusses the situation surrounding the Azraq aquifer, located
in Jordan and Syria, and the Nubian aquifer, located in Libya, Egypt
and Sudan.
Chapter Seven seeks to identify common themes present
throughout all the disputes in the region that could help those
working on water disputes in other parts of the world predict where
their situations might be headed. The chapter begins by looking at
the position of states in relation to a water resource. In particular,
Shapland identifies the likely position a country would take if it were
an upstream country, downstream country, or if it was both upstream
and downstream, such as in Syria and Sudan. The chapter then moves
on to discuss other geographical and hydrologic factors common to all
the disputes in the region, such as the degree of dependence a state
has on a particular shared resource, the variability of flow, and the
proportion of flow derived from each state. Next, the author
addresses common economic factors in the region's disputes.
Shapland explores factors such as the extent to which the source of
water is already utilized, which will have a bearing on whether or not
new projects will lead to disputes, and then discusses opportunities for
obtaining new sources of water, which would make it easier for
countries to deal with increased use of shared water resources. Next,
Shapland considers common political and legal factors. He examines
the International Law Commission Draft Articles on the Law of NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses, the political
relationship between states, and the domestic political situations
within states. The chapter closes with a brief consideration of the
changing picture for the future, in which the author predicts that
factors such as pollution, technological advances, and changes in
political regimes will make it hard to predict the outcome of future
disputes.
Finally, in Chapter Eight, the author provides his outlook for the
Shapland states his opinion that although pressure is
future.
increasing on the region's water resources, the risk of armed conflicts
breaking out over those resources is minimal. He points out that the
experience of the last several decades has shown that armed conflict
over water sources is very rare when compared to the use of economic
and diplomatic means. Shapland writes that there is more slack in
Middle Eastern water budgets than appears, and he believes states in
the region will be able to make technological advancements that will
enable them to deal with increased pressures on their water sources.
Though he is optimistic that enough water exists for all countries to
adequately fulfill their needs, Shapland does end on a positive note.
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He states that particularly in regards to the Arab-Israeli dispute, the
existence of political disputes in the region will continue to complicate
attempts to solve the region's water disputes.
DavidM. Jacob

COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
FIRST CIRCUIT
Dubois v. United States Dep't of Agric., 270 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. 2001)
(holding the United States Forest Service did not act in bad faith when
it authorized an increase in the amount of water that Loon Mountain
may draw from Loon Pond each year for snowmaking purposes).
Roland Dubois filed this suit against the United States Forest
Service ("Forest Service") alleging violations of the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") and the Clean Water Act
("CWA").
On appeal, the court entered a summary judgment in
Dubois' favor. On remand, Dubois sought to compel the Forest
Service to reimburse him for attorney's fees and costs.
Loon Mountain Recreation Corporation ("Loon Corp.") operates
a ski resort in Lincoln, New Hampshire. Because part of its resort lies
within the White Mountain National Forest, Loon Corp. was required
to have a special-use permit issued by the Forest Service. In 1986,
Loon Corp. applied for an amendment to its permit which would allow
it to increase the amount of water it used for snowmaking, from 67
million gallons per year to 138 million gallons. Loon Pond, a rare
high-altitude pond within the White Mountain National Forest, is
where the Loon Corp. planned to draw the majority of water.
Dubois alleged that the Forest Service violated NEPA by failing to
adequately explore reasonable alternatives to using Loon Pond as a
primary source of snowmaking water. The Forest Service contended
that it did not seriously consider other types of storage ponds because
"the sheer enormity of constructing comparable water storage
facilities.., was a practical impossibility." The court of appeals held
that the Forest Service violated NEPA because it had failed to
adequately consider the possibility of building on-site storage ponds as
an alternative to using Loon Pond as a water source for snowmaking.
The rule on fee shifting generally prohibits the prevailing party
from collecting attorney's fees from the losing party. One exception,
however, allows a district court to award attorney's fees to a prevailing
party when the losing party has "acted in bad faith, vexatiously,
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wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." Dubois argued that the Forest
Service's litigation position in this case was vexatious. Specifically,
Dubois noted that the Forest Service claimed artificial storage ponds at
Loon Mountain were a "practical impossibility," while at the same time
it authorized construction of a similar storage pond nearby.
Dubois claimed the district court erred in its analysis by requiring a
finding of subjective bad faith as a necessary precondition to an award
of sanctions.
The appellate court rejected this argument and
concluded that the Forest Service's conduct was not unreasonable.
Dubois raised further justifications for attorney's fees that the
appellate court refused to hear because Dubois failed to present those
same arguments to the trial court. The appellate court therefore
denied Dubois motion for attorney's fees, as it could not find any bad
faith conduct by the Forest Service.
Michael Barry

United States v. Mass. Water Res. Auth., 256 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2001)
(holding the district court had discretion to decline injunctive relief to
force the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority to install a water
filtration system, despite its violation of the Surface Water Treatment
Rule promulgated by the United States Environmental Protection
Agency under the Safe Drinking Water Act, so long as the court's
judgment provided maximum feasible protection of the public
health).
The United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
brought an enforcement action against the Massachusetts Water
Resources Authority ("MWRA") alleging violations of the Safe
Drinking Water Act ("SDWA") and the Surface Water Treatment Rule
("SWTR").
The United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts declined to require installation of a filtration system for
past violations, and the EPA appealed. On appeal, the EPA argued
that under the SDWA, courts have no discretion to withhold
indefinitely a provided-for remedy, such as filtration, if a public water
system has violated a substantive requirement of the SDWA.
In 1974, Congress passed the SDWA to protect the purity of the
drinking water provided by the nation's public water systems. In 1986,
Congress amended the SDWA to require the EPA to develop treatment
regimes, and to require that either the states or the EPA prosecute
violations of the SDWA and the SWTR. Through these amendments,
Congress required that all public water systems, except for systems
specifically eligible to receive a variance from the EPA, use disinfection
techniques to reduce the live quantities of pathogens in the water
supply. Congress also changed the SDWA to provide for filtration of
public water systems. Unlike the disinfection mandate, however,
Congress did not require all public water systems to employ filtration.
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instead

provided

that the EPA "shall propose

and

promulgate ...criteria under which filtration ...is required as a

treatment technique for public water systems supplied by surface water
sources."
In response to the amendments, the EPA promulgated the SWTR,
which applied the filtration requirement to public water systems that
draw some of their water from aboveground sources. The SWTR set
out eleven "avoidance criteria" for levels of certain waterborne
contaminants that all public water systems hoping to avoid installing a
filtration system must satisfy. The SWTR required that public water
systems not meeting all of the avoidance criteria by December 30,
1991, "must provide treatment consisting of both disinfection ...and
filtration" by June 29, 1993, or, if the violation occurs after December
30, 1991, within eighteen months of the violation. The EPA, however,
cannot compel a violator to comply with the SWTR through the
issuance of its own enforcement order. Rather, it must sue in federal
district court to request a remedy, such as the construction of a
filtration facility. The SDWA provides that in deciding such suits,
such judgment as protection of public health may
courts "may enter ...
require, taking into consideration the time necessary to comply and
the availability of alternative water supplies." Once a district court
finds that a public water system has violated one of the avoidance
criteria, it forever remains subject to an enforcement suit requiring
installation of a filtration system.
Established in 1984, the MWRA owns and operates the public
water system that provides most of the drinking water for the city of
Once the SWTR was
Boston and surrounding communities.
promulgated, the MWRA determined that it would not be able to
fulfill all of the avoidance criteria by the December 30, 1991 deadline.
On January 24, 1992, the Massachusetts Department of Environmental
Protection ("DEP") notified the MWRA that it would have to install a
filtration system by June 30, 1993. After it became clear that the
MWRA could not design and install a filtration system before June
1993, the MWRA and the DEP entered into negotiations, whereby
rather than requiring the immediate installation of a filtration system,
the MWRA could treat its water supply with disinfection, ozonation,
covered water storage facilities, and a watershed protection plan for
one of its reservoirs. On November 13, 1998, the DEP decided the
MWRA had adequately complied with the SWTR's avoidance criteria,
and concluded that the MWRA had developed satisfactory plans for
improving the quality of its water. The DEP's decision excused the
MWRA from installing a filtration system as long as the MWRA did not
violate any of the avoidance criteria, which could result in a
reimposition of the filtration requirement.
On February 12, 1998, the United States filed a lawsuit on behalf of
the EPA, which sought an injunction ordering the MWRA to comply
with the filtration requirement set out in the SDWA and the SWTR.
The EPA subsequently asked the DEP to revoke the MWRA's filtration
waiver based on this violation, but the DEP declined. The district
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court held that, based on the principle that only a "clear legislative
command" will circumvent the discretion of courts to fashion
equitable remedies, it retained discretion to determine appropriate
relief. The district court found no clear legislative command limiting
courts to mechanical enforcement of EPA compliance orders. Having
determined that it possessed the equitable discretion to withhold the
filtration remedy, the district court held that, given the lack of an
actual health issue in light of the MWRA's compliance with the
avoidance criteria at the time of trial, "any risk to public health
entailed by selection of the 'ozone-only' option is within acceptable
levels." The district court found that the MWRA's proposed treatment
plan was a "sound alternative to ... filtration when competing demands
for limited resources and the level of risk from all potential threats to
the safety of MWRA water are considered."
In its appeal, the United States argued that the district court did
not have discretion to withhold an SDWA provided remedy, namely
filtration. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
relied on the general principle that courts called upon to issue an
injunction must determine whether the equities of the case favor, and
whether the public interest would be served by, the granting of
injunctive relief. The Supreme Court has held there is a presumption
that a court has discretion whether to issue an injunction, and only a
proper showing of congressional -intent will overcome this
presumption.
In determining congressional intent, courts must
consider the language, history, structure, and the underlying
substantive policy of the legislation. Under this analysis, the court
noted that the language and structure of the SWTR regarding the
need for filtration reflect policy judgments of the EPA, not Congress,
and as such, did not demonstrate legislative intent. The court
disagreed with the United States and stated that a district court is not
required to order the substantive remedies available under the SDWA
whenever a regulation promulgated under the SDWA has been
violated. The court believed that as long as the district court issued a
judgment that ensures the public water system provides water that is
safe according to standards identified by the EPA, the court has
achieved the goal of the SDWA. Examining the language of the
SDWA's judicial-enforcement subsection, the court noted that,
following a violation of the SDWA's substantive provisions, a court
.may enter ... such judgment as protection of public health may
require...." The court focused on Congress's use of the permissive
"may" rather than language that would have required a specific
judgment to comply with the SDWA. Instead, the court found the
SDWA grants district courts the discretion to issue 'judgments as
protection of public health may require."
Furthermore, the court noted that while filtration is a requirement
under the SDWA/SWTR regime for water systems that fail to meet the
avoidance criteria, filtration is primarily a function of the SWTR, not
the SDWA. The purpose of the SDWA is to "assure that water supply
systems serving the public meet minimum national standards for
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protection of public health." Thus, the objective of the SDWA is safe
drinking water; filtration is merely one way to achieve that goal. So
long as a district court's judgment meets that SDWA goal of providing
safe drinking water, that judgment is properly within the scope of the
SDWA. The court was also satisfied with the district court's judgment
because the district court agreed to oversee the MWRA's compliance
with the filtration avoidance-criteria, thus ensuring that the MWRA's
water supply will remain safe according to the EPA's standards.
Despite the district court's finding that the SDWA contains a
"presumption expressed by Congress ...that filtration will almost

always be the preferred remedy for an SWTR violation," the court was
satisfied with the district court's decision not to issue an injunction.
The court reached this holding because the district court properly
exercised the flexibility Congress it in the statute, and assumed the
responsibility of monitoring the MWRA's compliance in the event that
future violations require a reexamination of the decision not to order
filtration. In sum, the court affirmed because the district court acted
within the scope of its authority under the SDWA and used its
equitable discretion to further the substantive purposes of the SDWA.
Kevin . Rohnstock

SECOND CIRCUIT
Catskill Mtns. Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. City of New York, 273
F.3d 481 (2nd Cir. 2001) (holding artificial transfers of water from one
watershed to another could constitute an actionable violation of the
Clean Water Act).
The Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited and other
recreational users of Esopus Creek (collectively "Catskill") filed suit
against the City of New York ("City") for alleged violations of the Clean
Water Act ("CWA"). Catskill claimed the City's release of water from
Schoharie Reservoir ("Reservoir") introduced "suspended solids,"
"turbidity" and "thermal discharges," into the naturally clearer and
cooler waters of the creek, all of which constituted "addition" of
pollutants under the CWA.
The Reservoir supplied drinking water to the citizens of the City by
discharging water through the Shandaken Tunnel ("the Tunnel") into
the creek, where it subsequently entered the Hudson River and flowed
south to the City. Without the Tunnel, water leaving the Reservoir
would naturally flow into the Mohawk River and would never flow into
the Creek.
The circuit court focused on the question of whether artificial
transfers of water from one watershed to another could constitute an
"addition" of pollutants actionable under the CWA. The CWA
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requires polluters to obtain a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES") permit. Catskill claimed the City's
transfer system constituted a violation of the CWA since the City had
no NPDES permit to discharge water from the Reservoir via the
Tunnel. The City countered first, by citing authority from other
federal circuits, which, relying on EPA policy statements, stated that
NPDES permit requirements did not apply to discharges from dams,
and second, by arguing its discharges did not amount to "additions" of
pollutants.
The Second Circuit admitted such statements could be persuasive
and deserved qualified deference from the court. However, it found
they in no way bound it to follow the holdings of other Circuits.
Furthermore, the court distinguished the two cited cases because they
involved the recirculation of water within a given system, whereas
Catskill's claim involved an artificial "inter-basin transfer" of water
made possible by a tunnel.
As to whether such a transfer could be considered an "addition" of
pollutants, the court appealed to logic and policy. Though the CWA
does not define "addition," the court held, "[n]o one can reasonably
argue that the water in the Reservoir and the Esopus [Creek] are in
any sense the same, such that the 'addition' of one to the other is a
Moreover, the court felt the CWA's
logical impossibility."
"uncompromising policy of 'restoring and maintaining the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters'," should guide
its interpretation of the debated term. Therefore, since the water
from the Reservoir might have been more polluted than the water in
the Creek, and because that would upset the Creek's environmental
integrity, the court held such a transfer could constitute an "addition."
A different finding, the court opined, could lead to a potentially
hazardous precedent allowing transfers from extremely polluted
watersheds into clean ones. Accordingly, the court reversed the lower
court's ruling.
Daniel C. Wennogle
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91 (2d Cir.
2001) (holding that the Environmental Protection Agency did not
violate the Administrative Procedure Act by approving the State of
New York's total maximum daily load standards for phosphorus in
eight drinking water supply reservoirs because: (1) the Clean Water
Act did not require that all TMDLs be expressed in daily terms; (2)
formulating the TMDLs based on an aesthetic water quality standard
was sufficient for drinking water supply purposes; and (3) given the
limited data and methodology available, EPA used its best professional
judgment in determining the margin of safety for the TMDLs).
In recent years, nineteen reservoirs located in upstate New York,
which supply New York City with its drinking water, have suffered
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increased phosphorus pollution due to sewage and nonpoint source
discharges. Phosphorus pollution can cause excessive growth of algae
and aquatic macrophytes, which may harm the aesthetics of the
reservoir and its drinking water supply.
In 1994, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ("NRDC") filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York claiming that the State of New York ("State") had a duty
under the Clean Water Act ("CWA") to promulgate total maximum
daily load ("TMDL") pollution standards for the reservoirs and that its
failure to do so left the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") with
a duty to promulgate such standards. The district court denied
NRDC's summary judgment motion on this claim, holding that a
genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the State had submitted
TMDLs for the reservoirs.
In January 1995, the State placed the reservoirs on a list given to
EPA for priority in developing TMDLs. In 1996, the State published a
report of its methodology for developing phosphorus TMDLs for the
reservoirs and explained that the TMDLs would be phased in over
time. On January 31, 1997, the first set of TMDLs was submitted to
EPA for eighteen of the nineteen reservoirs. On April 2, 1997, EPA
approved TMDLs for eight of the reservoirs. EPA declined to approve
TMDLs for the remaining ten reservoirs, concluding that pollution
levels in those reservoirs did not exceed the level that required TMDLs
under the CWA.
NRDC amended its complaint claiming the TMDLs the State
submitted were inadequate under the CWA and EPA's approval of
TMDLs for eight of the reservoirs violated its duty under the CWA as
well as the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). EPA moved for
summary judgment on both claims. The district court granted EPA's
motion on the CWA claim, stating that EPA's approval of TMDLs
under the CWA was within its discretion. However, the district court
rejected EPA's motion on the APA claim stating that genuine issues of
fact existed as to whether EPA should have approved some of the
TMDLs. On May 2, 2000, the district court found that EPA's approval
of the eight TMDLs was supported by the administrative record and
therefore, did not violate the APA.
On July 28, 2000, NRDC appealed this ruling to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In its appeal, NRDC renewed
its argument that the EPA violated the APA by approving TMDLs that
were deficient because the standards: (1) were expressed in terms of
annual, not daily, loads; (2) failed to implement the applicable water
standard for the situation-water supply; and (3) failed to incorporate
an adequate margin of safety.
The court stated that although a strict reading of the CWA
suggested that TMDLs had to be expressed in daily terms, permitting
alternative periods of measurement would best serve the purpose of
effectively regulating the broad range of pollutants covered under the
CWA. However, the court noted that the record showed that seasonal
changes in temperature, density, and wind affected phosphorus
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concentrations.
As such, the court suggested that a seasonal
measurement would be more appropriate for establishing phosphorus
TMDLs for the reservoirs. Therefore, the court remanded this issue to
require EPA to justify how its annual period of measurement would
account for these seasonal variations.
Second, the court expressed concern with EPA's use of a less
stringent aesthetic water quality standard, instead of the more
stringent water supply standard, for formulating its phosphorus
TMDLs. It noted, however, that the current aesthetic water quality
standard was driven by the need to control excessive algal and aquatic
plant growth, the same problems phosphorus creates for drinking
water supplies.
Moreover, the scientific knowledge regarding
phosphorus pollution in the reservoirs was not complete. As such, the
record adequately supported the court's holding that EPA's use of an
aesthetic water quality standard was appropriate for formulating the
reservoirs' phosphorus TMDLs.
Third, the court found that if EPA were disregarding a widely used
and reliable scientific methodology in determining a margin of safety
for its phosphorus TMDLs, their action would be easily open to
challenge. However, it noted that in determining the TMDL margin
of safety for the reservoirs, EPA used a model applied to several New
York City reservoirs in the past. Moreover, information available on
the reservoirs was limited. As such, the appellate court felt that EPA
had used its best professional judgment in formulating the margin of
safety for the TMDLs.
Matthew j Costinett

FOURTH CIRCUIT
Piney Run Pres. Ass'n v. Cty. Conun'rs, 268 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2001)
(holding National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES")
permit holder was shielded from Clean Water Act ("CWA") liability for
discharges of pollutants not listed in the permit, provided such
discharges were disclosed to the permitting authority and reasonably
contemplated in the permitting process).
Piney Run Preservation Association ("Association") brought suit in
United States District Court for the District of Maryland against
Commissioners of Carroll County, Maryland ("County"), alleging a
county-operated waste treatment plant discharged warm water into
Piney Run Stream ("Piney Run") in violation of the CWA.
The NPDES permit issued to Carroll County did not expressly
allow discharge of heated water. During the NPDES permitting
process, however, Carroll County disclosed the fact that the plant
would emit such water. The district court found the County liable
under the CWA for discharges from the Plant exceeding state water
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temperature standards.
Both the Association and the County
appealed. The Association argued the NPDES permit did not allow
heated effluent discharges; therefore, the plant violated the CWA by
discharging any level of heat into Piney Run.
The County contended it issued NPDES permits based on
compliance with state water quality standards. Because the Maryland
Department of the Environment ("MDE") enforced state water quality
standards, the district court should have deferred to MDE in
determining whether the Plant's discharges adversely influenced Piney
Run's ambient temperature. Furthermore, the County claimed the
Association lacked Article III standing to sue in federal court, as
individual members of the group could not prove requisite injury-infact, traceable to the Plant's releases of heated effluent into Piney Run.
Finally, the County argued a "permit shield" barred suit against
NPDES permit holders for discharge of pollutants not expressly
considered under those permits.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found the ambient
temperature of Piney Run had no bearing on its ultimate disposition.
Further, Association member Dorothy Rowland ("Rowland") could
show injury-in-fact required for Article III standing. Piney Run flowed
through Rowland's property, and was in a pristine state when she
purchased the tract in 1967. However, a high concentration of green
algae had recently formed in Piney Run, limiting Rowland's use of the
stream for livestock watering and recreational purposes.
The
Association presented evidence that the Plant discharged heat into
Piney Run. It also offered expert testimony showing a causal
relationship between green algae proliferation and an increase in
ambient stream temperatures. The court found the Plant's discharges
could cause or contribute to the kinds of injuries the Association
alleged. Thus, the Association demonstrated injury-in-fact traceable to
the actions of the County, thus bringing the action within purview of
Article III.
The appellate court disagreed with the County's interpretation of
the "permit shield" defense, finding that the CWA created strict
liability for all point-source discharges, unless exempted by an NPDES
permit. The permitting authority, in this case MDE, considered
discharge information from all relevant parties, calibrating permissible
releases under individual permits in accord with state water quality
standards. The effectiveness of the NPDES permitting process turns
on a permit holder's compliance with CWA reporting and monitoring
requirements. The court held that the CWA required the County to
disclose the nature of its effluent discharges to MDE. MDE could limit
pollutant releases if it reasonably anticipated resulting environmental
harms. Because the County disclosed the Plant's release of heated
effluent during the permitting process, the court held MDE reasonably
contemplated that the Plant would discharge heat pursuant to the
NPDES permit. Although the NPDES permit did not list heat as a
permitted pollutant, MDE considered the likely effects of such heat
releases in Piney Run during the permitting process. Thus, the CWA's
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"permit shield" defense barred the Association's suit against the
County.
Alan Curtis

SIXTH CIRCUIT
United States v. White, 270 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that
turbidity cannot be considered a pollutant under the Safe Drinking
Water Act for sentencing purposes).
An Ohio district court convicted John White and Carolyn Taylor,
employees of the Ohio County Water District, of making materially
false statements by submitting reports containing falsified turbidity
measurements to the Kentucky Division of Water ("DOW"). The
government filed this appeal to challenge the court's interpretation of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines in determining White and
Taylor's sentences.
John White was the general superintendent at the Ohio County
Water District's drinking water treatment plant at Cromwell, Kentucky.
Carolyn Taylor was a Water District employee assisting White in
managing plant operations. One of their responsibilities was to submit
monthly operations reports to the DOW.
During a surprise inspection of the plant in January 1997, an agent
from the Division noted that daily logbooks recording the measure of
turbidity had been left blank for each of four four-hour shifts. The
plant employee responsible for recording these measurements told the
Division agent that she had purposefully left the log sheets blank
because the turbidity measurements were all above 0.5 which might
put the plant at risk of noncompliance.
Review of this evidence and subsequent interviews with plant staff,
including White and Taylor, revealed several instances of similar
falsifications of turbidity measurements and submissions of inaccurate
monthly reports. This suggested that the water plant had been out of
compliance with the federal and state turbidity regulations during
most of the months in question.
The trial court sentenced both White and Taylor without using
sentence enhancements available under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The
government sought application of the Safe Drinking Water Act's
definition of turbidity as a contaminant in order to apply stricter
sentencing guidelines. To that end, the government argued that the
sentence enhancement should have been used because White and
Taylor discharged pollutants into the environment.
The court of appeals ruled that the language of the Safe Drinking
Water Act read as a whole, precluded the use of the sentencing
guidelines the government sought. The court stated, "even if turbidity
is considered a 'pollutant' ... the district court did not err in refusing
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to enhance White's and Taylor's sentences pursuant to this guideline
provision because their "record-keeping offense" cannot be said to
reflect an effort to conceal a "substantive environmental offense"
under the Safe Drinking Water Act or any other federal statute.
MichaelBarry
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Wisconsin v. United States EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding
the Environmental Protection Agency had authority to grant Indian
tribe "treatment-as-state" status; Indian tribe thus had authority to
regulate water quality on the reservation, even though that authority
may entail the power to regulate off-reservation activities).
The Mole Lake Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians ("Tribe")
applied to the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") for
treatment-as-state ("TAS") status in August 1994. TAS status would
allow the Tribe to establish water quality standards for waters within its
reservation, and require permits for any action that may create a
discharge into those waters. The State of Wisconsin opposed the
application, claiming it was sovereign over all navigable waters within
the state. Wisconsin also feared the decision would threaten its plan to
build a zinc-copper sulfide mine upstream from Rice Lake ("Lake"),
located on the reservation. Despite Wisconsin's objection, the EPA
granted the Tribe's application for TAS status. Wisconsin filed suit in
district court seeking to revoke the EPA's grant of TAS status to the
Tribe.
The district court upheld the EPA decision, Wisconsin
appealed, and the Seventh Circuit, reviewing the judgment de novo,
affirmed.
In 1991, the EPA issued a final rule that established four
requirements a tribe must meet to be granted TAS status. Wisconsin
argued the Tribe had not met the third requirement, which states,
"the functions to be exercised by the tribe must pertain to the
management and protection of water resources which are held by the
tribe, held by the Unites States in trust for the tribe, or otherwise
within the borders of the reservation." The final rule specified a tribe
seeking to satisfy this requirement must show it possesses inherent
authority over the waters. The EPA presumed inherent authority if a
tribe showed impairment of its waters would have a serious and
substantial effect on the health and welfare of the tribe.
Wisconsin advanced three reasons the Tribe had not established
inherent authority over its waters. First, the Lake was not within the
borders of the reservation. Second, Wisconsin owned the underlying
lakebeds; the tribe therefore did not have authority over those waters.
Third, the Tribe had not shown its authority to regulate off-reservation
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activities that would be affected by the Tribe's imposition of water
quality standards.
The court first addressed Wisconsin's argument that the Lake was
not within the reservation's borders. The court ruled that Wisconsin
waived this argument on appeal because the state did not raise it to the
EPA in the original proceeding.
In reaching its decision as to the second argument, the court
assumed Wisconsin had title to the lakebed. It ruled, however, that
Congress has ultimate authority to regulate the navigable waters of the
United States. Further, the Constitution vests the federal government
with exclusive authority over relations with Indian tribes. Because
Wisconsin's ownership of the lakebeds would not preclude the federal
government from regulating those waters, the court ruled Wisconsin
could not complain about the federal government allowing a tribe to
do so.
As to Wisconsin's final argument, the court held upstream, offreservation dischargers conducting economically valuable activities to
the state must ensure those activities do not result in contamination of
the downstream on-reservation waters. This is true even if compliance
effectively prohibited the activity altogether. The court stated once a
tribe is given TAS status, it has the same right as that given to states to
object to permits issued for upstream off-reservation activities. Since
Illinois, for example, would have the right to regulate upstream
dischargers in Wisconsin, so too did the Tribe. The court thus
affirmed the district court's ruling, holding the EPA's grant of TAS
status to the tribe was appropriate.
Brian L. Martin
United States v. Alshabkhoun, 277 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2002) (affirming
the district court's finding of A&A farms liable for violating the Clean
Water Act, and upholding the penalties assessed as reasonable).
A&A Farms ("A&A") owned 1,000 acres of farmland adjacent to
the Wisconsin River. The farm constructed a drainage ditch to collect
water and soil from the land, which was then conveyed to the river.
A&A did not obtain a permit from the United States prior to
constructing the ditch. Consequently, the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") issued an administrative compliance order stating that
construction of the ditch, absent a permit, violated the Clean Water
Act ("CWA"). The CWA prohibits the discharge of any pollutant,
including dredged or fill material, into navigable waters of the United
States, except in accordance with a permit. Thus, the United States
filed this suit against A&A under section 309 of the CWA. The district
court entered partial summary judgment in favor of the government,
and the parties entered into a Consent Decree ("Decree") to restore
the wetlands.
The Decree was negotiated by both parties and approved by the
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district court. The Decree required A&A to pay $225,000 in penalties
and to restore the wetlands according to an agreed upon schedule. It
also allowed for deadline extensions if a Force Majeure prevented or
delayed performance. Furthermore, A&A was required to give written
notification of any alleged Force Majeure to invoke the provision. The
decree also included a dispute resolution provision providing for the
accrual of penalties during the proceedings unless A&A successfully
filed a petition to stay its obligation to pay any penalty regarding the
disputed matters.
A&A began restoration of the wetlands in November of 1999,
subsequently filing a notice of dispute with the EPA in February of
2000.
A&A requested relief from the decree, asserting that
compliance was impossible.
The EPA denied relief to A&A.
Thereafter, A&A filed a Petition to Modify the degree with the district
court. The court denied the petition and ordered A&A to pay fines
amounting to $507,850.40. A&A appealed.
A&A conceded that its construction of the ditch violated the CWA,
however, it contended that the district court's enforcement of the
Decree violated public policy on two grounds. A&A first asserted that
the Decree's penalty provision violated public policy because it allowed
penalties to accrue while the parties engaged in dispute resolution
proceedings. Second, A&A asserted that the district court erred in
penalizing A&A for non-compliance of the Decree because a flood in
June of 2002 constituted a Force Majeure event under the Decree.
First, the appellate court noted that a Decree is a court order that
embodies the terms agreed upon by the parties as a compromise to
litigation. Further, for purposes of construction, ajudicially approved
decree is essentially a contract. The court observed, however, that a
provision within a decree that fixes a stipulated penalty is
unenforceable if it constitutes an unreasonable penalty or is void as a
matter of public policy. A&A asserted that based on United States v.
Witco, the stipulated penalty provision in the decree forced it to
surrender its rights to invoke dispute resolution because penalties
would accrue while the dispute was pending. The court stated that
Witco, a Delaware federal court decision, was not "controlling
authority" and was distinguishable from A&A's case. The court
remarked that in Witco, the required clean-up was completed before
the dispute resolution clause was invoked and the accrued penalties at
issue were unrelated to any continuing environmental violation. In
contrast, A&A invoked the dispute resolution procedures before the
required clean-up was completed. Thus, A&A's penalties accrued
because of its unwarranted delay in restoring the wetlands, as required
by the decree. The court reasoned that the Decree was drafted and
negotiated by both parties and entered into voluntarily.
Thus, the courts held A&A liable for the penalties that accrued
during the dispute resolution proceedings because excusing A&A from
the stipulated penalties would undermine the clear terms of the
Decree and allow the parties to delay performance by invoking the
dispute resolution clause with meritless claims. Further, the court held
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that the stipulated penalties imposed under the Decree were
reasonable because the penalties directly related to the environmental
harm caused by A&A, and the amount assessed was less than 10
percent of the statutory authorized penalty.
The court addressed A&A's second argument, noting that,
although the Decree provided for the extension of deadlines in the
event of a Force Majeure, the provision required A&A to notify the
EPA in writing if it intended to invoke the provision. Therefore,
because A&A did not comply with the Decree's procedural
requirements, it could not claim impossibility. Moreover, because the
flood occurred seven months after the Decree's deadline, the court
reasoned that the flooding did not warrant an excuse for the delay
and, therefore was irrelevant. Thus, the court affirmed the district
court's judgment.
ChristopherA. Gfnffin
United States v. Chemetco, Inc., 274 F.3d 1154 (7th Cir. 2001)
(holding: (1) section 309(c) (2) of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") was
unambiguous; (2) Congress intended the number of violation days to
be a sentencing factor and not an element of a CWA offense; and (3)
the fine imposed by the district court did not exceed the prescribed
statutory maximum penalty).
Chemetco plead guilty to violating section 301 of the CWA. The
district court ordered Chemetco to pay a fine based on the number of
days it violated the CWA. Chemetco appealed its sentence, arguing
that the district court misinterpreted the CWA and that the court's
findings violated the rule set forth in Apprendi v. New Jersey.
Chemetco obtained a permit from the Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") allowing construction and operation of a
storm-water runoff control system. Chemetco also installed, without a
permit, a secret pipe running from its property to a ditch tributary.
For a period of ten years, Chemetco used the secret pipe to illegally
release water containing toxic metals, until United States and Illinois
EPA agents discovered it.
Chemetco was indicted for conspiring to violate the CWA and
knowingly violating section 301 of the CWA. After conducting an
investigation, the government recommended fining Chemetco for 949
days of violation. According to its calculations, Chemecto argued it
was only liable for 71 days of violation. Chemetco also objected to the
government's findings, citing the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Apprendi. Chemetco further claimed that the government had to
prove the number of days of violation beyond a reasonable doubt, and
it had to be charged in the indictment with each day of violation.
The district court found that the indictment was sufficient because
it informed Chemetco of the charges and put it on notice of the
potential maximum penalty. Further, the district court found that
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Apprendi did not apply; therefore, the number of days of violation
under the CWA was a sentencing factor the court could find by a
preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, the district court found
there were 676 days of violation and sentenced Chemetco to a fine of
$33,275,000. Chemetco appealed that sentence.
The issue in this case was whether the number of days Chemetco
violated the CWA is an element of a CWA offense or a sentencing
factor. Due process requires the government to prove each element of
an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. After the government has met
this burden and an offender is found guilty of a crime, however, courts
can apply sentencing factors based on a preponderance of the
evidence to increase the offender's punishment. The court of appeals
held that it was important to determine whether the number of days
Chemetco violated the CWA was an element of a crime or a sentencing
factor. If the number of violation days belonged in the former
category, then it was reversible error for the district court to calculate
the number of violation days based on a preponderance of the
evidence.
The Supreme Court has ruled that, within certain constitutional
limits, Congress can identify which factors are elements of a crime and
which are sentencing factors. Therefore, the court of appeals had to
first determine Congress' intent. The court determined that if the
number of days of violation was a sentencing factor, then the next
inquiry became whether such a determination comported with the
constitutional limits elucidated in Apprendi.
To determine whether Congress intended the number of violation
days to be a sentencing factor or an element of a crime, the court of
appeals considered the language of the statute. When the language of
a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts must give effect to its plain
meaning unless doing so would "thwart the purpose of the overall
statutory scheme."
The court of appeals concluded that the language of section
309(c) (2) was unambiguous. Thus, the court held it had to give effect
to the statute unless doing so was inconsistent with the overall statutory
scheme of the CWA. The court found CWA's statutory scheme was
clear, as section 301 and other sections define what constitutes a
violation and section 309 establishes penalties for these violations.
Thus, because the clear and unambiguous language of section
309(c) (2) comported with the overall statutory scheme of the CWA,
the court concluded Congress intended the number of violation days
to be a sentencing factor and not an element of a CWA offense.
Moreover, the court of appeals held the plain language of the
CWA contradicted Chemetco's argument that each day of violation was
a separate offense. Section 309(c) (2) allows district courts to impose
fines "per day of violation," thereby implying that violations may span
more than one day. Given that generally a court should not construe a
statute in a way that makes words or phrases meaningless or
superfluous, the court found Chemetco's argument unavailing.
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Chemetco further argued that its sentence violated the rule
announced by the Supreme Court in Apprendi. In that case, the
Supreme Court held any fact that increased the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum had to be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Chemetco claimed the CWA had a statutory
maximum penalty: $50,000 per day of violation. The court held that
even if Chemetco's argument was taken as true, it would not mandate
a reversal because an Apprendi violation only occurred when the
imposed sentence exceeded the prescribed statutory maximum.
Chemetco had urged the district court to find seventy-one days of
violation, which would yield a fine range of $342,500 to $3,425,000.
The court's fine of $3,327,500 was less than what Chemetco contended
was appropriate. The court of appeals concluded, therefore, even if
the CWA had a statutory maximum penalty, the district court's fine did
not exceed the limit ($3,425,000) in the present case. Accordingly,
the court of appeals affirmed Chemetco's sentence.
GloriaM. Soto

NINTH CIRCUIT
Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
Environmental Protection Agency's refusal to take action against
alleged violations of the Clean Water Act was discretionary and not
subject to judicial review).
The Sierra Club and an individual citizen (collectively "Sierra
Club") sued the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"), Christine Todd Whitman ("Whitman"), and others
for failing to take action against the operators of a wastewater
treatment plant allegedly polluting the Santa Cruz River in violation of
the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The CWA authorizes any citizen to sue
the Administrator of the EPA for failure to perform any act or duty
deemed "not discretionary" under the act.
The treatment plant ("Plant"), located in Southern Arizona, served
a relatively small population of Americans and Mexicans, and had a
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit
that expired in 1996. The Plant continued to operate and discharge
pollutants thereafter while a new NPDES permit was on appeal.
According to the lower court's findings from January 1995 to 2000, the
facility violated its permit limitations 128 times.
The Sierra Club based its suit on the theory that the CWA required
Whitman to find a violation and file suit against the Plant. It focused
on language in the CWA that provides, whenever "the Administrator
finds that any person is in violation" of permit conditions, the
Administrator "shall issue an order requiring such person to comply...
or... shall bring a civil action." The court pointed out the language
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did not compel Whitman to find a violation, and Congress likely used
the word shall as instructive rather than compulsory language.
The court criticized the Sierra Club's argument on three fronts.
First, the court upheld the presumption that an agency's refusal to
investigate or enforce statutory violations lies within that agency's
discretion. Next, it reasoned the agency's limited resources, and the
high number of potential investigations it could face, forced the
Administrator to balance priorities and act only on serious violations.
Finally, the court determined Whitman's decision not to take
enforcement measure was of the type "typically committed to the
agency's absolute discretion." Therefore, the court held "[when] used
in a statute that prospectively affects government action" such as the
CWA, the word shall sometimes carried only the connotations of the
word "may," and did not mandate action.
In further justification of its ruling, the court noted the CWA's
provision allowing citizens to file their own suits against polluters
suggested no congressional intention to mandate government action
for every alleged violation. The court also scrutinized the legislative
history of the CWA for any indicia of a congressional intent to
mandate EPA action via the act, but found no compelling evidence to
suggest this. Accordingly, the court deemed the Sierra Club's claim
outside the scope of judicial review and dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
Daniel C. Wennogle

Natural Res. Def. Council v. United States EPA, 279 F.3d 1180 (9th
Cir. 2002) (holding that the Environmental Protection Agency erred
by not providing the public with notice of or the opportunity to
comment on changes included in final permits to release bark and
woody debris into marine waters when those changes were not a
logical outgrowth of the draft permits).
The Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") brought this
action against the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") for
failing to provide the public with notice of and the opportunity to
comment on changes the EPA approved in two final National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits.
The permits
authorized Alaskan logging transfer facilities ("LTFs") to discharge
bark and woody debris into marine waters. NRDC asserted that
interested parties could not have reasonably anticipated the changes
EPA approved in the final permits. The EPA claimed references
within the draft permits were sufficient to put interested parties on
notice of the changes.
The Alaskan timber industry transports most of its logs to markets
through marine waters. During transportation, friction between logs,
water, and the bottom of the water body causes the discharge of bark
and woody debris. The debris, which can accumulate in significant
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concentrations, deteriorates water quality, creates problems for marine
life and decays slowly.
In the mid-1990s, the EPA proposed a new, general permit that
would apply to all LTFs in the state. Final approval of the proposed
permit was conditioned upon the Alaska Department of
Environmental Conservation's ("ADEC") certification of the permit.
In its final draft certification, ADEC made substantive changes to the
permit that had not appeared in its first or second draft certifications,
but ADEC did not provide the public with notice or an opportunity to
comment on the changes. Although the EPA expressed concern with
the modifications, the Agency not only accepted ADEC's certification,
but also finalized the rule without providing an opportunity for
interested parties to comment. As a result, NRDC sued the EPA for
failing to provide adequate notice and opportunity for comment as
required by the Administrative Procedure Act.
This court decided the adequacy of the notice and comment
procedure by noting the differences between the draft and final
permits and analyzing whether interested parties would have
reasonably anticipated the changes in the final rule as logical
outgrowths of the draft permit.
Several differences between the draft and final permits led the
court to determine that the EPA's notice was inadequate. First, the
EPA's draft permit limited LTFs to a one-acre zone of discharge.
ADEC's final draft certification, however, imposed no specific limit on
the size of the zones into which LTFs could discharge bark and woody
debris. Despite an express concern that ADEC's changes to its draft
permit were substantive and might not comply with antidegradation
laws, the EPA accepted the changes without public notice or comment.
Second, the EPA originally proposed a general permit that applied
to nearly all LTFs but later adopted ADEC's proposal, which created a
more lax permitting scheme for LTFs in existence prior to October 22,
1985. ADEC's final draft certification exempted pre-1985 LTFs from
applying for a permit to discharge. Instead of applying for a permit,
LTFs only had to notify the EPA they were conducting activities that
resulted in the release of bark and woody debris. This decision was
ironic; the EPA initiated the permitting process because the permits of
pre-1985 LTFs did not comply with the Clean Water Act.
Third, there were considerable differences between the comments
made in reference to the draft permit and those NRDC later raised in
its petition. The court found these differences were a result of the
inadequacy of EPA's notice and comment procedures.
In analyzing each of these factors, the court found that the public
could not have reasonably anticipated the differences between the
draft and final permits. That is, the final permit was not a logical
outgrowth of the draft permit. As a result, the court remanded the
permits to the EPA for further proceedings.
Merc Pittinos
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City of Portland v. The Boeing Co. & Cascade Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2209 (denying summary judgment because plaintiff presented
sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether groundwater contamination by defendants had any effect on
the district's decision to seek alternative sources of water).
In 1999, the city of Portland, Oregon ("City") filed suit against the
Boeing Company and Cascade Corporation (collectively "Boeing") in
the United States District Court for the District of Oregon seeking
damages of over six million dollars resulting from Boeing's
contamination of part of the City's water supply. Less than a year later,
the City added a claim of fifteen million dollars in lost revenues that
was caused when the Tualatin Valley Water District ("District") and the
Powell Valley Road Water District ("Powell") decided to obtain a
majority of their water from sources other than the City. In response
to the new claim, Boeing filed a motion for summary judgment,
alleging that the City failed to establish a causal relationship between
the pollution and the water districts' decisions to seek water elsewhere.
Defendants subsequently withdrew their motion for summary
judgment with regards to Powell, and therefore the only issue before
the court was whether the City provided enough evidence to create a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the contamination caused
by Boeing had any effect on the District's decision to seek alternative
water supplies.
The City owns a field of wells located near Boeing's property,
which are used as emergency backup supplies to the Bull Run River.
In the mid-1980's, groundwater contamination was discovered on
Boeing's property. The wells themselves were not contaminated, but
the existence of groundwater contamination so close to the wells
prevented the City from using the wells to capacity. As a result, the
City was forced to obtain alternate water supplies and impose
restrictions on water use.
In 1991, The Wolf Creek Highway Water District ("Wolf') and the
Metzger Water District ("Metzger") merged to form the District. Prior
to the merger, both Wolf and Metzger entered into contracts with the
City under which the City would sell them its surplus water. The
contracts had a provision requiring Wolf and Metzger to buy minimum
amounts of water from the City or pay a penalty based on how much
water was obtained by other sources. When Wolf and Metzger merged,
the District inherited the contracts.
In 1992, the onset of drought in the region, in addition to the
inability to fully utilize the wells due to contamination, led the City to
ease its minimum purchase requirements contained in the contracts.
As a result, the District was able to purchase large amounts of water
from other sources. The City's additional fifteen million dollar claim
represented the revenue lost when the District decided to purchase a
majority of its water from other sources during the post drought
period, even though the City had adequate amounts of water to supply
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the district during that time.
Boeing argued that the City failed to show that the reason the
District decided to obtain water from other sources after the drought
was not due to the restrictions imposed during the drought. Boeing
contended that the District decided to seek alternative sources before
the drought: (1) due to concerns that the pipeline from the City could
not handle increased capacity due to population growth; and (2)
because the District wanted a source to the west of the Willamette
River that had better quality water. The City responded by arguing
that although the District may have had many reasons for obtaining
alternate sources, the inability to use the wells, coupled with the
elimination of minimum purchase requirements due to the drought,
played a significant part in the District's decision to use other sources
after the drought.
Boeing presented testimony from the District's directors that the
contamination was not a factor in the District's decision to obtain
water from sources other than the City after the drought had ended.
One director stated that the main motivation was to develop a source
independent from the City. Another director stated that the primary
reason for finding other sources of water was the need to get water to
Washington County. The City countered with testimony that the
District did not invest any money in other expansion projects until
after the drought in 1992, and that the final agreement between the
District and new suppliers was not approved until 1994.
In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a movant
must establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Once the
movant has met its burden, the onus is on the opposing party to
establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact. In this case, the
court found the City's evidence very thin on the issue of whether the
contamination together with the drought caused the District to buy a
majority of its water from sources other than the City. However, the
court was required to look at the evidence in a light most favorable to
the City, and in doing so, the court found the City had met its burden.
As a result, Boeing's motion for summary judgment was denied.
DavidM.Jacob
United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 279 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that while equity was inappropriate in the
abandonment context, equity may be appropriate in the forfeiture
context, if the landowners can show on a case-by-case basis that they
were prevented from complying with transfer requirements).
In the mid-1980s, a number of landowners in the Newlands
Reclamation Project in Nevada submitted applications to transfer
water rights between different parcels of property. The Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe of Indians ("Tribe") protested the applications under the
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Nevada law of forfeiture and abandonment, arguing that the transfers
would decrease the water flow into Pyramid Lake, situated on the
Tribe's homeland. The federal government and the Tribe appealed
from an order of the Nevada district court, which affirmed a
determination of the Nevada State Engineer ("Engineer") granting the
landowners' applications to transfer water rights.
First, the Tribe argued that the district court erred in affirming the
Engineer's determination that a prolonged period of non-use of water
rights does not create a rebuttable presumption that a landowner
intended to abandon those rights. The Ninth Circuit rejected this
argument in a past case, United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co. In that case,
this court held that although a prolonged period of non-use may raise
an inference of intent to abandon, it does not create a rebuttable
presumption. Thus, the court affirmed the evidentiary standard that
the district court applied in making its parcel-specific rulings on
abandonment.
Second, the Engineer asked the court to reconsider their 1993
ruling in United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co. ("Alpine M") to the
extent it held that 1902 was not the relevant priority date for
determining the application of the Nevada forfeiture statute. Yet, Orr
Water Ditch affirmed Alpine 1M, holding that landowners cannot claim
1902 as the date their water rights were initiated. Thus, the court
rejected the request to reconsider Alpine III and upheld the district
court to the extent it affirmed the Engineer's parcel-specific
application of the state forfeiture statute.
Therefore, the only issue outstanding on appeal was whether the
district court's broad application of an intrafarm exemption
constituted reversible error. The Tribe contended that the district
court erred in exempting intrafarm transfers of water rights from the
operation of Nevada's forfeiture and abandonment laws based on
equitable considerations. Further, the Tribe contended that the
district court erred in granting equitable relief to intrafarm transfers
based upon the assumption that the government and the TruckeeCarson Irrigation District ("TCID") had either explicitly or tacitly
approved these transfers prior to the landowner's submission of formal
transfer applications.
However, in the 1989 case United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir
Co. ("Alpine IF), this court rejected these arguments. If the transfer
applicants moved water within their farm without complying with state
transfer requirements, they did so "at their own risk" under Alpine II,
since the Reclamation Act made it clear that state law applied to these
actions. The United States never had the authority under the
Reclamation Act to approve such transfers; the fact that they occurred
had no bearing on whether state law principles of forfeiture and
abandonment should not be applied.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Tribe that, with respect to
abandonment, rather than supporting equitable relief, the factors
noted by the district court more appropriately bear on whether the
landowners formed the requisite intent to abandon their rights. The
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district court's factors include: evidence in the record that the
procedures to transfer water changed at least three times over the
years; an applicant was told that transfers were not allowed; and no
evidence existed that any of the landowners making intrafarm transfers
used more water than the amount granted by contract with the
government.
The court noted that if the landowners attempted to transfer rights
prior to filing their applications in this case and were thwarted by the
government or TCID, which would most likely demonstrate their lack
of intent to abandon. Yet, 'the court stated that the fact that a
landowner might have been prevented from filing a transfer
application would do nothing to alter a finding of non-use for the
statutory period. To completely remove the possibility of equitable
relief for those landowners who would otherwise technically forfeit
their properties through non-use, but who made efforts to comply with
the transfer requirements during the moratorium period, would be
inconsistent with equitable principles. The law abhors forfeiture; thus
equity should operate in these limited situations to protect
landowners.
In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order
to the extent that it provided blanket equitable relief for intrafarm
transfers without requiring an individualized factual showing with
respect to each transfer applicant. More specifically, the court held
that the district court erred in granting equitable relief to those
landowners facing abandonment because the landowners may
demonstrate that they did not abandon their water rights as a matter
of law. On remand, the district court was instructed to make factual
findings in order to determine whether each individual landowner had
the requisite intent to abandon in light of the factors noted in the
district court's opinion. With respect to forfeiture, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court's application of a blanket equitable
However, the court concluded that equity may be
exemption.
appropriate on a case-by-case basis in the forfeiture context if a
landowner can show steps were taken to transfer water rights during
the period of non-use, but that those steps were thwarted by the
government or TCID.
Nicole A. Ressue
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. v. United States Dept. of Interior, 269
F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding the Hayden-O'Mahoney
Amendment did not repeal Section 4-1 of the Reclamation Act of 1902
in its entirety and thus did not terminate the water districts' rights to
certain revenues arising under Section 4-1; further holding Section 4-1
and the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926 did not impose upon the
Secretary of the Interior an obligation to generate profits for the water
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districts by way of grazing leases).
This appeal involved the Rio Grande Valley irrigation project, a
national plan adopted in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries designed to irrigate arid western lands. The Elephant Butte
Irrigation District of New Mexico and the El Paso County Water
Improvement District No. 1 of Texas (collectively "Water Districts")
filed a complaint against the federal government asserting, inter alia,
that they were entitled to revenues under section 4-1, an amendment
to the Reclamation Act of 1902. The government contended the
Hayden-O'Mahoney Amendment enacted in 1939 ("Amendment")
repealed Section 4-1 and, thus, such revenues were not owed to the
Water Districts.
In 1902, Congress approved the Reclamation Act and established a
general reclamation fund to finance major irrigation projects in the
West. At its outset, the reclamation fund consisted solely of monies
generated from the sale of public lands. However, the agricultural
depression and the severe decrease in the sale of public lands during
the 1920s quickly rendered the fund insolvent. In response to this
financial crisis, Congress amended the Reclamation Act in 1924 and
added section 4-1 requiring water districts to take over the operation
and maintenance of the irrigation projects from the federal
government. In return for taking on this responsibility, the water
districts could retain some of the profits the irrigation projects
acquired instead of having to contribute all profits to the reclamation
fund.
Despite Congress' efforts to replenish the reclamation fund, the
fund continued to struggle as the economic depression persisted
through the 1920s and 1930s. In 1939, Congress enacted the HaydenO'Mahoney Amendment. The Amendment provided for deposit of
monies generated by federal power facilities into the reclamation
fund. Therefore, it repealed Section 4-1 to the extent this section
granted the water districts the right to profits produced by any power
facilities.
In 1979 and 1980, the Water Districts took control of the operation
and maintenance of their irrigation projects as required by section 4-1.
In 1990, the Water Districts filed a complaint and contended, pursuant
to section 4-1, they were entitled to revenues generated from such
projects. However, the government asserted the Hayden-O'Mahoney
Amendment repealed section 4-1 in its entirety, and, thus, terminated
the Water Districts' fights to revenues under the section. The
government challenged the district court's ruling that as a matter of
law, the Amendment did not repeal section 4-1 in its entirety.
The appellate court emphasized that a repeal by implication
demands that "the intention of the legislature to repeal be clear and
manifest" and that "repeal of a statute by implication is not favored."
After studying the text of section 4-1 and the Hayden-O'Mahoney
Amendment, the district court found two apparent conflicts between
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the statutes and held that the Amendment repealed section 4-1 only to
the extent the statutes conflicted with one another.
The district court had also reviewed the legislative intent behind
the enactment of the Amendment, and concluded that the purpose of
the Amendment was to deposit power revenues into the fund and
subsequently into the general treasury. The court found Congress did
not intend to regain all of the profits granted to the Water Districts
under section 4-1. The Amendment only discussed power revenues
while omitting any discussion concerning profits earned from the
leasing of project grazing and farmland, and the sale or use of town
sites, the two other sources of revenue explicitly provided for in
section 4-1. The court held the Water Districts were entitled to those
revenues arising under section 4-1, which were not explicitly repealed
or modified by the Amendment, i.e. profits earned from the leasing of
project grazing and farm land as well as the sale or use of town sites.
The second issue on appeal was the Water Districts' claim that
under section 4-1 and the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926 ("OAA"),
the federal government and specifically the Secretary of the Interior
owed a fiduciary duty to the Water Districts to generate revenue
through grazing leases. The Water Districts contended the agreement
between the Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau") and the Bureau of
Land Management ("BLM") was "not in the best interests of the
Project beneficiaries" due to the fact that the lease agreement
provided "no consideration" to them. In response to this claim, the
court concluded the federal government did not owe a fiduciary duty
to the Water Districts, nor was the government obligated to manage
the water project lands in such a manner as to produce profits for the
Water Districts.
The court distinguished the creation of an
entitlement, which the court described as an "honorary" obligation,
and the creation of a fiduciary duty. It held section 4-1 and the OAA
did not impose a fiduciary duty upon the Department of the Interior
but rather created an entitlement in the Water Districts by the federal
government.
Relying on Article IV, § 3 of the United States
Constitution, the court further held that by delegation from Congress
the Department of the Interior had plenary power over the
management and administration of public federal lands.
In conclusion, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's conclusion that the Hayden-O'Mahoney Amendment
did not repeal section 4-1 in its entirety, and thus, the Water Districts
were entitled to those revenues arising under section 4-1, which were
not explicitly repealed or modified by the Amendment. The court also
held that section 4-1 and the OAA did not impose an obligation upon
the federal government to generate profits for the Water Districts by
way of grazing leases. Therefore, the court reasoned, the lease
agreement the Bureau and BLM entered into was valid with respect to
management of grazing lands within the water districts.
Lucia Padilla
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Hayes v. Whitman, 264 F.3d 1017 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding the district
court correctly granted the Environmental Protection Agency's motion
for summary judgment because the constructive submission theory did
not apply, citizens lacked viable claims under the Administrative
Procedure Act, citizens' motion to amend was untimely, and citizens'
denied affidavit covered waived issues).
Individuals who used Oklahoma's waters and groups that
advocated protecting water quality in Oklahoma ("Citizens") sued the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").
Citizens alleged
Oklahoma failed to develop total maximum daily loads ("TMDLs") for
the state's impaired waters, which constituted a constructive submittal
of no TMDLs and triggered EPA's mandatory duty under the Clean
Water Act to develop these TMDLs. The United States District Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma granted the EPA's motion for
summary judgment, and denied the Citizens' motion to amend.
Citizens appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, which affirmed the district court's decision.
Citizens raised four issues on review. First, Citizens claimed the
district court erred when they granted summary judgment on their
constructive submission claim. The court reviewed constructive
submission and explained the theory turned on whether the state
determined not to submit a required TMDL to the EPA. The state's
decision did not trigger EPA's non-discretionary duty to develop
TMDLs itself unless the state's inaction clearly and unambiguously
demonstrated their decision not to submit required TMDLs. If a state
submitted a TMDL or planned to submit a TMDL in the future, then
constructive submission analysis was factually inapplicable. The court
explained summary judgment was appropriate because Oklahoma
submitted TMDLs to the EPA, thus rendering the constructive
submission theory inapplicable and destroying Citizens' suit based on
EPA's non-discretionary duty.
Second, Citizens asserted the district court erroneously dismissed
three Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") claims. The court
disagreed and affirmed summary judgment on all claims. Citizens had
premised their first APA claim on the constructive submission theory
and EPA's non-discretionary duty. Because Citizens' constructive
submission theory failed, the court affirmed summary judgment on
this issue. Further, Citizens asserted the district court should have
allowed Citizens to challenge the adequacy of Oklahoma's TMDLs
under the APA. The court affirmed summary judgment on this issue
because citizens failed to assert this claim before they submitted their
response to the EPA's motion to dismiss. The court said they
sometimes consider additional facts or legal theories asserted in a
response brief to a motion to dismiss, yet they do not consider
allegations and theories inconsistent with those pleaded in the
complaint. Thus, because Citizens' pleaded that Oklahoma failed to
submit TMDLs, they could not also challenge, in their response to the
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motion to dismiss, EPA's approval of Oklahoma's TMDLs.
Furthermore, the court disagreed with the assertion that Citizens
lacked the knowledge necessary to fully plead this APA claim. In so
holding, it noted that because EPA's actions regarding Oklahoma's
TMDLs were a matter of public record and part of EPA's motion to
dismiss.
Third, Citizens challenged the district court's denial of a motion to
amend their complaint. The court said the district court did not abuse
its discretion in so doing. The court explained, saying untimeliness
alone was a sufficient reason to deny leave to amend. Citizen's request
to amend was untimely because they knew EPA approved some of
Oklahoma TMDLs in April 1998, and did not file their application for
leave to amend until February 2000.
Finally, Citizens asserted the district court erred when they struck
Citizens' affidavit from a TMDL expert. The court affirmed the
district court's decision because the expert's opinion regarded the
substantive inadequacy of Oklahoma's TMDLs. Thus, the affidavit
exceeded the scope of legal issues and was consequently waived, unless
The court held justice
the ends of justice dictated otherwise.
of the waiver and
informed
were
supported the waiver because Citizens
court's grant of
district
the
affirmed
chose to proceed. Thus, the court
summary judgment on all issues.
Kirstin E. McMillan
FEDERAL CLAIMS COURT
Brace v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 649 (2002) (Denying summary
judgment because genuine issues of material facts existed as to: (1)
whether or not a sufficient nexus existed between plaintiffs land and
interstate water; and (2) the size of the "parcel as a whole" for
purposes of the Penn Centraltest).
Plaintiff, Robert Brace, brought suit against the federal
government ("United States") in the United States Court of Federal
Claims, alleging that the United States took his land without just
compensation when he was ordered to cease operation of a drainage
system located on his property, and to restore parts of his land to its
prior condition, which resembled wetlands. Brace argued that because
the Clean Water Act ("CWA") did not apply until 1977, the United
State's action interfered with the reasonable, investment-backed
expectations he had when he bought the property in 1975.
This case concerned the United States' second motion for
summary judgment. The court denied the first motion because the
court did not have the information it needed to determine the
economic impact, if any, on Brace. In its denial of the United States'
first motion for summary judgment, the court ruled that Brace failed
to meet factors (1) and (3) of the three factors used to determine
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whether or not a regulatory taking has occurred (known as the Penn
Central test).
Those three factors are: (1) the character of the
governmental action or regulation; (2) the economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant; and (3) the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with reasonable investment-backed expectations. The
Supreme Court has recognized that the third prong of the Penn Central
test alone may be determinative over a takings claim.
In this case, the court made note of the fact that it had already
found there was no taking under the third prong of the Penn Central
test, and therefore the court would be within its prerogative to grant
summary judgment to the United States. However, the court declined
to do so, stating "the absence of a factual record combined with recent
developments in takings jurisprudence ... does not support allowing

defendant's motion for summary judgment."
Brace's opposition to the United States' second motion for
summaryjudgment centered on the scope of the CWA. Brace argued
that because his land was not connected to navigable waters, the CWA
did not apply. In determining this question, the court turned to the
Supreme Court case, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC"). There, a consortium of
Chicago cities banded together to develop a disposal site for nonhazardous solid waste. The group purchased an abandoned gravel site
that had filled with water and become a habitat for migratory birds,
and then filed permits with the Corps of Engineers to refill some of
the ponds in which the birds were living. The Corps of Engineers
denied the permits, and the consortium challenged the decision
under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Seventh Circuit ruled
for the Corps of Engineers, and on appeal, the Supreme Court
reversed the Seventh Circuit's ruling. The Supreme Court recognized
that under § 404(a) of the CWA, the Corps had jurisdiction over
wetlands adjacent to navigable water because there is a significant
nexus between the wetlands and the navigable waters. However, the
Court refused to extend that jurisdiction to ponds that are not
adjacent to open water because, "the text of the statute would not
allow this." As a result, the Court held that isolated ponds wholly
located in two counties (of Illinois) do not fall under § 404(a)'s
definition of navigable waters solely because they are a habitat for
migratory birds.
The court in this case found the record unclear as to whether or
not a nexus existed between Brace's land and interstate water. The
court stated that if the facts were to indicate that Brace's land is not
connected to interstate water, then the issue of whether or not there
was a taking would be moot, because under SWANCC, the United
States does not have authority to regulate isolated ponds or wetlands
that are not connected to interstate commerce. On the other hand, if
a sufficient nexus were proved between Brace's land and interstate
water, then the court could grant the motion for summary judgment.
In addition, the court found that there was still a factual dispute about
what the "parcel as a whole" was for purposes of the second prong of
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the Penn Central test (the size of the "parcel as a whole" is needed to
determine the economic impact on the plaintiff).
Thus, the court denied the United States' second motion for
summary judgment because genuine issues of material facts existed as
to (1) whether or not a sufficient nexus existed between Brace's land
and interstate water; and (2) the size of the "parcel as a whole" for
purposes of the Penn Central test. In denying the motion, the court
ordered both parties to file a joint status report within forty-five days
that would include "precise information regarding the size of the
parcel as a whole, and location of the parcel in relationship to any
ditch, canal, or channel that could lead to an interstate water. The
court then urged the parties to try settling this matter.
David M.Jacob
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Altamaha Riverkeepers v. City of Cochran, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (M.
D. Ga. 2001) (holding Altamaha Riverkeeper, a non-profit
environmental organization, had Article III standing to sue the City of
Cochran for multiple NPDES violations; the citizen suit was not barred
by actions taken by the Environmental Protection Division against the
City in response to such permit violations).
Altamaha Riverkeeper ("ARK") is a non-profit organization formed
to protect and maintain the habitat, water quality, and flow of the
Altamaha River. The City of Cochran ("City") obtained a National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit from the
Georgia Department of Natural Resources, Environmental Protection
Division ("EPD"). The permit would allow the City to operate a
wastewater facility that discharged treated wastewater into Jordan
Creek, a tributary of the Ocmulgee River located in the Altamaha
River Basin. ARK brought this citizen suit under the Clean Water Act
("CWA"), which requires that all "point sources" obtain an NPDES
permit and operate in conformity therewith. Through delegation by
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), the EPD issues and
enforces all NPDES permits in Georgia.
ARK alleged the City violated its NPDES permit on numerous
occasions spanning from July 1995 to April 2001. ARK based its
argument on Discharge Monitoring Reports the City submitted to the
EPD, which revealed violations of the discharge limits allowed under
the City's NPDES permit. The City asserted ARK's individual members
lack Article III standing to bring this suit. The City further contended
since the EPD was currently enforcing the City's NPDES permit, the
citizen suit was "duplicative" and "intrusive," and, thus, ARK was
barred from bringing this suit.
The court emphasized individual members of an organization
must have standing to sue in their own right and the interest at issue
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must be related to the organization's purpose in order for an
organization to have standing to bring suit on behalf of its members.
Furthermore, individual members have standing if they can show: (1)
they have suffered an injury in fact; (2) the injury is traceable to the
defendant; and (3) a favorable decision is likely to redress the injury.
Applying this test to the current case, the court concluded ARK
had standing to bring this citizen suit against the City. In reaching its
conclusion, the court relied on the affidavits of ARK members who
testified they all used the area in question, and their recreational use
and aesthetic enjoyment dramatically decreased because of the
wastewater facility's discharges. In response to the City's argument
that another NPDES permittee was directly responsible for the
pollution in Jordan Creek and Ocmulgee River, the court recognized
that for standing purposes, it is not necessary for the moving party to
identify which polluter caused the specific harm. With respect to
redressability, the court pointed out that the focus must be on the
injury to ARK and its members, and not on the injury to the
environment. In other words, the court's remedy must insure the
City's compliance with its NPDES permit so ARK members and others
can use and enjoy the Jordan Creek and Ocmulgee River without fear
of pollution. The redressability component required for standing does
not require that the Court's remedy restock the fish population. The
Court concluded that ARK presented sufficient evidence to establish
Article III standing to bring this citizen suit against the City for
violating its NPDES permit.
The City also contended the CWA barred the present citizen suit
since the EPD formally sought action against the City for its NPDES
violations. The court rejected this argument pointing out that, even if
the EPD had taken action before ARK filed its suit, since ARK filed its
Complaint more than sixty days after giving notice of their intent to
sue but within 120 days of giving notice, ARK complied with the
procedures setout in the CWA for bringing a private citizen suit against
a permit violator.
In summary, the court held ARK and its members had Article III
standing to proceed with their suit against the City for violations of its
NPDES permit. The court further held that under the CWA, EPA or
EPD formal action does not bar citizen suits as long as the citizens give
sixty days' notice of their intent to sue and file their suit within 120
days of the date in which they gave notice. Finding sufficient evidence
of ninety-seven NPDES permit violations by the City from July 1995 to
April 2001, the court granted ARK's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.
Lucia Padilla
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Save Our Wetlands v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 013472, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1294 (E.D. La. January 15, 2002) (holding
that Army Corps of Engineers finding that a proposed development
project would cause no significant impact to the environment was not
arbitrary and capricious).
Save Our Wetlands brought a Motion for Preliminary Injunction to
enjoin construction of a development project approved by the Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps"). Save Our Wetlands contended the
Corps' finding that the project would have no significant impact on
the environment was arbitrary and capricious, and sought an
injunction.
On November 9, 2001, the Corps approved Stirling Slidell's permit
to construct a development project on thirty-eight acres in the Bayou
Liberty Basin of St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana. Prior to approving
the project, the Corps prepared an environmental assessment ("EA")
in compliance with the statutory requirements of the National
Environmental Policy Act. In the EA, the Corps analyzed the project's
direct and cumulative effects, alternatives to the development site, and
mitigating measures that would decrease the project's negative effects.
At the conclusion of its analysis, the Corps issued a finding of no
significant impact ("FONSI") and approved Stirling's application.
Save Our Wetlands contended the FONSI was arbitrary and
capricious because the Corps did not consider the direct, secondary
and cumulative effects of the development on area flooding in the
The court rejected Save Our Wetland's
Bayou Liberty Basin.
contention for four reasons. First, the Corps based its analysis of the
project's effects on a study conducted by Duplantis Engineering, which
the court found both comprehensive and conclusive. Second, none of
the federal or state agencies that analyzed the project voiced any
concern over its potential for increased flooding in the Bayou Liberty
Basin. Third, the Corps' approval mandated the construction of a
detention pond to control flooding. Fourth, the project was expected
to provide economic benefits to the surrounding community,
including funding for municipal improvements that would alleviate
existing flooding in the area.
In the Fifth Circuit, a plaintiff must establish several requirements
to prevail on a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The plaintiff must
prove a substantial likelihood of success in a trial on the merits of the
case, a substantial threat of suffering irreparable injury if the
injunction is denied, that the threatened injury outweighs the harm to
the defendant, and that granting the injunction would serve the public
interest.
The court held that because the FONSI was not arbitrary and
capricious, Save Our Wetlands was unlikely to succeed on the merits of
the case at trial. The court held that because the project did not
create a significant chance of increased flooding, the project would
not cause irreparable harm to Save Our Wetlands. Additionally, the
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court held that an injunction would not serve the public interest. As a
result, the court denied the Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
Merc Pittinos
United States Pub. Interest Research Group v. Heritage Salmon, Inc.,
No. 00-150-B-C, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13283 (D. Me. Aug. 28, 2001)
(holding associations asserting rights on behalf of members may
establish standing where the individual members meet basic elements
of standing).
In 2000, United States Public Interest Group ("USPIRG") filed a
citizen's suit accusing Heritage Salmon, Inc. ("Heritage"), a salmon
farm located in the vicinity of Cobscook Bay ("Bay"), Maine, of
violating the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), and failing to obtain an
NPDES permit. USPIRG sought a declaratory judgment that Heritage
was in violation of an effluent standard or limitation under Chapter
26, Title 33 U.S.C. In addition, they sought civil penalties and an
order enjoining Heritage from continuing to violate the applicable
standard or limitation. In response to USPIRG's accusations, Heritage
filed a motion to dismiss under the theory that USPIRG had failed to
establish standing.
When the plaintiff is an association asserting rights on behalf of its
members: (1) some members must have standing to sue in their own
right; (2) the members' interest in the suit must be germane to the
organization's purpose; and (3) the claim asserted and the relief
requested must not require the individual participation of those
members in the suit. Heritage conceded that USPIRG satisfied the
second and third requirements, but argued USPIRG was unable to
satisfy the first requirement. USPIRG claimed standing based on the
experiences of three members who stated they were adversely affected
by Heritage's pollution of the Bay and its tributaries. The members
each claimed they reduced or eliminated the amount of fish they
consumed from the Bay or its tributaries because they were fearful of
the effects of the pollution on the fish. Two of the members stated
they stopped fishing in the area because of the pollutants in the water
from Heritage, and feared the further depletion of wild salmon, which
were already suffering from Heritage's pollution.
The United States District Court for the District of Maine held
USPIRG had established standing because the members had suffered
injuries in fact traceable to the defendant's activities, which were
redressable through court action. Injury in fact was established, inter
alia, because the members were not taking advantage of a "local food
source that they would otherwise enjoy due, in large measure, to
Heritage's discharges." The court also emphasized that environmental
plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact "when they aver that they use
the affected area and are persons for whom the aesthetic and
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recreational values of the area will be lessened by the challenged
activity."
For an injury to be "fairly traceable" to the defendant, the court
analyzed whether Heritage's pollutants caused or contributed to the
kinds of injuries alleged by USPIRG. The court asserted Heritage
could not defeat the plaintiffs' claims of standing "simply by arguing
other causative agents may be operating to bring about the decline of
wild salmon stocks."
Finally, the court stated that to satisfy the redressability
requirement, the plaintiffs' attestations must reveal a "substantial
likelihood" the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury. The
court decided that an order enjoining unlicensed discharges from
Heritage's operations and/or penalizing Heritage for ongoing
violation of the CWA would provide a meaningful remedy for the
injuries. Therefore, the District Court decided USPIRG had standing
to bring a citizen's suit against Heritage for violations of the CWA.
Sarah A. Hubbard
Le-Ax Water Dist. v. City of Athens, 174 F. Supp. 2d 696 (S.D. Ohio
2001) (granting Le-Ax Water District's motions for summary judgment
and declaratory judgment, and holding that City of Athens' agreement
to provide water service to proposed development violated Le-Ax's
protection under 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b)).
Le-Ax Water District ("Le-Ax") sued the City of Athens ("City") for
arranging to supply water to a new development by University Estates,
Inc. ("UE"), asserting such an arrangement violated 7 U.S.C. §
1926(b), which serves to protect the rights of rural water districts in an
effort to promote rural expansion. The City claimed, since the new
development did not fall within Le-Ax's current boundaries as defined
by the state, Le-Ax could not assert a right to service the development.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
Le-Ax developed as a regional, rural water district with the help of
loans from the Rural Economic and Community Development Service
("RECDS"). Le-Ax pledged all its water service revenues to secure the
debt. According to a surveyor hired by the City, Le-Ax's boundaries
fell approximately 1400 feet short of the proposed UE development
site, a point the City emphasized at trial. Nonetheless, Le-Ax's water
lines ran close to the site, while the City would have had to create
additional water access in order to serve UE. These facts allowed both
parties to make arguments that § 1926(b) spoke in their favor.
The portion of § 1926(b) upon which Le-Ax relied stated, "the
service provided or made available" by a regional water district shall
not be limited by any "municipal corporation or other public body"
within which the regional district lies. The court allowed protection
under § 1926(b) upon the satisfaction of three elements: (1) the
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organization in question is a rural water association; (2) that
association is indebted to the RECDS; and (3) the association
"provides or makes service available" to the area in question. Since LeAx satisfied the first two elements, the court focused its examination
on the third qualification.
The court used the "pipes in the ground" test from a Tenth Circuit
decision holding, wherein an association "makes service available" if it
has "proximate and adequate" pipes in the ground to provide service
within a reasonable time. Because of the relative proximity of Le-Ax's
current pipes to the UE site, the court held that Le-Ax would be able
to provide or make service available.
The City claimed that Congress never intended for § 1926(b) to
"grant water districts an exclusive right to service a site that: (a) is
outside of the district's state-law defined area; (b) is wholly unrelated
to any federal indebtedness the water district has incurred; (c) the
water district has no legal obligation to serve; and (d) has never been
served by the water district before." The court noted, as a regional
water district, Le-Ax had a legal right to provide water service to any
unincorporated areas "within and without the district," regardless of
prior service to the area or any direct relationship to its federal
indebtedness.
Finally, the City argued construing § 1926(b) so broadly violated
Ohio's Tenth Amendment rights by infringing on powers reserved for
the state. Because Ohio voluntarily subjected itself to § 1926(b), and
because "Ohio retains the general authority to control water service
within the state," the court held the statutory provision "[did] not
improperly interfere with state or municipal sovereignty because the
limits it impose [d] [were] restricted in scope."
Thus, the court granted Le-Ax's motion for summary judgment,
enjoined the City from providing water service to UE, and granted a
declaratory judgment asserting that the City's arrangement violated 7
U.S.C. § 1926(b).
KatharineJEllison
STATE COURTS
ALABAMA
Water Works & Sewer Bd. v. Randolph, No. 1002182, 2002 Ala. LEXIS
34 (Ala. Feb. 1, 2002) (finding that a public corporation organized
under section 11-50-310 of the Alabama Code is not subject to the
reporting requirements of the Sunshine Law).
Members of the Water Works & Sewer Board of the City of Selma
("Board") held a private meeting, excluding Samuel Randolph, a
member of the Board. During the private meeting, the mayor of
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Selma was dismissed as superintendent of the Board. Thereafter, the
Board members filed a declaratory judgment as to their authority to
dismiss the mayor. Samuel Randolph brought this action against the
Board and its remaining members for violating the Sunshine Law by
conducting a secret meeting of the Board without notice to the public.
Randolph sought a judgment declaring the actions of the Board void,
and requested an award of attorney fees.
The trial court issued an ex parte temporary restraining order that
blocked the Board from enforcing its decision to terminate the mayor.
The Board challenged the trial court's jurisdiction on the ground that
the Board members had a pending declaratory judgment, and on the
ground that the Sunshine Law did not apply to the Board. The trial
court held that the Board was subject to the Sunshine Law and that its
private meeting was illegal. Consequently, the trial court found the
Board's actions taken at the private meeting were void and it
permanently enjoined the Board from engaging in any future secret or
illegal meetings. The Board appealed.
The Alabama Sunshine Law, section 13A-14-2 of the Alabama
Code, expressly prohibits secret, executive meetings of enumerated
state boards, commissions or courts.
On appeal, the Alabama
Supreme Court acknowledged that the Sunshine Law did not expressly
list public corporations or water boards as subject to the statute.
Therefore, the court noted that whether the statute applied to water
boards incorporated as public corporations was a question of first
impression. In interpreting the statute, the court noted that it must
ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature as expressed by
the statute. In doing so, a court may explain the language, but it may
not detract from or add to the statute. Further, when the language of
the statute is clear, there is no room forjudicial construction.
The court then determined that it must interpret the meaning of
the "catchall phrases" listed in the Sunshine Law. Further, the court
concluded that Randolph had the burden of proving that public funds
or grants received or disbursed by the Board were funds belonging to
the state, county or municipality. Randolph asserted that the Board
was a utility that received and disbursed public grants because it
provided water, sewer and garbage services, and it collected fees from
the public for performing these services.
The court interpreted section 11-50-314 of the Alabama Code, the
statutory basis for the Board's creation, as contemplating that monies
used by a public corporation in operating its business would come
from revenues it generated and from borrowing money. The court
reasoned that although the Board's customers were also residents of
the municipality, this did not convert the revenue received by the
Board into municipal funds. Thus, the court held that the Board did
not receive or distribute municipal funds, and that Randolph failed to
meet his burden. The court further reasoned that because no
statutory authority existed to confer "any legislative or judicial
function" to the Board, and because the Board did not exercise any
legislative orjudicial function, it was not subject to the Sunshine Law.
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The court held that the Sunshine Law did not apply to the Board,
a public corporation organized under section 11-50-310, and reversed
the judgment of the trial court, including the award of attorney fees,
and rendered judgment in favor of the Board.
ChristopherA. Giffin
ARIZONA
In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River
Sys., 35 P.3d 68 (Ariz. 2001) (vacating portion of Superior Court's
earlier order upon interlocutory review and holding the "practicably
irrigable acreage" standard insufficient as the exclusive quantification
method for determining water rights on Indian lands).
In September 1988, the Superior Court held Indian reservations
were entitled to "such water as is necessary to effectuate the purpose of
that reservation," and applied the "practicably irrigable acreage"
("PIA") method for quantifying the amount of water necessary for
each reservation. This method calculated the minimal amount of
water necessary to supply "those acres susceptible to sustained
irrigation at reasonable costs." Granting an interlocutory review, the
court held the PIA method insufficient, ruling each reservation's water
needs be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Water users in Arizona acquire water rights through an
appropriation and seniority system wherein rights are lost if the
appropriator does not make use of them for a period of five years.
Indian reservations, as federal lands, acquire water rights upon
creation of the reservation, and are not required to maintain the use
of the water. In establishing federal lands, whether Indian reservations
or national parks, the government "impliedly reserves enough water to
fulfill the [primary] purpose of each such reservation." Thus, federal
water rights entail only a reservation's minimal need. If a secondary
purpose arises, rights for that purpose are subject to the prior
appropriation doctrine.
The trial court assumed the primary use of water on Indian
reservations would be for agricultural irrigation. To determine the
amount of water allotted to a reservation, the trial court applied the
PIA standard. The Arizona Supreme Court found PIA to be inherently
flawed for failing to take into account the different geographical
topographies, cultures, and skills of the various reservations. The
location of many reservations does not allow agricultural pursuits, nor
are many tribes able to sustain themselves solely from growing crops.
The Arizona Supreme Court held the primary purpose in
establishing Indian reservations was to provide a "permanent
homeland" for the Native Americans, a homeland inherently entailing
various uses of water. The court intended for lower courts to grant
water rights to reservations on a subjective basis, considering "parties'
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recommendations regarding feasibility and the amount of water
necessary to accomplish the homeland purpose." Rather than set
forth a clear test to quantify water rights, the court provided a list of
factors, consistent with the idea of a reservation serving as a permanent
homeland, with which to determine the minimal amount of water
necessary for an Indian reservation. These factors include a tribe's
history and cultural practices, geography and topography of the
reservation, groundwater availability, and past water use.
The state litigants argued their water rights would decrease due to
the proposed system of allocation to Indian reservations. The Arizona
Supreme Court rejected their argument, holding, "such a minimalist
approach demonstrates appropriate sensitivity and consideration of
existing users' water rights, and at the same time provides a realistic
basis for measuring tribal entitlements."
Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court vacated that part of the
September 1988 order that established PIA as the standard for
reserving federal water rights on Indian reservations, instead requiring
courts to grant water rights to Indian reservations based on a case-bycase basis. The court affirmed the remainder of the order.
KatharineJEllison
CALIFORNIA
Deltakeeper v. Oakdale Irrigation Dist., No. C035745, 2001 Cal. App.
LEXIS 3687 (Cal. App. Dec. 26, 2001) (when certain unnamed parties
to litigation are protected by the interests of named parties, dismissal
of a case is not necessary under the rules of indispensable parties and
necessary parties).
Oakdale Irrigation District ("Oakdale"), South San Joaquin
Irrigation District ("South San Joaquin") and Stockton East Water
District ("Stockton East"), entered into the Joint District Water
Purchase Agreement ("Agreement") with the City of Stockton, Lincoln
Village Maintenance District, Colonial Heights Maintenance District,
and Central San Joaquin Water Conservation District, for the sale of
water by Oakdale and South San Joaquin to the other parties to the
Agreement.
Oakdale and South San Joaquin prepared an
Environmental Impact Report ("EIR"), which Deltakeeper challenged
by a petition for a writ of mandate. On August 26, 1999, Deltakeeper
filed a petition for writ of mandamus alleging the EIR failed to address
adequately the environmental impacts of the project proposed in the
Agreement. They requested the setting aside of the certification of the
EIR and a permanent injunction enjoining respondents from
engaging in any activity connected with the project until the project
approvals fully complied with the California Environmental Quality
Act ("CEQA"). The Oakdale, South San Joaquin, and Stockton East
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Districts filed a motion to dismiss the petition on December 13, 1999
for failure to join indispensable parties.
The court determined whether the unnamed parties are necessary
parties or indispensable parties to the litigation, under section 389 of
the Public Resources Code of California. Section 389 mandates that
whenever feasible, the person materially interested in the subject of an
action should be joined as a necessary party so they may be heard.
This section insures that complete, not hollow, relief will be had by all
interested parties, the protection of parties whose joinder is in
question, and a party is not subject, after the adjudication, to double
or otherwise inconsistent liability. The court here found that the EIR
ensured complete relief for all the interested parties. Secondly, the
court found the unnamed parties did not lose protection of their
interests when the joined parties had the same interest in the
litigation. All parties have voting rights under the Agreement before
any action is taken which binds the named parties to the outcome of
the vote. Finally, the parties will not be threatened with double or
inconsistent liability because any of them may cancel the Agreement if
the EIR is determined to be inadequate.
The next issue was whether a necessary party to the action is
indispensable. A party is indispensable only in the conclusory sense
that in its absence, the court has decided the action should be
dismissed. Ordinarily courts refuse to adjudicate a contract case when
all parties to the action are not present. The fact that the action may
affect the interests of the non-joined parties in the underlying contract
in this case does not dictate the conclusion they are indispensable
parties. The rights asserted in this litigation are independent of the
contractual rights to water established by the Agreement. An
indispensable party is determined by four factors: (1) whether the
judgment is prejudicial to parties or non-parties; (2) whether any
prejudice be lessened or avoided, (3) whether the judgment will be
adequate; and (4) whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy
if the action is dismissed. First, the court decided the non-joined
parties had interests in the litigation but the parties to the action
adequately, protected the interests. Second, the unnamed parties
could make no new arguments since a determination of an EIR's
adequacy was based on the existence of substantial evidence and any
party could make this argument. Third, any judgment rendered will
adequately adjudicate the rights of all parties. Fourth, if the action was
dismissed Deltakeeper would have no recourse because the statute of
limitations had run forjoining more parties.
Finally, the court found that if the action were dismissed, the
evaluation of the EIR would escape scrutiny, the main recourse the
public has to ensure projects comply with CEQA. Therefore, the court
did not dismiss the case.
ShandraDobrovolny
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Hartwell Corp. v. Superior Court, 38 P.3d 1098 (Cal. 2002) (holding
that California's Public Utilities Commission had authority under the
state constitution to adopt drinking water quality standards; that
judicial challenge to the adequacy of those standards was barred by
statute; that the statute also prohibited injunctions against water
utilities for violating those standards; that the statute would allow
damage claims should a utility fail to meet the Public Utilities
Commission's standards; and that there was no bar to action against
defendants who were not subject to Public Utility Commission
regulation).
Several hundred California residents ("Residents") brought four
separate actions in Los Angeles Superior Court against various groups
of corporate parties ("Industrial Defendants") and public water
utilities. These actions were consolidated into the instant case. The
Residents charged that they had been provided unsafe drinking water
and sought damages and injunctive relief. California's Public Utilities
Commission ("PUC") had authority to regulate some of the utilities
("Regulated Utilities").
Other utilities were not subject to PUC
regulation ("Unregulated Utilities").
The California Legislature gave the PUC authority to develop and
apply standards for the quality of drinking water, provided those
standards were not inconsistent with those of the California
Department of Health Services ("DHS"). The legislature also explicitly
limited the jurisdiction of judicial review of the PUC's decisions.
Specifically, the judiciary may not take action that would hinder or
interfere with the PUC's legitimate exercise of regulatory authority.
The legislature expressly described a baseline for water quality: the
PUC's standards had to be at least those of the DHS. The court held
that as long as DHS's standards are met, PUC has total authority to set
water quality standards, and that judicial review of the adequacy of
those standards is barred by statute. Accordingly, the court held that
the Residents were barred from seeking damages based on the
supposed inadequacy of the PUC's water quality standards.
The court also considered the Resident's available remedies for
violation of PUC's water quality standards. The court held that even if
those standards are being violated, injunctive relief against the utility
in question is inappropriate if that utility is under PUC regulation
because such an injunction would interfere with PUC's efforts to
correct the violation, which is a legitimate exercise of their regulatory
authority. Thus, the court held that the Residents were barred from
seeking injunctive relief for a violation of PUC standards by the
Regulated Utilities.
However, the court also held that holding the Regulated Utilities
liable for damages caused by violations of PUC standards would not
interfere with the PUC's exercise of authority, and consequently the
Residents could make claims for damages based on the Regulated
Utilities' violations of PUC standards. Furthermore, the court held
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that since the unregulated utilities and industrial defendants were not
subject to PUC regulation, court action against the unregulated
utilities would not interfere with the PUC's regulatory authority.
Hence the Residents' claims against the Unregulated Utilities were
allowable.
Thus, the Residents were limited in their recovery against the
Regulated Utilities to damages from violations of the PUC's water
standards, if such violations did exist. The Residents recovery the
Industrial Defendants and Unregulated Utilities were not limited. The
court remanded the case for further proceedings.
James Siegesmund
COLORADO
Empire Lodge Homeowners' Assoc. v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139 (Colo.
2002) (holding that a party does not have standing to challenge
another's water right on the basis of injury if it does not have an
adjudicated water right, and that water users diverting out-of-priority
water need augmentation plans decreed by water courts).
Empire Lodge Homeowners' Association ("Empire Lodge") filed
suit against Anne and Russell Moyer ("Moyers") in District Court for
Water Division No. 2 ("Water Court") claiming unlawful use
enlargement and invocation of the futile call doctrine. Empire Lodge
alleged that the Moyers unlawfully expanded their irrigated acreage to
include land outside their decreed use area, used water for undecreed
purposes, violated the "duty of water" limitation expressed in their
decree, and irrigated land that the Parkville Water District "dry up"
covenant required to be removed from irrigation. The Moyers
counterclaimed to enjoin Empire Lodge from illegally diverting water,
due to failure to obtain an augmentation plan decree, from Empire
Creek into Beaver Lakes. The Water Court dismissed Empire Lodge's
claims and enjoined Empire Lodge from its out-of-priority diversions
pending adjudication of an augmentation plan.
The Colorado
Supreme Court affirmed the Water Court's judgment.
Empire Lodge was a homeowners' association connected with
Beaver Lakes Subdivision, a 261-lot development situated on Empire
Creek, a tributary to the Arkansas River. The Moyers operated a ranch
downstream from Empire Lodge. Empire Lodge diverted water out-ofpriority to fill two ponds, known as Beaver Lakes, used for recreational
purposes. In order to divert out-of-priority, Empire Lodge relied upon
the State Engineer's approval. The State Engineer conditioned
approvals upon Empire Lodge providing substitute supply water to the
Arkansas River; however, the replacement point was below the Moyer's
ranch. As early as 1986, the State Engineer informed Empire Lodge
that it needed to obtain an adjudicated augmentation plan.
In order to determine whether Empire Lodge had standing, the
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Supreme Court first evaluated Colorado's prior appropriation system,
adjudication, and administration system of natural stream use rights.
Prior appropriation promoted multiple use of a finite resource, thus
fostering optimum use, efficient management, and priority
administration. Colorado premised this appropriation system upon
three principles: (1) waters are a public resource where property rights
can attach to unappropriated waters for beneficial use; (2) courts
adjudicate water rights and priorities; and (3) state engineers, division
engineers and water commissioners administer the waters in
accordance with judicial decrees and statutory provisions. In order to
obtain benefits of the priority system, such as value and priority, a
party must adjudicate its water right. During dry years, the State
Engineer administers the priority system by favoring decreed senior
users and curtailing decreed junior uses and undecreed water use.
Thus, a party cannot make an enforceable call on the river without
having a decreed right.
Next, the court evaluated out-of-priority diversions, augmentation
plans, and exchanges through the court and the legislative responses
to Colorado's increased water needs. These responses centered on
reinforcing the adjudication and administration process and use
maximization of Colorado's limited water supply. The Water Right
Determination and Administration Act established the ability to divert
out-of-priority through a "decreed augmentation plan." Augmentation
plans allowed out-of-priority diversions while ensuring protection to
senior rights via a replacement water supply. State Engineers enjoyed
short-lived authority to approve temporary augmentation plans.
However, in 1977, the legislature repealed this authority in response to
concern about the constitutionality due to lack of notice to potentially
injured water rights holders. Thus, the authority to approve an
augmentation plan lay with the courts.
Empire Lodge asserted that the State Engineer had broad
authority to approve substitute supply plans, but the court disagreed.
When utilizing the term substitute supply throughout the Colorado
Revised Statutes, the court determined the provisions' common nexus
was quantity and quality requirements applicable to replacement
water. The State Engineer had authority to approve augmentation
plans in a very narrow context. For instance, he may issue approval in
connection with sand and gravel open mine extraction situations or
with upstream reservoir storage so long as the user releases the water
upon senior user need due to insufficient supply.
In addition to authority, the court evaluated substitute supply in
the context of exchanges. The court identified four critical elements
to an exchange: (1) the substitute supply source must be above a
calling water right; (2) the supply must be the same quantity and
quality for the downstream water user; (3) natural flow must be
available at the upstream diversion point; and (4) the exchange
cannot injure other users. Exchanges are distinct from augmentation
plans because it merely substitutes water with a priority date, whereas
augmentation plans address depletion of the resource with no priority
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resulting.
The court found that Empire Lodge's out-of-priority diversion,
required, but did not have a decreed water right. Empire Lodge relied
on a right to divert via a State Engineer approved temporary
augmentation plan. However, the court determined that water courts,
not the State Engineer, have the sole authority to approve
augmentation plans. With no water right, Empire Lodge lacked
standing to assert either its futile call argument or its enlargement
claim. On the other hand, since the Moyers possessed a decreed water
right, they had standing to assert their counter claim.
In Empire Lodge's appeal to the Water Court's injunction, it
argued that the Moyers did not prove injury by Empire Lodge's
diversion. The court stated, first, there was a presumption of injury
and second, the Moyers provided actual proof of injury. The court
further found that Empire Lodge's substitute supply plan was not an
exchange because the replacement source entered the river system
below the Moyer's diversion point. The court clarified that the
injunction had the effect of directing Empire Lodge to obtain a court
approval for the out-of-priority diversion. Additionally, the court
stated that the injunction did not inhibit Empire Lodge's ability to
store water under "free river" conditions, and it could appropriate
unappropriated water. Thus, the court held the injunction enjoined
Empire Lodge's out-of-priority diversions that required a decreed
augmentation plan authorizing them to do so. The court affirmed the
Water Court's judgment.
Holly Kirsner
Strole v. Guymon, 37 P.3d 529 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (holding an oral
water rotation scheme unenforceable; a court may limit the use of a
pre-existing ditch to resolve an equitable dispute).
The Stroles owned property directly north of the Guymon's. Each
party held water rights from the Uncompaghre Valley Water Users
Association; the Stroles maintained an interest of .17 cfs for their 8.6
shares of irrigation water, and the Guymon's maintained an interest of
.22 cfs or 2.8 shares at 100 percent. There were two ditches involved,
the eastern ditch, and the western ditch. Each party's water entered
the Guymon's property through the eastern ditch on the southeastern
corner of their property. Starting in 1979, when the Stroles purchased
their property, they retained an agreement with the Guymon's
predecessor (the Guymon's purchased their property in 1995). As
such, the parties had rotated their water shares; the Guymon's used
the party's combined water one half of the time, and the Stroles used
the combined water the other half of the time. Because of the contour
of the land and the middle ditch, the Price ditch, it was imperative the
Stroles received the combined water for their hay crop. However, in
1999, the Guymons decided to discontinue the water rotation
arrangement.
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As a result, the Stroles filed suit alleging the Guymons interfered
with their water rights, and obtained a preliminary injunction that
allowed for their continued use of the water rotation agreement. The
trial court held the Stroles maintained an easement over the Guymon's
property, but the Stroles had no right to impose a water rotation
system over the Guymons. Thus, the trial court ordered the Stroles
receive all of their water through the eastern ditch; a diversion splitter
box be installed on the Guymon's property to ensure each party
received the proper allocation of water; a flume system be installed on
the Strole's property easing the water flow from the eastern ditch to
the western portion of the Strole's property; and, finally, all parties
share the cost based on their water allocation.
The Stroles appealed claiming the trial court erred in concluding
there lacks a contractual basis to impose a water rotation system. The
appellate court concluded a water rotation agreement does not defeat
a claim of continuous and exclusive possession with respect to the
adverse possession of water rights, and thus the trial court did not err.
The Stroles further claimed the trial court erred by severely limiting
their right to use the western ditch based on a balancing of equities
approach to easements, and their long existing use of the ditch should
have allowed them its continued use. The trial court determined the
Stroles maintained only an easement over the eastern ditch, however
the Guynons submitted two easements existed, ones over the eastern
and western ditches. The appellate court concluded the trial court
adequately weighed all the evidence and provided an adequate
remedy, and thus did not abuse its discretion. Furthermore, the
appellate court concluded a court may limit the use of a pre-existing
ditch in order to resolve a dispute equitably. Lastly, the Stroles
claimed the Guymons must bear the financial burden of building the
new irrigation system, and the Guymons appealed claiming they
should not bear any of the financial burden. However, the appellate
court held the trial court fashioned an equitable and fair remedy, it
did not abuse its discretion, and each party must share the cost.
Finally, the Guymons maintained the preliminary injunction allowing
the Stroles continued use of the rotation scheme should be dissolved.
The appellate court held that the injunction remained in effect until
the new irrigation system was completely installed.
Staci A. McComb
Mount Emmons Mining Co. v. Crested Butte, 40 P.3d 1255 (Colo.
2002) (reversing the water court's denial of Mount Emmons Mining
Company's application for a conditional water right by determining
that a beneficiary of a subordination agreement is not required to
satisfy the water availability test).
Mount Emmons Mining Company ("Mount Emmons") filed an
application for a conditional water right in 1988. Mount Emmons
planned to use water from the tributaries of the Gunnison River above
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the Aspinall Unit ("Unit") for mining purposes. The water court held
that since the Bureau of Reclamation ("BUREC") held the water rights
to the Unit, Mount Emmons needed a contract with BUREC to benefit
from the subordination policy. The policy essentially stated that inbasin projects on the Gunnison and its tributaries above the Unit
could deplete at least 60,000 acre-feet of water. The Colorado
Supreme Court rejected this decision.
The Court previously held that based on the subordination
agreement, BUREC must allow upstream,junior, in-basin depletions of
at least 60,000 acre-feet water. The Court stated that this depletion
allowance trumped BUREC's senior rights to appropriate water.
Because Mount Emmons was an in-basin and upstream appropriator,
the Court determined that Mount Emmons was an intended
beneficiary of this depletion allowance.
Furthermore, the Court disapproved of the water court's reliance
on Board of County Comm'rs v. Crystal Creek Homeowners' Ass'n to
determine the case. In Crystal Creek, the water court determined that
potential appropriators needed a contract with BUREC for access to
the 60,000 acre-foot depletion allowance. Based on the facts in Crystal
Creek, the water court similarly decided that Mount Emmons also
needed a contract with BUREC to access the depletion allowance. The
Supreme Court disagreed with this analysis because in Crystal Creek, the
appropriator was a trans-basin diverter, unlike Mount Emmons, which
was an in basin appropriator.
Finally, the Court determined that Mount Emmons was an
intended beneficiary of the subordination agreement, and that Mount
Emmons and BUREC did not need a contract for the issuance of a
conditional water decree. According to the Court, Mount Emmons
must show that water was available as a prerequisite to receiving a
conditional water right. Therefore, the Court reversed the water
court's denial and remanded the case to determine if a sufficient
amount of water was available to satisfy Mount Emmons' application
for a conditional water right.
Stefania Niro
Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude's Co., 36 P.3d 1229 (Colo. 2001)
(holding that the owner of property burdened by a ditch easement
who cannot secure the consent of the benefited owner to move or alter
the easement may make alterations only after obtaining a court
declaration that such alterations will not damage the benefited
owner).
The Roaring Fork Club ("Club") acquired neighboring,
upgradient property adjoining St. Jude's Company ("Ranch"). The
Club and the Ranch shared an interest in three irrigation ditches that
traversed the Club's property. The Club intended to develop its
property for recreational use by building a private fishing and golf
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club. In order to accommodate its development plans, the Club
attempted to purchase a portion of the Ranch's easements, or to
formalize a ditch maintenance agreement. However, when the parties
were unable to reach an agreement, the Club moved forward with
construction in and around the ditches.
The Ranch initiated a trespass action against the Club, seeking a
mandatory and permanent injunction requiring the Club to restore
the ditches to their original condition. The trial court, acting in equity,
concluded that the Club had committed trespass on the Ranch's
easements. However, because the Ranch sought an equitable remedy,
the trial court concluded that the Ranch was entitled to injunctive
relief in one of two forms. The Club must either restore the ditches to
their original condition or assume all responsibility for and expense of
operation and maintenance of the ditches on its property, and be
permanently obligated to deliver water to the Ranch in the amount,
quality and time consistent with the Ranch's adjudicated rights. The
court gave the right to choose between the alternative remedies to the
Club, which chose the maintenance and delivery option.
The Ranch appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, holding
that the maintenance and delivery option did not comply with
Colorado law. Further, the court of appeals held the trial court order
unjustifiably rewarded the Club for deliberate and conscious trespass.
The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the court of appeals was correct in preempting the trial court's
exercise of equitable discretion, and whether the court of appeals
erred by requiring an award of injunctive relief.
The majority rule in the United States, which prohibits burdened
estate owners from unilaterally relocating easements, has historically
governed ditch easements as well. Nevertheless, competing land uses
and unclear common-law precedent have led to conflicts. Although
the supreme court found that the Club had trespassed upon the
Ranch's easement, they recognized that competing uses should be
accommodated, if possible, and that inflexible notions of dominant
and servient estates did little to advance that accommodation.
The supreme court looked to the Restatement (Third) of Property
(Servitudes) § 4.8(3) (2000) ("Restatement") to articulate a balanced
approach between burdened and benefited estate holders. Thus, the
supreme court found the Restatement allowed a burdened property
owner, such as the Club, to unilaterally move or alter a ditch easement
in order to maximize the use of its own property (unless it is specified
in deed or otherwise to have a certain location), subject both to a
reasonableness test and to the constraints delimited in the
Restatement rule.
The supreme court then explained how it reconciled the notion
that interference with a ditch easement without consent, which
constitutes trespass, with the Restatement doctrine. If a burdened
owner seeks to move or alter a ditch easement and the benefited
owner refuses consent, the burdened owner may seek a declaratory
judgment from a court that the alteration does not damage the
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benefited owner(s) in accordance with the Restatement test. In such a
proceeding, a judge would apply the Restatement rule to determine
whether the planned changes pass the three-prong test.
The three-prong test requires the burdened owner to present a
prima facie case that the alteration would cause no damage under the
Restatement rule. A successful showing would shift the burden to the
benefited owner to establish damage. If the burdened owner made a
showing of no damage and the benefited owner's evidence was
insufficient to rebut, the court would enter a declaration for the
burdened owner. However, if the benefited owner successfully
demonstrated damage, the court should decline to permit the
alteration.
In evaluating damage, or the absence of damage, the trial court
must not only look at the operation of the ditch for the benefited
owner, but also at the maintenance rights associated with the ditch. In
addition, the water provided to the ditch easement owner must be of
the same quantity, quality and timing as provided under the ditch
owner's water rights and easement rights in the ditch.
Returning to the case at hand and recognizing that their opinion
identified a remedy previously not clear in law, the supreme court
remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the Club's
alteration of the easement was reasonable and otherwise satisfied the
Restatement criteria. If the alterations did not meet the test, the court
must order restoration. Further, the Ranch was entitled to an order
allowing it to inspect, maintain, operate and repair the ditch easement
and water structure, irrespective of allocation of costs and burdens of
maintenance that might form part of equitable relief.
John A. He fich
CONNECTICUT
Wood v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals., 784 A.2d 354 (Conn. 2001) (holding
spring water collection, storage, and transportation is not a permitted
agricultural use within Somers Town Code 214-4).
Hillside and co-plaintiffs ("Hillside"). appealed the trial court's
decision to uphold a cease and desist order the zoning Board of
Appeals in the Town of Somers ("Board") issued following judgment
that collecting, storing, and transporting spring water for human
consumption is not a permitted agricultural use within A-i zoning
districts, pursuant to Somers Town Code provision 214-4. The court
concluded Hillside failed to prove the Board's statutory interpretation
was illegal, arbitrary, or an abuse of its discretion. Hillside also
claimed the court should not have decided whether the use was legally
nonconforming, because the Board failed to address such issue
initially, and, thus, the court should have remanded it to the Board.
Applying Somers zoning regulations, the appellate court's
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determination of the Board's "reasonable and rational intent" utilized
to interpret the statute, is plenary. Though Somers Town Code
provision 214-98 permitted farms on A-i zoned property, Hillside's use
was not included within provision 214-4's "agriculture," or "cultivation
of the land" definitions. The court distinguished spring water
collection because it does not require soil preparation "for the
purpose of seeding the. land or growing crops," and further, because
spring water cannot be planted, grown, or harvested, but only
collected, requiring no soil to "grow or nurture some living thing."
The court further rejected Hillside's contention that collecting
spring water qualified as an "agricultural" or "farming" use because it
entailed "harvesting any agricultural.., commodity," under General
Statutes § 1-1 (q). Unpersuaded, the court was bound by Somers Town
Code 214-4's express "agriculture" definition and could not defer to
this statutory definition.
Hillside further argued the legislature
amended General Statutes § 19a-341 to classify spring water collection
as an agricultural activity. However, the court maintained the statute
bore no relevance to "agriculture" in provision 214-4, or to applicable
zoning regulations. Rather, the statute simply states spring water
cannot be collected in a manner constituting a nuisance.
Furthermore, the court found unacceptable Hillside's contention that
the use was permitted because it took place on a farm, because it is not
an "accessory use" incident to a permitted agricultural use within 2144, but rather activity "having no relation to the farm itself."
However, the court deemed the Board failed to initially address
whether the activity was legally nonconforming. Thus, the trial court's
determination of such issue was improper, as the factual record is
insufficient for the appellate court to make its own determination.
Therefore, the case was remanded to the trial court with directions to
remand this issue to the Board. Thejudgment was otherwise affirmed.
Robert Lykos
FLORIDA
Quiles v. Boynton Beach, 802 So. 2d 397 (Fla.App. 2001) (holding the
city of Boynton Beach's decision to add fluoride to the city's potable
water supply did not violate a citizen's right to refuse medical
treatment under Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution).
The Boynton Beach City Commission voted to add fluoride to the
city's potable water supply. Jesus F. Quiles ("Quiles"), a citizen, filed a
suit against the City alleging the fluoridation measure violated his right
to refuse medical treatment under Article I, Section 23 of the Florida
Constitution. The circuit court granted the city of Boynton Beach's
("Boynton") motion to dismiss with prejudice. Quiles appealed to the
Court of Appeals of Florida, Fourth District, which affirmed the circuit
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court, and held the fluoridation measure was a valid exercise of
Boynton's police power and was not an arbitrary or unreasonable
imposition on Quiles' constitutional rights.
The court examined the power vested in a municipality under the
Florida Constitution and found a municipality had broad
governmental, corporate, and proprietary powers to perform
municipal functions and services. Furthermore, the court found a
public authority, in a municipality, must protect the health, safety, and
general welfare of its citizens. The court said this duty included
sanitary and health regulations for the municipality's waterworks, as
evidenced by a Florida case that specifically upheld adding fluoride to
the city water supply as a valid exercise of a municipality's police
power.
Quiles asserted that the fluoridation was not within Boynton's
police power because fluoride had no real health benefits and was not
necessary to fight disease or make the water potable, but was a
prophylactic measure to fight tooth decay. Thus, Quiles claimed he
was forced to consume fluoride through Boynton's water, which
amounted to compulsory medication in violation of his right to privacy
under Article 1, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution. The court
distinguished Boynton's fluoridation measure from the prohibited
compulsory medication cases because Boynton fluoridated the water
before it entered Quiles' household and never sought to introduce
fluoride directly into Quiles' bloodstream. Thus, the court held
Boynton's fluoridation measure was not prohibited compulsory
medication because Quiles was free to choose not to ingest Boynton's
fluoridated water.
Quiles also argued that Boynton's power was limited to protecting
citizen health and did not extend to improving health by preventing
certain conditions. The court realized Quiles made a valid distinction,
but dismissed this contention saying it was not the duty of the court to
judge the wisdom of a municipality when adopting health measures.
The court's role was only to determine if Boynton acted within their
legal and constitutional limitations. Thus, the court held Boynton's
decision to fluoridate their potable water supply was within the
municipality's police power.
Kirstin E. McMillan
IDAHO
N. Snake Ground Water Dist. v. Gisler (In re SRBA Case No. 39576,
Subcase No. 36-00077D), 40 P.3d 105 (Idaho 2002) (holding
objections to decrees must be raised at the objection and response
phase of an adjudication, not in a motion to alter or amend).
The North Snake Groundwater District ("District") brought this
appeal contesting the decree of a water right to Bradley and Linda
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Gisler ("Gislers") and maintaining that it properly and timely raised
the issue before the SRBA district court. This court found that the
District did not raise its objections at the appropriate phase of the
adjudication.
The Gislers claimed a water right in July 1988 for 4.0 cfs for stock
water and irrigation for sixty-nine irrigated acres. In 1993, the Idaho
Department
of Water Resources
("IDWR")
submitted
a
recommendation for 1.5 cfs on a total of forty-eight irrigated acres.
The Gislers filed an objection to the report, however, in October 1997
the Gislers and IDWR reached an agreement and stipulated to 2.34 cfs
on sixty-one irrigated acres. The Special Master recommended a
decree in accordance with the stipulation.
In November 1997, the District filed a motion to alter or amend
the decree; this was the District's first involvement with the subcase.
The District alleged that the diversion rate in the stipulation was based
upon gravity or flood irrigation, but the Gislers were actually using
sprinkler irrigation, which allegedly requires less water. Three IDWR
affidavits supported the Districts contentions that: (1) the Gislers were
using sprinkler irrigation; (2) the decree was made on the assumption
that the Gislers would use gravity irrigation; and (3) gravity irrigation
generally requires more water than sprinkler irrigation. In 1998, the
Special Master denied the District's motion.
The District appealed to the SRBA district court and condensed
several issues into one underlying issue: IDWR's recommendation
based on gravity irrigation violated Idaho statutory mandates. The
SRBA district court denied the District's challenge, stating that
because the District had not followed proper procedure it had lost its
opportunity to object.
The District appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. The main
issue on appeal was whether the District had properly and timely filed
its objections in the SRBA district court. The District argued that a
party in the SRBA district court may challenge a special master's legal
conclusions, and, since the recommendation based on the Gislers
using a gravity system rather than a sprinkler system violated Idaho
law, this was a question of law. The District asserted that it was not
attempting to obtain an advisory opinion, rather, it was concerned that
the decree could result in non-beneficial use of water.
The Idaho Supreme Court found that an administrative order
governs the procedures of the SRBA district court and that statute
specifically states that all objections must be filed before the issuance
of a stipulation. In this case, the District filed its objections one-month
after the Gislers and IDWR reached agreement. This court held that
the District's claims were not legal in nature and the District is bound
by Idaho law; objections must be filed before issuance of a stipulation.
The District should have raised its challenges during the objection and
response period of the adjudication, not in a motion to alter or
amend.
Rebekah King
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ILLINOIS
Roketa v. Hoyer, 763 N.E.2d 417 (I. 2002) (holding the right to the
recreational use of a lake is essential to the beneficial enjoyment of its
bordering tracts of land; it is possible to permit concurrent uses of the
lake without hindering individual landowner interests).
Alice and Delphin Roketa ("Roketas"), owners of June Lake,
sought a court order to permanently enjoin Ralph Hoyer from using
the lake for recreational purposes. The Roketas alleged Hoyer had no
property right or interest in the lake and no right to use the lake.
Hoyer contended he had title to real estate along the shoreline ofJune
Lake, and an easement to access and use the lake for recreational
purposes. The circuit court found a use easement for recreational
purposes was imposed on June Lake for the benefit of the adjoining
real estate, and thus Hoyer had a right to use June Lake for
recreational purposes. The court granted summary judgment in favor
of Hoyer. The Roketas appealed.
The appellate court turned to basic principles of property law to
resolve the case. When the owner of a tract of land divides it into
different parts in such a manner that one part derives from another an
advantage of a permanent, open and physical character, and
afterwards sells a part of the property, the purchaser takes the part sold
with all the benefits and burdens that appear at the time of the sale.
Furthermore, when a grant is made for valuable consideration, it shall
be presumed the grantor intended to convey, and the grantee
expected to receive, the full benefit of the land conveyed. This
includes all other things necessary to the enjoyment of the land
granted, and those things shall pass with the land by the grant of the
land itself, without requiring specific mention of the benefits or
appurtenances. An appurtenant easement is an incorporeal right or
privilege incidental to the land conveyed. It runs with the land and
passes by conveyance of the land even without being mentioned in the
instrument of transfer.
Joseph and Joyce Bohn ("Bohns") originally owned a private
manmade lake, including the body of water and underlying ground,
known as June Lake, and the real estate surrounding the lake. In
order to sell the property, the Bohns divided the estate into several
tracts of land that each bordered the lake. First, the Bohns and Hoyer
entered into a warranty deed conveying a 1.52-acre tract of land
bounded on the west by the shoreline of June Lake to Hoyer.
However, no portion of June Lake was given to Hoyer; the deed was
silent as to Hoyers' right to use June Lake. Next, the Bohns executed a
warranty deed passing on a separate tract bordering June Lake, not
any portion of the lake, to the Roketas. This deed included a
provision granting the Roketas the right to use the lake for
recreational purposes.
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The Bohns subsequently executed a quitclaim deed conveying
legal title to June Lake and its surrounding land to the Bank in lieu of
foreclosure. The Bank then executed a corporate quitclaim deed
conveying title to the lake and certain tracts of bordering land to
Robert and Josephine Arnold, and expressly reserving access to and
use of June Lake for recreational purposes for the benefit of
specifically described real estate to the Bank and its successors,
grantees and assigns. Later in time, the Arnolds conveyed title to June
Lake and some adjoining tracts of land to the Roketas. The deed
expressly provided the conveyance was subject to the "rights of other
owners of land bordering on June Lake with respect to land lying
within June Lake and in respect to the water and use of the surface of
said lake."
The court believed it evident thatJune Lake was created to benefit
the land surrounding it. Thus, those tracts of land bordering the lake
derived open and visible benefits from the lake. The court held the
right to the recreational use of the lake is essential to the beneficial
enjoyment of the tracts that border it. Thus, the purchase of the
property is as much for the right to use the lake as for the land itself.
Accordingly, the court found the Roketas' property was subject to an
easement for the benefit of the Hoyer tract, and that beneficial right to
the use of the lake for recreational purposes passed with the
conveyance of that tract to Hoyer.
With regard to the use of easements, there is a principle of
concurrent use, rather than exclusive use. The owner of the servient
estate must not interfere with the use of the easement by the dominant
estate, and the owner of the dominant estate cannot materially alter
the easement to place a greater burden on the servient estate or
otherwise interfere with the use or enjoyment of the servient estate by
its owner. The use of an easement by both landowners must be
permitted in accordance with their individual interests. The Roketas
set up a catfish farm at one end of the lake. The court found no
evidence this use interfered with Hoyer's right to use the lake for
recreational purposes. Accordingly, the court determined it possible
to permit the parties to concurrently use the lake without hindering
their individual interests.
Kimberley E. Montanaro
MINNESOTA
Zaluckyj v. Rice Creek Watershed Dist., 639 N.W.2d 70 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2000) (affirming the district court's ruling that appellants failed
to exhaust their administrative remedies and failed to show that to do
so would be futile, thus appellants are not entitled to judicial relief).
Washington County Judicial Ditch No. 2 is a thirteen-mile public
drainage system that was originally established in 1909 pursuant to a
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court order. Land along the ditch is comprised of both private and
public interests. Appellants in this action are individuals who own
land along or near the ditch "Citizens"). Respondent Rice Creek
Watershed District is the drainage authority, respondents Department
of Natural Resources and the Board of Water and Soil Resources are
the state agencies that administer public water and wetlands
protection, and respondent Minnesota Center for Environmental
Advocacy, a nonprofit environmental group, intervened (collectively
"Respondents").
Citizens contended that overflowing water from the ditch flooded
their land. Thus, in 1995, the City of Hugo, which was a plaintiff in
the district court action, but did not file a notice of appeal, applied to
the watershed district for a permit to adjust the ditch by lowering three
culverts. This application was denied, but following a joint study and
other proceedings, the water shed district issued a permit in 1998
allowing one culvert to be lowered. In November of 1998, the City
petitioned the watershed district for a hearing pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§ 103E.075 (1998) to determine whether the other two culverts were
obstructing the flow of the ditch and thus should be lowered.
The watershed district denied the petition, determining that
lowering the culverts would not improve the hydraulic capacity of the
ditch unless other ditch repairs were made as well. The watershed
district noted that under Minn. Stat. § 103E.715 (1998), any interested
party may petition the watershed district to repair the ditch. However,
the City did not petition for repair; instead, the City and Citizens
landowners filed a declaratory judgment complaint and a petition for a
writ of mandamus in district court, seeking an order for the removal of
the obstructions and repair of the ditch, or, in the alternative, for
inverse condemnation proceedings and a determination that they were
exempt from certain rules and regulations. Before ever reaching the
merits of the case, the court determined that appellants failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies pursuant to section 103E.715
and dismissed the action.
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed two issues
using a clearly erroneous standard of review. First, the court asked
whether Citizens were entitled to ajury trial on the issue of exhaustion
of administrative remedies. Citizens argued that in mandamus and
declaratory judgment proceedings, parties are entitled to have issues
of fact tried by a jury, and since the issue of exhaustion of remedies
involved disputed questions of fact, Citizens were entitled to a jury
trial. The court disagreed, however, and held that issues of exhaustion
and futility of administrative remedies are generally legal questions for
the court. Thus the district court did not err in ruling that Citizens
were not entitled to ajury trial regarding exhaustion of remedies.
Next, the court considered whether Citizens failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies or failed to show that exhaustion would have
been futile. Citizens contended that the administrative remedies for
ditch repair were not available to them as a matter of law and that it
would have been futile for them to try. In particular, Citizens rely on
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Minn. Stat. § 103E.715(4) (a) for the proposition that repairs should
not be made if the cost of repair exceeds the total benefits the
landowners received. Citizens estimated present day repair costs at
$400,000 to $500,000, which greatly exceeds the 1909 determination
that the benefits to the landowners were $34,053.
Citizens
acknowledge that if the benefits were redetermined to reflect modern
day values, the repairs would probably be a feasible remedy. The court
determined, however, that Citizens were erroneous in their reliance on
§ 103E.715(4) (a) because the cap on the price of the repair project
only applies when 26 percent of the landowners affected sign a
petition for repairs.
An alternative provision authorizes repair
regardless of cost when the drainage authority determines that the
repairs are necessary for the best interests of the affected property
owners, thus the remedy is available to Citizens.
Citizens further contend that it would be futile for them to petition
for repair of the ditch because respondents will not issue the necessary
wetlands replacement and public water permits. However, the court
disagreed, noting that respondents have not made a final decision on
the matter. Additionally, Citizens sought a determination that the
ditch repair was exempt from certain wetlands replacement
requirements and public water mitigation costs, and sought
determination of the applicability of various other water management
related rules. Citizens argued that the district court erred in declining
to address the issue, but the court ruled that issues of this type should
be determined through the administrative process of a petition for
repair. Thus Citizens failed to exhaust their administrative remedies,
or show that doing so would be futile.
Makayla A. Shannon
MISSOURI
In re Application of Osage Water Co., 51 S.W.3d 58 (Mo. App. 2001)
(holding because the city failed to give notice to Osage Water
Company of its petition forjudicial review of Public Service
Commission's decision to permit water company to provide water to
subdivision, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the cause).
This appeal arose out of a dispute over Osage Water Company
("Water Company") supplying water to the Parkview Bay Subdivision
("Parkview") in the city of Osage Beach, Missouri ("Osage"). Osage
had earlier approved a plan allowing the Water Company to supply
water to Parkview providing that the Water Company met certain
design standards set forth in the Code of Ordinances. A few months
later, Osage withdrew its approval stating that the water company had
failed to meet the design standards for the water franchise ordinance.
In response, the water company filed an application for a
"certificate of public convenience and necessity" with the Public
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Service Commission ("Commission") to provide public utility water
service to Parkview. The commission decided the water company was
not required to obtain the city's franchise or consent to provide water
to Parkview because the water company was not going to use public
rights of way to provide its service. Osage had chosen not to intervene
in the Commission hearings but later filed an application for
rehearing with the Commission. That application was denied and
Osage then filed a petition for writ of review in the circuit court.
Osage served a summons and copy of the petition to the Commission,
but not to the Water Company.
The circuit court awarded judgment to Osage. Thereafter, the
Water Company filed an application to intervene in the proceeding, a
motion to set aside the judgment, a motion to dismiss the petition for
review, or in the alternative, a motion for rehearing, based on the fact
they were not given notice of the action as an interested and effected
party under Rule 100.01, Mo. Ann. Stat. § 386.510 (West 2000).
The Court of Appeals of Missouri, Western District held the
statutory provision governing judicial review of the Public Service
Commission's orders or decisions was inadequate and constitutionally
defective as to the notice requirement, and had to be supplemented by
statute requiring notice to be served on all parties. The court
therefore quashed the order of the circuit court for lack of
jurisdiction.
SarahA. Hubbard
MONTANA
Collins v. Swinger, No. 01-157, 2001 MT 265N (Mont. Dec. 17, 2001)
(affirming district court's decision that an easement by implication was
created where there was (1) separation of title; (2) a long-standing,
obvious use before the separation, which shows that the use was meant
to be permanent; and (3) necessity of the easement for the beneficial
enjoyment of the land granted or retained).
Keith and Marie Swinger ("Swingers") appealed a decision of the
district court for the Fourth Judicial District in Missoula County,
Montana, granting Gary Collins' ("Collins") request for injunctive
relief, damages, and attorney's fees. The district court had ordered
injunctive relief to allow Collins access to his water rights to Hayes
Creek on the Swingers' property, by right of easement by implication.
The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed that decision.
In the appeal, the Swingers and Collins disputed two issues. First,
the parties disagreed over who owned water rights from Hayes Creek, a
tributary of the Bitterroot River in Missoula County. The second
dispute hinged on whether the Swingers interfered with Collins' ditch
easement from Hayes Creek and his secondary easement to reach the
ditch diversion point on the Swingers' property. The Montana
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Supreme Court immediately dismissed the water rights issue, as the
matter had already been litigated in In re Adjudication of Existing Water
Rights (Swinger v. Collins).
The court then moved to the central issue in this appeal. Collins
claimed he had a ditch easement across the Swingers' property and the
Swingers wrongfully interfered with that easement. The district court
found for Collins and the Swingers appealed. In affirming the district
court's judgment, the court first considered whether an easement by
implication actually existed over the Swingers' property. It then
reviewed whether § 70-17-112, MCA included easements by
implication. The court finally looked briefly at whether the district
court erred in adopting Collins' proposed findings of fact.
Collins' water right diverted from Hayes Creek by way of a ditch
located just within the Swingers' property. Until the early 1990s,
Collins accessed his diversion point through a gate in the Swingers'
fence at the north boundary of the Swingers' land. The Swingers
removed the gate in 1993 and told Collins he could no longer access
his diversion point. Since 1996, Collins has not been able to access his
diversion point and therefore has had no control over water flow to his
property. Before any dispute over water rights, the Swingers never
It had also already been
challenged Collins' easement claim.
established that Collins water right was senior to the Swingers' right.
Therefore, the court turned to whether an easement by
implication had arisen. An easement by implication arises where there
has been: (1) separation of title; (2) a long-standing, obvious use
before the separation, which shows that the use was meant to be
permanent; and (3) necessity of the easement for the beneficial
enjoyment of the land granted or retained. The court ultimately
found Collins satisfied each element.
Collins' and the Swingers' properties had been common
ownership from the 1920s until 1948. Collins' ditch was visible and
obviously in use when the property was severed in 1948; it has been in
continuous use since 1948. Since 1948, no deed in either parties'
chain of title evidences a desire to terminate or restrict the ditch use
rights of either Collins or his predecessors. These facts satisfied the
first two elements of an implied easement. The fact that Collins could
not access water for irrigation of his land satisfied the third element in
that it deprived him of the beneficial enjoyment of his land.
Therefore, the court found an easement by implication.
The court then turned to the Swingers' claim that § 70-17-112(4),
MCA's scope was limited to easements acquired by prescription or
conveyance. The court again agreed with the district court's holding
that the statute was not an exclusive list of the easements to which the
statute applied and was not limited to easements by prescription or
conveyance. Finally, the court held that where the district court's
findings of fact were based on substantial evidence and were not
clearly erroneous, the district court did not err in adopting Collins'
proposed findings of fact. The court affirmed the judgment of the
district court, awarded costs and attorney's fees to Collins and
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remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
ChristineEllison
Gaudreau v. Clinton Irrigation Dist., 30 P.3d 1070 (Mont. 2001)
(affirming the district court's holding that: (1) the Clinton Irrigation
District ("CID") had no duty to prevent flood waters caused by icejams
on the Clark Fork River from overflowing their irrigation system and
damaging Gaudreau's property; (2) CID exercised reasonable care in
the maintenance of its system; and (3) CID had no duty to warn
Gaudreau of flooding conditions so that they could protect their
property).
Appellants, Jeanne Gaudreau ("Gaudreau") and Jerry Montelius
("Montelius") operate a horse riding and boarding facility near
Clinton, Montana near the Clark Fork River. Upstream from the
Gaudreau facility, the Clinton Irrigation District ("CID") owns and
operates an irrigation ditch. A headgate on the CID system diverts
water from the Clark Fork River into a canal. Once waters enter the
canal, they are directed through a series of culverts under an interstate
highway and into a channel that runs adjacent to the Gaudreau facility.
On the evening of February 7, 1996, an ice jam formed on the Clark
Fork River downstream from the headgate, causing river water to back
up and flood the channel upstream from the Gaudreau facility.
Another ice jam formed on the channel, which caused overland
flooding of the area adjacent to the channel, including the Gaudreau
facility. After the flooding receded, significant damage was revealed to
real and personal property at the Gaudreau facility.
Gaudreau and Montelius sued CID in the District Court, Fourth
Judicial District, Missoula County, for negligence, trespass, and
nuisance. At trial, Gaudreau and Montelius abandoned the trespass
and nuisance claims and proceeded on the negligence claims. The
district court ruled in favor of CID. Gaudreau and Montelius appealed
to the Supreme Court of Montana asserting that the district court
erred in: (1) determining that CID had no duty to prevent flood waters
caused by ice jams on the Clark Fork River from overflowing the CID
system and damaging their property; (2) determining that CID
exercised reasonable care in the maintenance of its system; and (3)
concluding that CID had no duty to warn them of the flooding
conditions so that they could protect their property.
First, the supreme court noted that Gaudreau and Montelius'
reliance on a Montana statute governing the liability of water user
associations for damages stemming from improper maintenance was
misplaced because: (1) the statute did not apply to irrigation districts,
like CID; (2) it did not impose liability, but disclaimed liability by the
state; and (3) only applied to damages "occurring on the works," and
not property damages such as those Gaudreau and Montelius alleged.
As such, the statute did not support the existence of a duty by CID to
prevent flooding due to ice jams.
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Second, the Supreme Court noted that the primary factor in
determining whether an irrigation district owes a duty to a damaged
plaintiff is whether it was foreseeable that a district's acts or omissions
would pose a risk of injury to the plaintiff. According to the court,
testimony at trial clearly demonstrated that overland flooding from the
Clark Fork River generally and due to ice jams was uncommon. As
such, the risk of damage to the Gaudreau facility from overland
flooding from the Clark Fork River was not foreseeable. Therefore,
the Supreme Court held that CID had no duty to erect or maintain
flood control measures on their system to protect the Gaurdreau
facility.
Third, the Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the district
court that no evidence existed to suggest that CID failed to exercise
reasonable care in the maintenance of their system. According to the
Supreme Court, Gaudreau and Montelius were relying in their appeal
of this issue on evidence that was clearly controverted at trial. As such,
the Supreme Court held that CID exercised reasonable care in the
maintenance of its system.
Fourth, the Supreme Court noted that the precedent on which
Gaudreau and Montelius were relying to impose a duty to warn on CID
required CID to have foreknowledge of the hazard or to have created
the hazard. According to the Supreme Court, overland flooding due
to ice jams was already established as unforeseeable and was created by
a mix of circumstances out of the control of CID. As such, CID did not
have a duty to warn Gaudreau and Montelius of the overland flooding
due to the ice jams.
Matthewj Costinett
In re Deadman's Basin Water Users Ass'n, 40 P.3d 387 (Mont. 2002)
(holding that the district court erred as a matter of law when it
prohibited irrigation from Deadman's Basin Reservoir in a manner
contrary to the water purchase contract).
In 2000, Wiley Micks contracted with Deadman's Basin Water
Users Association to purchase the right to 775 acre-feet of water from
the Deadman's Basin Reservoir ("Reservoir"). Micks depended on the
water to irrigate his hay crop. The hay crop was important to
sustaining the animals at the genetic materials facility he operated.
The water purchase contract provided for a pro rata reduction in water
distribution in the event an inadequate amount of water existed to
satisfy the outstanding water purchase contracts.
On its own motion, the Fourteenth Judicial District Court,
Musselshell County, found that the water level in Deadman's Basin
Reservoir had reached "a critically low level." The district court
decided that the reservoir water should be used to maintain the
Musselshell River flow, which supplied domestic, municipal, stock and
wildlife water usage. On August 2, 2000, the district court issued an
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order effective August 12, 2000, through September 30, 2000, which
prohibited the irrigation of crops from the Deadman's Basin
Reservoir.
The district court's order contradicted the pro rata reduction in
water distribution set forth in section one of the Deadman's Basin
water purchase contract, and prevented Micks from irrigating his hay
crop. Micks continued to irrigate his hay crop with the reservoir water,
and the district court found Micks to be in violation of the order.
Micks moved the court to reconsider its August 2, 2000 order, issue a
temporary restraining order, and issue a preliminary injunction. The
district court denied the motion, and Micks appealed to the Supreme
Court of Montana. On appeal, the decision was reversed and
remanded.
Micks set forth two arguments to show why the August 2, 2000
order did not apply to him. First, he maintained that the water he
used to irrigate his crop came from a system that was not connected to
the Musselshell River. Second, Micks argued that the right to the
Reservoir water should not be appropriated to the municipality to his
detriment.
The district court's order contravened the terms in section one of
the water purchase contract. The Supreme Court of Montana found
that the district court erred when it made the determination that
domestic appropriation of the Reservoir water was a higher priority
than Micks' use for irrigation purposes. Because language of
contractual provisions should be interpreted according to its plain,
ordinary meaning, and because the language in section one of the
water purchase contract is unambiguous regarding the outstanding
distribution of water in the event there is an insufficient supply in the
Reservoir, the district court was bound to those terms as written.
Melissa L. Gordon
NEBRASKA
Jurgensmier Farms, Inc. v. Kearney Cty., No. A-00-564, 2001 WL
968062 (Neb. App. Aug. 28, 2001) (granting injunctive relief and
damages resulting from Kearney County wrongfully blocking a natural
drainageway by raising a county road).
Jurgensmier Farms, Inc. ('jurgensmier") brought this case on
appeal from a district court decision denying injunctive relief and
damages against Kearney County ("County"). Jurgensmier purchased
land ("property") for farming in 1967. In 1979, the county decided to
raise the county road that bordered the Jurgensmier Farm to the east.
At that time, Jurgensmier expressed concern that the raising of the
road would impede the natural drainage from the property.
After the county raised the road, Jurgensmier experienced water
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backing up in the Southeast corner of the property. Jurgensmier
attempted to have the county install a culvert to drain the excess water,
but the county refused. Jurgensmier then attempted to remove the
excess water by pumping the water through an irrigation line placed
over the road to adjacent lands. The county informed Jurgensmier to
cease this pumping and remove the line. Jurgensmier then asked the
County to bury the line, which the County refused to do.
Jurgensmier once again appealed to the County to install the
culvert before filing its complaint on November 20, 1997. The
complaint sought injunctive relief and damages from the county for
wrongfully blocking the drainageway from the Jurgensmier property,
which created a nuisance, loss of land use, and damage to crops. The
district court of Kearney Country held trial on December 1, 1999 and
entered a judgment for the county by finding Jurgensmier did not
meet its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that a
drainageway transversed the road before the road was altered, that a
drainageway formed and exited the property in a natural way, that the
drainageway carried water from a higher to a lower estate, and that the
County obstructed this drainageway.
Jurgensmier appealed this decision to the Nebraska Court of
Appeals claiming the district court erred in finding Jurgensmier was
not entitled to injunctive relief and damages as a result of the County's
interference with a natural drainageway, and by overruling its
rehearing request.
The court of appeals determined Jurgensmier had the burden to
establish every controverted fact necessary to entitle them to relief.
Additionally, the court of appeals determined an action for injunction
sounds in equity, and equity actions are de novo proceedings in front of
the court of appeals.
The court of appeals relied on Cruberv. County of Dawson in their
analysis of the district court's ruling. The analysis consisted of a test
through which it must be established that: (1) a natural drainageway
exists; (2) the natural drainageway traversed the road before the
alteration; and (3) the natural drainageway was obstructed because of
the road alteration. The court of appeals determined a natural
drainageway occurred in the present case as defined as diffused water
that concentrates and gathers in volume thereby losing its diffused
character and then flowing into a well-defined course. Undisputed
evidence determined the water was diffused water (defined as water
that appears on the surface with no permanent source or supply,
typically resulting from rainfall or snow melting) that flowed off the
Additionally, the court of appeals
property to the southeast.
determined Jurgensmier, through preponderance of the evidence,
established this natural drainageway existed before the alteration of
the road. Finally, the court determined the county has a duty to keep
a natural drainageway open, and, due to the road alteration, failed this
duty, causing obstructing to theJurgensmier's detriment.
The court of appeals concluded the district court erred in denying
the injunctive relief Jurgensmier sought, and remanded the case back

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

to the district court with directions. As a result, the court of appeals
did not address Jurgensmier's second issue regarding the district
court's alleged error in overrulingJurgensmier motion for a new trial.
William H. Fronczak
City of Lincoln v. Cent. Platte Natural Res. Dist., 638 N.W.2d 839
(Neb. 2002) (holding that the Department of Natural Resources'
decision to deny Saunders County the right to become a party to the
City of Lincoln's application to appropriate flows of the Platte River
was proper based upon the Department's factual determinations, and
that those factual determinations were not arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable).
The City of Lincoln sought to appropriate flows from the Platte
River for groundwater recharge.
An application for such
appropriation was made to the Department of Natural Resources in
September of 1993. Notice was published, which specified a deadline
of August of 1994 for filing objections. Several timely objections were
filed. These resulted in two compromises, which amended the
application by reducing the amount of stream flow requested. In
1999, more than five years after the deadline had passed, Saunders
County filed an objection. This action necessitated a hearing to
determine whether Saunders County could still become a party to the
application.
The Department of Natural Resources held that Saunders County
had failed to prove: (1) that it had a sufficient interest in the subject
matter to become a party; (2) that its participation would be helpful in
rendering a decision; and (3) that its participation at the time of filing
would not unduly disrupt or delay the proceedings. Noting that any
one of these failures alone would be a sufficient reason to deny
Saunders County's request, the Department of Natural Resources
refused to allow Saunders County to become a party to the action.
Saunders County appealed.
Appellate review of the factual determinations of the Department
of Natural Resources is limited to situations where those
determinations are arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. The court
held that this high standard of review had not been met in the instant
case. Ample evidence had been presented for the Department to
reasonably reach the conclusions it did, and the absence of certain
evidence (including drafts of the hearing officer's findings) was not
sufficient to make the Department's findings of fact arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable. The court then held that given these
findings of fact, denying Saunders County's request was an appropriate
application of the law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the holding of
the Department of Natural Resources.
James Siegesmund
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NEW HAMPSHIRE
KSC Realty Trust v. Town of Freedom, 772 A.2d 321 (N.H. 2001)
(holding spring water transport and sale are accessory to permitted
Rural Residential water storage use).
William and Carol Foord appealed the superior court's order
affirming the Town of Freedom Zoning Board of Adjustment's
("ZBA") decision to prohibit them from using their land to sell water.
The Foord's land contained spring canals releasing underground
water, which they first used residentially, but in 1987, when Mr. Foord
entered into a contract to sell water, they collected it in tanker trucks
and transported it from the property. The Town of Freedom zoned
the property as Rural Residential ("RR"), and thus, permitted its use
for "Water Recreation and Storage Facilities" under Zoning Ordinance
§ 304. In 1996, the town's Board of Selectmen ("Board") informed the
Foords that selling water was not a permitted use in RR districts. The
Foords appealed the decision to the ZBA, which held water sales were
not permitted within the Foords' zoning district, and the use was
neither nonconforming commercial, nor residential accessory. On
appeal, the superior court held water storage was a permitted use, but
its sale and removal were not.
The supreme court treated the ZBA's factual findings and
ordinance interpretation on these questions of law as prima facie
reasonable, noting its decision would be upheld unless evidentially or
legally unsupported. Zoning Ordinance § 304 is "permissive" in
structure, prohibiting land uses unless expressly permitted, or
accessory to a permitted principal use, and "subordinate to it." As
such, the town claimed sale and transportation were not accessory to
the statutorily permitted storage use, and therefore not allowed.
However, Zoning Ordinance § 901 permits some commercial uses for
water "storage facilities," within its definition as a place for
"commodities" and "merchandise." This definition contemplates the
water's later transport off the property and sale, evidencing the storage
facility's commercial purpose. Therefore, the court reasoned the
Foord's transportation and sale were incidental and subordinate to
water storage, and, thus, accessory to the permitted use.
Robert Lykos
NEW JERSEY
East Cape May Assoc. v. N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 777 A.2d 1015 (N.J.
2001) (holding there is no taking claim when a state agency deems
private property a protected wetland).
East Cape May Associates ("ECM") filed suit seeking damages after
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the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection ("NJDEP")
declared ECM land was a designated protected wetland. The trial
court found that ECM's taking claim was moot. As a result, ECM and
NJDEP appealed.
ECM owned a 100-acre undeveloped plot of land in the City of
Cape May. In accordance with the Coastal Area Facility Review Act
("CAFRA"), ECM applied for a permit in order to develop the tract.
NJDEP denied the permit based on the protected status of the land as
a wetland and as having an "exceptional resource value." ECM
subsequently filed suit against the State, claiming a taking had
occurred. The court sided with ECM, but remanded with direction to
address the State's denominator argument.
The court noted that the denominator is a tool "to determine
whether a taking has occurred. The court is charged with comparing
the ratio of the land subject to the regulation with the property
owner's entire property of 'the parcel as a whole'." After an extensive
fact investigation, this court found the property in question was not
one whole, but rather separate development of resources, therefore
the tract did not qualify as a "parcel as a whole" to be calculated in the
denominator equation.
The court also addressed whether the NJDEP had any authority to
make pre-permit deals without duly promulgated regulations. It found
that while an agency has broad discretion in its actions, the NJDEP
should act in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.
The court also found the provisions of CAFRA should not in any
way "be regarded as to be in derogation of any powers now existing
and shall be regarded as supplemental." Therefore, because the
primary issue in this case was freshwater, the NJDEP had state
regulatory power to "bargain" with ECM concerning allowed
development.
The court remanded the case to allow NJDEP to promulgate
regulations concerning amelioration issues, and to decide whether a
regulation will excessively burden private property interests. It found
there had been no taking in this case, temporary or otherwise, mainly
because the NJDEP was still optioning the owners to develop the site.
Though there was a delay in the application process, the court did not
find this "extraordinary," warranting a finding of taking.
ECM also brought a claim of breach of contract and damages,
arising out of a predecessor-in-title argument. The state originally had
title to the property. It transferred title to private parties in 1903 and
1907. The court found the Legislature, in enacting such programs as
CAFRA and the FWPA, made clear its intentions to solve generalized
environmental problems. As such, the court found the riparian rights
sold, "did not forever grant the landowners the right to fill the
wetlands on the eastern tract, free of all government regulation."
Anne Francis
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Lake Lookover Prop. Owner's Ass'n v. Olsen, 791 A.2d 270 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (affirming the lower court's decision to
allow the property owners' association to assess costs to property
owners for repair to the lake's dam, since the property owners have
easement rights to the lake).
Olsen and other property owners (collectively, "Property Owners")
appealed from an order by the Superior Court of New Jersey that
required them to share in the cost of repairing a dam on Lake
Lookover in which the Property Owners have easement rights by virtue
of the fact that their property surrounds the lake. Lake Lookover
came into existence in the 1920s when developers dammed a
watercourse and subdivided property around the lake into more than
100 home sites. With the conveyances of these properties came
easement rights to the lake.
In 1994, New Jersey's Department of Environmental Protection
("DEP") filed suit against the development company of the Lake
Lookover properties and the property owners' association
("Association") after attempting, since 1980, to direct the development
company and the Association to repair the dam. After several years of
negotiations between the DEP, the development company and the
Association, all three parties executed an agreement, which the
Superior Court of New Jersey approved on March 11, 1998. This
agreement, in which the development company conveyed the Lake
Lookover property to the Association, required all Property Owners to
contribute to the costs of repairing the dam. The agreement directed
the Association to inform all Property Owners of the agreement, which
the Association did on June 22, 1998.
After reaching the agreement, the Property Owners failed to pay
their apportioned cost of repair, and the Association filed suit. The
court held that the Association had the authority to make the
assessments in order to pay for the dam repair. The Property Owners
appealed, making two primary arguments.
First, the Property Owners wanted to abandon their easement
rights, which they argued, would eliminate their liability for assessed
repair costs. The appellate court determined that since the Property
Owners had enjoyed the rights of the easement, they could not simply
terminate those rights now. The court reasoned that allowing the
Property Owners to abandon their easement rights, and thus their
payment obligations, would harm other property owners and the lake
itself.
Second, the Property Owners claimed that the Association did not
have the right to assume the role of assessing repair costs. Again, the
court ruled in favor of the Association, and found that the Association
had the right to make assessments against the Property Owners. The
court stated that the Association maintained and repaired the lake
facility since the beginning of the Lake Lookover community.
Additionally, the Association took the lead role in the prior litigation
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with the DEP and the development company without the disagreement
of the Property Owners. These facts entitled the Association to assume
the role of assessing repair costs.
Stefania Niro
OREGON
Becker v. Pieper, 32 P.3d 912 (Ore. App. 2001) (holding the trial
court erred when it relieved respondents of a defaultjudgment against
them in suit for reformation of contract, declaration of water rights
ownership, and moneyjudgment for unjust enrichment).
Becker owned a ninety-acre parcel of land and the water rights to
that land. He intended to transfer the water rights from that land to
another parcel of land he owned before subdividing and selling the
ninety-acre parcel. He initiated a water rights transfer with the
Oregon Water Resources Department, and then sold the subdivided
parcels. Becker's initiation of the water rights transfer did not suffice
to sever the rights from the subdivided property. Unbeknownst to
Becker at the time, he conveyed the property's water rights to Pieper
and the other defendants (collectively "Pieper") because the contracts
for the sale of the land did not contain any language reserving the
water rights to Becker. When Becker learned of the unintentional
transfer of water rights to Pieper, he asked all the new property owners
for permission to complete the transfer of water rights as he intended.
All refused.
Becker filed suit for reformation of his sale contracts to Pieper,
declaration he was rightful owner of the water rights, and a money
judgment against Pieper on the theory of unjust enrichment. Becker
and Pieper entered into binding arbitration pursuant to the sale
documents. The arbitrator found in Pieper's favor and entered
judgment with the trial court accordingly. The trial court granted the
non-defaulting defendants' motion to dismiss Becker's suit for
reformation and declaratory judgment, and entered judgment in their
favor.
Seven defendants, respondents in the appeal ("Pieper et. al"),
failed to appear which resulted in Becker obtaining default judgments
against them. In addition to the defaultjudgment, Becker obtained an
"Acknowledgement
of
Reservation
of
Water
Right,"
("Acknowledgement") from four of the defaulting defendants, which
declared defendants "recognized and acknowledged that the
conveyance by which they purchased their lots reserved the
appurtenant water right to plaintiff."
Pieper et. al., upon learning of the favorable outcome of the nondefaulting
defendants,
including
those
who
signed
the
Acknowledgement, attempted to re-enter the case by moving for relief
from default judgments.
The trial court granted that motion,
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concluding Pieper et. al. were "in the same legal and factual situation
as the non-defaulting defendants." Becker appealed judgment in their
favor.
Becker contended on appeal the trial court's ruling placing Pieper
et. al. in the same position as non-defaulting defendants was error. He
asserted each defendant occupied a different and distinct legal
position with respect to the sales agreement for his or her lot, because
Becker negotiated each sale on different terms. Pieper et. al. argued
the trial court correctly concluded they were in the same position as
non-defaulting defendants, therefore they were entitled be
acknowledged in the judgment.
The court determined, "in the same legal position" means that the
grounds "on which a successful defendant prevails will necessarily
apply to a defaulting defendant with the same force and effect,"
meaning the same legal grounds would absolve defaulting defendants
of liability as a matter of law. The court concluded Pieper et. al. were
not in the same legal position as the co-defendants who "appeared and
prevailed in the arbitration." Becker alleged he or his agent notified
each defendant of Becker's intent to retain the water rights to the land
when the land transferred ownership. Further, Becker asserted the
non-defaulting parties who answered his complaint denied that
allegation, but Pieper et. al. admitted the allegation. The court agreed
with Becker. Therefore, the court concluded, all defendants were not
so similarly situated as to be in the same legal position as to their
defense against Becker's reformation and declaratory judgments, and
ordered reinstatement of the defaultjudgments against Pieper et. al.
Rachel Sobrero
PENNSYLVANIA
Redstone Water Co. v. PUC, No. 531 C.D. 2001, 2001 Pa. Conmmw.
LEXIS 789 (Penn. Oct. 30, 2001) (holding the Pennsylvania Public
Utility Commission ("PUC") lacks jurisdiction to issue orders based on
water quality disputes, and a lack in adequate water pressure is not
sufficient to uphold PUC orders).
Customers of Redstone Water Company ("Redstone") brought a
complaint citing their dissatisfaction with both water quality, and water
pressure. The customers testified before an administrative law judge
("ALJ") that the hardness of Redstone's water caused considerable
damage to hot water heaters and bathroom fixtures. Additionally,
customers testified the water had both an unpleasant smell and taste,
and had particles floating in it. Many refrained from washing clothing
in Redstone's water based on the fear the water would leave stains.
Finally, customers testified as to their dissatisfaction with Redstone's
water pressure.
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At the request of the Office of Consumer Advocate ("OCA"), an
expert gave testimony tending to support the customers' claims. The
expert explained the concerns regarding water quality were valid. In
order to reduce the hardness of Redstone's water, the expert
recommended either construction of a water treatment plant, or
mixing softer water from a nearby municipal authority with Redstone's
water in order to dilute it. With regard to water pressure, the expert
testified that Redstone did not comply with Pennsylvania Public Utility
On cross
Commission ("PUC") water pressure regulations.
examination, the expert admitted that in some ways his
recommendations were not practical, his analysis was based on
potentially inaccurate methods, and his water pressure calculations
were based on his "best guess."
Redstone's expert testified that water hardness is common in
western Pennsylvania, and stated that treating Redstone's water with
softer water might increase sodium levels potentially causing harm to
customers with circulatory problems. This expert also testified that
based on his findings, Redstone's pressure was within acceptable limits.
After weighing the expert testimony from both sides, the ALJ
determined Redstone failed to provide adequate water service in
violation of PUC code. Thus, the court ordered Redstone to conduct a
study to find the most practical method for bringing their water within
federal and state water drinking standards, as well as compliance with
water pressure standards. Redstone appealed to the PUC, which
affirmed the ALJ's holding. The PUG additionally required Redstone
to submit reports to the OCA every three months outlining its progress
regarding the engineering study, and apply for funding from the Small
Drinking Water Engineering Services program. Ultimately, Redstone
appealed.
Redstone argued regulation of water quality was outside the
jurisdiction of PUG, and, therefore, they should not be bound by
PUC's orders. Redstone further maintained jurisdiction over water
quality belongs to the Department of Environmental Protection
("DEP"). PUG argued an exception existed allowing for certification
of some water quality issues. However, this procedure was only
applicable where water quality was at issue in a case originally before
the PUG. Thus, the court held developing and implementing
procedures regarding drinking water standards is specifically vested in
the DEP.
Finally, the court deemed water pressure as a service, rather than a
quality problem. Redstone did not argue the PUG lacked jurisdiction
but rather was short of evidence to support its position that the water
pressure was inadequate. The court held PUC's position was based on
a "best guess," thus, there was a lack of substantial evidence, and PUC's
order with regard to water pressure must therefore be reversed.
Michael Sheehan
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TENNESSEE
City of Murfreesboro v. Pierce Hardy Real Estate, Inc., No. M200000562-COA-R9-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 767 (Tenn. App., Oct. 12,
2001) (holding determination of navigability is an issue for the trier of
fact; if a waterway is determined navigable, the riparian landowner is
not entitled to compensation for the portion of condemned land
below the low water mark because no private ownership rights in a
navigable waterway can exist).
The City of Murfreesboro ("City") condemned 2.36 acres of a 10.5acre commercial tract of land Pierce Hardy Real Estate, Inc. ("Hardy")
owned along the West Fork of the Stone's River. The condemned land
consisted of .61 acres in the riverbed and 1.75 acres along the
riverbank. Hardy's deed described the property as extending to the
center of the river. The condemned property included land at the
bottom of the river from the centerline to the riverbank, the riverbank,
and a strip across the top of the riverbank.
The City filed a motion to have the West Fork of the Stone's River
declared a navigable waterway, contending navigable waterways were
not entitled to private ownership; therefore Hardy was not entitled to
compensation for the condemned land. The City supported its
contention by asserting the United States Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps") determined the waterway was navigable and gave public
notice of that determination. In addition, the City argued, due to the
federal government's asserted jurisdiction over the river, it was
navigable. The trial court held in favor of the City, and stated the river
could neither be privately owned nor owned by the state. Hardy
appealed.
The court examined the Corps' determination that the West Fork
of the Stones River was a navigable waterway, and stated the
determination bound Corps activities, but not federal courts, and
therefore did not bind Tennessee courts.
While the Corps'
determination may be accorded "substantial weight," the court stated,
Hardy was entitled to introduce contrary proof.
No federal court had determined the West Fork of the Stones
River a navigable waterway. The court stated a determination of
navigability by the Corps for federal purposes did not equate to the
same finding for state regulatory purposes. "The federal government
has ... dominant control over navigable waters used in interstate
commerce for purposes and to the extent necessary to protect
interstate commerce." However, that control applies to the waterway,
not to ownership of the underlying soil. The court stated ownership of
the bed and banks of navigable waters is generally a matter for state
determination, subject to the United States' interest that they remain
accessible for interstate commerce and foreign commerce.
Navigable waters in the United States are public. Neither the state
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nor riparian owners can interfere with their use. When the United
States does not hold title to land upon which navigable waters lie,
ownership determination of the navigable waters and the soil beneath
them lies with states.
The court stated that the district court correctly identified the
elements of the test for navigability: "a navigable waterway of the
United States must (1) be or have been; (2) used to susceptible of use;
(3) in the customary modes of trade and travel on water; (4) as a
highway for interstate commerce."
Due to the lack of evidence on the navigability of the West Fork of
the Stones River, aside from the notice by the Corps, the court
reversed the ruling of the trial court and remanded for determination
by the trier of fact based on evidence relevant to that determination.
The court stated if the West Fork of the Stones River was
determined navigable, the riverbed was not subject to private
ownership. As a result, Hardy would not be entitled to compensation
of the condemned land below the low-water mark. In Tennessee,
grants of land along navigable streams extend to the low-water mark
only, and tide to the streambed remains with the state. If the waterway
is navigable, the soil covered by water and the use of the stream
belongs to the public. Therefore, any deed Hardy had only conveyed
property extending to the low-water mark.
Rachel M. Sobrero
TEXAS
Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., No. 00-0436, 2002 Tex. LEXIS 13
(Tex. February 14, 2002) (holding that the Edwards Aquifer
Authority's adoption of well-permitting rules falls within the exception
to the Property Rights Act for actions taken under a political
subdivision's statutory authority to prevent waste or protect rights of
owners of interest in groundwater).
Upon being denied a permit application for one of their two pecan
orchards, Glenn and JoLynn Bragg ("Braggs") brought suit against the
Edwards Aquifer Authority ("Authority") and its general manager.
The Edwards Aquifer Act ("EAA") created the Authority to manage
groundwater withdrawals from the aquifer through a permit system.
The EAA charged the Authority with carrying out the state legislature's
mandate of conservation. The legislature anticipated that an increased
withdrawal of water from the aquifer could cause a drought with
potentially devastating effects.
The issue in the case hinged on the Authority's adoption of rules
governing the issuance of well permits. The permit system gave
preference to "existing users," which the EAA defined as people who
withdrew and beneficially used the aquifer on or before June 1, 1993.
The Braggs only accessed the aquifer by means of a well on one of
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their orchards, Home Place, prior to 1993; they did not drill a well for
the other orchard, D'Hanis, until 1995. Based upon the fact that the
Braggs did not qualify as existing users for the D'Hanis orchard, their
permit application was denied. The Braggs brought suit because they
could not grow pecans in commercial quantities with the single permit
granted for Home Place.
The Property Rights Act ("PRA") provided for a cause of action for
real property owners if there was governmental action taken without
preparing a takings impact assessment ("TIA"). The Braggs argued
that pursuant to the PRA, the Authority was required to prepare a TIA
before promulgating rules governing aquifer permits, and before
applying those rules to the Braggs' pending application.
Since the PRA applied to "governmental entities," including
political subdivisions, and the Authority was considered a political
subdivision, the Braggs maintained that the Authority's promulgation
of rules constituted a government action that was subject to the PRA.
The trial court found the Authority's well-permitting rules and the
proposed actions on the Braggs' permit application were void because
the Authority did not prepare a TIA. The court of appeals vacated in
part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed.
The Supreme Court concluded that based upon the FAA, the
Authority was not required to prepare a TIA. The Court recognized
that the PRA applies to governmental entities when they make rules,
but exempts these entities from the requirement of a TIA when the
entity acts pursuant to its enabling statute in preventing waste or
protecting the owner's rights of interest in groundwater. Since the
Authority adopted well-permitting rules pursuant to the EAA, an
enabling act that gave the Authority all of the powers, rights and
privileges necessary to manage, conserve, preserve and protect the
aquifer and to prevent the waste or pollution of water in the aquifer
the PRA did not apply.
Melissa L. Gordon
VERMONT
Cmty. Nat'l Bank v. State, 782 A.2d 1195 (Vt. 2001) (holding an
interest in condominium property constructed on lake landfill is
subject to Vermont's public trust doctrine).
Community National Bank and Newport Harbor Club
Condominium Association (collectively "National Bank") appealed a
superior courtjudgment in favor of the State of Vermont ("Vermont").
The superior court concluded National Bank held the condominium
property subject to the Vermont's public trust interest, and the
property's diminution in value was insufficient to estop Vermont's
interest.
In 1986, National Bank constructed condominiums on filled lands
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that were once a part of Lake Memphremagog. It discovered, through
a prospective purchaser's tide search in 1969, the Vermont Water
Resources Board ("Board") had required a former owner to dredge a
portion of the lake bottom, and use it as fill for a Newport city
boathouse. The Board stated the order did not convey any tide or
interest to the landfill or to lands lying under public waters or waters
affected.
The current land owners, the Stevens, brought their
concerns to Reginald LaRosa, the Department of Water Resources,
and Environmental Engineering's operations chief. As a result,
LaRosa concluded the order had not required work done below the
low water mark and the state had no property interest.
In 1998, National Bank discovered the property was located on
filled land and reduced the units' appraised value. As such, it
commenced action against Vermont, seeking a declaration that the
public trust doctrine did not apply, or, alternatively, estopping
Vermont from asserting any interest in the property.
National Bank first argued the legislature had the power to
transfer public trust lands into private ownership free from state claim.
The court entertained the transfer idea but rather, required the state's
intent to abandon. The court ruled intent must be clearly expressed
or necessarily implied and statutes were interpreted in favor of
retaining public interest in tidelands. In the case at bar, the court
found no express or implied intent. The plaintiffs argued LaRosa's
declaration constituted Vermont's intent to hold no interest in the
condominium property. While LaRosa was in charge of managing the
State's public trust lands, the court ruled the legislature had not
delegated authority to LaRosa to abandon or convey into private
ownership all public trust lands.
Thus, National Bank alternatively argued Vermont was equitably
estopped from asserting the public-trust doctrine because the
diminished property values resulted in injustice, which required an
equitable remedy. However, the court found the injustice was not of
sufficient magnitude to justify estoppel. Thus, the court held the
equitable estoppel doctrine applicable to lands held in public trust.
Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed the superior court's decision.
Jon Hyman
WASHINGTON
Rothweiler v. Clark Cty., 29 P.3d 758 (Wash. App. 2001) (holding
Clark County did not have a duty to improve a drainage system, but
did have a duty to maintain the system's original efficiency; the County
was not liable for damages resulting from the system being
overwhelmed).
In June

1997, heavy rains overwhelmed a drainage system
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maintained by Clark County, Washington ("County"), resulting in the
flooding of the Rothweilers' home. Both parties agreed the flooding
resulted from an inadequate drainage system being overwhelmed by
extremely heavy rainfall. The Rothweilers sued the County for
negligence, negligent intrusion, nuisance, statutory nuisance, and
statutory negligence. The trial court granted the County's motion for
summary judgment, and the Rothweilers appealed.
On appeal, the County asserted both that a municipality had no
common law duty to drain surface water, and the common enemy
doctrine, which permits landowners the opportunity to dispose of
unwanted surface water with no liability for damages to one's neighbor
that may occur. However, this law has long been perceived as
inequitable by Washington courts, and as a result, exceptions to the no
duty rule have evolved. As such, the Rothweilers argued three
applicable exceptions.
The Rothweilers first sought relief under the "watercourse or
This exception asserts that a
natural drainway" exception.
municipality that dams a stream, gully, or natural drainway is not
shielded from the ensuing damage. However, the court found this
exception inapplicable because the drainage system the County
operated did not qualify as a natural drainway or watercourse. The
Rothweilers' second argument relied on the "collect and discharge"
This exception provides surface waters may not be
exception.
artificially collected and discharged on adjoining lands in quantities
greater than, or in a manner different from, the natural flow thereof.
However, the Rothweilers' expert witnesses were unable to support this
position with any material facts. Therefore, the court found there was
inadequate support for attempting to assert this exception. Finally,
the Rothweilers asserted the "due care" exception. This exception
requires landowners who alter surface water flow to act in good faith in
order to avoid unnecessary damage to others' property. However, the
County was able to successfully reject this assertion because the issue
did not involve a stream or natural drainway, nor does failing to drain
naturally accumulating water constitute altering the flow of surface
water.
The Rothweilers then attempted to attach liability for their
flooding damages by asserting that a municipality has a duty to
reasonably maintain its drains. This rule does not require a city to
modify its system over the passage of time. Rather, it requires a
positive duty to use reasonable care to maintain its original efficiency
once a city has adopted a particular plan. The County admitted the
drainage system was insufficient for handling the storm water that
flooded the Rothweilers' house. However, the County maintained it
was not liable for using an inadequate system because it was only
required to maintain the original efficiency of the system. As such, the
County produced evidence it had cleaned the drainage system six
months before the flooding. The Rothweilers were unable to produce
any evidence that the drain was clogged. Rather, evidence by both
parties reinforced the idea that the failure of the system was because of
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it being overwhelmed. The court thus held there was no duty for the
County to upgrade the system. The appellate court affirmed the
decision of the lower court finding no duty to drain surface water, and
a duty only to maintain the drain system, not to improve it.
Michael Sheehan
Tapps Brewing, Inc. v. City of Sumner, 22 P.3d 280 (Wash. Ct. App.
2001) (holding city imposed General Facilities Charges, billing
property owners for city storm drainage system improvements, valid).
Tapps Brewing, Inc., Daniel, and Andrea McClung (collectively
"Tapps") appealed the trial court's denial of summary judgment.
Tapps had challenged the imposition of a General Facilities Charge
("GFC") the City of Sumner ("City") imposed in order to improve the
City's storm drainage system. Under the City's scheme, the GFC is
imposed upon the issuance of property improvement permits, and is
based on the amount of impervious surface on the developed
property.
Tapps applied for a development permit to remodel its property,
and was charged $9,950 as a storm drainage GFC. The McClungs
replaced an existent building and paved a parking lot. The storm
drainage pipe running through McClung's property was too small;
therefore, the City required the McClungs to replace the pipe with a
larger pipe as a condition of the development permit. The GFCs give
the City authority to construct "systems of sewerage" by "control[ing]
the rates and charges for their use." The court found the statutory
language clear and unambiguous in legally authorizing the City to
impose the instant GFCs.
Tapps first argued the GFC was invalid because the City's power to
impose fees on land development was limited and any city "charges
must be proportionate to the cost of the system attributable to the
property being charged." However, the Court found the charges
imposed did not meet this proportionality standard.
Tapps then argued the City had "unlawfully discriminated against
them by requiring them to pay more than other customers." They
claimed the charges were disproportionately applied, in violation of
the statutory uniformity standard. Nonetheless, the Court refused to
hear this issue as it was not raised as a stipulation, and therefore was
outside of the scope of the Court's discretionary review.
Anne Francis
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WISCONSIN
In re Annexation of the Smith Prop. v. City of La Crosse, 634 N.W.2d
840 (Wis. App. 2001) (holding contiguous requirement in property
annexation did not require physical contact between dry land).
The Town of Campbell ("Town") challenged four City of La Crosse
("City") ordinances, which annexed certain properties from the Town
to the City. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Town.
In 1996 and early 1997, the City annexed four different properties
from the Town. The Black River separates the Town's properties from
the City. At no point do the dry lands of the City and the annexed
properties meet. The trial court determined Wisconsin Stat. §
66.021(2)(a) governed the annexations. The statute requires the
annexed property be contiguous to the City. The trial court
determined the annexed properties and the City were neither
touching nor close enough to be contiguous to validate the four
annexations.
The City argued the trial court erred in granting the Town's
motion for summary judgment because the borderline separating the
City and the Town lies at the center of the riverbed and the contiguity
requirement does not mean dry land must meet dry land. The Town
argued the body of water destroyed contiguity. In the absence of
statutory definition, the court relied on Webster's Dictionary to define
the term "contiguous." The court concluded "contiguous" included
properties in physical contact with one another and as such, the
annexing and annexed properties were in physical contact along the
riverbed.
The Town argued the state ownership of the submerged land
beneath navigable waters up to the high water mark caused a
separation between the City and the Town properties and therefore
could not be considered contiguous. The court disagreed. Thus,
while the state held this land in trust, it was subject to a riparian's
ownership of the center of the riverbed to the bank.
Jon Hyman
WYOMING
McTiernan v. Scott, 31 P.3d 749 (Wyo. 2001) (holding the State Board
of Control's decision that Scott abandoned water rights in 14.8 acres of
his property was not supported by substantial evidence, and the Board
did not have authority to order Scott to file a petition to change the
point of diversion and means of conveyance absent appropriate
findings of fact).
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Scott and McTiernan are adjoining landowners whose properties
were once owned in common. Both parties held water rights in Smith
Creek. Scott's water right was a territorial right with a priority date of
May 1882 and has number three priority on Smith Creek.
McTiernan's priority was number four.
In 1996, McTiernan filed a petition with the State Board of Control
("Board") seeking an order that Scott had abandoned a portion of his
water right. After a contested hearing in 1997, the Board concluded
that Scott had abandoned 14.7 acres of the Shellcross parcel. Scott
appealed to the district court. On certification from the district court,
the Wyoming Supreme Court held the Board's factual findings
regarding the irrigated acreage on the Shellcross parcel were
insufficient and remanded the matter to the Board. On remand, the
Board concluded that Scott had abandoned 14.8 acres of the
Shellcross parcel and ordered Scott to file a petition for change of the
point of diversion and means of conveyance with the Board. Scott
again appealed to the district court, which independently reviewed the
evidence. The district court concluded there was not substantial
evidence to support the Board's conclusion that 14.8 acres of the
Shellcross parcel had been abandoned, and found instead that only
9.2 acres had been abandoned. Furthermore, the district court found
there were no basic findings of fact to support the Board's order
requiring Scott to file a petition to change his point of diversion and
means of conveyance. McTiernan appealed to the supreme court.
The first issue presented to the supreme court concerned the
existence of substantial evidence. To find substantial evidence, the
supreme court must review the entire record to determine if there is
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept in support of
the agency's decision. The standard requires there be more than a
scintilla of evidence, although it dges not require that the proof
support only one conclusion to the exclusion of all others.
Furthermore, for evidence to be sufficient to allow a "reasonable
mind" to accept an agency's conclusion, there must appear in the
record evidence that allows either a definitive conclusion or a
reasonable extrapolation based on the surrounding circumstances.
The supreme court's review of the record led it to conclude that
the district court's decision regarding the abandoned acreage was
correct. Although the Supreme Court will defer to the Board's
specialized knowledge and expertise regarding water and irrigation, it
will overturn an agency's decision when it is clearly contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence on record. Occasionally, the
review process requires the reviewing court to assess the facts gathered
during the administrative hearing, but that assessment usually does not
involve reweighing or reconsidering basic facts found by the agency.
However, because of that process, the court may arrive at a different
conclusion from the agency. Such was the situation in this case.
After reviewing the record, the supreme court concluded the
evidence in the record did not support the Board's conclusion. It
found that the Board had ignored key evidence of irrigation activity on
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the Shellcross parcel showing extensive irrigation efforts by Scott
during July and August of 1996. As the supreme court stated, the
Board may have found this testimony not credible and unpersuasive,
but if so, it was incumbent upon it to articulate its reasoning in the
order. Ignoring relevant evidence adduced at a contested case
proceeding constitutes an arbitrary and capricious action. Thus, the
supreme court affirmed the district court's finding that 9.2 acres had
been abandoned.
The second issue involved the Board's order to Scott to file the
necessary petitions with the Board for changing the point of diversion
and means of conveyance and to identify the lands actually irrigated
under the appropriation. The Supreme Court affirmed the district
court finding that such an order required basic findings of fact
regarding when and who made changes in diversions and means of
conveyance. Without such information, the district court held that
Scott would not know how to respond to the Board's order. The
district court noted that if the Board simply meant Scott to identify his
point of diversion and means of conveyance without formal petition, it
had the power to require that action.
John A. Helfrich

COLORADO WATER RIGHTS APPLICATIONS
WATER COURT DMSION 1
APPLICATION FOR WATER RIGHTS, WATER STORAGE RIGHT,
CONDITIONAL UNDERGROUND WATER RIGHTS, CHANGE OF WATER

RIGHT AND PLAN OF AUGMENTATION, IN WELD COUNTY, COLORADO.

Case No. 2001CW182 (Water Division 1, Oct. 25, 2001). Applicant:
Eric Koolstra (Atty. P. AndrewJones, Lind, Lawrence & Ottenhoff
L.L.P).
1. Applications
Eric Koolstra ("Koolstra") seeks to expand the Koolstra
Aquaculture Facility ("Aquaculture Facility") by filing an application
for absolute and conditional water rights, absolute and conditional
storage rights, change of water rights, and plan of augmentation.
Koolstra operates the Aquaculture Facility, where water is diverted
from the Koolstra Seep and Drain Tile No. 1 ("Tile No. 1"), circulated
through four covered fish runs, and then directed to the Little
Thompson River with no consumptive use. Koolstra plans to expand
the operation to include uncovered runs at Koolstra Aquaculture
Facility Enlargement ("Facility Enlargement"), and a series of warm
water ponds ("Aquaculture Ponds").
Uses for the water include: aquaculture, irrigation, storage, fish
and wildlife, recreation, augmentation, and replacement. Separate
descriptions for each structure, reservoir, and change requested in the
application are detailed below.
The application for absolute and conditional water rights contains
eleven separate structures. Included therein are Tile No. 1, Tile No. 2,
and the Wells. Tile No. 1 is located at the SW1/4 of the NE1/4 of
Section 21, T.4 N., R. 68 W., 6th P.M., Weld County, Colorado. The
sources for Tile No. 1 are drain and seep waters accumulating in
Sections 17, 20 and 21, T. 4 N., R. 68 W., 6th P.M. Diversion of one cfs
from the drain tile and application to a beneficial use commenced
appropriation for an absolute water right on March 1, 1997. The
claimed amount of water from Tile No. 1 is used for irrigation of 126
acres in the NE1/4 of Section 21, T. 4 N., R. 6 W. 6th P.M.,
aquaculture, augmentation, and storage.
Tile No. 2 is located on the SE1/4 of the NE1/4 of Section 21, T. 4
N., R. 68 W., 6th P.M., Weld County, Colorado. The sources for Tile
No. 2 are drain and seep waters accumulating in Sections 21 and 22, R.
4 N., R. 68 W., 6th P.M. An engineering study commenced the
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application for one cfs of a conditional water right. The proposed use
for Tile No. 2 is the same in nature and location as the use for Tile No.
1.
Nine separate wells are proposed at a depth of fifty feet; drawing
1000 gallons per minute from tributary alluvium for aquaculture and
storage. Appropriation for the wells is initiated by the filing of this
application.
The next section of Koolstra's application proposes six separate
structures for absolute and conditional storage rights. The structures
include: the Home Pond, the Seep Pond, the Storage Pond, and the
Aquaculture Ponds. The reservoirs include: the Aquaculture Facility
and the Facility Enlargement.
The Home Pond is located in the SW1/4 of the NE1/4 of Section
21, T. 4 N., R. 68 W., 6th P.M., Weld County, Colorado. Sources for
the reservoir are the Big Thompson River, the Little Thompson River,
and drain and seep waters accumulating in the SW1/4 of Sections 17,
20, 21 and 22, R. 3 N., R. 68 W., 6th P.M. Diversion of one acre-foot,
absolute, with a right to fill and refill as in priority, of water was put to
beneficial use on August 1, 1997 for aquaculture, fish and wildlife,
recreation, augmentation, and replacement.
The Seep Pond is located in the SE1/4 of the NE1/4 of Section 21,
T. 4 N., R. 68 W., 6th P.M, Weld County, Colorado. Sources for the
reservoir are the Big Thompson River, the Little Thompson River, and
drain and seep waters accumulating in the SW1/4 of Sections 17, 20,
21 and 22, T. 4 N., R. 68 W., 6th P.M. Appropriation for one acre-foot,
conditional, with a right to fill and refill as in priority, commence
pursuant to an engineering study and filing of this application. The
amount claimed will be used for aquaculture, fish and wildlife,
recreation, augmentation, and replacement.
The Storage Pond is located in the NW1/4 of the NE1/4 of
Section 21, T. 4 N., R. 68 W., 6th P.M, Weld County, Colorado.
Sources for the reservoir are the Big Thompson River, the Little
Thompson River, drain and seep waters accumulating in the SW1/4 of
Sections 17, 20, 21 and 22, T. 4 N., R. 68 W., 6th P.M. Appropriation
for thirty-four acre-feet, conditional, with a right to fill and refill as in
sources are in priority, commence pursuant to an engineering study
and filing of this application. The amount claimed will be used for
irrigation of 126 acres in the NE1/4 of Section 21, T. 4 N., R. 68 W.,
6th P.M, and for aquaculture, augmentation, and replacement.
The Aquaculture Ponds are located in the NE1/4 of Section 21, T.
4 N., R. 68 W., 6th P.M, Weld County, Colorado. Sources for the
ponds are the Big Thompson River, the Little Thompson River, drain
and seep waters accumulating in the SW1/4 of Sections 17, 20, 21 and
22, R. 4 N., R. 68 W., 6th P.M. Appropriation for forty-two acre-feet,
combined, conditional, with right to fill and refill as sources are in
priority, commence pursuant to an engineering study and filing of this
application.
The amount claimed will be used for aquaculture,
augmentation, and replacement.
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The Aquaculture Facility is located in the SW1/4 of the NEI/4 of
Section 21, T., 4 N., R. 68 W., 6th P.M., Weld County, Colorado.
Sources for the ponds are the Big Thompson River, the Little
Thompson River, drain and seep waters accumulating in the SW1/4 of
Sections 17, 20, 21 and 22, R. 4 N., R. 68 W., 6th P.M. The
Aquaculture Facility comprises four covered fish runs, each run
measuring 120 feet by seven feet. Diversion of .5 acre-feet of water,
absolute, with right to fill and refill as sources are in priority, was put
to beneficial use on March 1, 1997 for aquaculture, augmentation, and
replacement.
The Facility Enlargement is located in the SW1/4 of the NE1/4 of
Section 21, T. 4 N., R. 68 W., 6th P.M., Weld County, Colorado.
Sources for the ponds are the Big Thompson River, the Little
Thompson River, drain and seep waters accumulating in the SW1/4 of
Sections 17, 20, 21 and 22, R. 4 N., R. 68 W., 6th P.M. The Facility
Enlargement comprises thirty-two fish runs, each measuring 120 feet
by ten feet. Appropriation for 5.5 acre-feet, conditional, with right to
fill and refill as sources are in priority, commence pursuant to an
engineering study and plan and filing of this application.
Koolstra seeks to change 4.5 shares of the capital stock of the
Handy Ditch Company out of the total outstanding 900 shares.
Koolstra proposes to change the use of the Handy Ditch shares from
irrigation use to irrigation, augmentation, storage, replacement, and
aquaculture uses. Return flow obligations associated with the Handy
Ditch shares are 15.58 acre-feet per year, distributed in varying
amounts throughout the year. A previous adjudication declared the
historic consumptive use of each Handy Ditch share to be 6.88 acrefeet. Koolstra's plan mandates releasing the amount of water
necessary to maintain historic return flows from the Handy Ditch
shares, when being delivered, or alternatively from Tile No. 1 and Tile
No. 2, the Storage Pond, the Seep Pond, the Facility Enlargement, the
Aquaculture Ponds, the Home Pond, and the Aquaculture Facility
directly to the Little Thompson River.
Koolstra proposes to use the Handy Ditch Shares changed by virtue
of the application to augment 26.88 acre-feet of out-of-priority
evaporative consumption occurring in the Aquaculture Facility
Enlargement, the Aquaculture Ponds, the Home Pond, and the Seep
Pond. During times of valid downstream senior call, Koolstra will
release fully consumptive use water in the amounts and at the time set
forth in a set distribution schedule directly to the Little Thompson
River to prevent any injury to other holders of vested water rights.
During the irrigation season, Koolstra will use the Handy Ditch shares
to make these releases. When the Handy Ditch is not delivering water,
Koolstra will release water from the Storage Pond.
2. Opposition
As of February 4, 2002, three Statements of Opposition have been
filed in response to Koolstra's application. The opposing parties
include: the State Engineer, the Thompson Water Users Association,
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and the Handy Ditch Company.
The Thompson Valley Water Users Association ("Association")
filed a Statement of Opposition on December 24, 2001 concerned that
the rights sought in Koolstra's application may injure the rights of
Association members and other water users. Additionally, the objector
proposed that any decree, if entered, contain appropriate provisions
for the release of all water stored out-of-priority. The Association also
requested that strict proof be required as to the amount of evaporative
loss and out-of-priority depletions, and that the reasonable
administration of applicant's augmentation plan meet the
requirements of strict proof; resulting in remediation of any injury
caused by applicant's out-of-priority diversions. Lastly, the Association
asked that the amount of consumptive use claimed in applicant's
Handy Ditch shares be substantiated.
On December 28, 2001, the State Engineer filed a Statement of
Opposition requesting that Koolstra: (1) quantify the historical and
consumptive use of the water right and provide terms and conditions
for dry-up of irrigated acreage; (2) maintain the historic flow regime;
(3) prove ownership of other entitlements to use the structure
claimed; (4) provide adequate engineering to verify claims made in
the application, including timing and location of historic return flows
and how claimed replacement sources will match the historic flow
regime; and (5) allow for development of adequate account and other
conditions to prevent injury to vested water rights.
The day of the State Engineer's filing, the Handy Ditch Company
advanced a similar objection, asserting that members of the Handy
Ditch Company along the Big Thompson River and its tributaries may
be adversely affected if the application is granted. Further, the Handy
Ditch Company asserted the requirements that Koolstra's (1) use of
the water should remain subject to operational control of the Handy
Ditch Company; and (2) should be limited in accordance with the
water rights' historical use, including a requirement that return flows
reasonably approximate historic return flow in amount, location and
timing.
Each Statement of Opposition included the right to raise
additional objections or otherwise amend their Statements of
Opposition as more information becomes available.
Kiowa K Engwis
CONCERNING THE APPLICATION FOR WATER RIGHTS OF THE CITY OF

GOLDEN, Case No. 98CW448 (Division 1 Water Court, June 2001).
Applicant: City of Golden (Attys. Glenn E. Porzak & StevenJ. Bushong,
Porzak, Bronwning &Johnson, LLC.)
1. Applications
On December 30, 1998, the City of Golden ("Golden") submitted
an application to the Division 1 Water Court ("water court") for water
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required for a championship white water course ("course") on Clear
Creek in Jefferson County. Golden is proposing to design, construct
and install eight dam structures and flow deflectors for the purpose of
controlling and concentrating the flow of Clear Creek to allow boating
(including kayaking, rafting and canoeing), piscatorial, and general
recreational beneficial uses. As part of the application, Golden claims
the following amounts of water per month on an absolute ("A") and
conditional ("C") basis: January 101 cubic feet per second ("cfs") A,
February 75 cfs A, March 96 cfs A, April 255 cfs A, May 836 cfs A and
164 cfs C, June 992 cfs A and 8 cfs C, July 768 cfs A and 232 cfs C,
August 559 cfs A, September 251 cfs A, October 143 cfs A, November
103 A, December 128 cfs A.
In addition, Golden also applied for water rights associated with
ten additional structures to be added to the course for the same
beneficial uses. The amounts of water claimed per month for this
extension are: January 101 cfs C, February 75 cfs C, March 96 cfs C,
April 255 cfs C, May 1000 cfs C, June 1000 cfs C, July 1000 cfs C,
August 559 cfs C, September 251 cfs C, October 143 cfs C, November
103 C, December 128 cfs C.
After submission of the application, Golden amended this
application by dropping their claim on the first structure in the course
and amending their claimed appropriations for the months ofJanuary,
February, March and December on both the existing and additional
courses to 70 cfs per month absolute.
2. Opposition
Statements of Opposition were filed by the following parties:
Colorado Water Conservation Board ("CWCB"), the State Engineer
("SEO"), Coors Brewing Company ("Coors"), Town of Idaho Springs
("Idaho Springs"), City of Arvada ("Arvada"), Board and County
Commissioners of the County of Clear Creek ("Clear Creek Board"),
Clear Creek Skiing Corporation, City of Westminster ("Westminster"),
and Town of Georgetown ("Georgetown").
Before trial, Arvada, Idaho Springs, and Coors all withdrew their
statements of opposition. Additionally, the Clear Creek Board, Clear
Creek Skiing Corporation, Westminster, and Georgetown entered into
stipulations with Golden and, thus, withdrew from the case.
Westminster stipulated that their primary diversion was downstream of
Golden's last proposed diversion structure. In the other three
stipulations, Golden agreed to subordinate up to 41 cfs of the course
water rights for the benefit of the upstream objectors.
Therefore, the CWCB and the SEO remained as the only objectors
to the application. The CWCB argued against the application because
the application's purpose was similar in nature to an instream flow
right. The SEO opposition disputes: (1) whether the water rights
sought had been applied to beneficial use in the amount and at the
time claimed; (2) the conditional water rights are sought in amounts
and times that cannot be placed to beneficial use; (3) the application
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is not capable of administration; and (4) the application seeks instream uses inconsistent with the Colorado Supreme Court Ruling in
Thornton v. City ofFort Collins.
3. Water Court Proceedings
In March 2001, the water court held a hearing on Golden's
application. The water court determined the amount of water
diverted and controlled by the existing structures within the course
were both reasonable and in conformance with Thornton. Unrebutted
testimony and evidence indicated the design capacity of the diversion
structures supported the claimed diversion amounts, and the diversion
structures controlled, concentrated and directed the flow of the water
through the course constituting a diversion as required under C.R.S. §
37-92-103(7).
The water court stated recreational use is a recognized beneficial
use within Colorado. The water court determined most of the water
claimed by Golden was put to beneficial use, and the conditional
portions of the existing course can and will be diverted in a reasonable
amount of time. Evidence indicated this course is economically
beneficial to Golden, and boaters of all skill levels at the claimed flow
rates can use the course. However, the water court determined that
Golden was only entitled to an absolute decree for those flow rates that
have been put to beneficial use by the boaters. Insufficient data was
provided to support that all the diversions within the course were put
to beneficial use. Therefore, the water court reduced Golden's
absolute water right claims, while increasing their conditional water
right claims. Furthermore, the court also made a distinction between
daytime, nighttime uses of the course, and determined nighttime uses
were still in the planning stages and should be considered conditional.
The water court also ruled on two additional points raised by the
SEO and the CWCB. First, the court determined Golden had no
intent to export water outside Colorado.
Undisputed evidence
indicated major industrial, municipal and agricultural diversions
existed downstream of Golden, which would use and reuse this water
up to seven times before the water exited the state at the
Nebraska/Colorado state line. Finally, the water court determined,
pursuant to the Board of County Commissioners and Aspen Wilderness
Workshop v. Colo. Water Conservation Board decisions, Golden's
constitutional right to appropriate new water in accordance with
Colorado law may not be denied or limited due to public policy.
William H. Fronczak

CONFERENCE REPORT
THE 20TH ANNUAL WATER LAW CONFERENCE
GROWTH AND SCARCITY: MANAGING WATER TO AVOID
CONFLICT
San Diego, California

February 21-22, 2002

The 20th Annual Water Law Conference provided two days of
discussion focused on the rising tensions, especially in the West,
between the ever increasing growth of water demand and the equally
increasing scarcity of water to meet that demand. Among the
highlights of the conference was a celebration of twenty years of water
law conferences, an in-depth look at the Klamath Basin crisis, an
examination of the issues surrounding federal Indian reserved rights
to groundwater and a look at the water resource issues in New York
City before and after the World Trade Center tragedy.
DAY ONE
SESSION ONE-FIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE ALLOCATION OF SCARCE
WATER RESOURCES

This discussion, moderated by Douglas MacDougal of Schwabe,
Williamson & Wyatt based in Portland, Oregon, included five speakers
who each addressed the allocation of water resources for varying
needs. The Water Law Review's own advisory board member Hamlet
"Chips" Barry, Manager for Denver Water, provided insight on the
allocation of water resources for cities. Mr. Barry addressed the issue
of water supply versus demand in metropolitan Denver and
throughout the urban West. Mr. Barry also discussed various
allocation methods and theories as well as the flaws, both real and
perceived, of all allocation systems.
Tom Birmingham the General Manager of the Westlands Water
District, Fresno, California, provided a perspective on water allocation
for agriculture. Specifically, Mr. Birmingham discussed the policy
issues arising from a proposal to retire up to 200,000 acres of land in
the Westlands District from irrigated agriculture as a means of
balancing demand with supply. Mr. Birmingham noted that land
retirement is a means of dealing with the scarcity of water resources
that was once considered taboo. However, the Westlands District views
land retirement of a substantial area it controls as "an innovative
means of dealing with two significant issues, drainage and water
supply."
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The third speaker on Thursday morning was Steven T. Miano of
Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, LLP from Philadelphia. Mr. Miano
looked at the allocation of water resources to maintain water quality.
Among the topics addressed were a historical perspective on water
quality, the Clean Water Act's regulatory approach, and what states
must do to maintain water quality.
Mason D. Morisset, of Morisset, Schlosser, Ayer &Jozwiak, Seattle,
Washington, provided a perspective on water resources for Native
American tribes. Mr. Morisset gave an overview on the Winters
Doctrine and the scope of tribal reservation water rights. Also
discussed was the trust responsibility of federal agencies to Native
American tribes and federal compliance with NEPA and tribal rights.
Before a short break, we heard from Rachel Paschal Osborne who
discussed various efforts to restore and protect instream flows for the
benefit of fish in Washington State. In particular, Ms. Osborne
provided insight on trends in instream flow protection, different
restoration mechanisms, water transfers and water markets, and the
future of river and stream restoration in Washington.
SESSION TWO-THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN: THE CHALLENGE OF
RECONCILING MIXED MISSIONS

Session Two addressed the Klamath River Basin crisis where
drought, Endangered Species Act issues, and the over-allocation of
limited water supplies created serious impacts on agriculture and
wildlife interests. Years of litigation and mediation efforts have done
little to resolve the issues surrounding the Basin. This session,
moderated by Martha 0. Pagel, Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, looked
at whether the mixed missions and goals of agencies, tribes and users
in the Basin have to be better understood before a solution is possible.
The first speaker was Meg Reeves, the Deputy Director of the
Oregon Water Resources Department. Ms. Reeves described the
Oregon adjudication process generally, the specifics of the current
Klamath Basin Adjudication and other related mediation proceedings.
Ms. Reeves also discussed the activities of the Oregon Water Resources
Department in the Basin.
Paul S. Simmons, Somach, Simmons & Dunn, Sacramento,
California, spoke about the Klamath Irrigation Project and the various
legal and regulatory issues surrounding the water shortages and
drought of 2001. Mr. Simmons also looked at the issues likely to
influence the availability of water in future years. Among these issues
are pending litigation, future administrative and/or legislative action,
and the potential success or failure of dispute resolution processes.
Carl Ullman provided insight on the water rights of the Klamath
tribes. Mr. Ullman looked at the crisis outside of the common "fish vs.
farmers" clash in which the crisis is often portrayed, and discussed the
many tribal and non-Indian communities that are involved and
affected by the issues surrounding the Klamath Basin.
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Finally, Sue Ellen Woolridge, Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of
Interior, described the Basin's ecological diversity and gave an
overview on the various species of wildlife found in the area. Ms.
Woolridge also discussed the Klamath Project crisis from the
perspective of the Department of Interior. Remarking on the lack of
effective collaboration between the Department and tribal interests in
regard to Indian water rights in the Basin, Woolridge mentioned that,
"tribes are so hardened by pain and anger that they are unwilling to
work for creative solutions." Woolridge mentioned that environmental
groups active in the area must also accept a degree of blame for the
present impasse because "they are bent on serving their interests
regardless of the human costs."
LUNCHEON WITH KEYNOTE SPEAKER: RODERICK E. WALSTON, DEPUTY
SOLICITOR, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

This years keynote speaker was Roderick E. Walston, the newly
appointed Deputy Solicitor of the Department of Interior. Mr.
Walston began his speech by giving a brief overview of the Office of
the Solicitor including a look at the history of the office and his role as
Deputy Solicitor. Mr. Walston then addressed two major issues
affecting his office: the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), and Tribal
water rights.
Mr. Walston initially remarked that species not even heard of when
the Water Law Conference first began twenty years ago are now crucial
factors behind many water allocations. The Deputy Solicitor then
noted the contrast between critical determinations made under state
clean water acts, which often balance competing factors, axid the ESA,
which makes its determination that a species is endangered or
threatened solely on the basis of the best available scientific evidence.
Mr. Walston observed that a natural outgrowth of this is that many
issues currently in litigation regarding the ESA go to the validity of the
science used to determine critical habitat.
Mr. Walston observed that environmental groups were winning
court battles over the ESA regarding "timing issues." For example,
courts are rejecting the, Fish and Wildlife Service's policy of delaying
determinations regarding habitat designations and instead creating
deadlines for the Fish and Wildlife Service. On the other hand, Mr.
Walston did believe that developers and other similar interests were
gaining ground by making various state and federal agencies consider
economic factors when making their decisions.
Mr. Walston then turned to the issue of Indian water rights. After
a brief review of the history behind the Winters doctrine and Indian
reserved water rights, Mr. Walston outlined the policy under which his
office operates in regard to Indian water rights. The Office of the
Solicitor favors negotiated settlements as opposed to "time consuming"
adjudications. Furthermore, Gale Norton's four "Cs," consultation,
cooperation and communication in the service of conservation, drive
the office's handling of all negotiations.
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Mr. Walston concluded his speech with optimism as to the
Department of Interior's future involvement regarding both ESA
issues and Indian water rights. Mr. Walston also concluded with the
belief that national interests should prevail, but that state and local
governments need to be heard and that there is room for both
interests.
BREAK-OUT SESSION ONE--PRACTICE SKILLS: DISCLOSURE, DISCOVERY
AND SETTLEMENT IN COMPLEX WATER LITIGATION

In this first break-out session, the panelists discussed three aspects
of water law litigation that are seldom addressed, yet essential to
effective practice in the field.
From her prospective as a practitioner in Idaho, Josephine P.
Beeman led off the session with an overview of disclosure
requirements in water litigation. Beeman noted that although Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) (1) demands mandatory disclosure of
non-requested information, many federal district courts have chosen
to opt out of the initial disclosures requirement. Beeman also noted
that in a review of the procedural rules in the western states, only
Arizona, Colorado, and Utah follow the mandatory disclosure
requirements of Federal Rule 26.
To demonstrate how water
practitioners have faced disclosure challenges in states without
mandatory disclosure, Beeman detailed Idaho's Eastern Snake Plain
Aquifer dispute between surface- and groundwater users.
John B. Draper continued the session with a lecture on discovery in
water litigation. Referring to recent technological advances in the
field, Draper's discourse focused on the unique challenges litigants
now face in water litigation, and how to confront them. In particular,
Draper addressed the growing use of data bases, FTP servers, and
special software in order to satisfy water litigation discovery
requirements. Draper acknowledged that while these new mediums
allow for more efficient discovery on one hand, they nevertheless
present problems such as inflated expenditures and technology
sharing obstacles.
The session closed with a lecture on settlement in water litigation
given by Hank Meshorer of the United States Department of Justice.
Mr. Meshorer noted the natural propensity of water litigation to lead
to a polarization of the parties involved. In order to foster settlement
and avoid extended litigation in water cases, it is advisable for the
central parties to restrict the involvement of peripheral interests in the
settlement discussions. Environmental groups, in particular he said,
often make settlement difficult. When settlement is achieved, Mr.
Meshorer concluded, the agreement should be fair to all the parties,
legally sufficient to the degree that the agreement would not spur
litigation, and final, insomuch as it will require no further judicial
action.
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BREAK-OUT SESSION Two-ETHICS AND THE UNITARY GOVERNMENT:
THE FEDERAL LAWYER AND HER CLIENT, AND CONSIDERATIONS OF THE
PUBLIC GOOD
The Session Two panel reviewed some ethical issues that tend to
arise among federal attorneys. Specifically, the panel spoke about: (1)
the not-uncommon situation where multiple agencies' authorities are
in conflict; (2) attorney representation of Indian tribes following
federal employment; and (3) the conflicts between the public duty and
client loyalty.
Jeffrey P. Minear of the Solicitor General's Office led off the
session. He addressed "the legal and ethical issues that are implicated
in litigation and water negotiations when one federal agency has
regulatory or quasi-judicial authority over another."
The second speaker was V. Heather Sibbison. Sibbison is a former
federal attorney who now represents Indian tribes. She addressed the
unique problems that normally arise when federal litigators choose to
discontinue their government employment. While federal statutes
create many post-employment prohibitions, Sibbison noted that
federal Indian Law practitioners are generally exempt from these
prohibitions under the Indian Self Determination Act and Education
Assistance Act of 1975.
Clive Strong's lecture on the federal theory of the unitary
executive concluded the session. This theory posits that a dispute
between two agencies of the Executive branch does not amount to a
"case or controversy" within the Constitution's Article III jurisdiction
for federal courts. Strong discussed the variety of approaches the
states have taken to role conflicts where this theory is applicable.
BREAK-OUT SESSION FOUR-FEDERAL INDIAN RESERVED RIGHTS TO
GROUNDWATER
Professor Robert Anderson from the University of Washington
School of Law began the session by giving a legal overview of Indian
Water Rights. Anderson revisited the creation of the Winters doctrine,
in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
He noted the
doctrine's consequence in establishing Indian reserved water rights.
Anderson then discussed the significance of the 1952 McCarran
Amendment, which allows the United States to be a defendant in a suit
aimed at the adjudication of a water right. Finally, Professor Anderson
reviewed Indian water rights settlement issues as presented in 55 Fed.
Reg. 9223 (Mar. 12, 1990).
Harley R. Harris next offered a state and private perspective on
federal Indian reserved rights to surface and groundwater. In regard
to surface water, Harris pointed out that the state's legal regime is
generally paramount; a state's adoption of the riparian, prior
appropriation, dual, or permit system will usually control the
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adjudication of a surface water right. Rights to groundwater, however,
are often scrutinized within the confines of common law principles
such as that of reasonable use. Turning to federal reservdd rights,
Harris noted that numerous federal and state courts have decided the
extent of such rights under varying circumstances.
This, he
concluded, has led to the vague and open-ended nature of the
doctrine of Indian reserved water rights.
Scott B. McElroy, of Boulder Colorado concluded the session with
an examination of the present enforcement approach to reserved
tribal water rights to groundwater. McElroy focused on two recent
cases that came before the Arizona Supreme Court; Gila III and Gila
IV He noted that the Gila IV decision confirmed the notion the
United States Supreme Court originally expressed in Arizona v.
California that reserved rights must "satisfy the future as well as the
present needs of the Indian Reservations." Gila III, he went on to say
affirmed that groundwater may be set aside under the reserved rights
system. The court was clear that whether the water source involved is
underground or above ground is not a determinative factor.
DAY TWO
SESSION ONE-100 YEARS OF U.S. RECLAMATION: DEALING WITH
SCARCITY AND GROWTH '- PERSPECTIVES OF THE CURRENT AND
FORMER COMMISSIONERS OF RECLAMATION

For the opening panel discussion on Friday morning, the current
Commissioner of Reclamation and three former commissioners came
together to discuss the successes and failures of reclamation over the
years, and to discuss the future of the agency. Joining the panel was R.
Keith Higgenson, appointed in 1977, Dennis B. Underwood,
appointed in 1989, and the current commissioner, John W. Keys III.
President Bush, the elder, appointed Mr. Underwood as
commissioner in 1989. According to Mr. Underwood, this was a
period of confrontation between the new Republican President and
Democratic controlled Congress, the beginning of a multi-year
drought affecting the West, a period 'of growing conflict between
environmental and economical interests, and a time of uncertainty for
the Bureau of Reclamation and its employees. Mr. Underwood
responded to the issues facing his agency by preparing a
comprehensive strategic plan for the Bureau, enhancing human
resources development, and establishing a corporate sense and
business practices.
The next speaker was Mr. Higgenson who shared his recollections,
as well as a splendid video show on the Bureau's "most significant
failure:" the breakdown of the Teton Dam in Idaho on June 5, 1976.
Mr. Higgenson showed the audience video footage that chronicled the
leaks leading up to the Teton Dam's eventual failure. The Dam's
failure resulted in the emptying the reservoir of about 250,000 acrefeet of water in five hours, cost eleven people their lives and resulted in
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the payment of more than $322 million in damages.
Finally, Mr. Keyes provided perspective and insight on his lifetime
career in the Bureau. Mr. Keyes had spent time working for all the
previous speakers on the panel, retired and then returned to
reclamation to serve as commissioner. Mr. Keyes focused on the need
to build consensus rather than conflict for the Bureau to succeed in
the future.
SESSION TWO-LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE OF WATER MANAGEMENT:

SELECTED BASIN ISSUES

The conference's final session provided examples of approaches to
future water management in two vastly different regions: southern
Nevada and New York City.
Kay Brothers of the Southern Nevada Water Authority began with a
presentation on southern Nevada's growing water needs.
Her
presentation focused on the tremendous population growth in the Las
Vegas area throughout the twentieth century. This unanticipated
growth, Brothers observed, has forced the state to tap into
unanticipated water resources. The most significant of these resources
has been the Colorado River, which was not originally slated as a water
source for the region. Brothers gave a brief overview of the Law of the
Colorado River, touching on every legal device governing the river
from the 1922 Colorado River Compact, to the 1974 Colorado River
Basin Salinity Control Act. While Nevada's apportionment of the
Colorado is still far less than that of other dependent states, the
Southern region's population continues to grow at an inordinate rate,
creating a concurrent growth in reliance on Colorado River water.
Mark D. Hoffer, general counsel for the New York Department of
Environmental Protection, concluded the conference with his
perspective on the New York City Watershed Memorandum of
Agreement ("MOA") of 1997. He first detailed the history of the three
supplies serving the city and the city's distribution system. Next, Mr.
Hoffer discussed the challenges new federal drinking water regulations
presented to updating these systems. While the City began to fashion a
watershed protection program in 1990, it met with opposition from
the watershed communities. The state became involved in 1995, and
ultimately produced the MOA, which summarizes a consensus between
the City and the watershed communities. The final MOA has five basic
elements aimed at fulfilling federal law: (1) watershed land acquisition
by the City; (2) new, updated City watershed rules and regulations; (3)
City funding of watershed protection and partnership programs; (4)
creation of watershed protection and partnership council; and (5) new
filtration avoidance determination.
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